Not All in the Same Boat

What Russia Wants at COP-30

Сlimate and environment analyst at Arctida, is attending the UN international climate conference in Belém. The organizers themselves call this year’s conference—the 30th in the series—a “turning point.” In her column, she reflects on what the conference is for, whether it can influence Russia’s actions, and why the Arctic is not mentioned at COP at all.

The UN climate conference focuses on vulnerable regions of the Global South, leaving the Arctic outside the frame. For its part, Russia also ignores climate risks in the Arctic, deliberately refusing to take actions that would actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

For two weeks, Brazil’s Amazon region will be crowded with events: tens of thousands of people arrive for international climate negotiations. Delegations of the Paris Agreement parties participate in official negotiation processes and represent their countries at pavilion events. Journalists from all over the world document the conference.

Civil society observers are drawing attention to the hottest issues: the critical lack of measures to reduce fossil fuel extraction and combustion, as well as ongoing attempts by developed countries to dodge their historical responsibility for the climate crisis. There are also concerns about the unfair distribution of efforts to finance adaptation to the negative impacts of climate change, such as extreme weather events.

Civil society representatives also emphasize the need to listen to and meaningfully include local communities and Indigenous Peoples in decision-making, and to focus particular attention on the most vulnerable countries, which are already suffering immense losses from climate impacts.

As if out of habit, Russia has arrived at COP30 in the last carriage of the climate-action train. Russia ratified the Paris Agreement at the last minute—four years after it was adopted at COP21. This year, on the eve of COP30, Russia announced a new emissions reduction target: to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 33–35% compared to 1990 levels.

In reality, this target allows Russia to increase its emissions. In 1990, annual CO₂ emissions—including forest absorption—were around 2.4 billion tons. Because of the economic crisis, Russia’s emissions fell sharply after 1990 and remain far below the level the country uses as a reference point for its climate pledges. In 2023, Russia’s emissions amounted to 911.1 million tons CO₂-equivalent including forests—already 37.5% of the 1990 level.

This means that simply by increasing its emissions from today’s baseline, Russia has effectively already “achieved” 62.5% of its stated 33–35% reduction target.

The “critical insufficiency” of Russia’s national climate policy also lies in the fact that the country has no plans to phase out fossil fuel extraction, combustion, or exports—and continues to promote natural gas and nuclear energy as low-carbon solutions, despite numerous contradictions.

Instead of real climate action, Russia continues to expand industrial development in the region, treating the Arctic as a strategic resource base. Developing northern oil and gas fields is one of the top priorities of Russia’s hydrocarbon sector. According to the Strategy for Developing the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation until 2035, the region is set to host new oil and gas provinces and fields with hard-to-extract reserves—both pathways fundamentally incompatible with limiting warming to 2°C.

And to transport these fossil fuels to consumers, Russia wants to expand the Northern Sea Route—a key shipping artery through the Arctic Ocean, where most cargo consists of coal, oil, gas, and petroleum products. Increasing human presence and industrial activity in the Arctic promises more greenhouse gas emissions, environmental pollution, and heightened risks of industrial accidents.

The situation in the Russian Arctic is further complicated by the fact that after 2022, international scientific projects withdrew from the region; independent organizations stopped working for various reasons. Russia’s effective withdrawal from cross-border cooperation and data exchange significantly hinders international research needed to analyze and forecast Arctic climate conditions. Meanwhile, Russia’s environmental and climate policy for the Arctic is becoming increasingly “sovereign.”

With no need to align itself with international regulations—such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism—Russia focuses on its own interests, continuing to promote natural gas as an “alternative low-carbon” fuel, nuclear power as “zero-carbon,” and hoping to balance emissions through forest absorption. This is why the country regularly recalculates the absorptive capacity of ecosystems, hoping to achieve carbon neutrality on paper.

The international climate agenda often overlooks the Arctic as a climate-vulnerable region because UNFCCC rules allow only countries to be classified as vulnerable.

Russia is designated as a country with an economy in transition—somewhere between a developed and developing country. As a result, it is neither required to contribute to climate funds nor eligible to receive financial support for energy-transition, adaptation, or loss-and-damage projects.

There are 14 such countries in Annex I of the UNFCCC, all from Eastern and Central Europe and the former USSR—economic systems that in 1990, when the classification was adopted, were undergoing the collapse of the Soviet Union and transitions to market economies.

Other Arctic states—Norway, Sweden, Canada—are classified as developed and must contribute to climate funds supporting developing countries. They themselves are not eligible for such assistance, based on the assumption that they have the resources to develop and implement risk-reduction and adaptation measures.

However, the Arctic is one of the most climate-vulnerable regions on the planet; moreover, 65% of the Russian Arctic sits on permafrost. The Arctic is warming three to four times faster than the global average, intensifying climate risks.

Thawing permafrost, damage to urban, industrial, and transport infrastructure, coastline erosion from storms, ecosystem degradation, heatwaves, and wildfires—these are only some of the climate crisis impacts the Arctic is already experiencing.

As a result, in global climate negotiations, Arctic territories and local communities are not just underrepresented—they are effectively ignored, excluded from dialogue and decision-making. This is why Arctic states must take joint action to protect Arctic ecosystems, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, ensure effective adaptation for the most vulnerable areas, and exchange scientific data to improve climate-risk forecasting and safeguard the region’s future.

Moreover, the Arctic must be incorporated into the international climate agenda as a vulnerable region. Without joint efforts by Arctic states and meaningful Russian participation in real climate action, the Arctic will remain stranded on a melting ice floor while other vulnerable regions travel together in the same boat, fighting to save their homelands.