Peace on The Aggressor's Terms: Why Ukrainians see concessions to Moscow as futile

Almost 90% of Ukrainians are convinced that any potential peace agreement and cessation of hostilities would amount only to a pause before a new Russian attack. For this reason, 60% of those surveyed believe that concessions made to secure peace are meaningless and merely provoke the aggressor. At the same time, around 30% while harbouring no illusions about a renewed Kremlin offensive nonetheless consider negotiations and a peace agreement necessary, arguing that Ukraine lacks the resources to continue a war of attrition.

Concessions are seen as possible and meaningful only if Ukraine receives genuine security guarantees. However, most existing formats for such guarantees have today been heavily devalued by the actions of Western powers themselves. In these circumstances, many Ukrainians consider the development of Ukraine’s own nuclear weapons to be the most reliable guarantee. It was precisely the possession of nuclear weapons that enabled Vladimir Putin to manipulate Western governments, limit their assistance to Ukraine, and thereby undermine trust in the reliability of alliances, including NATO.

Today, only about 25% of surveyed Ukrainians consider NATO membership guarantees to be fully reliable, while a further 25% do not believe in them at all. In the absence of a nuclear option, the most acceptable scenario appears to be a combination of NATO membership with the intensive development of Ukraine’s own armed forces and their stable financing. The simultaneous renunciation of NATO membership and the introduction of restrictions on the development of the Ukrainian army are seen by Ukrainians as an invitation to Putin to launch a new act of aggression.

This autumn, 38% of those surveyed acknowledged the possibility of territorial concessions for the sake of achieving peace quickly, while 56% rejected this idea. However, follow-up questions show that such concessions are understood primarily as freezing the conflict along the current front line and refraining, for the time being, from retaking territories by military means. Legal recognition of Russian occupation or the transfer to Russia of territories not currently occupied is categorically rejected by between two thirds and three quarters of respondents. In eastern regions, however, the idea of exchanging northern Donbas for peace, even if fragile, enjoys somewhat greater support.

Expected outrage among Ukrainian society is provoked by measures perceived as rewarding the aggressor, which are seen as embedded in a Kremlin Washington plan. These include the lifting of all sanctions on Russia and its reintegration into the global economy, as well as the abandonment of all claims regarding crimes committed during the war, including crimes against Ukraine’s civilian population. At the same time, a majority considers it entirely normal to hold presidential elections within 100 days of signing a peace agreement.

A fictitious peace and unreliable guarantees

Negotiations with Russia make no sense in the absence of security guarantees for Ukraine, since the peace process would be used by Putin solely as a pause before a new attack on Ukraine. This view is held by two thirds of Ukrainians, 65%, according to a survey by Info Sapiens conducted on behalf of the New Europe Centre between 5 and 26 November. At the same time, 30% believe that negotiations are worth pursuing because Ukraine lacks the resources to continue a war of attrition. However, the majority within this second group are convinced that Putin does not intend to abandon his plan to conquer Ukraine. When asked whether they think Russia would attack Ukraine again after a frozen conflict and a period of pause, 87% answered in the affirmative.

The survey also demonstrates a profound erosion of trust in external Western security guarantees. Respondents consider the development of Ukraine’s own nuclear weapons to be the most reliable guarantee, an option chosen by 31%. The same share was recorded a year ago, although at that time an almost equal proportion regarded NATO membership as a reliable option, 29%. A year of Donald Trump’s presidency has definitively undermined confidence in the alliance, membership of which only a few years ago, at the start of the war, appeared to be an absolute guarantee. Today, only 19% of surveyed Ukrainians believe in its effectiveness. The past years have shown that it was nuclear weapons that enabled Russia to blackmail the West and force it to limit military assistance to Kyiv, experts from the New Europe Centre reasonably note. This experience undermines trust in almost any other form of guarantee. Only 12% believe in the effectiveness of deploying European troops on Ukrainian territory, and just 10% trust the guarantees that could be provided by a defence alliance with the United States.

Nevertheless, in the absence of a nuclear option, 42% of those surveyed still consider NATO guarantees to be the most important of the available possibilities, according to an earlier survey conducted in September the Razumkov Centre. Meanwhile, 29% view bilateral security agreements with partner countries as an alternative to NATO. A total of 25% do not believe in the reliability of NATO guarantees at all, while a similar share tends to believe in them. The largest group, 40%, sees Ukraine’s security as a combination of NATO guarantees and the strengthening of its own armed forces. Among all security guarantee scenarios, the greatest support was given to the option described as strengthening the Armed Forces and defence capabilities of Ukraine without any restrictions, and ensuring stable financing of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which was supported by 88%. Clearly, the simultaneous enshrinement in a peace agreement of Ukraine’s renunciation of NATO membership and restrictions on the development of its armed forces appears not only wholly unacceptable to the Ukrainian population, but effectively as encouragement for a future Russian attack.

The decline in trust in external security guarantees within Ukrainian society reflects a broader disappointment with Western behaviour throughout the conflict. This trend is likely not unique to Ukraine. Ukrainian expectations regarding the position of the United States have shifted in line with Donald Trump’s own vacillations. At the beginning of the year, 48% of Ukrainians surveyed by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) believed that US support for Ukraine was weakening and that the American administration intended to pressure Kyiv into signing an unfavourable agreement with the Kremlin, while 39% thought the US wanted to help Ukraine end the war on acceptable terms. After the scandal involving Zelensky, Vance and Trump in the Oval Office, nearly two thirds of Ukrainians, 64%, held the first view, while only a quarter, 24%, held the second. By August, when Trump sought to increase pressure on Russia through new sanctions on Russian oil, the two groups had almost equalised, at 42% versus 38%. However, by early October, 52% of those surveyed again believed that the US was more likely to pressure Ukraine. A degree of disappointment has also grown in Ukraine with regard to Europe. Although a substantial majority still believe in European support, 58%, the share of those who think that support from Europe is weakening increased from 28% in the first half of 2025 to 36% in the October survey by KIIS.

The aggressor's terms: territory and humanitarian betrayal

Ukrainian views on the terms of peace and concessions to the Kremlin have remained broadly unchanged, despite extreme war fatigue. The reasons for this stability are clear in the context of the data presented above. Concessions make no sense if the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are convinced that Putin will continue his conquest of Ukraine until he encounters real resistance. Concessions are not perceived as resistance, but rather as a sign of weakness, and therefore, in the eyes of Ukrainians, they increase rather than reduce the likelihood of the next attack.

According to KIIS data from early October, that is before the emergence of the latest peace plan, 54% of surveyed Ukrainians opposed any territorial concessions, even if this meant that the war would last longer and threats to the preservation of independence would arise. The share of those who considered concessions possible for the sake of achieving peace quickly in 2025 stands at 38%, which is significantly higher than in 2024, when it was 26–32%.

However, these proportions hold only as long as the content of the concept of territorial concessions is not specified. If such concessions are understood as the official recognition of territories occupied by Russia, they become unacceptable for 67% of those surveyed. If they imply the transfer to Russia of territories currently controlled by Ukraine, they are unacceptable for 71%.

The most acceptable scenario for respondents was the de facto recognition of the situation regarding occupied territories, that is, freezing the conflict along the front line. Under this interpretation of territorial concessions, understood as refraining from attempts to retake territories during the current phase of the conflict, 56% still oppose such a scenario, while 35% agree with it. In eastern regions, however, only 47% clearly oppose the idea of conceding to Russia territories it has not yet captured, while 29% find it difficult to answer, which may be interpreted as a signal of acceptability. The share of those unwilling to recognise the occupation de facto is also lower there, at 47%, matching the share of those prepared to recognise it, 46%.

It is not easy to establish a precise picture of Ukrainian attitudes towards the latest peace initiatives. Events and plans with varying numbers of points change too rapidly and are discussed behind closed doors. According to a study by Gradus, a company specialising in online polling, on 25 November 17% of 1,000 respondents considered a 28 point peace plan acceptable. A total of 43% regarded it as completely unacceptable, while 33% agreed that it contained both acceptable and unacceptable elements.

Unsurprisingly, respondents considered the provision of security guarantees for Ukraine to be acceptable, with 74% supporting this point. Less trivial is the fact that two thirds, 65%, supported holding elections within 100 days of signing the agreement. By agreeing to this demand, voiced not only by Putin but also by Trump, Volodymyr Zelensky appears to have understood that it would look legitimate in the eyes of Ukrainian society. Slightly fewer, 59%, agreed to Ukraine’s non nuclear status. The most unacceptable elements for respondents were the reintegration of Russia into the global economy, opposed by 75%, and amnesty for all crimes committed during the war, opposed by 73%. Opposition to limiting the size of Ukraine’s armed forces was, somewhat surprisingly, lower, at 63%. Overall, however, 72% consider the likelihood of this plan being adopted to be low, and 68% do not believe it would lead to a lasting peace.

In the Info Sapiens New Europe Centre survey, by contrast, a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is considered completely unacceptable by 78%. The idea of legally recognising the occupation of Ukrainian territories is unacceptable for 77%, granting the Russian language the status of a second state language for 73%, abandoning criminal prosecution of Russia’s leadership and war criminals for 65%, and lifting sanctions on Russia for 64%. A hard line on these issues has been maintained by society throughout almost the entire war. At the same time, only 41% of respondents consider refusal of NATO membership to be unacceptable, compared with almost 49% a year ago and 57% two years ago. This reflects not so much greater willingness to compromise among Ukrainians as a devaluation of trust in the alliance.