Repression in Russia in 2025. Overview by OVD-Info

OVD-Info cannot consider any case initiated under the articles on terrorist acts (Article 205 of the Criminal Code), financing terrorism (Part 1.1 of Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code), undergoing training for terrorist activities (Article 205.3 of the Criminal Code) and sabotage to be deliberately politically motivated. We are aware of the fact that in the context of the terrible war, people may, for one reason or another, engage in dangerous activities that threaten others or cause significant harm. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the increase in the number of prosecutions, especially against residents of the occupied territories and Ukrainian military personnel. Just like the new articles of the “sabotage package” (facilitation of sabotage activities—Article 281.1 of the Criminal Code, training for sabotage—Article 281.2 of the Criminal Code, organisation of a sabotage community—Article 281.3 of the Criminal Code), this indicates the politicisation of the sphere.

According to Department One data, a significant portion of cases involving terrorism charges are related to the war. The reasons for prosecution include arson, communication with actual or alleged representatives of the Ukrainian side and donations to Ukrainian paramilitary organisations.

Department One concludes that courts hand down an average of five convictions under terrorism articles every day. In 2024, there were approximately 1.5 times more convictions than in 2023 (916 vs. 623). The number of convictions in the first half of 2025 is slightly lower than the total number for 2023 (597). Court decisions are becoming increasingly severe: in the first half of the year, the number of convictions to terms of more than 20 years was the same as in the preceding five years taken together (even though the outcome of many cases is unknown).

According to the Judicial Department, the first half of 2025 saw a huge increase in the number of convictions under Part 2 of Article 205 of the Criminal Code (committing a terrorist act by a group of persons and/or causing various serious consequences). Compared to the first half of 2024, there were almost seven (!) times more such convictions—201 vs. 29. The number of convictions under Part 3 of the article (committing a terrorist act involving an attack on dangerous sites or resulting in death) also increased significantly: 18 in the first half of 2025 compared to two in the first half of 2024. There were also more convictions under Part 1 of the article—28 vs. 23.

Ukrainian soldiers captured in the Kursk region receive sentences under the article on committing terrorist acts: official reports accuse them of violating the rules of war and committing war crimes against civilians, but in reality, for some reason, this all regularly narrows down to charges of committing terrorist acts.

The case of bombing the Crimean Bridge on 8 October 2022 stands apart. The defendants were involved in one way or another in the transportation of the cargo containing explosives: one was looking for a driver to transport it, another one was the driver, a third was the director of the company that accepted the order, two owned the warehouse etc. According to them, no one knew about the planned explosion. Upon learning of the explosion on the bridge, the director of the transport company, Oleg Antipov, went to the FSB himself and provided all the information he knew. The other defendants had the status as witnesses for some time and did not try to escape. Having studied the case, the “Support for Political Prisoners. Memorial” project concluded that all eight defendants were innocent. Nevertheless, in November 2025, all were found guilty of committing a terrorist act that resulted in the death of people and other serious consequences (Part 3 of Article 205 of the Criminal Code) and of transporting explosives by an organised group (Part 4 of Article 222.1 of the Criminal Code) and were sentenced to life imprisonment.

A similar case was opened in June 2025 following an operation codenamed “Web,” in which Ukrainian drones hidden in lorries attacked military airfields in Russia. Mediazona found out that four lorry drivers were charged.

The number of convictions for financing terrorism (Part 1.1 of Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code, the most frequently applied part of the article) remained unchanged (50 in the first half of 2025 and 2024). Convictions under the article on undergoing training for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities (Article 205.3 of the Criminal Code) doubled, from 20 to 43, as did convictions for participation in the activities of a terrorist community (Part 2 of Article 205.4 of the Criminal Code), from 30 to 64. There were three times as many convictions for organising a terrorist community (Part 1 of Article 205.4 of the Criminal Code)—11 vs. 3, which is already more than in the whole of 2024 (9).

The number of convictions for organising the activities of a terrorist organisation (Part 1 of Article 205.5 of the Criminal Code) remained unchanged, with three convictions for the same period in 2024 and 2025. For participation in such activities (Part 2 of Article 205.5 of the Criminal Code), there were 78 convictions in the first half of 2025, compared to 63 in the first half of 2024.

There has been an increase in the number of convictions for sabotage under Part 1 (17 vs. 9) and especially under Part 2 of Article 281 of the Criminal Code (sabotage by a group of persons with serious consequences and/or committed against defence or government facilities—41 vs. 6, compared to 28 for the whole of 2024). In the first half of 2025, there was only one conviction under Part 3 of the article—on sabotage involving an attack on dangerous facilities or resulting in death—with no such convictions in 2024.

Terrorism charges are brought against Ukrainians involved in the Azov Brigade as well as Aidar and Donbass (there are two battalions with this name) battalions. The Russian Federation has designated all these units as terrorist organisations. Despite the fact that in recent years these military formations have become part of the Ukrainian army, captured servicemen and state officials from the occupied territories face prosecution in the same type of cases as members of terrorist groups.

The year 2025 saw verdicts handed down in two such collective cases. In March, 12 people associated with Azov were sentenced to terms ranging from 13 to 23 years in a strict regime colony (another 11 people received sentences in absentia, as they had previously been transferred to Ukraine as part of a prisoner exchange, and one, Alexander Ishchenko, died in custody). In October, 15 people associated with Aidar were sentenced to terms ranging from 15 to 21 years in a strict regime colony (two female medics involved in the case were transferred to Ukraine, and the fate of another prosecuted individual is unknown).

Yevgeny Zakharov, the head of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, said that while in 2024 the number of convicted people from the occupied regions of Ukraine, most of whom were military personnel, was counted in the tens, by the end of 2025 the count had reached thousands. Ukrainian human rights activists are only able to establish their location after they are placed in Federal Penitentiary Service facilities—before that, they can be cut off from the outside world and lack procedural status for a long time.

According to the authors of a report published by the Memorial Human Rights Centre that is based on conversations with residents of the de-occupied territories of Ukraine, Russian law enforcement agencies systematically refuse to recognise Ukrainians as prisoners of war. In fact, the latter are legalised within the Russian judicial system through the initiation of criminal cases. Ukrainians find themselves cut off from their lawyers and families and are held in pre-trial detention centres and penal colonies where they are subjected to torture, sexual violence and deprivation of food and medical care.

Ukrainian prisoners are usually charged with participating in terrorist organisations (Article 205.5 of the Criminal Code) or communities (Article 205.4 of the Criminal Code), as well as undergoing training in terrorist activities (Article 205.3 of the Criminal Code). In addition to terrorism charges, Ukrainian military personnel are also charged with murder, attempted murder and cruel treatment of prisoners (Part 1 of Article 356 of the Criminal Code—use of prohibited means and methods of warfare). According to Oleg Orlov, a co-chair of the Memorial Human Rights Centre, in wartime it cannot be claimed that all these charges are unfounded. However, the human rights activist notes that in many cases, the law enforcement agencies use torture to extract confessions.

According to Orlov, Ukrainian military personnel also face charges of illegally crossing the border, as was the case with those who participated in the invasion of the Kursk region. Some receive sentences under the article on violent seizure of power, which is linked to the practice in the unrecognised Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), where Ukrainian military personnel were charged under such articles. After the official annexation, Ukrainians began to be prosecuted under articles mirroring those in the Russian Criminal Code.

It is not only Ukrainian military personnel who face repression, but also residents of the occupied territories of Ukraine. Officers of the FSB, the National Guard (Rosgvardia), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the military police kidnap people who disagree with the invasion, hold them captive in schools and basements, torture them and force them to confess that they participated in anti-Russian protests at the behest of Ukrainian intelligence services. According to Yevgeny Zakharov, the occupation administrations snatch local residents on suspicion of their pro-Ukrainian views or because they spoke Ukrainian. At risk are priests of Ukrainian churches, journalists and former government officials, even if they worked just as ordinary clerks, as well as people who served in the army between 2014 and 2021.