Billionaires on Outsourcing: In Armenia, the Kremlin has once again placed its bets on a Russian businessman as leader of the opposition

Armenia is another post-Soviet state where Moscow's influence has weakened significantly in recent years, whose pro-Western trajectory irritates the Kremlin and which is approaching pivotal elections in the near future. Last year, Moldova was such a country, and developments ahead of the Armenian vote are in many ways reminiscent of the Moldovan scenario.

During his first-ever visit to Yerevan, US Vice President JD Vance not only signed landmark agreements on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, voiced explicit support for the incumbent prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan. The EU has allocated funding to help Armenia counter potential Russian interference in the elections. In Moscow, meanwhile, hardline propagandists have threatened Yerevan with a second ‘special military operation’ for its alleged ‘betrayal’ and rapprochement with the West.

The Kremlin, it appears, has placed its bets on Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, who is expected to act as the leader of a united opposition to Pashinyan in alliance with the Armenian Apostolic Church. His task would be to rally those dissatisfied both with the course of the Armenian–Azerbaijani peace process and with Yerevan’s distancing from Moscow. The model of a pro-Russian oligarch consolidating opposition to a pro-Western leader and serving as Moscow’s principal instrument of influence in a country’s domestic politics is fast becoming the Kremlin’s calling card in its use of ‘hybrid power’ across the post Soviet space. The approach worked in Georgia and failed in Moldova. Armenia now appears set to become the third case. How strong are Moscow’s chances?

The stakes are set: Moscow, Brussels and Washington

US Vice President JD Vance, who visited Yerevan in early February, became the most senior American official ever to set foot on Armenian soil. During his visit, he not only signed an agreement with Nikol Pashinyan on investment and cooperation in the field of nuclear energy (an area previously monopolised by Rosatom), as well as the supply of reconnaissance drones. He also offered direct backing to the Armenian prime minister ahead of the elections.

Donald Trump's return to the White House a year ago was initially met with disappointment in Yerevan. Trump is known for his ties to the Aliyev family, his tolerance of autocrats and his indifference to human rights issues. It seemed that Armenia had little to hope for. Yet the Armenian Azerbaijani settlement unexpectedly became one of the showcases of Trump’s foreign policy record. The so-called Zangezur transport corridor, now branded TRIPP (Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity), linking the two parts of Azerbaijan through southern Armenia, has been presented as an example of the ‘commercial peacemaking’ the US president so openly admires.

The fact that Vance explicitly referred to the forthcoming elections during his visit highlights a new pressure point in Armenian politics. On the eve of Vance’s visit, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gently rebuked Armenian Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan in Moscow for accusations voiced in Yerevan that Russia intended to interfere in the elections. He also stressed that ‘membership of the Eurasian Economic Union is incompatible’ with cooperation with, and ‘all the more so accession to’, the EU. ‘It is your choice,’ the minister concluded. Moscow was responding to Pashinyan's statement that Armenia would remain in the Eurasian Economic Union until it had moved sufficiently close to EU membership. Less restrained than Lavrov was the Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, who, on his channel Solovyov Live, openly mused about the possibility of another ‘special military operation’ wherever Russian interests were deemed to be under threat (a view echoed by other Russian turbo-patriots).

Pashinyan, meanwhile, has made EU accession a central pillar of his strategy and regards it as a form of ‘institutional anchor’ for domestic reform. To become an EU member, Armenia ‘objectively must meet European Union standards’, and if it succeeds in doing so the country ‘will benefit’, even if membership is not ultimately granted, he argues in response to domestic Eurosceptics. Last year parliament, where his Civil Contract party holds a majority, adopted the law ‘On the start of the process of accession of the Republic of Armenia to the EU’. It was presented as a major achievement, despite the fact that Yerevan has not even secured candidate status, which Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine already possess.

In May, on the eve of the elections, Yerevan will host a summit of the European Political Community, a format for discussing European issues with non EU states, devised by Emmanuel Macron in 2022. Previous summits have taken place in Moldova and Albania, both aspiring EU members. Crucially, they were attended by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ilham Aliyev, as Turkey and Azerbaijan are members of the EPC. They have now been invited to Yerevan as well. The day after this summit, the first EU-Armenia summit is scheduled to take place, at which the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Council, António Costa, will discuss integration with Pashinyan. A similar summit was held in Moldova last year, also shortly before elections. European officials are likely to present Pashinyan with some form of political gift as a contribution to his election campaign. In December 2025, the EU pledged to invest €500 million in energy investment to reduce Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia, along with a further €15 million for ‘resilience building’, including countering Moscow's information interference, as European Commissioner Kaja Kallas specifically emphasised.

These summits are intended to create a favourable information background for Pashinyan. He is leading the country towards a European future, while the election of an alternative candidate could undo these efforts, as in Georgia, which the EU is now depriving of its long awaited visa-free regime. In this context, Lavrov’s remarks about the incompatibility of ‘cooperation’ with the EU and membership of the Eurasian Economic Union also have an electoral dimension, albeit with the opposite sign. They imply that the pursuit of the elusive goal of EU membership could deprive Armenia of the tangible benefits of trade with Russia.

According to a survey conducted by the American International Republican Institute (IRI) in June 2025, if a referendum on EU accession were held, 49% of those surveyed would vote in favour, citing ‘strengthening security and stability’, ‘boosting the economy’ and ‘national development’ as their main arguments. Fifteen per cent said they would vote against, fewer than a quarter of those intending to participate. Their concerns centred on the erosion of Armenian values and national identity, and on the risk of ‘angering Russia’. More significant, however, is that 36% said they would not take part at all. This constitutes a sizeable group of passive Eurosceptics who view the prospect of accession as little more than rhetoric (a similar dynamic of disillusionment with the attainability of European integration was observed in Moldova during the pre-election period → Re:Russia: The Contested Underbelly). Pashinyan’s central strategic objective may therefore yet become the focus of intense campaigning.

Visa-free travel and Reels against the indifferent

For a leader under whom the country has lost two wars, Pashinyan’s position appears relatively resilient. At the very least, he continues to outpace his rivals by a significant margin.

The economic situation contributes greatly to this. In the first year of Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, Armenia’s GDP recorded double digit growth of 12.6%, according to Armstat. This was the result of both the influx of more than 100,000 Russians fleeing mobilisation and repression and, to no lesser extent, a sharp increase in trade turnover with Russia. Exports to and imports from Russia in 2022–2024 grew roughly 3.5 times compared with 2021, and by 2024 imports of Russian goods were almost five times their pre war level. Armenia became an important hub for Russia’s circumvention of sanctions, including the re-export of Russian gold for processing in Arab states. Only in 2025 did volumes begin to decline somewhat. Growth has also moderated, but remains robust at around 6% in each of the past two years. Over four years the economy expanded by 37%, only slightly less than total growth across the entire 2010s. Yet this success has depended more on external factors than on domestic reform, and in particular on trade with Russia.

According to a survey conducted by the Armenian service MPG in June, only 22% of those surveyed approve of Pashinyan as prime minister, while 68% disapprove. In an IRI survey, 13% said they trusted Pashinyan. That is a modest figure, yet his principal rivals register trust ratings of between 2% and 5%. Moreover, 61% of those surveyed say they trust no one, and a further 10% are undecided. In summer polling, 17% said they were ready to vote for the prime minister’s bloc, while his competitors scored between 1% and 4%. Again, 40% stated that they would not vote or would spoil their ballot, and 22% remained undecided. Pashinyan’s lead is therefore highly conditional, and there is considerable scope to mobilise those who are not inclined to support him yet see no viable alternative.

Pashinyan himself seems to understand this. In particular, he has moved to revamp his image. Long fond of social media, he regularly streamed live on Facebook at the start of his premiership. Since autumn 2025, however, he has sought to attract attention through music and viral trends. Previously he posted idiosyncratic videos of himself sitting in his office, drinking coffee to a backdrop of jazz or instrumental tracks. His playlist now features artists such as Zemfira, Vladimir Vysotsky, Stromae, Adriano Celentano and Queen. Instead of simply sitting at his desk, he forms heart shapes with his fingers or produces GRWM, get ready with me, style clips, a popular short video format in which bloggers film themselves dressing, applying make up or preparing to go out. He has also posted Reels in which he rises from his chair, briskly puts on a jacket or adjusts his tie. Another pre-election initiative has been the creation of a music group, VarchaBand (varcha is the Armenian word for prime minister). Pashinyan plays the drums in the band and has already performed at one live concert.

The strategy is clearly aimed at younger voters. According to the aforementioned IRI survey, the 18 to 35 age group poses particular difficulties for the authorities. Only 29% of young people surveyed believe the country is moving in the right direction, compared with 43% among those aged 56 and over. Almost 50% of young people say they do not intend to vote, 37% would abstain and a further 12% would spoil their ballot. That is 10 percentage points higher than the average level of non participation across the sample.

It is assumed that exposure to trend driven content, combined with news that visa free travel to Europe may soon be available on an Armenian passport, especially given the already plentiful and affordable flights from Yerevan, could shift attitudes. Dialogue with Brussels on visa liberalisation has been underway since 2024, but Yerevan recently received a detailed roadmap outlining the steps required to simplify short term travel. These include predictable measures to strengthen border security, combat irregular migration and enhance document protection.

Russian know-how

Until recently, the Armenian opposition lacked a single figure capable of uniting the disparate forces opposed to Pashinyan. The old elites, led by former president Robert Kocharyan, recognise that their presence tends to repel rather than attract voters. Even after defeat in the2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war, when snap elections were called, Kocharyan’s bloc secured two and a half times fewer votes than the prime minister’s alliance, 21% against 54%. This sent a clear signal to his political generation that it was time to step aside and look for new faces without high negative ratings.

It might have been expected that, in the three years since the exodus of Armenians from Karabakh, an ‘Artsakh party’ would emerge. Representatives of the now-defunct unrecognised republic – those who had avoided Azerbaijani prisons – could have consolidated support and mounted a joint challenge to Pashinyan. In practice, however, Armenia had not regarded Karabakh Armenians as full citizens, despite issuing them passports. Although these documents were outwardly identical to standard Armenian passports apart from a special 070 series, they were effectively travel documents without full civic rights. Their holders must now apply for full Armenian citizenship, and so far only around 26,000 people have managed to do so. That number may rise before the elections, but it is unlikely to become a decisive factor. Nor has a single leader emerged from this constituency.

The leading contender to act as a unified opposition candidate was identified only last week. It is Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian businessman and head of the Tashir Group. Ranked 44th on the Russian Forbes list, with a fortune of $3.2 billion as of April 2025, and valued at $4.9 billion by the global Forbes ranking, Karapetyan controls a portfolio that in Russia includes the Rio shopping centres, the Tashir pizza chain and Fora Bank. In Armenia, Tashir owns, among other assets, Electric Networks of Armenia, which serves around one million subscribers.

It is difficult to say whether the billionaire had seriously intended to challenge Pashinyan a year ago. Now, however, following an acute confrontation with the authorities, he has become Armenia’s most prominent political prisoner (although he has been transferred to house arrest). Armenians themselves widely apply that label to him. According to MPG, more than 60% believe political prisoners exist in the country, and 65% of that group cite Samvel Karapetyan as an example. Next in this ranking are Bishops Bagrat Galstanyan and Mikael Ajapahyan, whose support Karapetyan had publicly endorsed shortly before his detention.

Legally, Karapetyan cannot serve as a member of parliament, let alone prime minister. The constitution requires exclusive Armenian citizenship for at least four years. Nevertheless, the newly established party Strong Armenia, founded on 11 February, has nominated him as its candidate for prime minister, pledging to amend the constitution immediately in the event of victory. Technically this is possible. Amending Article 148 of the Constitution does not require a referendum but a two thirds majority in parliament. Karapetyan would also have to renounce his Russian citizenship.

This bold proposal appears to have emerged only recently among his supporters. Previously, the focus had been on his nephew Narek, who holds no other citizenship. Immediately after his uncle’s arrest, Narek founded the political movement ‘Po-svoemu’ (In Our Own Way), which has since become the basis for Strong Armenia.

Assessing the party’s prospects is difficult. Narek Karapetyan recently cited a poll conducted on his behalf by the little-known company EMPIRICA, according to which 34% of Armenians support Samvel Karapetyan as future prime minister, compared with 33% for Pashinyan. No details of the sample or methodology have been disclosed. Even so, Pashinyan appears to regard Samvel Karapetyan as his principal challenger, although he has so far declined to comment on his nomination, arguing that it is legally impossible.

From the outside, the situation resembles earlier developments in Georgia and Moldova: a pro-Russian oligarch becomes the focal point and leader of a new political force, receives informational and political backing from Moscow and simultaneously uses Russian territory as a secure base where his assets are shielded from domestic pressure. In Georgia, the model has proved effective. Bidzina Ivanishvili exerts decisive influence over a country that has sharply pivoted from European integration towards Moscow. In Moldova, Ilan Shor failed to play the Moscow card successfully and has for now concentrated on projects in Russia, one of which, the ANO Eurasia initiative, maintains a representative office in Armenia). The Armenian case will be the third. It seems that Moscow considers this instrument of geopolitical influence to be quite effective.

An alliance of the clergy and ultra-wealthy

Samvel Karapetyan’s political trajectory began with his intervention in Pashinyan’s dispute with the Armenian Apostolic Church, which the prime minister began to sharply criticise last year and sought to reform despite lacking either the authority or the institutional means to do so. The name of Karapetyan’s nephew’s movement, ‘Po-svoemu’ (In Our Own Way), refers to the words of his businessman uncle, which have become widely known in Armenia: A small group of people, having forgotten the millennia old history of Armenia and the Church, have launched attacks on our people and the Armenian Apostolic Church. Since I have always stood alongside the Armenian Church and the people, I will take direct part. If the politicians fail, we will participate in all this in our own way.’ On 18 June 2025, the Armenian authorities interpreted these words as ‘calls to seize power’, which became the basis for the businessman’s arrest.

A week later, similar charges were brought against a group of priests. In some cases, rather than extremism in the sense of public incitement, investigators alleged preparations for an armed coup. The priests were said to have formed ‘strike groups’ tasked with creating chaos in Yerevan through arson attacks on cars and damage to transport and energy infrastructure, followed by the seizure of government buildings. The evidence presented by the Armenian investigation bears a striking resemblance to material previously showcased by law enforcement bodies in Belarus or Azerbaijan when exposing alleged ‘conspiracies’ by the opposition. The conspirators were said to possess a document entitled ‘Coup Plan’, which conveniently found its way into the press. The document, however, refers to 2024, while investigators maintain that the coup was being prepared in summer 2025 and was to culminate in September. There are also audio recordings of conversations between Bishop Bagrat (Galstanyan) and his associates, although lawyers claim that they have been falsified. Analysts note that this is the fourth alleged ‘coup attempt’ reported by Pashinyan and the Armenian special services in the past three years.

Samvel Karapetyan is also mentioned in the purported plan. Under ‘Human Resources’, it claims that he commands between 5,000 and 8,000 individuals in Armenia who could be mobilised to implement it. This is widely understood to refer to employees of Electric Networks of Armenia, the national electricity operator owned by Karapetyan. Its licence has now been revoked, and the authorities are exploring options for its nationalisation.

Many in Armenia believe that an alliance between Karapetyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church could pose a serious challenge to Nikol Pashinyan. Unlike Armenian businessmen such as Gagik Tsarukyan, who has largely withdrawn from politics and is now building the world's largest statue of Jesus Christ),Karapetyan would remain financially secure even if he lost Electric Networks of Armenia, as most of his assets are located in Russia. That, however, also makes him dependent on the Russian authorities. Secondly, the Church is effectively the last stable institution in the country beyond Pashinyan’s control. According to an IRI survey, 58% of Armenians trust the Church, placing it second only to the army in public confidence. The government, the prime minister’s office and parliament rank significantly lower.

Those Armenians who have little faith in the ‘peace process’ and believe that Pashinyan is conceding too much to Azerbaijan, thereby deepening Armenia’s vulnerability, tend to place their hopes in the Church. The political outlook of this segment of society is succinctly captured in a headline from the opposition leaning outlet Alpha News: ‘Armenia is surrounded by enemies. We need patriots, the army and the Armenian Apostolic Church.’ In this narrative, affiliation with the Church serves as a marker of belonging. It is also worth recalling that following the 2020 war, the Catholicos of All Armenians, Garegin II, called on Pashinyan to resign. In 2024, during border delimitation near the villages of Kirants, Voskepar and Berkaber, protests against what critics described as a ‘land giveaway’ were led by Bishop Bagrat Galstanyan, who openly demanded a change of government and stated that he was acting with the blessing of the Catholicos.

The government therefore had grounds to view the Church leadership as disloyal. Yet it was Pashinyan who crossed the point of no return. By May 2025, protests led by Bishop Bagrat had largely faded from public attention when the prime minister unexpectedly described churches as ‘chulans’ (storerooms) and then went further, alleging that most bishops were violating their vow of celibacy. According to Pashinyan, even Garegin II has an adult daughter and therefore occupies his position illegitimately.

The prime minister has sought to rally certain bishops around him who are also in conflict with Garegin II, and has even attended services led by defrocked priests, that is clergy stripped of their rank by the Catholicos. However, the creation of an alternative ecclesiastical structure with broad public backing appears unlikely. For ordinary Armenians seeking baptism or marriage, canonical ordination matters. Services conducted by defrocked clergy tend to attract mainly officials and deputies from the ruling party rather than a wider congregation.

With his harsh rhetoric and actions, the prime minister may have manoeuvred himself into a corner. It is no longer possible to restore relations with the Catholicosate. Pashinyan has stated that he considers him as effectively defrocked. Yet he is also unable to translate his words into action. The prime minister has announced a ‘march on Etchmiadzin’, which should lead to the removal of Garegin II, several times since July 2025. If he did not act on that threat earlier, doing so on the eve of elections would be even more difficult and politically hazardous. For now, Pashinyan seems to be ‘freezing the conflict’ by transferring two bishops, one of whom is the Catholicos' nephew, to house arrest. At the same time, Garegin II himself is currently unable to leave Armenia and criticise the government from abroad, as he faces criminal proceedings for ‘obstructing the execution of a court order’.

Competition of fears

The extent to which Moscow is prepared to invest in Samvel Karapetyan remains unclear. There is little doubt that the new opposition receives informational support in Russia, particularly when it criticises Pashinyan. At the same time, Russian officials continue to engage with their Armenian counterparts. The recent visit to Moscow by Armenian parliamentary speaker Alen Simonyan, known for his critical remarks about Russia, and his meeting with Sergey Lavrov, despite the latter’s public rebuke, appeared more conciliatory than confrontational. Moscow is also likely mindful that an overtly aggressive campaign in Armenia would now be interpreted as a direct challenge to Trump’s project.

If the European Union has from the outset backed Pashinyan, his opponents have sought to compete for favour in Washington. Last autumn, Narek Karapetyan managed to secure an interview with Tucker Carlson, a media figure closely associated with Trump. He emphasised the theme of Christianity, highly salient for Republican audiences. Carlson listened attentively to claims that the prime minister was waging war on faith, undermining millennia old church traditions and lacking genuine public support.

However, the visit by JD Vance and his pre-election expressions of support for Pashinyan indicate that the United States is not only backing the prime minister but also welcoming his efforts to reduce dependence on Moscow, including in the energy sector. As noted above, peace in the South Caucasus and the transport link from western Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan, and onwards to Turkey, through Armenian territory as part of the so-called Middle Corridor bypassing Russia, represent an investment to which the Trump administration has already committed political capital. Under the agreement, the US Armenian joint venture TRIPP Development Company, with 26% owned by Yerevan and 74% by the United States, will manage the road and organise transit without the direct involvement of Armenian border guards. Armenian authorities will receive the data, but document checks will be carried out by company personnel, largely in electronic form. On the State Department website, this is referred to as the ‘front office–back office operating model’.

The balance of forces is sufficiently clear that even opposition figure Narek Karapetyan does not reject TRIPP outright. He argues that the project carries ‘both opportunities and risks,’ suggesting that its vulnerability lies in the fact that the United States acts as a witness rather than a guarantor. That characterisation is disputable, but it allows him to appeal to public anxieties about Azerbaijan and a broader sense of insecurity. His platform contrasts ‘Pashinyan's peace’ with a notion of genuine security, a ‘guaranteed peace’ rather than what he terms a weak hybrid substitute.

If Pashinyan’s opponents seek to mobilise fears of Azerbaijan, the prime minister’s party is likely to play on fears of Russia and to highlight Karapetyan’s links to Moscow. Even the billionaire’s supporters appear aware of this sensitivity, reportedly urging Russian propagandists (including Aram Gabrelyanov) not to mention Karapetyan too often.

In 2019, shortly after Pashinyan came to power, 93% of Armenians described relations with Russia as good and only 6% as bad. Today, after two lost wars in which the Kremlin did not provide the support many Armenians had expected, and amid Pashinyan’s westward drift, the ratio stands at 43% positive to 55% negative, according to the same IRI survey. At the same time, 27% regard Russia as a threat, while 45% see it as a partner. Some 14% favour an unequivocally pro-European and pro-Western course, 31% prefer a mainly pro-European orientation while maintaining good relations with Russia, 8% advocate a clearly pro-Russian path, and 26% support a pro-Russian course combined with good relations with the West. The balance between pro-European and pro-Russian vectors is 45% to 34%. Compared with autumn 2024, however, the share of pro-European respondents has declined from 51%, while the pro-Russian share has risen from 26%.

Pashinyan's modest approval ratings, the large pool of undecided or disengaged voters and the signs of a slight rightward shift and growing Euroscepticism suggest that an alliance between the Armenian Apostolic Church and a Russian oligarch is unlikely to achieve a two thirds parliamentary majority, the threshold required to install Samvel Karapetyan as prime minister through constitutional change. It could, however, become a focal point for consolidating discontent and deprive the prime minister’s bloc of absolute, or even relative, dominance in parliament.