Zoomers and the War: Will the campaign to recruit students for the war be successful enough?

A large-scale campaign to recruit students and young people for the war with Ukraine has swept through Russian universities almost everywhere. However, its prospects for success appear doubtful. In general, international surveys indicate that each successive generation is less willing to take up arms to defend its country. In this respect, Russian youth resemble their counterparts in developed and affluent countries, where military service is unpopular.

Russian young people also occupy relatively advantageous positions in the labour market and have comparatively high expectations regarding the type of work they are willing to undertake. They have been among the principal beneficiaries of the wage competition of recent years.

Nevertheless, data from a February survey conducted by ExtremeScan indicates that young people in general, and students in particular, are the category of Russians most sceptical and negatively disposed towards the war.

A combination of direct and indirect questions posed to respondents indicates that among students, only around 20–25% are prepared to express support for the war, even among those who agreed to participate in the survey. A negatively distanced stance towards it is characteristic of the majority within this socio-demographic group.

This is reinforced by the fact that the associated costs of the war are felt particularly acutely within this group: difficulties with travelling abroad, the withdrawal of Western brands from the Russian market, and, in particular, restrictions on internet access.

There is little doubt that the recruitment campaign will attract a certain number of young people, particularly into drone units, not least given the ‘gamified’ perception of this type of service. However, given the narrow demographic base of this group and its generally negative attitude towards the war, the campaign is unlikely to resolve the Russian army’s manpower shortages sufficiently to enable a successful offensive.

Generation Z: demographics and expectations

Reports from various cities and universities indicate that Russian students, particularly those in IT disciplines, are being actively recruited into ‘virtually safe’ drone units (→ Novaya Gazeta: Dropped Out of University; T-invariant: Alternative Service; Important Stories: Let’s Change the Scenery; Idel.Realities: A Trap for Students). The idea of recruiting contract soldiers at universities appears logical, as they have long served as a source of manpower for the armed forces. In many institutions, posters have long appeared near faculty offices featuring a familiar image of a military commissar ‘waiting’ for those who fail to complete their examinations on time. Previously, however, those who filled the ranks were typically students who had been expelled. Now, contracts are being offered even to those in good academic standing. They are attracted by salaries, benefits, and the prospect of obtaining a degree with relative ease. The combined authority of university administrations and military enlistment offices exploits students’ dependence on institutional leadership, their financial motivations, and age-specific traits such as a willingness to take risks and a limited inclination to consider adverse outcomes.

This strategy is also facilitated by an important demographic characteristic of Russian youth: on average, they start families two to three years after graduating from university, and efforts by state demographic policy have so far failed to shorten this interval. Family considerations are often a key deterrent for potential contract soldiers. As data from the ‘Chronicles’ project shows, more than half of those surveyed who expressed willingness to go to war but did not follow through cited family objections, most often from a spouse. Among students, this constraint is typically much weaker.

At the same time, both Russian and international surveys show that with each successive generation the proportion of young people willing to serve in the military declines, as does the share prepared to take up arms to defend their country. This trend is characteristic of all relatively developed countries, where the value placed on human life and personal comfort has increased alongside rising prosperity. According to data from Gallup International surveys conducted in 45 countries at the end of 2014 and 2023, the global share of people willing to take up arms to defend their country fell by nearly 10 percentage points over this period, from 61% to 52%. The world is also clearly divided on this issue between the Global South and East and the Global North-West, comprising the EU, the United States, and Canada. In the latter, only 30–40% are willing to take up arms to defend their country, compared with 60–80% in the East and South. In Russia, in 2023, despite the protracted war in Ukraine, 32% responded positively to this question, placing the country closer to European states, as well as Japan, Hong Kong, and the United States, than to Asian countries such as India, Iran, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

Another important feature of Russian demography is the relatively low share of young people within the population. Men aged 18 to 30 account for only around 9% of the adult population. Countries with such a demographic structure generally face greater structural difficulties in recruiting for military conflicts, researchers note. But beyond that, the relative scarcity of young people creates favourable conditions for them in the labour market. In Russia, acute labour shortages have driven up demand for young workers and, accordingly, wage levels. In technical universities, particularly in information technology fields, which are of particular interest for recruitment into technically oriented military units, students often begin working well before completing their studies. In many cases, weaker academic performance reflects confidence in their labour market prospects. A recent survey conducted by ExtremeScan in February 2026 (based on a representative sample of 1,600 respondents using CATI methodology), illustrates this relatively privileged position. Overall, only 13% of adults reported that their material situation had improved over the previous 12 months, while the share reporting deterioration was 3.5 times higher at 41%. Among young people, however, the balance is markedly different, at 22% versus 32%. In this sense, younger cohorts have been the principal beneficiaries of rising wages and incomes in recent years.

At the same time,the small size and strong labour market position of this generation are accompanied by higher expectations of employers and working conditions. While young people value career progression and earnings no less than older cohorts, they are less willing to tolerate micromanagement or to engage in work whose purpose they neither understand nor share, as noted in the Higher School of Economics study ‘Zoomers in the Labour Market’. As a result, a contract for military service may not appear particularly attractive to them, despite the substantial financial incentives.

Zoomers and the war

These structural factors are compounded by political considerations. Young people in general, and students in particular, are consistently identified in surveys as among the most anti-war segments of society. For example, according to data from the Levada Centre’s February survey, when asked whether military operations should continue or whether peace talks should be initiated, 67% of those surveyed chose the latter option, rising to 79% of those in the 18–24 age group. The results of the February ExtremeScan survey show that just over half (54%) of all Russians support the ‘special operation’, compared with 36% of young people and only 25% of students.

Given that anti-war positions are criminalised in contemporary Russia, it is reasonable to assume that some of those surveyed avoid expressing their views directly, while feeling more comfortable characterising the opinions of those around them (→ Re:Russia: Between ‘Spiral of Silence’ and ‘Jumping on the Bandwagon’). In February 2026, 44% of Russians nationwide reported that most people in their immediate circle supported the military action in Ukraine, 15% said that most opposed it, and 31% described their environment as mixed. Among young people, the share reporting a predominantly pro-war environment falls to 30%, compared with 18% who report a predominantly anti-war one; among students, the corresponding figures are 25% and 18%. Thus, both among students and within their social environments, support for the intervention is lower. While the proportion of those in predominantly anti-war environments increases only modestly, the share surrounded mainly by supporters of the war declines significantly. Among students, only around one in four report being in such an environment, while approximately 70% inhabit mixed settings in which opposing views are expressed. In this context, offers to risk one’s life for a cause that is relatively unpopular within one’s immediate social milieu are unlikely to prove attractive, even when accompanied by substantial financial incentives.

Figure 1a. Proportion of those supporting the ‘special military operation’ (SMO) among the general population of the Russian Federation and among youth groups, February 2026, % of those surveyed

Figure 1b. Proportion of those with social circles holding different views on the ‘special military operation’ among the general population of the Russian Federation and among youth groups, February 2026, % of those surveyed

To clarify public attitudes towards the ‘special military operation’, the ExtremeScan survey included an additional question: ‘Which of the following statements about the 'special military operation' do you most agree with?’ Respondents were offered three options: (1) ‘The 'special military operation' is a common cause to which I feel personally connected’; (2) ‘The 'special military operation' is a matter for the state, to be handled by the military’; and (3) ‘The 'special military operation' is an event into which people have been drawn by a political decision’. Across the full sample, the first, conformist option was selected by 37% of those surveyed; among young people, this share falls to just over a quarter (26%), and among students to only around one in five. By contrast, 56% of students chose the third option, reflecting a position of distancing: for them, the ‘special military operation’ is a matter for the state, to be handled by professional soldiers, and does not concern them personally. Taken together, responses to these three questions suggest that within the student population, among those willing to participate in surveys, only around 20–25% express some degree of support for the war.

Figure 2. Distribution of different views on the ‘special military operation’ among the general population and among youth groups, February 2026, % of those surveyed

Those affected and those who do not trust

It is also noteworthy that young people report the greatest degree of discomfort arising from the costs of the war and the associated restrictions, and express the highest levels of dissatisfaction with them. Only 17% of those surveyed aged 18 to 29 stated that they had not experienced any inconvenience as a result of sanctions, the withdrawal of Western companies from Russia, restrictions on access to online products and services, or limitations on travel abroad. Among the population as a whole, by contrast, 42% reported no such difficulties. Among students, the share of those who reported being unaffected falls further, to just 13%.

Figure 3. Proportion of those who encountered various difficulties during the ‘special military operation’ among the Russian population as a whole and among youth groups, February 2026, % of those surveyed

As we can see, sensitivity to difficulties associated with travelling abroad among young people is around one and a half times higher than the population average, while sensitivity to the withdrawal of Western brands is almost twice as high. Dissatisfaction with restrictions on internet access in this group is nearly universal. Taken together, this suggests that young people, and students in particular, primarily associate the ‘special military operation’ with tangible negative effects. This underpins their generally low sense of personal involvement and is likely to constrain their willingness to respond to calls from university authorities and military enlistment offices to go to the front.

Against the backdrop of expectations that the war would end in the first half of 2025, recruitment into the Russian army on a contract basis increased, as individuals sought to secure earnings while assuming that the risk of being killed would decline with an imminent cessation of hostilities. However, survey data indicate that students assess the prospects for a ceasefire far more pessimistically than the population as a whole. While just over a quarter of Russians (27%) believe that the fighting will continue beyond the next year, this figure rises to 36–40% among young people and students.

Figure 4. Distribution of different estimates of when the ‘special military operation’ will end among the general population and among youth groups, February 2026, % of those surveyed

Thus, young people, and students in particular, despite the material gains they have derived from increased labour market demand during the war, constitute the group most critical of the ‘special military operation’. They are less likely to feel a sense of personal involvement in this confrontation, yet are far more likely to experience its negative impact on their own lives and to take a more pessimistic view of its likely duration. As a result, young people, and especially students, are the least motivated to risk their lives for a cause that is relatively unpopular within their social milieu. The capacity of military enlistment offices and university administrations to alter this situation appears limited. Efforts to emphasise the distinctive status of service in unmanned systems units are also unlikely to prove decisive: students are reluctant to fight not only because they fear being assigned to assault units, but also because they seek more broadly to distance themselves from what they perceive as an unpopular and life-disrupting phenomenon, preferring to endure and outlast it while preserving their lives and health.

This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that a certain proportion of young people, not solely motivated by financial incentives but also by personal conviction, will respond to recruitment efforts and sign contracts. There are always individuals willing, even eager, to go to the front, though they are often restrained by their families. In the present context, the state is likely to act in opposition to such familial constraints and may achieve some success. However, given the small size of this age cohort, its relative optimism regarding its prospects in civilian life, and, above all, its generally negative attitude towards the war, it is reasonable to conclude that these efforts will not yield a substantial increase in manpower for the Russian armed forces.