A week ago, it seemed that the speech at the opening of the Davos Forum would be Dmitry Medvedev's last attempt to set his agenda on the international level. In any case, an effort in this direction against the backdrop of growing skepticism about him and his political future. But the Russian plot in Davos unexpectedly unfolded quite differently. Its main character was not Dmitry Medvedev at all, but, on the contrary, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. It was he, the initiator, the engine and the main beneficiary of the “Yukos case”, who arrived there as a real winner, with a shield on which the new six years for Mikhail Khodorkovsky were clearly inscribed, and appeared before Western investors as a symbol of the lack of alternatives to the Putin-Sechin course.
Unlike Dmitry Medvedev, Igor Sechin was not afraid of questions about the second trial. He was waiting for them. He rightly earned the title of "tsar of Russian energy" from the Western press. In general, he presented himself as a person with whom one should talk, while Dmitry Medvedev looked more like a person who, at best, could be listened to. The unequal weights of the two officials reflected the unequal weights of the two facets of the Russian economy: Dmitry Medvedev's Skolkovo projects are like cranes in the sky, while Sechin's energy industry is a real bird, albeit with a national crow's grin.
However, it is wrong to say that Dmitry Medvedev "lost" Davos to the "hawks". There was no game. Mr. Medvedev himself did not unfurl, but rather rolled up his banners. His speech, despite the fact that it was seasoned with the usual garnish of recitatives about modernization, climate flaws and sighs about democracy, in fact was exactly in the direction that was drawn by the director's hand for the entire Russian bureaucratic business delegation.
And this applies not only to comments about Khodorkovsky. It must be said that on this occasion all the Russian officials parachuted into Davos repeated essentially the same thing. They did not try to protect Russian justice, defiantly rejected the discussion of the legal side of the issue, and the meaning of their remarks, on the contrary, clearly tended to one thought: anyone who behaves like this with us (or, more precisely, with Him?), is not immune from the fate of Khodorkovsky. And this was actually a prelude to their "positive program" - the presentation of Russian investment authoritarianism.
If you look closely, all the officials - Dmitry Medvedev, Igor Sechin, Igor Shuvalov and even Alexander Khloponin - presented the same hyperproject, the main idea of which was the statement: stop talking about the investment climate, the investment climate is us (or is it?) . You need to invest directly through us, and everything will be fine with your money. But Khodorkovsky, Magnitsky - yes, this happens ... when they invest not through us.
As a matter of fact, Dmitry Medvedev also spoke about the same thing, but stylized a little like blancmange. In addition to various good wishes in Medvedev's 10 points, two or three really important ones are clearly distinguishable. The first is about privatization, the second is about the creation of a sovereign fund, and, perhaps, another point is about the exchange of energy assets.
Privatization here means the sale of non-controlling stakes in supercorporations and state-owned companies created in previous years to domestic insiders and foreigners. As for insiders in Russia, this will ensure their legal participation in the division of future profits. As for foreigners, their participation should legalize these corporations in international business, ensure its interest in maintaining the existing political system and, if possible, facilitate a limited transfer of technology and management. Approximately the same goals are pursued by the plan for the exchange of energy assets. The pilot project of which was the deal between BP and Rosneft.
It should be noted that in reality, deals like the one between BP and Rosneft have more to do with politics and PR than economic development and investment. The exchange of shares of energy giants does not replace direct investment, which creates new industries, jobs and new opportunities. This is not an influx of real money. For the economy, the difference is the same as the difference to love a real woman or a film star from a magazine. With a real woman, you can have a relationship, a family, you can only admire a film star. The share of direct investments in their total inflow to Russia was depressingly small even before the crisis - 23-25%. After the crisis, it decreased to 16% (despite the fact that a large part of them is the returned Russian capital). This is the real problem and the main obstacle to normal economic development. And the deal with BP doesn't change anything here.
The issue of investment is partly of concern, however, to the Russian elite. That is why the second item in Medvedev's proposals was the creation of a sovereign investment fund. In fact, this is still the same idea of a “roof”: instead of an investment climate, there are direct guarantees for investments made through the state fund. Only in the presence of such a "roof" the state guarantees protection from itself.
It must be said that sovereign funds usually mean state funds that invest the wealth accumulated by the state in order to increase them. Therefore, they invest where it is more profitable and more reliable. In this case, we are talking about creating a fund for foreign investment in the Russian economy on a parity basis with the state. But, as a rule, the state invests where either the profit or the payback period is not very attractive for a private investor. Foreign investors, on the contrary, are interested in maximum profit. So already in the plan there is an internal contradiction.
There is one more problem. The Russian bureaucratic vertical knows how to seize and protect assets. But what it does not know how, by definition, is to control costs. This is clearly demonstrated by all Putin's infrastructure projects. Therefore, foreigners will go into such a fund only if the yield is guaranteed - some form of bonds. And this means that in the case of lower returns, the shortfall will turn into public debt. It seems that as a result, new Russian mega-projects will be financed in this way - the Olympics and the World Cup.
One way or another, the Russian bureaucratic delegation came to the Davos Forum with a coherent program of Russia's positioning in world business in the near future. Which, of course, will determine the domestic political vector. It's not just about improving the investment climate here. A bad business climate is actually a necessary part of this model. For it is the level of threats that determines the desire of investors to go under the "roof", and the "roof" allows you to concentrate all sources of profitability under your control. That is why Russian officials almost flaunted the names of Khodorkovsky and Magnitsky in Davos. The phenomenon, which in the 1990s was called “power entrepreneurship” and elevated to the state level, is the core of the program proposed in Davos. The program of the fourth term of Vladimir Putin, which, ironically, was again formatted by the restrictions imposed by the decision in the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.