The pace of the Russian spring offensive was the slowest in the last three years, and in May the front finally stood still, despite the high level of manpower losses on the Russian side. The numerical advantage has practically ceased to be converted into territorial gains for the Russian army.

The pace of Russia's spring offensive has been the slowest in the past three years, and by May the front had effectively ground to a halt despite continued heavy Russian personnel losses. Russia's numerical advantage has largely ceased to translate into territorial gains. The Russian command is confronting a systemic crisis.

Over the past three months alone, Ukraine has carried out 55 successful strikes on Russian oil infrastructure and another 18 on other industrial facilities. Although the intensity of this campaign remains the same as in the final months of last year, the increased striking power of the drones and the cascading nature of attacks increases the damage caused. The Ukrainian air campaign of 2026 looks like another turning point in the war.

Over the past three months alone, Ukraine has carried out 55 successful strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and a further 18 against other industrial facilities. While the intensity of this campaign has not exceeded the levels seen in the final months of last year, improvements in drone strike capability and the cascading nature of the attacks have significantly increased the damage inflicted. Ukraine’s aerial campaign in 2026 appears to represent another turning point in the war.

Vladimir Putin and Putin's Russia appear to have missed the chance to win the war of attrition with Ukraine. And this can be considered a completely historical event, which until recently was difficult to imagine, which has yet to be comprehended and to the consequences of which Russia still has to get used to and adapt.

Vladimir Putin and Putin’s Russia appear to have missed their chance to secure victory in the war of attrition with Ukraine. This can be regarded as a genuinely historic development, one that would have been difficult to imagine until recently, that has yet to be fully comprehended, and to which Russia has yet to adapt.

The atmosphere of fears and rumors, ridiculous preparations and regulations on the approaches to the current May 9 add up to a general picture and a general feeling: few people can and want to share this holiday with Vladimir Putin, which was long ago appropriated by him and adopted as the day of his personal political triumph.

The atmosphere of fear and speculation, the absurd preparations and restrictions surrounding this year’s 9 May celebrations all contribute to a broader picture and a common impression: very few people are able or willing to share this holiday with Vladimir Putin, a holiday he long ago appropriated and turned into a day of his own personal political triumph.

The political regime of ‘military Putinism’ as the new form that Vladimir Putin’s regime has assumed over the past five years is currently facing not yet a crisis, but certainly a crisis-like intensification, that is, a whole cluster of challenges, to each of which it has no convincing response.

The political regime of “military Putinism”—that new form that Vladimir Putin’s regime has acquired in the last five years—is today facing not yet a crisis, but definitely a crisis condensation, that is, a whole bunch of challenges, to each of which it does not have a convincing answer. This does not mean at all that the regime will not cope with them, will not be able to manage their crisis potential, avoiding too obvious demonstration of its weakness and reducing image and managerial damage.

The design and principles of successfully functioning democracies and federations vary widely and are largely a compromise shaped by the specific circumstances of their emergence, subsequent evolution, and accumulated institutional path dependency. What matters is not so much devising the best recipe for Russian democracy as identifying the key goals of reform and the problems of institutional design around which the main debate is unfolding today and is likely to continue in the future.

The design and principles of successful democracies and federations vary widely and are largely a compromise of the particular circumstances of their emergence, subsequent evolution, and accumulated institutional “dependency.” It seems important not so much to write the best recipe for the institutions of Russian democracy, but to identify the key goals of reforms and those problems of institutional design around which the main discussion is unfolding today and, most likely, will continue in the

Part 3 of the report ‘Return to Normality and Advanced Democratisation’ is dedicated to possible scenarios for political transformation in Russia and was prepared as part of the project ‘Platform for Normalisation: Restoring the Future’. It addresses a question that is usually left outside the scope of political reform plans. A ‘window of opportunity’ for democratisation generally opens in the context of a crisis of the authoritarian regime. However, not all such crises lead to democratisation.

The third part of the report “Return to Normality and Advanced Democratization,” dedicated to possible scenarios for political transformation in Russia and prepared as part of the project “Normalization Platform: Reclaiming the Future,” addresses an issue that usually remains outside the scope of political reform plans. A “window of opportunity” for democratization, as a rule, opens in connection with a crisis of an authoritarian regime, but not all such crises lead to democratization.

The report published below was prepared as part of the collective project ‘Platform for Normalisation: Restoring the Future’. Launched several years ago at the initiative of Russian economist Andrei Yakovlev, who has remained its coordinator and driving force, the project has brought together a substantial group of experts (in the broadest sense of the term).