Modern discursive confrontation between Russian nationalists and federal authorities

We republish an article by A. Verkhovsky, published in the journal of the Levada Center "Public Opinion Bulletin", in No. 4, 2011. The article was completed in November 2011, that is, before the mass protest movement began. ** 2000s: nationalists and power

The reaction of society to the riots on Manezhnaya Square

An attempt to correct the course of power since December 2010

Response to course correction **

2000s: nationalists and power

The 2000s in Russia are largely marked by increasingly intense polemics on those social problems that can be interpreted as ethnic (and even then they are necessarily interpreted in this way in today's Russia). But before turning to the actual consideration of discursive practices, a few words should be said about the political background against which they unfold.

The past decade began with a sharp rise in mass ethno-xenophobia [1] , and the level reached in 2000 has hardly changed since then. In the early years of the decade, the topic of racist violence entered the public eye with a series of market riots. And at the same time, at the level of radical nationalist groups and in the mass media, the theme of migration (both immigration and internal migration of “non-Slavs”) was recognized as the main topic [2] . Immediately after this, the corresponding rhetoric was picked up by Vladimir Zhirinovsky's LDPR, and then by the Rodina parliamentary bloc. Since then, anti-migrant themes and ethno-nationalist political mobilization have made notable progress, despite rather severe restrictions from above. The entire decade has passed under the banner of competition between the two main currents in Russian nationalism - "imperial" and ethno-nationalist, and now the second one is clearly demonstrating greater dynamism and success [3] .

The main plots were run in over the years almost to the point of automatism, and gradually reduced by the beginning of the new decade to exactly two rhetorically interrelated topics - "ethno-banditry" and "the problem of the Caucasus", the latter being understood not so much as a problem of the North Caucasus as a region, but as a problem of immigrants from the Caucasus to other parts of Russia. In recent years, the nationalist opposition has been increasingly persistent in adding sharp criticism of the authorities to these topics - as corrupt, anti-people or even anti-Russian and serving "foreigners" [4] .

It is difficult to say whether the nationalists were narrowing down the themes of their speeches, going towards the intuitively felt moods of society as a whole, or whether these sentiments were shaped to a large extent by nationalist agitation, but it is certain that in the early 2010s we see that mass sentiments are only a more amorphous a copy of the agitation of Russian ethno-nationalists. We see a very high level of mass ethno-xenophobia, especially among young people and especially in both capitals, which is politically very significant. Moreover, if support for political slogans is relatively stable, then the feeling of ethnic hostility - one's own towards others or others towards oneself - increased noticeably in 2010-2011 (to the exceptional level of 2004) [5 ] . Hostility focuses on people from the North Caucasus and "illegal migrants from the CIS countries", i.e. from Transcaucasia and Central Asia [6] (but Caucasian phobia begins to outweigh migration phobia, especially among young people [7] ). It is also important what exactly is called as the main irritating factors. Half of the respondents, as a rule, cannot name the reasons for their dislike, and of the rest, only a minority points to such reasons as the threat of terrorism or competition, while the majority speaks of a difference in behavioral norms, “disrespect for customs”, etc. [8] Some experts, attracted by the Polytech agency for research in several regions, spoke even more clearly: a survey of experts revealed a correlation between attitudes towards an ethnic group, in fact, only with the peculiarities of its behavior [9] . Focusing on “cultural difference” implies the unsolvability of the “problem of foreigners”: in fact, it is said that either “they” will begin to behave like “we” (which is the basis of the much discussed in 2010-11 idea of ​​the “Muscovite code” [10 ] ), or “they” must leave.

However, there is a real problem, which indeed seems so neglected that there are serious doubts that it can be resolved - this is the problem of the North Caucasus. It's not just about the problems that are most often talked about - terrorism, the rise of radical Islamism, excessive levels of criminalization and corruption, and high unemployment. The region, it seems, not only does not approach the rest of Russian society in terms of its social structure, but moves away from it. It is governed, especially in Dagestan and Chechnya, in such a specific way that it is hard to imagine that it is part of the same country, these republics are more like troubled colonies. And it does not seem at all that the policy of the federal authorities will be sufficient to reverse this trend of disintegration of the region. Most citizens, of course, do not think in terms of integration, they are concerned, as mentioned above, with terrorism and the "bad behavior" of people from the Caucasus outside of it. It got to the point that in the mentioned survey of the Polytech agency, 26% of the young people surveyed spoke in favor of the separation of the Caucasus from Russia, even being clearly warned by the interviewer that this could lead to the collapse of Russia. 14% of the undecided motivated their position most often by the fact that secession of the territory would not help, since people from the Caucasus would still remain in Russia [11] . A Levada Center poll on the same topic, but only for Chechnya and conducted without age restrictions, gave similar results: 11% consider Chechnya to have already seceded, 23% would be happy to secede, and 28% would rather not care [ 12 ] .

Among Russian nationalists, the topic of secession of the North Caucasus has been discussed for a long time and mostly sympathetically. But at the level of leaders, this idea is perceived as very problematic in implementation and therefore does not enjoy wide support. Instead of the idea of ​​secession, the slogan “Stop feeding the Caucasus!” was put forward, almost unanimously supported among them, meaning the demand to stop direct and indirect support of the region from the federal budget [13] . This slogan is widely used in the hope of finally getting through to the minds of ordinary xenophobic-minded citizens, who now for the most part do not support the nationalist movement at all; and so far - in vain, judging by the attendance of the relevant rallies.

A fairly wide team of authors also prepared a special brochure-report "Caucasus-2011: Russian view" [14] , sustained in a fairly moderate tone. However, “for their own” slogan can be transformed into “The Caucasus will starve!”, as the author happened to hear at a nationalist rally on June 11, 2011. The authors of the report consider the option of secession of the Caucasus as a backup, in case they fail to force the region to assimilate .

The separation was also opposed by the main leaders of the “Russians” movement, created in May 2011 on the basis of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), “Slavic Force” (formerly “Slavic Union”, renamed due to the ban), “National Socialist Initiative” and other smaller organizations. These leaders even paid an official visit to Chechnya in July 2011, where they were received by the head of the republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Both sides of the negotiations undoubtedly viewed them as a success in securing their role as "ethnic leaders", which is extremely important for them. Alexander Belov and Dmitry Demushkin said after the trip that they admired the way Kadyrov manages the republic, and the separation of the region cannot solve the existing problems [15] .

During the 2000s, the authorities reacted differently to the activity of nationalists and to the increasingly persistent turn of public opinion towards the acute problematization of ethnic issues. In 2003-2006 an experiment was carried out with the Motherland bloc, which was intended to accumulate xenophobic sentiments and a significant part of nationalist activity in a controlled manner. The experiment obviously failed and was curtailed. Later, in 2007-2009. it was repeated on a smaller scale with pro-Kremlin youth movements that copied the rhetoric and partly practice of DPNI and other publicly active ethno-nationalists. At the same time, efforts were made to divide radical nationalists into more and less radical ones. But even these experiments were stopped in the second half of 2009 precisely because it was not possible to keep the ultra-right elements under control [16] . At the same time, a real fight against racist violence began to slowly unfold from the middle of the decade, reaching (probably) a peak in 2010, when 320 people were convicted of such crimes. [17] .

And all this time the official discourse has been composed of two components. The first is countering extremism. This discourse of protecting power and suppressing political opponents of any kind is closely related to the relevant legislation and its very problematic application [18] , which is not the topic of this article. The second component, the resolution of "interethnic conflicts", was inherited from Soviet times [19] . In addition to the unfortunate use of the word “nation”, which denotes an ethnic community in Soviet and modern Russian political parlance, the very idea of ​​conflict, which implies certain ethnically organized parties, is important here. The situation of an attack by a dozen ideological racists on one or two passers-by rises sharply, thus, in status and implicitly suggests the need for negotiations between the respective "ethnic parties". Such negotiations were often called and are called in public discussions as a way to solve the problem, and even actually took place in the form of meetings between the leadership of the so-called "ethnic diasporas" and the leaders of Russian ethno-nationalist organizations (an extreme case is official negotiations between the authorities of Kyrgyzstan and the neo-Nazi organization "Slavic Union" [20] ).

If the main theme of ethno-nationalist propaganda for the past ten years has been the theme of "the dominance of migrants", it would be reasonable to expect that in this area the authorities will respond to such persistent criticism. The main response of the authorities, in addition to occasional explanations of the economic necessity of immigration and incantations about the observance of the law, was the policy of regional labor migration quotas. Its complete detachment from economic reality betrayed precisely the propagandistic nature of this measure (the corruption benefits from quotas still accrued more to local and regional officials than to the federal level).

Another important topic of ethno-nationalists is "ethno-banditry", that is, allegedly special criminal activity of ethnic minorities, and here one should wait for a response from law enforcement agencies. The police do not have official statistics that take into account the ethnicity of criminals, so it is not easy to give such an answer. There are statistics on citizenship, and in general it plays against ethno-nationalists: 3-4% of detected criminals are non-citizens [21] , which roughly corresponds to their number in the country [22] , but these statistics are very rarely mentioned. But from time to time you can even hear from the most senior law enforcement officials that it is migrants who provoke the worsening of the crime situation. True, journalists make a significant contribution here, conveying statements and especially statistics in such a way as to create the most disturbing impression (the main mistake, intentional or not, is to mix data about immigrants and about “non-natives” among criminals) [23] . In fact, there are not so many such statements by officials, but they are the ones that are replicated, so it can be assumed that such statements meet the expectations of the majority of journalists writing on these topics. But perhaps it is also the fact that there are no clear statements explaining that migrants are not a key crime problem, with an analysis by different types of crimes, by regions, and so on.

Thus, in the topic that can be called “migration as a problem”, the authorities do not actually oppose ethno-nationalists. This unexpected consensus is perceived by society as a dead end: the problem is identified, repeated many times, but solutions are not offered. In fact, they are offered. On the one hand, there are supporters of mass deportation, border closures, the introduction of a visa regime with the CIS countries, and so on, but they speak relatively quietly due to their marginal political status and restrictions on access to the media. On the other hand, supporters of the development of integration programs and a consistent fight against discrimination are speaking out, but their voice is even too quiet. The proposals of officials of various levels are repeated almost verbatim from year to year and are clearly not accompanied by any practical activity that is noticeable to society, so they are simply ignored or awarded with sarcastic comments. As a result, the genre of a hopeless statement of the dead end of the so-called "national policy" is becoming more widespread in the mass media. [24] .

The reaction of society to the riots on Manezhnaya Square

The riots organized by radical nationalists on Manezhnaya Square and other related events of December 2010 [25] sharply raised the status and emotional degree of all discussions, one way or another related to the topic of ethnicity. This topic began to claim to be one of the key in the coming 2011 and, accordingly, in the federal elections - parliamentary and presidential. But the modern Russian political system does not allow for open controversy in "big politics" if it is not allowed by the Kremlin. Since the participation of nationalist parties in "big politics" has been explicitly excluded since 2006 (and these parties themselves have disappeared), the discussion about racism, migration, and similar topics has been severely deformed. The sharp contrast between the massive demand for a topic and the lack of adequate discussion on it is striking.

Not only the political system as a whole has been deformed, but the nationalist movement itself. Deprivation of access to elections, and indeed the quality of these elections, drastically reduces the value of political activism proper in the eyes of the new activists. But the movement is predominantly youth and is quickly replenished with new age cohorts. These young people either quickly become disillusioned and return to private life, because they turn to violent actions as the most accessible alternative (although this alternative is also problematic, which is actively discussed in the ultra-right environment). However, it must be said that even without pressure from the authorities, the movement of Russian nationalists is experiencing an extreme shortage of personnel who are not oriented towards violence. And there are almost no people who are ready to condemn the so-called direct action [26] . This specifically Russian problem significantly reduces the ability of the nationalist movement to influence public controversy.

Instead of nationalists, the most intelligent part of which is able to coherently state their vision of problems and formulate their proposals, the same ideas for society are broadcast by other actors, not always directly connected with nationalists.

A special role is played by some journalists who specialize in the topic of “defending Russians”. It is they who generate and convey to a wide audience the interpretation of many conflicts and problems precisely as “inter-ethnic”. This happens especially often after the publication of high-profile news, in which the ethnic factor really played a significant role - journalists try to find such events. This is how the perception of any conflicts involving people of different ethnicities as interethnic ones is formed. This perception seems to have become almost universally accepted.

The most telling recent example is the coverage of the conflict in the village of Sagra in the Sverdlovsk region. The actual outline is very simple: some villagers came into conflict with a local drug dealer - he called in some bandits for help - the bandits arrived on July 1, 2011 in several cars and with weapons - on the way the villagers made them an armed selection, in a shootout of the bandits was killed - the investigation that began was carried out rather sluggishly, there was even an attempt to lay the blame on the shooting peasants, and not on the bandits. However, even the initial coverage of the conflict was strongly ethnically tinged. The author of the replicated messages, the head of the City Without Drugs organization Yevgeny Roizman, known not only for extreme methods of "treatment" of drug addicts, but also for numerous racist statements, emphasized that the drug dealer was a gypsy, the peasants were Russians, and the bandits were Azerbaijanis, and Roizman's colleague Yevgeny Malenkin, to whom he referred, already directly called the bandits "animals" [27] . And in the vast majority of subsequent texts that mentioned Sagra, it was mentioned precisely as an example of "ethnic conflict", with more or less emphasis on criticism of the police, although even in the initial reports of "City Without Drugs" there was no mention that the conflict was somehow motivated by ethnic hostility - it was just an attack by bandits on the village.

It is noteworthy how unanimous this understanding of history was in Sagra, in comparison with the interpretation of events on Manezhnaya Square. Then, despite the pronounced ethnic hostility of the participants, many commentators sought to divert the ethnic theme into the background [28] .

There are also cases when journalists come out directly with policy articles of a nationalist nature, which always attracts attention when it comes to a popular publication. For example, after the events on Manezhnaya Square, the well-known journalist Dmitry Sokolov-Mitrich published an article [29] based, which is noteworthy, not on protecting the interests of ethnic Russians, but on protecting “atomized” citizens from wild Caucasians living according to other laws and gradually gradually seizing power in Russian cities. The author proposes to start "legal terror" against people from the Caucasus, punishing them as much as possible for any offenses, in order to instill in them respect for general civil norms of behavior. It is interesting that the author is not in the least embarrassed by the racist selectivity of the proposed measures (the editors of one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the country are not at all embarrassed), moreover, he is sure, it seems that this was precisely what was meant when, for example, in New York, the “zero tolerance”, and believes that this is what the majority of citizens want, supporting the slogan “Fuck the Caucasus! E ... t!".

The rhetoric of "ethnic conflict" is actively supported, consciously or by inertia, by many socially significant figures. It is worth highlighting among them the leaders of the main religious organizations. Traditionally, in modern Russia, religious and ethnic identifications are not just mixed, but this mixing is institutionalized. For example, only the so-called “traditional religions” (Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism) are represented in the Interreligious Council of Russia, which differ from almost all the others precisely in that they can indicate their “ethnic area”, which ideally does not intersect with “ethnic religions”. habitats” of partners on this council. The division of "areas" not only exists in reality (exceptions exist, but are few), but is constantly emphasized by religious leaders. After the events on Manezhnaya Square, the representative of the Russian Orthodox Church, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, proposed the creation of interfaith working groups to appease "interethnic conflicts." This proposal is highly unrealistic. It is all the more surprising that President Medvedev agreed with Father Vsevolod's proposal at a meeting of the Presidium of the State Council on February 11, 2011.

The proposed peacekeeping is not only implicitly based on the concept of “interethnic conflict”, but also deliberately transfers participants in former or future riots from the status of hooligans, or even criminals (whom the authorities and society may treat with more or less condescension, depending on the circumstances) into the status of legitimate representatives of their "people" [30] . In a fairly frank form, this idea was expressed by a generally moderate person, de facto one of the most audible voices of the Russian Orthodox Church, Deacon Andrei Kuraev. Regarding the riots on Manezhnaya Square, he said: "A pogrom is always the reaction of the defenseless, who are tired of hoping for protection from the authorities" [31] .

The topic of nationalism, which is in demand in society, cannot be ignored by the parliamentary parties. The easiest way to dodge the demands of society is the fundamentally unprincipled ruling United Russia, and in previous elections it lagged far behind its opponents in terms of the amount of hate speech in its campaigning [32] . Of course, he always picks up the xenophobic rhetoric of the Liberal Democratic Party, which initially acted as a nationalist party and only eventually lost its principles. Although the LDPR acted somewhat more frankly for the 2011 parliamentary elections than before: it not only attracted certain groups of radical nationalists to cooperate on the periphery of party life, but created a “Russian Committee” under the party, which included the leaders of the main public organizations of radical Russian ethno-nationalists . The LDPR went to the polls under the slogan “LDPR is for the Russians,” but did not include right-wing radicals on the party list itself.

The cooperation of other registered parties with radical nationalists, even if it became closer, still remained a peripheral phenomenon for the parties. But, avoiding politically risky (and for many morally unacceptable) cooperation with the radicals, party leaders themselves actively pick up some of their rhetoric. As an example, Boris Nadezhdin, leader of the Right Cause liberal party near Moscow, was falsely accused of recruiting skinheads into the organization [33] . Of course, Nadezhdin, who presents himself as a Russian liberal, does not recruit people more radically than the moderately nationalist activist and political strategist Viktor Militarev. But he puts forward the slogan “Moscow region is Russian land” and this is how he explains its meaning: “if, relatively speaking, you came here, let you be Chinese, Caucasian, Japanese, whatever, and are going to live here and so that your children live and grandchildren, you need to become a Russian person, if not by complexion, then by culture, by traditions, by customs. Because people here have been living like this since time immemorial.” Further, Nadezhdin argued that multiculturalism has been practiced in Europe for 20 years, and a “melting pot” has been operating in the United States, and insisted that the only correct way is the second one, understood as complete assimilation, up to the indispensable naming of children by Russian names (although, to baptize all Nadezhdins does not offer), otherwise the Indians in their villages "will dump their dead in the Oka, and so on." Of course, the concept of "soil" is not limited to immigrants. If the Moscow region was and should remain the “core of the Russian people”, then it remains to be added: “At the same time, I respect the desire of the Chechen people that this (apparently, the Chechen land - A.V.) be the core of the Chechen people, and in Grozny the mosque, and Kadyrov forever and ever and so on. I don’t go there with my charter.” It is also noteworthy that Nadezhdin insisted that people with non-Russian surnames (like Roizman or Pletosu) cannot be Russian nationalists. [34] . Thus, Nadezhdin's rhetoric is aimed at assimilation, but in reality it works rather to divide the population, including citizens, along ethnic lines and separately along ethno-territorial lines.

Finally, one should not think that the so-called "extra-systemic", that is, obviously not allowed in the parliament, democratic opposition remains aloof from the same processes. For example, the group of Vladimir Milov, expelled (or left, different interpretations of the split are possible) from the Solidarity movement precisely for its inclination towards nationalist ideas, continued its activities under the name Democratic Choice and merged in this capacity into the united liberal-democratic opposition party PARNAS ". In the draft program of the "Democratic Choice", for example, it was proposed to introduce restrictions for people from the North Caucasus on entry to other regions of the country [35] .

In the small democratic opposition, which feels its weakness, the mechanism of rejection of even radical nationalist elements is very weak. For example, the defenders of the Khimki forest were joined by very radical ultra-rightists directly with their own symbols, and this did not cause any protests from the leadership of the movement [36] .

Eagerly published in all major opposition-democratic publications, economist and publicist Mikhail Delyagin already in 2010-11 tried to create a national-populist party "Motherland - Common Sense" together with another well-known publicist, Maxim Kalashnikov, who directly called himself a National Socialist [37 ] , but even this did not make Delyagin a less acceptable author. Delyagin does not consider himself a nationalist, but he understands the situation in the country as follows: “what is officially considered “nationalism” and “extremism” today is basically nothing more than a manifestation, terribly belated and incredibly weak, of the self-preservation instinct of the Russian people and of the entire Russian civilization as a whole in the face of the monstrous ethnic aggression to which he is subjected. The source and form of aggression are indicated - "the growing Caucasian terror", it is also said that this aggression, "as far as one can judge, is supported by the authorities" [38] .

An attempt to correct the course of power since December 2010

The December events of 2010 demanded from the country's leadership both a prompt reaction and some kind of course correction in what could be called "ethnic policy". Moreover, approximately one-fifth of the citizens, to one degree or another, supported the speakers at the Manezh [39] .

The prompt reaction, after several days of complete confusion, was to be expected. Both members of the power tandem called for tough and non-selective (in the ethnic sense) measures to maintain the rule of law. It was really necessary to state in that situation, but it was clearly not enough.

Vladimir Putin was the first to make statements on the merits of a possible policy adjustment, so we will begin our analysis of the position of the ruling tandem from him.

A few days after the riots, he met with the leaders of football hooligans (and in vain, because these leaders demonstrated in December that they were not able to control a significant part of the fans, especially the youngest), visited the grave of Yegor Sviridov, who was killed in a street fight and became a reason for unrest (such a step by the prime minister would have deserved all approval if it were not an extraordinary exception in the practice of V. Putin; at least he never came to the graves of those killed in numerous hate crimes), and by the end of December he even spoke in favor of tightening the registration regime at the place of residence or stay, up to criminal liability for violations [40] . However, the last populist statement had no real consequences. And in general, the obvious attempts to flirt with potential supporters of ethno-nationalists ended there, probably because the real threat of new unrest has already passed.

At the same meeting where Putin spoke about tightening the registration regime, he also spoke in favor of the idea of ​​uniting the political nation, though without using the term itself. Recognizing that something unifying is needed to create such a nation (the ideological unity of the Soviet people was cited as an example), Putin proposed developing “all-Russian patriotism” as a unifying idea, which is an obvious tautology.

In general, Putin's reasoning remained within the framework of the "settlement of interethnic relations" [41] . (By the way, all of his speeches since December 2010, somehow related to topics of interest to us, are on Google for the word "interethnic". Some other major politicians, including President Medvedev, Google does not give such an ideal result.) This is expressed in the pronunciation years of tried-and-true formulations in the spirit of "interethnic harmony". Although, admittedly, the Prime Minister does not avoid specific sensitive issues (for example, about the targeted recruitment of students from the North Caucasus [42] ), even if he knows that the audience will not be happy: for example, he spoke to the activists of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia about the inevitability of further labor immigration [43] . Putin pays great attention to the education of ethnic tolerance, but interprets it not through civic solidarity or the idea of ​​equality, but traditionally, that is, ethnographically: “We must always remember that one of the causes of interethnic conflicts is ignorance, a low level of education of people, their own culture, and the culture of their neighbors" [44] . And, of course, nothing is said about real migrant integration programs, and the word “discrimination” does not occur at all (which, we note, is by no means typical of Putin alone).

The prime minister’s educational message highlights the same idea of ​​territorial binding of ethnicity, which, for example, Boris Nadezhdin declares (see above) and which is usually associated in the media with the folk proverb “you don’t go to a strange monastery with your own charter.” Putin has repeatedly said that a person must adapt his ethno-cultural traditions to the ethno-cultural traditions associated with his current place of permanent or temporary residence. “The culture of interethnic communication” lies in the fact that “if someone moves to the territory of his non-traditional residence, he must respect the culture, language, and customs of those people among whom he decided to live” [ 45 ] . The question arises in what forms this “respect” should be shown, but the answer to this question cannot be obtained not only from Putin, but also from officials more accessible for questioning. However, Putin gave some idea about this: at a meeting with representatives of the North Caucasian youth organizations, recalling the debate in Europe about wearing a veil, he said that if the host “people” (obviously, it was not about a political nation, but about an ethnic group - A.V.) certain behavior (for example, wearing a veil) “is perceived as religious and cultural aggression, if this causes rejection, then you need to treat this with understanding and not impose your own rules.” Putin also added: “I fully admit that there are people with completely radical views, but then go and live where these radical views are the norm.” [46] .

In the spirit of the idea of ​​"settlement of ethnic conflicts," Putin speaks of the need for interaction between ethnic organizations and even addresses them directly at a special meeting in July 2011. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of religious organizations, traditionally grouped as ethnic ones. The Prime Minister even indulges in rather strange pseudo-theological speculations for this: “You know, we have Eastern Christianity - Orthodoxy. And some theorists of Christianity say that in many ways it is even closer to Islam than, say, to the Catholics” [47] .

Dmitry Medvedev's speeches, focused on changing the policy in the field of ethnicity, differed markedly from Putin's - if only by the fact that they underwent a rapid evolution.

Back in late December, the President was only talking about restoring “interethnic harmony”, almost without falling into populism (except at the moment when he considered it necessary to mention in this regard the need to “harder block the channels of illegal migration”), but without picking up on the merits of the words Putin on civil unity [48] .

But already in January, he delivered a keynote speech to the leadership of the Federal Assembly. Insisting on unity in the diversity of Russian ethno-cultural traditions, he singled out the special role of Russian culture as not only the largest in terms of quantity, but also as "the basis, the backbone of the development of our entire multinational culture."

At the same time, Medvedev paid special attention to Orthodoxy, up to such a turn, somewhat unexpected in this context: “... in recent years, Russia has built new churches, museums, and hotels for pilgrims in the Holy Land. This, of course, strengthens Russian traditions.” It should be taken into account that Dmitry Medvedev can be called an Orthodox president to a much greater extent than Vladimir Putin [49] .

There is nothing new in the construction of the union of ethnic cultures headed by the Russian. And the President continued by saying that cultures should not be understood only in the sense of relevant traditions, culture also includes modern culture, which must be specially developed: “We need to support modern Russian folklore, music, and literature of our days, and those before our eyes." Medvedev ended his speech pathetically: "This is the only way to develop synthetic national values" [50] . Probably, the President really counts on the fact that modern cultural trends, which are much more open in terms of “intercultural interaction”, whatever that means, will contribute to the integration of the nation. Of course, cultural practices alone cannot provide such a result, but at least some meaningful consideration was put forward in this speech about where the unity of Russian citizens could come from.

At a specially convened meeting of the Presidium of the State Council “on measures to strengthen interethnic harmony” on February 11, 2011 [51] , Medvedev continued the same line, but corrected it.

He spoke less about the dominant role of Russian culture, except that he reminded that immigrants are required to know the Russian language (and the relevant measures are now being prepared by the Government). But he emphasized that for Russia the speeches of Western leaders “about the collapse of the policy of multiculturalism” are irrelevant: Medvedev insisted on the multicultural nature of Russia. However, he did not say anything specifically about the policy of multiculturalism: in Russia, politicians and officials in general, as a rule, confuse the meaning of this word with the actual multiculturalism of society.

On the other hand, it was directly stated about the need to “create a full-fledged Russian nation while preserving the identity of all the peoples inhabiting our country”, however, only in the final speech, when several participants in the meeting spoke in favor of such an idea.

The practical proposals of the President lay mainly in the field of education - whether for young people, officials or citizens in general, and were either very general or not very serious in nature (for example, a lot was said about campaign videos). Again, the role of religious leaders was emphasized. But a real problem was also touched upon - ethnic discrimination in the formation of authorities in the regions. The government and representatives of the President in the federal districts were invited to submit proposals "to eliminate such distortions."

Thus, Medvedev did not actually develop his proposals put forward in December. And in general, acted rather cautiously. It is also noteworthy that in the subsequent spring and summer months he made no significant new announcements. Most likely, the fact is that in the highest bureaucratic circles there is no semblance of agreement on what the state's strategy might be, as there was never before. Not in vain, despite the almost universal opinion that the Concept of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1996, is outdated, it has not been possible to develop and adopt a new one so far.

In principle, Medvedev's February speech was based on a report distributed to the participants, prepared by the Ministry of Regional Development [52] . But if we turn to the text of the report itself, it becomes clear that the President did not fully voice the concept of the report, apparently formulated too clearly, although it is precisely from this concept, briefly outlined below, that all that he nevertheless said follows.

The report focuses the state on "taking systemic measures aimed at strengthening the civic unity of Russians while simultaneously addressing the issue of the ethno-cultural well-being of the Russian majority and preserving the ethno-cultural diversity of the Russian nation."

The report repeatedly refers to the concept of "majority". For example, "the identity of Russia and Russian civilization" is "multinationality, polyconfessionality and multiformity in the presence of an ethnic (Russian) and religious (Orthodox) majority." Among the global trends, along with mass migrations, the clash of secular and religious paradigms, etc., is also called "the search in a democratic society for a legal way out of the situation of absolutization of the rights of minorities to the detriment of the rights of the majority."

The report, with a frankness that is probably unique for official documents, opens a list of problems that Russia inherited from the USSR, "the ethnic principle of the administrative-territorial structure."

With regard to Russia, the term “Russian civilization” is emphatically used, referring to the rich tradition of so-called civilizational nationalism [53] . This tradition in today's Russian nationalism is opposed to ethno-nationalism, and thus the report is also opposed to it, which is directly stated in the text itself.

The problems and corresponding proposals of the report are best illustrated by the list of “key problems in the sphere of the state of interethnic relations” presented there. I will have to quote it in its entirety, since the wording and their sequence best represent the position of the authors of the report:

“- a weak all-Russian civic identity, including among the North Caucasian youth, with the increasing importance of ethnic and religious self-identification;

• ethno-political and religious-political radicalism and extremism, including among the youth;

• the complex socio-cultural well-being of the Russian people against the background of the ethnic mobilization of other ethnic communities and the growth in the number of migrants, the dissatisfaction of their ethno-cultural needs;

• the growth of nationalist sentiments among Russian youth;

• low activity of non-governmental organizations;

• the lack of public agreement on the issue of the basic values ​​of Russian society, the still insignificant role of traditional (including family and religious) values ​​in the life of a modern Russian against the backdrop of an increase in the activity of both traditional and new religious organizations;

• attempts to implement a number of geopolitical projects on the territory of the Russian Federation in the interests of individual foreign states, ethnic or religious communities and aimed at destabilizing the socio-political situation in Russia up to the collapse of the state along ethnic or religious lines.

The report unconditionally and directly supports the formation of the priority of civic identity over ethnic identity (especially in the education system). The possibility of forming such a priority is confirmed by the data of VTsIOM polls, according to which the significance of ethnic and, moreover, religious differences for Russians is gradually decreasing [54] .

The historical identity of the concepts "Russian" and "Russian" is involved. It is worth noting that the key quote is taken from one of the main liberal nationalists of the early 20th century, Pyotr Struve. And in today's conditions, one of the key tasks is to strengthen the role of the Russian language.

With regard to minorities, the report even speaks of the problems of discrimination and the need for social adaptation of migrants. One of the tasks of the state policy is formulated as follows: "overcoming corruption in state authorities and law enforcement agencies, which forms protest moods in society and impunity for individual representatives of ethnic communities." Admittedly, it was impossible to address the popular topic of “ethno-crime” in society in a more politically correct way.

Reaction to course correction

The difference between the clarity of the wording of this report, which leaves no room for various interpretations, and a certain evasiveness of the President's speeches, is striking. But no less important is the response in the environment of the highest bureaucracy caused by the conceptual approach seen in both of these sources. A certain scatter of responses could be observed right at the very February meeting of the Presidium of the State Council, although for such meetings it is natural to fully agree with the position proposed from above.

Already the governor of the Rostov region, Vasily Golubev, who had the opportunity to present the very report of the State Council working group, made certain deviations from the meaning of the report when presenting it. For example, when discussing the causes of existing problems, he referred only to external or historical causes, but did not discuss the shortcomings of today's policy in any way. Obviously stronger than in the report, the emphasis was placed on the difficulties in the "ethnic well-being" of Russians; it was even said that “today we do not have enough public organizations that would develop and promote Russian culture, folklore, traditions, and finally, the Russian language” [55] . Speaking about the general attitude towards the formation of a common civic identity, the speaker simultaneously considered that “particular attention should be paid to the peacemaking social potential of national-cultural associations, religious organizations, communities and fraternities” (which, apparently, is partly based on the Rostov experience of local interethnic negotiation sites, etc.).

At the same time, Golubev very accurately set two related tasks: “First of all, we need to agree on terminology and clarify the main approaches to the implementation of the state national policy, what ideas we are promoting that unite all citizens.” The only trouble is that neither he nor the other speakers, either at that meeting or later, did not only the second (which is objectively very difficult), but also the first, which was pointed out a month later by leading sociologists who gathered to discuss the same issue. and anthropologists [56] .

Regional leaders supported the idea of ​​forming a general civil unity, as well as the idea of ​​the dominance of Russian culture (and, first of all, the key role of the Russian language) in this process. Even the presidents of the national republics (Yakutia-Sakha and Dagestan) spoke in this spirit, although the president of Bashkortostan, Rustem Khamitov, nevertheless insisted on maintaining bilingualism. The President of Kabardino-Balkaria, Arsen Kanokov, supported Medvedev even more radically: “The establishment of the leading role of the Russian people, their language and culture in this process, in my opinion, should have legal consolidation” [ 57] . He also emphasized the importance of strengthening the traditional moral and religious values ​​of the different peoples of the country. Valentina Matvienko, for her part, proposed to legislate "the substantive foundations of the national-state idea of ​​modern Russia."

There is no certainty that such a political elite is capable of pursuing a conceptually coherent state policy in such a vague issue for it. Moreover, the official document of the highest quality at the moment, namely the above-mentioned report (it can and should be criticized, but it is difficult to expect something qualitatively better from the state apparatus), is not being promoted properly by the country's top officials. And there is almost no discussion at the level of high-ranking officials.

The reaction of society to the policy statements of the President in January-February 2011 was extremely sluggish. Basically, in the non-official mass media, they limited themselves to an ironic retelling with an emphasis on the word “Russian”, which does not have the best reputation in today's Russian language, and on the analogy with the concept of “Soviet people”.

In essence, the President's initiative was questioned by sociologists Emil Pain and Vladimir Mukomel, who reasonably noted that supra-ethnic unity should be realized through a civil nation. But for the existence of such an active civil society and the corresponding self-awareness of citizens, and in today's Russia, both are very weak [58] . It can also be added that the existing political regime does not imply their strengthening. However, it is not for nothing that neither Putin nor Medvedev used the term "civil nation". What they talked about and what is described in the report of the State Council should rather be called the term "political nation" - it contains the antithesis of an ethnic nation, but it does not actually imply democracy. And such political nations are possible - many countries in Europe and Latin America in their authoritarian period can serve as an example of this. Perhaps the ruling tandem implicitly had this in mind (the degree of rigidity of authoritarianism is a secondary parameter in this case).

It is also interesting to note the reaction of some Russian ethno-nationalists. Precisely some, since some of them, such as, for example, Pavel Svyatenkov, preferred to actually ignore the new ideological initiatives of the authorities [59] . Konstantin Krylov, who usually writes about everything in the world, did not react at all.

On the other hand, Mikhail Remizov, one of the most moderate authors of the ethno-nationalist camp, practically agreed with Medvedev. He does not object to the option of a civil nation (and he uses this very term), but precisely because the formation of such a nation presupposes a powerful unification, only not in language or some ethnographic features, but “homogeneity of political culture and civil consciousness.” Remizov writes that if the authorities manage to achieve such uniformity in relation to the Caucasus and to people from the Caucasus, this will suit the Russians quite well: “the main request of Manezhnaya Square may well be considered a request for a civil nation” [60 ] .

But the rhetoric of the State Council report that “Russians” and “Russians” are historically the same thing can also be turned in the oppositional direction, which was done by more militant authors (although also far from street radicals), Boris Vinogradov and Andrey Saveliev. They criticize Medvedev for trying to build a "Russian" nation at the expense of the Russian nation: "From our point of view, a nation has already been formed in Russia, and it exists as a phenomenon of Russian political culture." Further, a common place for nationalists is repeated: “bureaucracy and ethnocracy form an alliance against the Russians” (by ethnocracy, of course, we mean any, except Russian). It is noteworthy, however, that further the authors do not at all insist on some kind of cultural “Russification”, they argue that “any questions of nationality (ethnicity) and religious affiliation should be left to the private discretion of the citizen, and the state should adhere to a strict unifying role”, all peoples must “assimilate into the Russian civil nation, preserving their ethnographic features and faith” (an analogy is the American “melting pot” with WASP as its core) [61] .

Thus, even A. Savelyev [62], who firmly stands on the positions of the racial approach, today stands for the same things that the typical frightened city dweller D. Sokolov-Mitrich and the liberal B. Nadezhdin stand for, and which can be subtracted by wading through contradictory rhetoric , from the official presidential position. It must be said that this is a very rare example for today's Russia of agreement between such different actors.

On the other hand, Konstantin Krylov, one of the most intelligible and convincing propagandists of Russian ethno-nationalism, undoubtedly disagrees with the President. For him, the existing government is “foreign” and anti-Russian, and therefore, in principle, cannot be a source of something constructive in nation-building. Krylov also cannot accept the construction of any entity that is more significant than the Russian people themselves, understood as a consanguineous community [63] . And he is by no means alone in this understanding.

The government is very cautious in offering society a gradual transition from the current ethnic policy to some new one, in the spirit of the agreement noted above. The current one can be characterized in two ways. Firstly, as almost absent, not really formulated in any way. Secondly, as based on the priority of "maintaining interethnic peace" by maintaining a balance between the various subjects of alleged "interethnic relations" - left over from the Soviet era (for example, territorial ethnic elites), random (for example, the so-called "national diasporas") or even in no way structured in reality (for example, “Caucasian youth”). This policy requires only the repetition of the thesis that multi-ethnicity is a plus for the country, and does not allow for any other meaningful statement.

The new policy, apparently, should become a policy of greater unification of the country in the sense of both written and customary law, and this process should be accompanied by pedaling patriotic emotions and emphasizing the significance of the Russian and Orthodox "core" of the political nation thus formed. From the current statements of the country's leaders and their practical actions, it is impossible to draw conclusions about what the pace of this process will be, how much the supposed integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities will resemble cultural assimilation, and so on. In fact, it is not even possible to say whether this process of constructing the "correct cauldron" will begin at all.

It is already clear, however, that the attitude in all sectors of society (we considered as examples of extreme cases - members of the Presidium of the State Council and intellectual leaders of Russian ethno-nationalists) to a possible change in course, if it manifests itself at all, looks contradictory. In order for the course to be changed in such conditions, it will apparently require some other noticeable shocks of a scale not less than those that were in December 2010.

---

[1] Lev Gudkov. “Russia for Russians”: xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments in Russia // Does Russian society need immigrants? Moscow: Liberal Mission Foundation, 2006, pp. 31-78.

[2] Ibid. See also: Ethnic and Religious Intolerance in the Russian Media. Monitoring results 2001–2004 / Ed. A. Verkhovsky and G. Kozhevnikova. Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2005.

[3] This topic certainly needs more discussion. See: Verkhovsky A. The evolution of the post-Soviet movement of Russian nationalists // Bulletin of Public Opinion. 2011. No. 1 (107). pp.11-35.

[4] Here, for example, is the headline of the news on the website of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration: The ruling national traitors are preparing a new anti-Russian law // DPNI website. 2008. October 11 (http://www.dpni.org/articles/commentari/10230/).

But the authorities can be directly called "anti-Russian". See: March 13 – come to the polling station! Express your attitude to the party of thieves and crooks! // There. 2011. March 9 (http://dpni.org/articles/novosti_dp/21023/).

[5] See for example: Nationalism in Russia // Levada Center. 2011. September 6 (http://www.levada.ru/press/2011090601.html); Should people of the following nationalities live in Russia? (Yes) // Ibid. 2010 (http://www.levada.ru/archive/mezhetnicheskie-otnosheniya/sleduet-li-ogranichit-prozhivanie-na-territorii-rossii-lyudei-sl).

[6] See the data of the VTsIOM survey in the report of the Ministry of Regional Development: On measures to strengthen interethnic harmony in Russian society // Website of the Ministry of Regional Development. 2011. February (http://www.minregion.ru/activities/interethnic_relations/national_policy/505/902.html) (hereinafter referred to as the "Report of the Ministry of Regional Development"). pp. 15-17.

[7] In a survey of young citizens, 39% of respondents expressed dislike for Caucasians (even more than for policemen - 27%), and for foreign workers - 20%. These data are given in a survey by the Polytech agency commissioned by the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. See: Interethnic intolerance in the urban youth environment (in the wake of the events at Manezhnaya) // Site of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. 2011. April (http://www.oprf.ru/files/oprosmolodezh.pdf) (hereinafter - "Poll of the Polytechnic University"). pp. 48-49.

[8] Ibid. Page 17. In the adult sample in the Levada Center survey “Nationalism in Russia” cited above, the picture is slightly softer, but similar.

[9] Ibid. Page 21-30.

[10] The discussion began with this interview with a Moscow official: Lyubov Pyatiletova. Muscovites of the Five Seas. Mikhail Solomentsev: We must bet on what unites the inhabitants of the capital // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 2010. June 16.

[11] Poll of the Polytech. Page 52-54.

[12] It is interesting that the sum of the first two numbers, that is, the percentage of those who are quite ready for the secession of Chechnya, was even higher in 2002-2005, but the percentage of those who are indifferent is much higher than before. In total, in the 2011 survey, they all accounted for 62%, which is the absolute maximum. Data provided to the author by the Levada Center.

[13] Now the republics of the North Caucasus are among the most dependent on subsidies from the federal budget, although the leaders in this indicator are still the regions of the Far East.

[14] The text of the report is available on the website of the journal of the moderate wing of Russian ethnonationalists: Kavkaz-2011: Russian View // Website of the journal "Questions of Nationalism" (http://vnatio.org/arhiv-nomerov/node82/).

[15] Alexander Belov: "Let's restore Russia!" // APN.ru. 2011. July 12 (http://www.apn.ru/opinions/article24469.htm).

[16] Kozhevnikova Galina. Ultra-right tendencies in pro-Kremlin youth movements // Russian nationalism between the authorities and the opposition. M.: Center "Panorama", 2010. S. 4-17.

[17] Up-to-date statistics can always be obtained on the SOVA Center website (http://sova-center.ru/database), as well as in the appendix to the latest report on manifestations of radical xenophobia, available on the SOVA Center website. For hard copy see attachments in: Xenophobia, freedom of conscience and anti-extremism in Russia in 2010. Moscow: SOVA Center, 2011.

[18] Latest annual report: Rosalskaya Maria. Illegal application of anti-extremist legislation in Russia in 2010 // Ibid. pp. 73-97. News and reports on this topic can also be found on the website of the SOVA Center in the section "Illegal Anti-Extremism" (http://sova-center.ru/misuse).

[19] Alexander Osipov wrote: “During the Soviet period, the main ideological cliché denoting the direction of state policy in this area was “friendship of peoples”. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the emphasis shifted noticeably, and the former thesis began to be expressed through negation - as the prevention and settlement of conflicts. By itself, this formula does not carry a specific content, but provides the basis for many rhetorical devices to justify social engineering of a different nature and direction. Osipov A. Construction of ethnic conflict and racist discourse // Racism in the language of social sciences. St. Petersburg: "Aleteyya", 2002. P. 45-69.

In a broader context, A. Osipov examines the Soviet conceptual heritage in: He. Equality without borders // Emergency reserve. 2011. No. 4.

[20] Do not negotiate with neo-Nazis! // SOVA Center. 2009. January 30 (http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2009/01/d15173/).

[21] Judging by the official data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. See for example: The state of crime - January-December 2010 // Website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (http://www.mvd.ru/presscenter/statistics/reports/show_88233/).

[22] In the summer of 2011, Vladimir Putin said: “According to various sources, we, in Russia, now have anywhere from 7 million to 10 million immigrants.” See: Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin met with representatives of confessions and national-cultural public organizations // Site of the Prime Minister. 2011. July 20 (http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/15972/).

If we assume that Putin would not call those who have already received citizenship as immigrants, and even if we take a lower figure from those named, it turns out that non-citizens commit crimes even somewhat less often than citizens. Perhaps this balance is somewhat leveled due to unsolved crimes.

[23] All this is considered on the example of one of the speeches of the Chairman of the Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin in: Bessudnov Alexey. Why does the prosecutor's office attribute unnecessary crimes to foreigners // Slon.ru. 2009. May 25 (http://slon.ru/articles/35786/).

The very speech of A. Bastrykin (far from the only, but a significant example) see: Speech of the Chairman of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation Bastrykin A.I. at an interdepartmental meeting on combating migrant crime and improving the forms and methods of migration policy // Website of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. 2009. May 21 (http://www.sledcom.ru/actual/4637).

[24] A striking example among many: Vadim Rechkalov. While I'm kind // Moskovsky Komsomolets. 2011. 4 August.

[25] They are described in comparative detail in: Galina Kozhevnikova, Alexander Verkhovsky. The Ghost of Manezhnaya Square: Radical Nationalism in Russia and Opposition to It in 2010 // Xenophobia, Freedom of Conscience and Anti-Extremism in Russia in 2010. M .: Center "Sova", 2011. S.24-29.

[26] I wrote more about this in: Verkhovsky A. The evolution of the post-Soviet movement of Russian nationalists ...

[27] Initial reports in LiveJournal: Animals got lost // Live Journal E. Malenkina. 2011. July 4 (http://malenkin.livejournal.com/190699.html); We went // Live Journal of E. Roizman. 2011. July 4 (http://roizman.livejournal.com/1197298.html).

[28] See, for example, the same Polytech Report.

[29] Sokolov-Mitrich Dmitry. Manege Justice // Komsomolskaya Pravda. 2010. December 13.

[30] See Recommendations of the Meeting of Representatives of the Synodal Department for Relations between the Church and Society and Youth Public Associations // Interfax-religion. 2011. January 20 (http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=documents÷=1077).

[31] “The protest at Manezhnaya is a cry of pain and despair,” said Protodeacon Andrey Kuraev // Pravoslavie.ru. 2010. December 13 (http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/43453.htm).

[32] Galina Kozhevnikova. Hate speech and elections: federal and regional levels. Based on monitoring materials for autumn-winter 2007-2008. M .: Center "Sova", 2008. S. 56-70.

[33] Rubin Mikhail. "Just Cause" begins experiments with nationalism // Izvestia. 2011. August 2.

[34] For an almost verbatim transcript of a live conversation between Boris Nadezhdin and the author of the article, see: Ideological discussions in the ranks of the Right Cause party // Radio Liberty. 2011. August 4 (http://www.svobodanews.ru/articleprintview/24287042.html).

[35] The main ideas of the "Democratic Choice" in the field of migration policy and policy in the field of interethnic relations // Democratic Choice. 2011. March 17 (http://demvybor.ru/documents/DV-migration.pdf).

[36] A group of local ecologists have managed to turn their fight against the construction of a motorway through a forest near Moscow into a symbol of the confrontation between "ordinary people" and officialdom merging with business. Far-right groups striving for demarginalization and turning to any popular topic for this could not pass by the Khimki Forest. See the report of one of these groups about a trip to the Khimki forest: Right League on the defense of the Khimki forest // Website of the Right League. 2011. May 15 (http://pravliga.com/2010-09-06-16-25-32/689-2011-05-15-21-11-06).

[37] There is a separate study about Kalashnikov: Evgeny Moroz. Raised the swastika. Imperial project of Vladimir Kucherenko // SOVA Center. 2003. November /d1266/ ; http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2003/11/d1265/).

Modern self-presentation of Kalashnikov: Kalashnikov Maxim. The economic and organizational base of "Kyiv Rus-2", the most important questions - without answers! // Big Forum. 2008. November 10 (http://bolshoyforum.org/forum/index.php?page=29); He is. Totalitarianism - mon amour // Live Journal of M. Kalashnikov. November 24, 2009 (http://m-kalashnikov.livejournal.com/239415.html); He is. Theses for the future-6 // Ibid. 2009. November 7 (http://m-kalashnikov.livejournal.com/225820.html).

[38] The same speech contains a remarkable version of the events on Manezhnaya Square. First, they are not just objectively provoked, but deliberately organized by the "ruling bureaucracy". Secondly, the participants in the rally at Manezhnaya allegedly did not chant aggressive slogans, although the most popular, judging by all the videos, were “Fuck the Caucasus, fuck!” and “Your children will answer for this murder!”, but exclusively advocated fair law enforcement, proclaiming at most “Stop killing Russians.” See: A cold ethnic war is still going on in Russia. Full text of the speech of the director of the Institute of Globalization Problems M. Delyagin at the XI summit of the Russian-German St. Petersburg Dialogue (Hannover, Germany) // Website of M. Delyagin. 2011. July 19 (http://delyagin.ru/articles/18595.html).

[39] The support revealed in sociological surveys is, of course, very conditional. But it cannot be completely ignored. According to the Levada Center, 22% fully or partially supported the protests on December 11 and 16: Do you personally support such protests or condemn them? // Levada Center. 2010. December

[40] Verbatim report on the joint meeting of the State Council and the Commission for the Implementation of Priority National Projects and Demographic Policy // Website of the President of Russia. 2010. December 27 (http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/9913).

[41] The well-known bias in the Russian political language, associated with the use of the word “national” in the meaning of “ethnic”, is fully inherent in Putin, although not only him, of course, among politicians and officials. The word "ethnic" is still sometimes used by him - precisely as a complete synonym for the word "national". This is clearly not reflected: once the Prime Minister even used the phrase "national ethnic" as the same synonym. Putin does not use the word "civilian" in the phrase "civil nation". In the texts related to the topic of the report, there is only the phrase “civil peace” or, more often, “civil and interethnic peace” (sometimes also “inter-confessional”).

[42] Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin took part in the interregional conference of the United Russia party on the topic “Strategy for the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus until 2020. Program for 2010-2012” // Website of the Prime Minister. 2010. July 6 (http://premier.gov.ru/visits/ru/11295/events/11301/).

[43] Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin spoke at the VII Congress of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia // Ibid. 2011. January 12 (http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/13844/).

[44] Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin took part in the VI Congress of the All-Russian Pedagogical Assembly // Ibid. 2011. May 31 (http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/15422/).

[45] Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin met with representatives of confessions and national-cultural public organizations // Ibid. 2011. July 19 (http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/15972/).

[46] Putin in the Caucasus again spoke about the fact that visitors should respect the traditions of local residents // Ibid. 2011. August 03 (http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/08/03/n_1951405.shtml).

[47] A special program entitled “A Conversation with Vladimir Putin. Continued // Ibid. 2011. December 16 (http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/13427/).

[48] ​​Verbatim report on the joint meeting of the State Council and the Commission for the implementation of priority national projects and demographic policy // President's website. 2010. December 27 (http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/9913).

[49] I cited confirmation of this in an article that will be published in the near future: Verkhovsky A. Nationalism of the Leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in the First Decade of the 21st Century. // Orthodox Church under the new patriarch. Moscow: Carnegie Center, ROSSPEN, 2012, pp. 141-169.

[50] Meeting with the leadership of the Federal Assembly // Website of the President. 2011. January 17 (http://kremlin.ru/news/10087#sel=35:58,35:58).

[51] Meeting of the Presidium of the State Council on measures to strengthen interethnic harmony // Website of the President of the Russian Federation. 2011. February 11 (http://news.kremlin.ru/news/10312/print).

[52] Or, at least, with his dominant participation. We can assume a special role in the preparation of this report of the director of the Department of Interethnic Relations Alexander Zhuravsky.

The text of the report is available on the website of the ministry: Report of the State Council of the Russian Federation. On measures to strengthen interethnic harmony in Russian society // Website of the Ministry of Regional Development. 2011. March 29 (http://www.minregion.ru/activities/interethnic_relations/national_policy/505/902.html).

[53] Pain Emil. Russia between empire and nation // Pro et Contra. 2007. No. 3; Shnirelman Victor. Time of civilization: civilizational approach as a national idea // Russian modernization: reflections on originality. M.: Three squares, 2008. S. 198-232; Pain E., Verkhovsky A. Civilizational nationalism: the Russian version of the “special path” // Ideology of the “special path” in Russia and Germany: origins, content, consequences. M.: Three squares, 2010. S. 171-210.

[54] According to the charts on page 18 of the report, ethnic differences were considered very significant in 2005 by 38%, in 2007 by 28%, and in 2010 by 24%, and insignificant, respectively, by 25%, 31% and 32 % (the rest consider them moderately significant or, which is rare, find it difficult to answer). For religious differences, the same series are: 26, 22, 18% and 36, 38, 40%.

[55] Quoted hereinafter from: Meeting of the Presidium of the State Council on measures to strengthen interethnic harmony // Website of the President of the Russian Federation. 2011. February 11 (http://news.kremlin.ru/news/10312/print).

[56] Problems of ensuring interethnic harmony in Russia. Materials of the Round Table of the Scientific Council on National Policy Issues of the Social Sciences Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (March 14, 2011) // Website of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights (www.president-sovet.ru/structure/consolidation_group/ materials/actual_problems.doc).

Particularly noteworthy are the first two performances - by Leokadiya Drobizheva and Viktor Shnirelman.

[57] As is known, bills of this kind were repeatedly prepared by Russian nationalists in parliament, but never had a chance of being adopted.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Pavel Svyatenkov. Double Bourbon // Russian Observer. 2011. February 13 (http://www.rus-obr.ru/day-comment/9660).

[60] Mikhail Remizov. Civil nation: Russian request for today // APN.ru. 2011. February 2 (http://www.apn.ru/publications/article23602.htm).

[61] Boris Vinogradov, Andrei Saveliev. Multiculturalism will not pass // APN. 2011. February 16 (http://www.apn.ru/publications/article23654.htm).

[62] Shnirelman Victor. Racology in action: the dreams of deputy Savelyev // Tops and bottoms of Russian nationalism. M .: Center "Sova", 2007. P. 162-187.

[63] See, for example, his brief overview of ethno-nationalist views (he calls them national democratic) versus "imperial" and "liberal": Between Scylla and Charybdis. National Democracy in its Relationship to Empire and Liberalism // Live Journal of K. Krylova. 2011. July 13 (http://krylov.livejournal.com/2278881.html).

Sources

• Verkhovsky A. Modern discursive confrontation between Russian nationalists and federal authorities // Bulletin of Public Opinion. 2011. No. 4 (110). pp.5-18.