“And a historian knows history, but does not know what history is ,” - this is what one of the philosophical professors used to say when I was a student, meaning, naturally, not only historians, but also many others. At least the same “economists” who are especially noticeable these days with their claim to represent Reality itself. There is no need to explain to what extent this claim is unscientific. The most authoritative Weber spins in his grave every time “scientists,” losing methodological restraint, operate with “ideal-typical constructions” (for example, the construction of “economic rationality”) as if they were the structures of being itself. By the way, here a thread stretches from the most authoritative Weber to the most odious (within the framework of the “methodology of sciences”) Hegel, who called private scientific disciplines “abstract” - on the grounds that they artificially isolate a certain aspect of reality - and, on the contrary, wanted to see philosophy " concrete”, since only it can “take” reality in its totality. This is about the methodology of the notorious “economist’s answer to the philosopher” et vice versa.
So, economic science deals with “pure economics”, which in reality does not exist (due to the conventionality of its premises: rationality of the subject, orientation towards “endless” accumulation of profit, exchange of resources, the possibility of contractual relations, non-violence, and the like). By asserting that it is, nevertheless, the true reality, the economist becomes an economic centrist, that is, an idealist and ideologist. He sacrifices an attempt at a systemic understanding of reality in the name of an attempt at its systemic distortion and, ultimately, systemic transformation. It is important for us that this ideological economiccentrism is the ideology of the countries of the “world core” - for it is the more suitable for maintaining their dominance, the less capable it is of explaining its foundations.
It is clear that economic power is born not thanks to equivalent market exchange, but in spite of it. In this sense, the position of the “core countries” on a global scale is quite similar to the position of the “oligarchs” on a Russian scale. Having established their dominant position through primarily non-economic (and somewhat random) instruments, both put on a pragmatist face, switch to the language of the “eternal laws” of the market and with a broad gesture call on others to honest enrichment, to sacred awe of property, to increasing "competition" and so on. And the ambiguity of the situation cannot be attributed, as many would like, to the costs of “primitive accumulation” - because the non-economic determination of economic dominance is not a passing stage of capitalism, but its permanent dynamic element. The authors of “world-system” analysis - F. Braudel, I. Wallerstein - develop this thesis to the point of linking the very essence of capitalism with it and thereby turning the concept of capitalism into a kind of antipode to the “pure market”. If the “market” for them is the sphere of action of the economy, taken in the same narrow as precise sense of the word, then capitalism is a system for the reproduction of economic domination through politics .
“Throughout this book,” writes Braudel in “Games of Exchange,” “a hidden idea of play, risk, fraud came to light, and the main rule was to create counter-play , that is, using the mechanisms and tools of the market, make the latter function differently, if not vice versa, it might seem interesting to create the history of capitalism as a kind of special case of the manifestation of game theory. But this would mean again discovering under the apparent simplicity of the word “game” different and contradictory concrete realities - a predictable game, a correct game, a legal game, a topsy-turvy game. , a picaresque game..." Politics, as I talked about it the previous time , is the art of maximizing power through sovereign ( not to be confused with the word “arbitrary” ) manipulation of the “rules of the game,” by shifting and mixing the conventional boundaries of different subject areas.
Therefore, it is strange that the critic Basov projected onto me his idea of politics as one of the subject areas and built the architectonics of his revelations on this substitution. “In politics and PR (in comparison with economics) ,” he sneers, “ we have downright champion’s potential” ... Politics, economics, PR - all this is distributed into some separate cells and seems to be drawn out with lines, with crossing which the referee will shout “out”. “PR,” for example, is, for Basov, once and for all, nothing more than the area of verbal arrangements. “Agents (of foreign economic activity - M.R.) are waiting - they can’t wait, ” he writes, mockingly, “ for a modest seller of happiness in the person of a professional PR man, so that he can explain to them how the world works and where their capital is most comfortable.” Well, if we understand “explanations” as something merely verbal, this could perhaps be a reason for irony. But the word "explain" has much more urgent connotations, and much stronger modulations of speech are available to power. The language of events, the language of fear, the language of pain opens a more direct path to man (and to the “man of the elite” as well as to the “man of the masses”) than the language of discursive ethics. In a word, Basov lives in a space where conventional boundaries are not problematized.
And the point here is not only in disciplinary limitations, which, in order to feel comfortable, distributes social existence into “sectors” and introduces the appearance of a stereotyped order where it does not exist in substance. The point is the very desire to live as if he existed.
The breeding ground for this aspiration is “civilization,” and a person who instinctively respects various kinds of plywood partitions is what we call “civilized.” “Civilized man,” for example, is defined by the unshakable conviction that Boeings exist for civil transport; Cardboard cutting knives exist for cutting cardboard; Manhattan shopping centers exist for the purpose of trading; man exists for happiness. And so on. The “barbarism” of barbarians does not lie in increased cruelty, but in a kind of blindness and indifference to the screens of civilization (of course, not civilization in general, but this particular civilization). Therefore, the “barbarian” is more free to move around the “social space” - of course, provided that he is sufficiently “educated”. An "educated barbarian" is one who has acquired the technical skills of navigating civilization, but has not acquired the (conventional) internal limitations that come with them. In this sense, the strategy of “educated barbarism” appears to be a winning strategy. In relation to “civilization,” “educated barbarism” should win - much like how “gun culture” once defeated China, whose leadership in the invention of gunpowder did not develop into advanced technical re-equipment of troops due to intra-civilizational ethical restrictions.
It is clear what the spells about belonging to the “civilized world” mean for us in this regard. Namely: narrowing the horizon, limiting play opportunities, the message that we are no longer inherently dangerous. Meanwhile, the strength of the Russian in relation to the West, if it is possible at all, is par excellence precisely the strength of the “educated barbarian.” Isn’t this connected with the intense mythical aura around the “Russian mafia”, which, while not inferior to Western “autochthons” in the level of adaptation to the cultural environment, surpasses them in the capabilities of liberated combinatorics?
By the way, one of the most striking symbolic contradictions of our era is the contradiction between the strength (at least mythical) of the “Russian mafia” and the weakness (both mythical and real) of the “Russian state”. Most likely, these two “systems” have the character of communicating vessels: in order to become strong itself, the state must “defeat” the mafia - this is a commonplace. However, in what capacity should it defeat it? Until now, if it opposes it, it is only as an abstract principle - trying in the name of law to curse the reality of lawlessness. But force can only be defeated by another force, not by principle. The strength of the mafia as such has so far lay, among other things, in its network organization, which does not make the Basovian distinction between “economics” and “politics,” “PR” and “action,” etc. Moreover, everyone seems to recognize that this organization organizes not only itself, but also the social space that it traverses. That is, in essence, it challenges the function of the state, which itself in its early years (in those “barbaric times”) quite clearly acted as a clan, an organized minority exercising dominance in the social environment and giving it the form of a separate society.
So why not draw the obvious conclusion: the only opportunity for the state to live up to its mission is not to build its building on the sand of an abstract legal principle, but to ensure its rank superiority (and, by the way, to solve the “problem of corruption” ), openly borrowing features from the mafia. That is, becoming a corporation - with very strict rules of internal (internal) mobilization, with a very pronounced ethics of collective domination, with a very wide range of means and with very large (national-historical) ambitions. The last sign, while not being “mafia” at all, does not at all introduce dissonance into the overall picture. On the contrary, only he gives it completeness and meaning: don’t you feel the contradiction between the cruel perfection of the classic “mafia” machine and the ultimately weak principle of profit on which it rests?
If the word “mafia” still confuses you, then you can say it differently. One can return to Braudel's critique of capitalism, where capitalism is understood as a “political” octopus that permeates the “economy,” and call the system that must be created state capitalism 1 .
Notes
1 For Braudel and Wallerstein themselves, this concept of capitalism has a distinctly negative meaning. They present “capitalism,” that is, the non-economic determination of the economy, as a parasitic growth on productive market relations rather than as their natural and enduring internal condition. However, it is clear that this is connected not so much with the binding logic of their analysis, but with its ("left") ideological subtext , which we are free not to accept.