
So it happened that there was no foreign policy in the past week and a half. Analysts who were preparing to track GDP meetings in Germany, Portugal and, especially, Mexico were left without a subject for analysis, and the work of the Foreign Ministry was reduced, at first glance, to registering messages from the leaders of various countries and organizations expressing sympathy and solidarity for the hostages, their to family and friends, the people of Russia and its authorities. But even in the way the world community reacted to the terrorist attack in Moscow, there was a foreign policy component. Explicitly in some cases and covertly in others.
Solidarity as an advance (USA and UK)
To begin with, we must pay tribute to the leaders of the United States and Great Britain, as well as their colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic and in the Pacific, for the fact that their reaction to the hostage taking in Moscow was swift and unequivocal. As for Washington, we can consider that Bush “repaid the debt” to Putin for the support that Russia provided to America after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington.
Washington and London went even further. And if the first words of the American and British leaders were dictated by purely human motives, then the next steps of the Bush administration and the Blair cabinet were taken “with a cool head,” since policy, including foreign policy, has such a not always pleasant quality as continuity . And there is no cynicism in this. That's life.
At the very beginning of the anti-Russian campaign in the European and American media (with which, unfortunately, the Russian media compete - and not unsuccessfully), the essence of which is expressed in headlines, for example, from The Guardian (not even the most harsh) "The catastrophe was presented as a successful operation" or "The assault tore the mask of humanity from Putin's face," the State Department placed full responsibility for the deaths of the hostages on the terrorists. The British government, in turn, made a sensational statement - for Europeans, of course, and not for Russians - that it had reliable information about the connections of the Chechen terrorists who organized the hostage-taking at Dubrovka with the terrorist group Al-Qaeda.
Let me remind you that this statement was made on Monday, that is, two days after the storming of the Dubrovka Palace of Culture, in the House of Commons, which, at the request of Anthony Blair, met for a special meeting to discuss the consequences of the Moscow terrorist attack. The words of the British Prime Minister spoken at this meeting are worth quoting again in order to refer to them in the future, in a conversation about Latvia. Expressing solidarity with the Russian people, Blair added: "I hope people will understand the scale of the dilemma that President Putin faced. He needed to structure the situation in such a way as to minimize the loss of life without making any concessions to this extreme manifestation of Chechen terrorism." .
The British Prime Minister's speech is true, by the way. In terms of changes in the foreign policy environment that occurred after the terrorist attack in Moscow, it is worth noting the speech at the same meeting by the leader of the opposition Conservatives, Ian Duncan Smith, who, agreeing with Blair’s position, expressively added: “Events in Moscow show that the war on terrorism must be continued , and those who say that we need to stop are mistaken." And so that these words of an influential member of the House of Commons do not remain misunderstood, the head of the British Foreign Ministry, Jack Straw, on the same day, but already at a meeting of the parliamentary committee on international affairs, having habitually designated international terrorism as “the greatest strategic threat to the civilized world,” not at all subtly hinted that we should be talking and, in fact, we are talking about a quick solution to the Iraqi issue. It is clear how, given that the hint was made in London.
In Washington, corresponding steps were also taken that led international players to the idea that “solidarity and sympathy” - the sincerity of which, please note, no one can doubt - is at the same time an advance to Moscow in view of the upcoming consideration of the resolution in the UN Security Council ( or resolutions) on Iraq.
The expectation of concessions from Moscow on the Iraqi issue became especially clear after the “list” statements from London and Washington. First, Great Britain significantly expanded its “list” of terrorist organizations, and then Washington demonstrated unprecedented determination and announced the possibility of adding even specifically Chechen separatist organizations to its “list.” At the same time, Mr. Boucher, representing the State Department, specially emphasized: “The process of making such a decision requires a long analysis of the facts relating to the activities of the organization and careful collection of information. So far we have not come to any conclusion.” Then, of course, everything will follow the “cancellation of the Jackson-Vanik amendment” scheme. That is, the Americans will either promise to add Chechen separatists to the “black list” or refer to insufficient information. And so seven times. Therefore, it is better to treat these kinds of promises from Washington as an “unexpected joy”, which, if it breaks down, will happen suddenly and without any effort on the part of Moscow. And remember that Washington understands only two languages - military and trade. All unilateral acts of other countries aimed at benefiting the United States are taken for granted in Washington, and no response should be expected.
To complete the picture, these passes towards Russia were supplemented by a new position of the US administration, whose representative stated on November 1 that Washington is ready to revise its draft resolution on Iraq in order to bring it closer to the projects of France and Russia. Let me remind you that the Russian project is assessed by experts as “significantly diverging” from the US project, and the French version is considered as something in between and could become the basis for the search for a compromise in the Security Council.
Should the Kremlin consider itself obligated to somehow repay Washington for its support during and after the hostage crisis in the Nord-Ost building? It is unlikely. It’s worth at least once taking an example from the Americans themselves, whose gratitude for support from Moscow after September 11 and during the operation in Afghanistan never materialized into anything worthwhile (even what was promised, like the same Jackson-Vanik amendment, was not done). However, if the GDP considers that Russian foreign policy should be “moral,” then it will be possible to slightly satisfy the interests of the United States by “playing Iraq” together with Paris. Putin and Chirac have already proposed two options to the Security Council, which, in general, correspond to a certain average (in the sense of “as always”) external “image” and “behavior” of Russia and France, and now Moscow can withdraw its proposal in favor of the French compromise option . At the same time, if Washington agrees to this game, France receives political satisfaction without bringing the matter to a “veto”, which it will have to impose on a US decision for the first time in 50 years, Russia plays along with both yours (such as a concession to Washington) and ours (all -after all, not the American-British “force” option), and China, which for the most part remained silent during the “battle of the giants,” can with a feeling of deep satisfaction (again, with the fact that the American option did not pass) will join France and Russia , thereby creating a majority in the five permanent members. In this situation, Bush and Blair will have virtually no arguments left to defend the “forceful” version of the resolution. Although - let me allow myself a “seditious” thought - just such an outcome may turn out to be the best for Washington. After all, it is one thing to escalate the situation and build up the military presence in the Persian Gulf, and quite another to have a war with Iraq, and not for the liberation of Kuwait, as last time, but for the sake of destroying the ruling regime, albeit formally, but legitimate. In addition, it is somehow hard to believe that Washington (not to mention the American voter) will be very happy about the fact that the United States will become the gravedigger of the UN. However, this is another topic.
Beyond logic and morality (Denmark)
Perhaps the diplomatic attack on Denmark, which continued the entire time the hostages were in the theater center on Dubrovka, and which developed after the successful operation to free them, was the only event of the past week and a half that took place specifically in the foreign policy department.
First, about logic. It is elementary logic, as well as historical precedents, that allow us to consider the hostage taking in the Nord-Ost building and the so-called “World Chechen Congress” in Copenhagen as two parts of a single plan. If it weren’t for Saturday’s storming of the Palace of Culture, the terrorists could have held the hostages until Monday, and then in Copenhagen this whole nightmare would have been presented as a “step of despair” by Chechen combatants dreaming of negotiations or, in other scenarios, Zakayev would have informed Russia and the world about that that “President” Maskhadov is using his last strength to keep the “field commanders” driven to the limit from starting to blow up nuclear power plants. By the way, it is not excluded that Zakaev & Co would simply blackmail Danish officials with hostages held in the Dubrovka Palace of Culture. And there it was Sunday, a day off in the Danish ministries, and Zakayev’s words about nuclear power plants hardly went unnoticed and successfully became a memory of Chernobyl.
But even with such motives, Denmark could take an example from neighboring Holland (which immediately and practically without explanation canceled the presentation of the militant newspaper “Chechen Times”) and close the Maskhadov-Basayev shop in its capital. But Copenhagen did not do this. This provoked Moscow to make tough diplomatic moves, which can - and should! - become even tougher.
Speaking of Holland. The presentation of the militant newspaper Chechen Times was to take place in the press center in The Hague, which is directly adjacent to the building of the national parliament and where the Prime Minister of the Netherlands holds official briefings once a week. However - and this is worth special mentioning - the press center itself is a non-governmental institution, and the organizers of the presentation were “non-governmental organizations”, which are treated with the same reverence in Holland as in Denmark. However... Once - and that's it! - “there will be no kin.” Why were the Dutch more decisive than the Danes? Or, more precisely, why did the Dutch want, but the Danes did not want, to show determination in giving the Chechen separatists a turn away? Is it because there were two Dutch citizens among the hostages in the Nord-Ost hall at that time, and there were no Danes among them? Perhaps the Dutch also remembered that until now - since mid-summer - there has been no news about the Dutch citizen Arjan Erkel, head of the Doctors Without Borders office in this republic, captured by terrorists in Dagestan? It turns out that Movsar Baraev made another mistake. The Dutch should have been released immediately - you see, the presentation of the Chechen Times would not have been cancelled.
As for morality, this aspect of the issue was expressed without any - for once - equivocals and floridity by our Foreign Ministry: "In light of the tragic events of recent days in Moscow, a series of bloody terrorist attacks in other regions of the world - the failure of official Copenhagen to take measures to prohibit provocative the gathering looks especially blasphemous." Short and to the point.
Copenhagen’s arguments, then - in connection with the “World Chechen Congress”, and now - in connection with the extradition of Zakayev - look, to put it mildly, unconvincing and are more like the excuses that Eduard Amvrosievich has been feeding Moscow for several months now.
However, this is not important. Denmark put herself in a certain position, and this is her own business. It’s up to the Kremlin to decide what to do , how to “resolve” the situation. And here the most important thing is, firstly, not to stop and not let the situation go, and secondly, to consistently, publicly and strictly fulfill promises and threats. Too often Moscow gave up games that they had almost won.
What to do with Denmark? Firstly, to fulfill his promise to cancel the summit meeting scheduled for November 11-12 and, moreover, at the Russia-EU summit, which should be moved from Copenhagen to Brussels, it would be worthwhile to arrange the schedule of GDP’s stay in the capital of the European Union so that he never crossed paths with Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, even in the corridor (you can consult veterans of the Soviet Foreign Ministry about how to do this - they have extensive experience in ceremonies and demonstrations). You can strengthen the demonstrative effect by following the example of the leaders of the same European Union, who deliberately arrived late for meetings in orderly ranks so as not to greet or shake hands with the representative of Austria after the far-right Freedom Party of Jörg Haider entered the government coalition.
Secondly, we must definitely insist on our position on the issue of extraditing Akhmed Zakayev to Russian justice. If Copenhagen continues to prevaricate, the Russian Ambassador to Denmark, Mr. Bordyuzha, can be recalled “for consultations.” If it doesn’t work, we need to move on, even to the point of breaking diplomatic relations.
For this, thirdly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prosecutor General’s Office need to start working normally and not give the Danes additional arguments, such as untranslated documents. It will be especially annoying if the diplomatic offensive on Copenhagen fails due to the fault of Foreign Ministry and prosecutorial officials who forget to put some document in a folder intended to be sent to the Danish Ministry of Justice (at the last moment, of course).
Fourthly, this demarche should be transferred to pan-European platforms, including the international tribunal in The Hague. And not only European ones. If, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rightly asserts, there is “a direct violation by Denmark of its international obligations, first of all, UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which provides for a ban on any support for terrorists,” then the question of sanctions against Denmark should be raised in the Security Council.
How will the European Union as a whole react to such a demarche by Russia? Most likely, in different ways. “Big” countries - France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, etc. - if they do not publicly support Moscow, they will be understanding and, most likely, will try to reason with inexperienced Danish politicians. Another thing is the “synclitte of small countries”. The fact that a group of Lithuanian parliamentarians (Lithuania is still only a candidate for the EU, but this does not change the essence of the matter) has already appealed to their Danish colleagues “not to succumb to pressure from Moscow” and not to hand over Zakayev, who supposedly represents the interests not of terrorists, but “ rebels" and "armed dissidents" is very typical.
Here it is time to think about the motives that motivated Denmark in the story of the “Chechen Congress”. Let me remind you that in the last week and a half, Russia has made claims and demands against France and Turkey. Concern was expressed to the French Ambassador in Moscow, Blanchemaison, on October 27 that a “gathering in support of Chechen terrorists” was held on October 26 in Paris at the De la Colline theater. On November 1, Russia demanded that Turkey close all Chechen missions providing support to the militants. It’s worth noting here that the fastest to navigate the new situation was Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, who, for sin’s sake, was a bit smarter? - closed the “representative office of Ichkeria” as early as October 26th.
So what about the motives? Türkiye - of course, brothers in faith. But Turkey is a large country that is striving (at least until the last parliamentary elections) to join the European Union and has very large trade interests in Russia. And Ankara’s geopolitical interests in the Black Sea, Balkan and Caucasus regions can only be realized under the condition of conflict-free coexistence with Russia. So the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Tashkent, has already confirmed Turkey’s readiness to consider, and most likely, fulfill Russia’s demands.
There is no need to look for motives in France, since the reputation of the French left (not only intellectuals) is well known. No offense, as they say, but we cannot condone it either.
Denmark's motivation is more complex and deeper. This country is one of the leaders of the “small Europeans” who are ready to desperately defend their right to make decisions together with the “European giants”. In this particular case, Denmark demonstrated how a small European country (which also holds a rotating presidency of the European Union) can try to drive a wedge between Russia and leading EU members such as Germany. In general, the northern European countries fear - and quite rightly so - that Germany will finally follow the behest of its “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck, who predicted that the rapprochement of Germany and Russia would not only lead to prosperity for both countries, but would also make their opinion decisive in Europe as a whole. By the way, it is Berlin’s desire to establish special relations with Moscow that is encouraging other European leaders to seek a political union with Russia.
It is on this fear that the unspoken, but from this no less harmful “anti-Russian coalition”, which the majority of the countries of Northern and Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltic states, is growing before the Russian-German union. At the same time, one should not forget that in Eastern Europe and the Baltic, the desire to defend its political significance before the threat of the Union of Russia and Germany is multiplied by historical grievances received either from the German or from the Russian empires, or both alternately.
If such a coalition develops, then should Russia behave at least somehow in relation to it? Of course yes. In today's world, a chap -keeping attitude towards anyone - even the most little one - a member of the international community can turn into great troubles. But this, just, the Russian Foreign Ministry, in my opinion, is not aware.
About pugs, elephants and parallel spaces (Latvia)
An example of such an attitude of Russia to “little SIM” is Latvia, which is also a potential (or already relevant?) Participant of the “anti -Russian coalition of European small”. Judging by the Russian Latvian press, foreign policy regarding this small but very offended country from Russia is completely absent. And this despite the fact that almost half a million Russians live in Latvia (they are called Russian -speaking). If we agree that there is a certain “Russian world” on the planet and it has not only material (quantitative), but also spiritual dimension, then these half a million Russians bring a serious depressive motive into the spiritual state of the “Russian world”. However, the indifference of the Russian Foreign Ministry to Latvia as a whole, and the position of the Russians there - in particular, comes from the fact that this country, like some others, is perceived as existing in parallel space. That is, foreign policy is when with Germany, France, America, and Latvia is when the Russians who are already oppressed there themselves get to the International Court and there is nowhere to go to Moscow - it is somehow necessary (namely, that is, after the sleeves) to protect or to protect) When a piece of an oil pipe, which is not even perceived as a foreign one, someone will steal.
What does the hostage capture have to do with it? Despite the fact that the President of Latvia Vike Vick-Freberg spoke twice about the tragedy in the theater center on Dubrovka. The second time it was an official statement made after its advisers tracked the reaction to Moscow events of European and world leaders. Everything was in order there. But since representatives of Latvia were also in the Nord-Ost hall, the journalists forced the president to speak out the next day, without an international cheat sheet. And then she said. No, not a word was said about the sympathy of the Russian people or the Russian authorities. Why? Yes, because neither the people, nor the authorities, nor Russia itself, Ms. Vick-Freberg, sympathized. “It makes no sense for us to be afraid of all, to run around and scream,” said the President of Latvia. “But we sympathize with the people captured in hostages.” These words can be translated something like this: "We sympathize with every specific person, and Russia, its people and power - invaders at the genetic level - is right." These words could say, for example, Saddam Hussein, who sincerely hates America, about the attacks of September 11: I sympathize with people, but not to America.
Later, having heard the words of Bush, Blair (see above), Shreder, Robertson and his other mentors, who mandatory expressed solidarity with the Russian people, who had experienced a terrible emotional blow, and the Russian authorities for the burden of responsibility in the adoption of impossible decisions, The President of Latvia recovered. But after. And then, the next day after hundreds of hostages were captured in the Nord-Ost Theater, the collective unconscious of the majority, which indirectly (through parliament) chose it as its leader, spoke in the Latvian president. The statements of some Latvian parliamentarians only confirm such an assessment. Like the refusal to rename Johar Dudaev Street even after the tragedy in Moscow.
So, if Russia feels the “elephant” in relation to the “Moska” of Latvia, then in this case I condemn not “pugs”, which behaves the way it can, but an “elephant”, which in its arrogance will wait for troubles when Mosek will become ten or twenty. Yes, and other “elephants” can take advantage of the “moski” yield in order to run into the Russian elephant in their own way - “in their own way” and take a piece of pasture from him. Do we need this? If not, then the Foreign Ministry should start working, and not just appear. The presence of a Foreign Ministry, as well as the presence of a large and beautiful embassy in a particular country, does not at all mean that foreign policy is being implemented in relation to this country.
Foreign wartime policy
As the Danish plot developed, I once once once had a chance to observe that today is not the time of Igor Ivanov. It seems that the fact that Russia got the opportunity to make not response, but independent and strong moves, plunged it into depression. I understand that personal impressions in this matter to the case, as they say, cannot be applied, but it was impossible not to notice the inconsistency between the tone of the statements of the Russian Foreign Ministry - intelligible and severe - and the behavior of the “chamber” of the minister. He was unsure of himself, even confused (which is his answer in Novodevichy to the statement of the head of the Danish Ministry of Justice Lena Espersen). Now, it seems, it has become completely clear that Igor Ivanov, perhaps, is good - professional, intelligent - Minister of Foreign Affairs, but not for wartime.
Maybe it makes sense to revive “rumors” about the possible appointment of Parliamentary International International Dmitry Rogozin (he just has a suitable energy balance) or Mikhail Margelov . For example, the answers of Ms. Espersen Igor Ivanov and Dmitry Rogozin were strikingly. Ivanov has a perplexity and promise not to retreat, Rogozin has indignation and promise to advance.
The picture is very unprofitable when the president of the country extremely raises the “degree” of Russia's behavior in the international arena - I mean the GDP statement of October 28 about the participation of the army in the fight against terrorists, “wherever they are,” and its ministers are unable Support him.