Chapter 2. Right-wing radical movement in modern Russia

Within the framework of the topic of interest to us, right-wing radical (ultranationalist and religious-fundamentalist) political parties and movements deserve special consideration. Due to the peculiarities of the political tradition, mentality, etc., in Russia it is practically impossible to create a movement that takes an ultra-nationalist position, and at the same time does not share anti-Semitic stereotypes to one degree or another. Even in the National Bolshevik Party, whose leaders officially renounced anti-Semitism, it is quite widespread among the rank and file and occasionally expressed in the party press (in the regional press a little more often than in the central one).

Due to the obviousness of anti-Semitism in the ideology of these movements, we will not specifically focus on it, but in general terms we will consider the current state of this part of the political spectrum.

Right-wing radical parties and movements are currently an integral part of the political system of modern Russia. True, the place they occupy in the political spectrum is rather peculiar.

On the one hand, right-wing radicals (nationalists and religious fundamentalists - in Russia, these movements have been given the general definition of "radical national patriots") do not hide the fact that they set themselves the task of a comprehensive transformation of society and, as a rule, changes in the constitutional order of the Russian Federation. In their propaganda and activities, the radicals balance on the edge of the law, and often even cross this line. Radical national patriots are aware that the goals they set for themselves can hardly be achieved as a result of "normal" political struggle limited by federal law by parliamentary methods, and therefore they are perhaps even more oriented towards alternative, non-parliamentary methods. fight. Some groups and their leaders do not hide the fact that they admit the possibility of coming to power through an armed coup. And revolutionary rhetoric occupies an important place in almost all right-wing radicals.

On the other hand, nationalist organizations took part in elections and propagated their views, even openly extremist ones, with virtually no hindrance, at least until the late 1990s. Moreover, radicalism for the first post-Soviet years was a political norm, violence in the eyes of society was a legitimate method of struggle for both the authorities and the opposition, and almost all segments of the political spectrum had their own radicals who propagandized openly extremist ideas and at the same time were an organic part of the political systems as a whole. The entire political system was utterly radical, radicalism was not a marginal phenomenon, but part of the "mainstream" of those years. In this context, it is quite natural that right-wing radicals, ultra-nationalists and religious fundamentalists existed virtually unhindered, and although their ideology and activities were shocking and fearful, there was no real opposition to radicals either from the state or from society in the early and mid-1990s. th years were not.

Attempts by the authorities to counteract the right-wing radicals began to take on a somewhat systematic character only from the end of 1998. During almost the entire first post-Soviet decade, against the backdrop of violent and far from always legal activity of extremists, anti-fascists justifiably reproached the authorities for passivity, lack of political will, or even open connivance with radicals. There is no doubt that such a situation seriously destabilized the situation inside the country and spoiled its image in the foreign policy arena. A surge in the activity of radical nationalists with the connivance of the authorities against the backdrop of general social instability in the country and the popularity of revanchist sentiment even gave rise in the early 1990s to a pessimistic (not to say "panic") thesis about "Weimar Russia" by analogy with Weimar Germany.

Of course, by 2003, compared to the mid-1990s, the situation had changed a lot. The society became less radical and generally less politicized, and the authorities began to put pressure on extremists. However, as it is easy to see, opposition to radical national patriots by the state is mostly situational. Sometimes the specific actions of officials raised serious doubts, both ethical and legal. And the fact that radical national patriots have by now largely lost their influence on society is only partly explained by the activities of the authorities, and to a greater extent by changes in society and the political life of the country as a whole and the evolution of the national extremists themselves in particular.

This chapter is devoted, firstly, to the internal dynamics in the activities of right-wing organizations in 1990-2003, and, secondly, to the consideration of specific actions on the part of the authorities aimed at counteracting these forces. We will be especially interested in the events of recent years and the current situation. Since it is not possible to cover in detail all spheres of ideology and activity here, we will focus on the most general description of the ideology and organizational forms of right-wing radicals, consider questions about the popularity of their views in society, about illegal activities on their part. In the second part of this chapter, we will look at the government's policy towards right-wing radicals. For more detailed research in these areas, we refer readers to reference and analytical literature published by the Information and Research Center "Panorama" (1) .

The last preliminary remark is that the realities of the political field in modern Russia are changing rapidly. It is safe to say that in the few months it takes to prepare this book for publication, some of its details will no longer correspond to reality: newspapers may cease to be published, parties may form coalitions, split and disappear from the political scene, leaders may rename their own groups or join others. We ask the reader to treat with understanding the possible inconsistency of some details of the book with the realities of life by the time it appears on the shelves of bookstores. Unfortunately, this is inevitable.

2.1. Right-wing radicals in modern Russia: who is who

Classification problems

With all the ideological diversity of right-wing radicals, with a certain degree of conventionality, they can be divided into several main currents.

Naturally, the classification of radical national-patriotic political organizations is possible according to various ideological parameters: views on the ideal political structure of Russia (monarchists, national republicans, etc.), interpretation of the nature of the nation state (ethno-nationalists, supra-ethnic imperial nationalists), religious position (Orthodox fundamentalists , neo-pagans, non-religious nationalists), views on property (from National Bolsheviks and National Socialists to supporters of predatory national capital), etc. Classification according to these parameters, although it will be as correct as possible, still does not help to form a complete picture of what are national radicals in modern Russia after all. We can only agree with the words of the American researcher Walter Laqueur: “Russian politicians are in constant motion, and, apparently, this will continue for a long time. Depending on the situation, people and groups belonging to the center move to the right, and vice versa, some right-wingers become moderates.<...> Under such circumstances, it seems impossible, and wrong, to draw a clear line between "extremists" and "moderates". Strange alliances arise, they will arise in the future, so any attempt to classify them as this do botanists, zoologists or chemists, is doomed to failure" (2) .

Of course, despite the aforementioned difficulties, one cannot completely abandon the classification of right-wing radical groups. Without this, it is impossible to create a general idea of ​​what right-wing radicalism is in today's Russia.

In order to form the most generalized picture of the radical right movement, simplifying somewhat, we propose to divide its representatives into "old" and "new" right (3) . This division is based on the most general, informal features of a more mental and ideological than programmatic nature. The main parameter that distinguishes the "new" right from the "old" is the revolutionary nature of their nationalism, and not so much in terms of programmatic goals, but in mentality. As a rule, the revolutionary nature of consciousness means the creation of paramilitary detachments, a readiness for violence in activities, an apology for war, and an aggressive incitement of ethnic hatred in propaganda.

Clarification of the classification based on a broad approach that takes into account the peculiarities of mentality and behavior is necessary, since it is almost impossible to make a correct distinction between organizations based on the provisions of political programs, often just formal ones. Within the framework of this chapter, we will be primarily interested not in the relatively moderate "old" ("Black Hundreds", Orthodox fundamentalists), but in the "new" right - national revolutionaries (National Socialists, National Bolsheviks and outright fascists).

The largest such organization for a long time was the Russian National Unity (RNU) of Alexander Barkashov (4) .

Russian national unity

RNE was formed in the period from September 1990 (when a group led by Alexander Barkashov and Viktor Yakushev left the National Patriotic Front "Memory" of Dmitry Vasiliev) to October of the same year (when the tandem A. Barkashov - V. Yakushev broke up). The official date of birth of RNE is October 16, 1990.

The ideology of the RNU is a mixture of traditional Russian Black Hundred nationalism and outright Nazism. RNU members profess aggressive anti-liberalism, anti-communism and anti-Semitism, sing the ideals of a pure Russian nation (in the first version of the RNU program there were theses on the criminal prosecution of mixed marriages and the introduction of eugenics (5)) and Russian spirituality (Orthodoxy, but in its "original forms"). The stylistic imitation of the German Nazis by the Barkashovites was obvious. Unambiguous associations were evoked by the RNE emblem containing a swastika, a greeting with a raised right hand, a black uniform, etc. Barkashov did not hesitate to call himself a Nazi and speak enthusiastically about Hitler (6) .

RNU functioned as a paramilitary type organization. Members of the movement wore uniforms, engaged in power sports, drill, learned to shoot. The leaders of the organization have repeatedly stated that the members of the organization are preparing for a situation of civil war (7) .

RNE actively showed itself during the events of September-October 1993. The Barkashov detachment was the most important component of the motley forces of the defenders of the White House and supporters of the Supreme Council dissolved by the President. The members of the RNE were the most disciplined and were responsible for the most responsible areas of defense. On October 3, the Barkashovites, led by their leader, stormed the city hall building on Kalininsky Prospekt.

In the mid-1990s, the RNU developed rapidly, but by 1998, the first manifestations of an internal crisis began in the organization. The organization split in 2000.

The number of RNU during the heyday of the organization, according to the most plausible estimates, fluctuated around 15-20 thousand active members (and the payroll was even larger). Branches of the RNU operated practically throughout Russia, and were also active in Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia. The split of the party in 2000 was accompanied by an aggressive showdown in the leadership of the movement and, as a result, a massive exodus of members.

RNU's print organ is the Russian Order newspaper (the indicated circulation ranged from 25,000 to 500,000 copies, although recently the newspaper has been published no more than once a year), regional publications are also published. In 1999, the registration of "Russian Order" was canceled by the court on a formal occasion, but in 2000 the publication was re-registered in Belarus and since 2001 it has been published again (under the Treaty on the Union State of Russia and Belarus, Belarusian media are distributed in Russia without any additional permissions and registrations, and vice versa). A. Barkashov retained control over the newspaper after the RNU split. In addition to "Russian order", RNE publications are also published in the regions. Issue their own newspapers and organizations formed as a result of the split.

It can be confidently asserted that the RNE experienced its heyday in the mid-1990s. The heroic aura of the "defenders of the White House" attracted radical nationalists to the RNE - the Barkashovites turned out to be a few who managed to benefit directly from the 1993 crisis. However, internal stagnation, a losing information policy, a passive position in the elections on the one hand, and pressure from the city authorities on the other hand led to the fact that since 1999-2000 the RNE entered a period of decline (8) . After the split, or rather, a series of splits, starting in September 2000, the RNE actually ceased to exist as a single organization.

Some of the groupings formed after the split claim to retain their former name and symbols. There are rather tense relations between the alternative RNU groups. Although they practically act in solidarity in political propaganda campaigns (against the TIN, in defense of Budanov, etc.), in personal contacts, it comes to physical clashes. Various nationalist publications are full of unrestrained polemics of the former Barkashovites with each other, including insults, accusations of various vices and crimes, and a significant amount of compromising materials. This controversy, which accompanied the split of the RNU and is still languidly going on in the newspapers and on the Internet, significantly contributed to the mass exodus of former members from the organization.

The biggest fragments of the movement so far:

RNU-I. Leader - Alexander Barkashov, founder of RNE. The number of RNU-I is 1-1.5 thousand people. Initially, after the split, the vast majority of regional organizations refused to recognize the leadership of the former leader, and Barkashov himself came up with the idea of ​​transforming the political movement into a "military-religious brotherhood" Guards Barkashov. the former leader returned the name "RNU" to the group of his supporters.

A major success of A. Barkashov can be considered the resumption of the publication of the previously banned newspaper "Russian Order" - thus, the Barkashovites managed to retain the name and brand of the relatively well-known earlier publication. However, Barkashov's organization is practically not active and its existence is known only from a leaflet campaign in the Moscow metro. In addition, the Barkashovites conduct propaganda on the Internet, but they clearly cannot compete with the more active Internet propaganda of the "Lalochkin group" (RNU-II).

RNU-II. Leaders - Eugene and Mikhail Lalochkin. The Lalochkin brothers headed the main number of regional organizations and even tried to completely preserve the movement by excluding Barkashov and his supporters from it. Number - 2-3 thousand people. The Lalochkin brothers head the regional branches of the RNU in St. Petersburg (Mikhail) and Voronezh (Yevgeny). Vladimir Shcherbakov, leader of the movement in the Far East, also plays a prominent role in RNU-II.

The main success of the Lalochkin brothers was the successful establishment of horizontal ties with most of the regional RNU groups and the preservation of the structure of the movement throughout Russia. However, in order to avoid accusations of ambitious plans during the split of the movement, the brothers refused leadership positions, and alternative leaders did not appear in RNU-II. According to the original plan, after the restoration of ties, representatives of regional organizations were to gather at the congress and elect a new composition of the Central Council of the movement and its chairman, but the maximum that was done in this direction was to hold several coordination meetings with the participation of representatives of regional organizations. In fact, RNU-II is an unstructured network of regional groups. The coordinating function of the St. Petersburg and Voronezh organizations has been reduced to a minimum. The weakness of the group in organizational terms is at least evidenced by the fact that in a year and a half it was not possible to create a stable cell of supporters of the Lalochkin brothers in Moscow.

RNU-II conducts active propaganda. Several websites are maintained on the Internet, including the old site of the movement, which RNU-II managed to keep. In addition, the "Lalochkin group" publishes independently or collaborates with a number of regional newspapers ("Evpatiy Kolovrat", "Our Fatherland" and at one time - "New System" in St. Petersburg, "VRO RNE Newsletter" in Voronezh, "Russian Light "in Ryazan, etc.).

"Russian Renaissance" (RV). The leaders of the RV movement were Oleg Kassin (coordinator of the RNU regional organizations before the split) and Yuri Vasin (head of the Moscow regional organization of the RNU before the split), the initiators of the RNU split in the fall of 2000. O. Kassin and Yu. Vasin, relying on regional leaders dissatisfied with the personality of A. Barkashov, deposed the chairman of the RNU. The leader of the "coup" O. Kassin initially planned to abandon the symbolism, form and radical ideology of the RNU. However, he was not supported by the majority of schismatics who separated into the Lalochin group (RNE-II), and as a result, he was forced to form the RV movement with a minority of regional organizations that had left Barkashov’s subordination. The basis for the movement was the former regional branches of the RNE in the Stavropol Territory, Perm, Kirov, Rostov, Kostroma and Tver regions and in Moscow. The initial number of RV reached about a thousand people.

The RV movement held its founding congress, at which the eight-pointed star became the emblem of the movement (without the inscribed swastika - like the emblem of the Spas movement, recorded on the ballots of 1999), and the color of the uniform of the comrades-in-arms became blue (instead of black). RV began to publish the newspaper "Our worldview" and regional newspapers in Tver and Perm. However, by the end of 2001, the movement was in crisis due to internal disagreements about its future fate. O. Kassin wanted to give the organization a respectable image and constantly supported the actions of the Russian authorities, and the leaders of regional groups Andrei Dudinov (Stavropol) and Vladimir Noskov (Perm) saw this as a departure from the principled line of the movement. As a result, the RV movement, in turn, experienced a split.

At the end of 2001, Oleg Kassin joined the leadership of the Vozrozhdeniye party created by businessman and State Duma deputy Yevgeny Ishchenko. At the founding congress of the party on February 16, 2002, E. Ishchenko became the chairman of the party, and another deputy of the State Duma, Sergei Zagidullin and O. Kassin, became deputy chairmen. The party does not publish its own printed organ, but E. Ishchenko's interviews and articles are often published in various publications, for example, since the spring of 2002, in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper. "Renaissance" in its propaganda focuses on a tough anti-immigration policy, intensifying the fight against crime, supporting the military-industrial complex and domestic entrepreneurs, and anti-Western rhetoric.

Yuri Vasin, in turn, entered the leadership of the National Revival Party Narodnaya Volya, created by Sergei Baburin on the basis of the Russian People's Union (RUS).

At the end of 2001, the leaders of the regional groups of the RV, who, following Kassin, refused to join the "Ishchenko party" (Alexander Frutikov from Tver, Vladimir Noskov from Perm, Andrey Timofeev from Kostroma) deposed Kassin from the post of chairman of the movement at the end of 2001. However, to maintain the unity of the RV still failed. Some of the regional groups continue to call themselves the RV movement, some joined the National Power Party of Russia, and V. Noskov and the newspaper "Mirovozrenie" published by him declared themselves the Perm representative office of the Oprichny Brotherhood in the name of St. Rev. Joseph Volotsky.

Another group that exists in Moscow and some other regions after the split of the RNU is the Slavic Union (SS). Leader - Dmitry Demushkin, honorary chairman - Nikolai Kryukov, former chief of staff of the united RNE. The SS considers itself the Moscow regional branch of the All-Russian RNU, but at the same time does not recognize either Barkashov or the Lalochkins and independently establishes contacts with regional organizations. The printed organ of the SS was the newspaper "Stenka", which is currently out of print. The number of SS - about two hundred people. The SS practically does not conduct agitation, being rather a military-sports group. Members of the SS are involved in sports and security activities.

The RNU Consolidated Detachment, a small group that formed in Moscow after the split, after some attempts to establish its own contacts with regional organizations, joined the United People's Party.

On the whole, RNU, weakened by the split, is gradually leaving the political arena. Some prospects (for example, possible registration or attempts to participate in elections) are only for groups of former Barkashovites within the framework of new organizations - the Vozrozhdeniye E. Ishchenko and Narodnaya Volya S. Baburin parties.

National Bolshevik Party

Another major national radical organization is the National Bolshevik Party (NBP).

The leader of the NBP is the well-known writer Eduard Limonov; after his arrest in April 2001, Anatoly Tishin took over as chairman of the party.

The number of the NBP is about 7 thousand people. Officially, there are branches of the NBP in 51 regions of Russia. Representatives of the party from 38 regions attended the First All-Russian Congress of the NBP. In addition, branches of the NBP operate in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

During 1994-2002, the NBP's print organ was the Limonka newspaper, its circulation fluctuated around ten thousand copies, with a frequency of once every two weeks. Since the autumn of 2002, the central print organ has been the Generalnaya Liniya newspaper, which has retained its format, circulation, periodicity, and even the Limonka logo. A number of regional publications are published.

The NBP took shape gradually from November 1992, when a group of radicals led by E. Limonov and Andrey Arkhipov left the party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and formed the National Radical Party (subsequently split into groups of supporters of Limonov and Arkhipov), to November 1994, when The first issue of the Limonka newspaper was published. The official birthday of the party is November 28, 1994.

A feature of the ideology of the NBP is its pro-Soviet orientation and not ethnic, but cultural (and to a lesser extent - state) nationalism. The main symbol of the party is a black hammer and sickle in a white circle on a red background.

In its activities, the NBP pays special attention to protecting the rights of the Russian population in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Members of the NBP (both from Russia and from local groups) take an active part in various events (not always legal, and often openly hooligan), aimed, according to the National Bolsheviks, at protecting the interests of the Russian diaspora in Latvia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan. These actions, although they usually do not have immediate results, nevertheless draw public attention to the problem, and also, ultimately, contribute to the popularity of the party. The most famous actions of non-violent protest of the National Bolsheviks in Latvia (the capture of the bell tower of the Cathedral of St. Michael in Riga in 2001) and in the Crimea (the capture of the tower of the Sailors Club in Sevastopol in 2000), as well as the support of Russian separatists in Northern Kazakhstan (the failed uprising of the Cossacks in Kokchetav in 1997).

The NBP was registered as an interregional organization in early 1997 and re-registered on February 9, 1998. Despite repeated attempts, the NBP could not obtain all-Russian registration.

Although the NBP can hardly be called a mass party, it has managed to carve out a niche in the political spectrum. With its bright style and successful propaganda, the NBP noticeably influences a part of Russian youth, which does not always adhere to Nazi or communist views.

The right-wing radicalism of the NBP can be disputed: its ideology is internally contradictory, and leftist elements in it are noticeable no less, and perhaps even more, than nationalist ones. In the party itself, at the end of 2002 (on the eve of the 4th congress), a discussion once again broke out about the "rightness" and "leftism" of the National Bolshevik course. Perhaps, after the exit from the NBP of its first ideologist A. Dugin in 1998, the ratio of components in the right-left ideological and stylistic cocktail of the NBP and Limonka changed. The party has become more leftist than neo-Nazi, there are more elements of anti-globalism, "chegevarism", Trotskyism and the ideas of the European "new left", and fewer elements of Nazism, conservative revolution, traditionalism, Eurasianism and the "new right" - less. True, the Party's "leftward movement" can only be regarded as a trend, and not as a final change in position. Considering the fundamental eclecticism of Limonov and his followers, as well as the almost complete independence of regional organizations in choosing an ideological platform (in some departments, left-wing radical intellectuals dominate, in others, national radicals or even racist skinheads), the ratio of right and left elements in the party can still change.

The NBP actively developed until the early 2000s, constrained only by external factors - for example, the lack of all-Russian registration. At present, the NBP is the most radical of the relatively large political parties. Perhaps, apart from the NBP, only various versions of the RNU have regional branches throughout the country, but the RNU is weakened by internal conflicts, while the NBP continues to exist as a centralized and living political party. However, the NBP is objectively weakened by other reasons, namely the arrest of the leadership and pressure from law enforcement agencies (9) .

NBP chairman Eduard Limonov and a number of other NBP activists were arrested in April 2001 after party members bought several machine guns. According to investigators, the weapons were purchased on the direct orders of Limonov. In September 2002, a trial began in Saratov (the place where weapons were purchased). For two years, the forces of the activists and the money of the party went to a large extent to protect the imprisoned leadership of the NBP (the well-known lawyer Sergei Belyak acted as Limonov's lawyer).

The acting chairman of the party, Anatoly Tishin, determined that his main task was to use repressions against the party leadership to attract public attention and sympathy, which, I must say, the National Bolsheviks succeed. Various factors provide a more sympathetic than negative tone towards the NBP in many media: the dubious legal basis for the arrest of Limonov (it is not clear how justified the version of the investigation about the involvement of the party leader in the purchase of weapons) looks like a provocation machine guns (the persons who sold the weapons were not identified and detained; meanwhile, the National Bolsheviks were arrested immediately after the acquisition of machine guns, which at least convinces that there is operational information about the deal, or even that the situation was set up), selfless behavior of rank-and-file party members (almost a month-long hunger strike by four National Bolsheviks demanding an open trial), etc. As far as one can judge, as a result of the very fact of Limonov's arrest and the features of working with the media described above, the fame and popularity of both the leader himself and his party in society has increased. This is also confirmed by the results of the by-elections to the State Duma in the Nizhny Novgorod region on March 31, 2002, in which Limonov participated in absentia: although he lost, he received the largest number of votes compared to all previous attempts to participate in the elections.

However, despite a competent line of legal defense and work with journalists, the National Bolsheviks are constrained in their actions and cannot, in order not to negatively affect the course of the investigation and trial, carry out their hooligan and political activities to the same extent. The slogan of the NBP "Put Limonov in jail - untie our hands!" testified to the somewhat passive political behavior of the party in the past two years, pending trial. In addition, faced with real opposition (not always expressed in the correct form) from law enforcement agencies, many of its members left the party, and the growth of the NBP's fame and popularity did not affect either the growth of the party's ranks, or even the circulation of the party newspaper.

The pressure of the authorities on the NBP, in addition to the general difficulty in the activities of the party in its former form, is also expressed in private, but very effective for suppressing the political structure of actions: for example, on July 26, 2002, the party newspaper "Limonka" was banned, the further stay of the party in the premises occupied is questionable , and so on.

In 2002, the party proclaimed its task to collect the number of members and regional organizations necessary for registration at the all-Russian level. At the moment this seems unrealistic. First, objectively, the NBP cannot meet the strict requirements of the Law on Political Parties, and there is no explosive growth in the number and rapid pace of party building. On the contrary, one can state a certain outflow of members from the party, frightened by the real prospect of criminal or administrative prosecution and unprepared to uncompromisingly go to the end without a chance of victory. Secondly, the National Bolsheviks, unlike many other political organizations, will not be able to submit falsified documents for registration: it is quite obvious that any formal pretext in the case of the NBP will be enough to refuse registration, and party documentation will be strictly checked. And, finally, the NBP has every chance of being banned altogether. The lawsuit to liquidate the NBP has already been filed with the court, but the court heeded the arguments of party lawyer Sergiy Belyak and decided to postpone consideration of the lawsuit to ban the NBP until a decision was made on the "Limonov case", since the rationale for the party's ban stemmed from the guilt of the leadership, which had not yet been proven in court and activists. After this decision (and until the end of the NBP leader's trial), the Law on Combating Extremist Activities was adopted, which significantly increased the likelihood of legal liquidation of the NBP.

Objectively, the NBP is in a very difficult position. The arrest of the leadership and the powerful pressure of law enforcement agencies make it almost impossible for the full functioning of the political organization. Although the party continues to operate and even successfully use state repressions to win the sympathy of the population, it has no chance to go beyond the marginal field in which it is currently located. There can be no question of any participation of the NBP in the upcoming elections to the State Duma.

In reality, at the moment (June 2003) it is difficult to predict how the fate of the National Bolsheviks will develop further. On the one hand, the party held its next constituent congress and is going to apply for all-Russian registration under the new law, and, most importantly, Limonov's lawyer managed to get the party leader released on parole. On the other hand, severe pressure from law enforcement agencies and a possible ban on the party may push the National Bolsheviks out of the field of legal politics in general.

In any case, even if the party disappears without a trace or collapses like the RNU (which is unlikely, especially given the release of the leader), one cannot but admit that the NBP was the most striking radical political project in post-Soviet Russia.

Other right-wing organizations

Apart from the NBP and the RNE, other "new" right-wing organizations failed to expand their activities to an all-Russian scale. However, some organizations are quite visible on the far right of the political spectrum.

Of the currently active organizations, the overtly racist People's National Party (PNP) of Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky is worth mentioning first. The number of NNP is 500-700 people. Official party organizations exist in 38 regions. The central print organ is the newspaper "I am a Russian" (circulation - 15,000 copies, frequency - once or twice a month).

A feature of the NNP is its focus on working with skinheads - racist teenagers with skinheads (10) . Skinheads are a relatively numerous trend in the youth subculture, which is based on aggressive racism. The main occupation of skinheads is the beating of representatives of various national minorities (immigrants from the Caucasus, gypsies, students from Africa and Asia, etc.), which sometimes has a mass character and takes on the scale of pogroms. The loudest and bloodiest of the actions of skinheads was the pogrom at the Tsaritsyno market in October 2001. Actually, skinheads are not a political movement, but national-radical parties actively recruit "militants" from among them. True, not everyone succeeds in this - shaven-headed teenagers do not like party discipline, avoid ideological jungle and often believe that parties, unlike themselves, are busy only with "talking". The NPP is a rare example of the successful work of the nationalist party with skinheads.

The deputy chairman of the NNP is Semyon Tokmakov, a shaven head who became famous in 1998 for beating up a black guard at the US embassy in Moscow. Tokmakov, having joined the party immediately after his release from prison in 1999, brought a significant number of skinheads with him - in fact, from that moment on, skinhead teenagers are the basis of the NNP.

The propaganda of the NNP is notable for its radicalism, especially with regard to the exploitation of anti-Semitic and anti-Caucasian stereotypes. The leader of the party in April 2002 was convicted of inciting ethnic hatred to three years in prison (probation), and immediately amnestied.

The Party of Freedom (PS) of Yuri Belyaev (until 2000 - the National Republican Party of Russia (NRPR), formed as a result of the split of the party of the same name by Nikolai Lysenko) is also actively working with skinheads, with its center in St. Petersburg. In the northwestern regions of Russia (Leningrad region, Pskov), the PS is one of the main national-radical parties. With the help of Andrey Grebnev, the former leader of the St. Petersburg branch of the NBP, who went over to Yu. Belyaev in 2000, the PS managed to attract skinheads to its activities. A. Grebnev is now the editor-in-chief of the printed organ of the PS - the monthly newspaper "Our Review" (circulation - 10,000 copies).

The fact that both the NPP and the PS work most actively with skinheads has contributed to the increase in the visibility of the organizations over the past year and a half. After several bloody pogroms in Moscow in 2001, the attention of the media was riveted on young racists, and this interest (if not "unhealthy excitement") was used to gain popularity by Ivanov-Sukharevsky and Belyaev. Although this ensured the influx of skinheads into these parties and helped the leaders to exploit for self-promotion informational occasions that really had nothing to do with the parties (racially motivated street violence, the expectation of pogroms on Hitler's birthday on April 20, 2002), on the other hand, this feature weakens the parties. . Skinheads prove to be highly unreliable and undisciplined party activists; only a minority of shaven-headed teenagers are fit for routine party work. Despite the coincidence of the ideological and ideological positions of skinheads and radical national leaders, the difference in mentality is enormous. A racist teenager will beat passers-by with a non-Russian appearance on the street, and not stick up posters or stand in pickets. And the unequivocal association of the PS and the NPP with skinheads scares away older and more respectable nationalists from the party.

Both NNP and PS apply for all-Russian registration, but have no chance of this. In reality, both parties have in their ranks several hundred members, most of whom are minors, and no more than a dozen active regional branches. There can be no question of any real participation in the political process of the NNP and PS, however, these parties represent a certain danger with their propaganda, which mainly affects aggressive teenagers, who subsequently pour out their hatred on the streets.

In the mid-1990s, in Moscow and a couple of other cities (St. Petersburg, Yaroslavl), perhaps the most radical of all legal nationalist organizations, the Russian National Union (RNS) of Konstantin Kasimovsky, was noticeable. The RNS has never been numerous (during its heyday, the party numbered 150-200 people in Moscow), but it was quite noticeable by its active and aggressive propaganda. The main print organ of the RNS - the newspaper "Shturmovik" (at its best published weekly) was closed by a court decision in 1998, and, unlike the "Russian order", not for a formal reason, but because of its content. In 1999, the leader of the RNS and the editor-in-chief of Sturmovik, K. Kasimovsky, was sentenced to two years in prison (conditionally) for inciting ethnic hatred.

After receiving a suspended sentence, Kasimovsky, although he returned to political activity, tries to be more careful. RNS, for a short time called the Russian National Socialist Party, now bears the name of the Russian Action Movement (RD). In fact, the RD movement now is a group of ideologists (first of all, Kasimovsky himself, as well as Alexander Eliseev and Victoria Vanyushkina), who propagate their views through the Right Resistance newspaper, which is much less radical compared to Sturmovik. It seems that after a clash with law enforcement agencies, Kasimovsky abandoned his idea of ​​coming to power "through a civil war" and modestly claims to be the ideologist of the coming national revolution.

Unions of right radicals

Throughout the 1990s, attempts were repeatedly made to unite national radicals. In 1992-1993 mass associations of left-wing patriots (communist sovereigns) and right-wing radicals - the National Salvation Front of Ilya Konstantinov and the Russian National Cathedral of Alexander Sterligov - were relatively successful. After the crisis of October 1993 and the reform of the party system of the Russian Federation, these coalitions fell apart, and the idea of ​​a broad unification of right-wing radical forces remained, despite all the attempts of enthusiasts, in the field of theory.

In 1996, the Coordinating Council of Radical Nationalist Parties (KSRNP) was created. The CC included the NBP, NNP, NRPR Y. Belyaev, the New Public Russian Movement (NORD) Georgy Shepelev, the Kiev Party of Slavic Unity (PSU) Oleg Bakhtiyarov and a number of smaller groups. The main task of the association was to determine the position of the nationalists in the 1996 presidential elections. After the elections, the Constitutional Court practically ceased to exist.

The idea of ​​a broad association of right-wing radicals was revived in 2001, when a new law on political parties tightened the requirements for obtaining all-Russian registration, which is necessary to participate in elections to the State Duma. It became obvious that only together the various groups of right-wing radicals would be able to recruit the number of members and regional branches required by law.

The most successful attempt at such an association in 2001-2003 was the National Power Party of Russia (NDPR). The idea of ​​a single nationalist party was born in the spring of 2001, when it became clear that none of the existing national-patriotic organizations was in a position to independently register at the all-Russian level. The direct initiative for the creation of the party, apparently, came from the leader of the left-nationalist organization Union of Officers, Stanislav Terekhov.

The first Memorandum on the establishment of the Organizing Committee of a single nationalist party (the name NDPR was adopted later, the name Russian State Party was originally proposed) was signed on May 18, 2001 by Yuri Belyaev (Freedom Party, Nashe Obozrenie newspaper), Dmitry Dyomushkin (Slavic Union), Stanislav Terekhov ( Union of Officers and newspaper of the same name), Vladimir Selivanov (newspaper "Desnitsa"), Alexander Aratov (newspaper "Russkaya Pravda"), Alexander Sevastyanov (League for the Protection of National Heritage, "National Newspaper"), Dmitry Rumyantsev (newspaper "Stenka"), Andrey Arkhipov (Russian Project - Great Russia), Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky (People's National Party and the newspaper "I am Russian!"), Vladimir Avdeev (magazine "Ateney"). The memorandum called on the nationalist leaders "to cast aside their ambitions and personal grievances in the name of a common goal - the salvation of Russia."

Later, the document was signed by Viktor Korchagin (Russian Party of Russia, Russkiye Vedomosti newspaper), S. Kucherov (Derzhavny Soyuz news agency), Igor Dyakov (Empire newspaper), Vladimir Popov (Era Rossii newspaper), Mikhail Kazmin (Rubezh newspaper, Vladimir), Stanislav Terentyev (Kolokol newspaper, Volgograd), Oleg Kitter (Alex-Inform newspaper, Samara), V. Mironov (Peresvet newspaper, Krasnodar), Boris Mironov (former chairman State Press Committee of the Russian Federation), Grigory Trofimchuk (former leader of the RNE in Saratov, now heads the Moscow Party of National Rise and edits the newspaper "National Rise"). At the initial stage, Alexander Chervyakov (the Russian Host magazine and the movement of the same name) also took part in the Organizing Committee, but he did not sign any documents, he was not a member of the Organizing Committee and rather quickly withdrew from the activities of the NDPR. At the beginning of 2002, the President of the All-Russian Federation of Hand-to-Hand Combat Tadeush Kasyanov joined the Organizing Committee.

By the end of 2001, due to internal conflicts, about half of the participants left the Organizing Committee (I. Dyakov, A. Arkhipov, D. Demushkin and A. Ivanov-Sukharevsky), by the beginning of 2002 A. Aratov and Yu. Belyaev left the Organizing Committee. A truly broad coalition did not work out - ideological disputes quickly began between the members of the Organizing Committee (neopagans sorted out their relationship with Orthodox fundamentalists, anti-communist nationalists - with left-patriotic participants, etc.). In addition, it also failed to discard personal ambitions, as the Memorandum called for. The situation was complicated by bad personal relations between some of the founders of the association.

As a print organ of the Organizing Committee of the NDPR, several issues of the newspaper "Russian Front" were published (as special issues of "I am Russian", "National Newspaper" and the newspaper "Union of Officers"; the circulation of different issues ranged from 1,000 to 10,000 copies).

The founding congress of the NDPR was held on February 24, 2002 in the Sosny boarding house in Korolev near Moscow (former Kaliningrad). The congress was attended by 216 delegates from 65 regions.

The Central Political Council (CPC) of the NDPR was elected at the congress. Three co-chairs headed the CPC NDPR - S. Terekhov (direction on organizational issues, relations with the regions; statutory commission), A. Sevastyanov (direction on program and ideological issues; program commission), B. Mironov (direction on relations with official authorities and public associations).

The NDPR, which at first promised to become the largest association of radical national and left-wing patriotic forces since the days of the Russian National Cathedral and the National Salvation Front, eventually became more of an association of individual leaders and several small groups, including regional ones.

In September 2002, the NDPR received official registration. Amazed by this fact, democratically oriented journalists, anti-fascists and human rights activists published the statements of the leaders of the NDPR at the founding congress full of anti-Semitism and xenophobia, and pointed out the illegality of registering such a party (based on the Law on Political Parties and the Law on Combating Extremist Activities). After that, the Ministry of Justice appealed to the NDPR with a demand for clarification, and the party leadership "dissociated itself from the statements of its individual members" (including two of the three co-chairs). Justice Minister Yury Chaika said that his department would closely monitor the nationalists, and if such statements are repeated, then the question of revoking her registration will arise. In January 2003, the party received its first warning from the Ministry of Justice (after the publication of Mironov's interview containing anti-Semitic statements in Moskovskie Novosti).

In the spring of 2003, the NDPR was deprived of all-Russian registration (for a formal reason - the party failed to register the required number of regional branches within the prescribed period).

Other attempts to create a broad association of national patriots were even less successful. The alternative project of the right-wing radical coalition, the United People's Party (UNP), has completely failed.

The organizing committee for the creation of the UNP was formed on August 2, 2001. The organizing committee included representatives of a number of Orthodox-fundamentalist, nationalist and left-wing patriotic organizations: Alexei Romanov, chairman of the small right-wing radical movement "White World", leader of the religious-fundamentalist group "Russian Falanga" and editor of the newspaper of the same name, Igor Lavrinenko, columnist for radio "Rezonans" A .Orlov, headman of the Oprichny brotherhood in the name of St. Joseph of Volotsky Anatoly Makeev, editor of the journal "Geopolitical Review" Yevgeny Morozov.

On February 17, 2002, the above political and public figures, as well as the representative of the communists A. Serbo, signed the "Agreement on the Formation of the Joint Organizing Committee for the Creation of a Single Political Organization (Party of the Russian People)".

In Moscow, the UNP was joined by Vladimir Goncharenko, leader of the RNE Consolidated Detachment, one of the smaller organizations that emerged as a result of the movement's split. The party published a small-circulation newspaper "People", maintained a website on the Internet and was no longer noticed in any activity. It can be argued that at the moment such a party does not exist. A. Romanov June 7, 2003 established the United People's Radical Movement.

Sergei Baburin's National Revival Party "Narodnaya Volya" (originally called the Party of Justice and National Revival) also acted as an association of national patriots. The founding congress of the party was held on December 21, 2001. Sergei Baburin (formerly the leader of the Russian People's Union) was elected chairman of the party, Yuri Vasin, Nina Zhukova, Vladimir Davidenko, Viktor Alksnis were elected as his deputies. The printed organ of the party is the newspaper "Vremya" - formerly the publication of ROS.

Initially, there were negotiations on the entry into the new party of Baburin, positioning itself as social democratic and patriotic, representatives of broad opposition forces: from the radical Nazi Slavic Union of D. Dyomushkin to the respectable Socialist Party of Russia Ivan Rybkin, but in the end the party turned out to be rather a restructured ROS, which was joined by individual figures of both radical national-party and centrist orientations.

Approximately the same electorate is intended for the People's Patriotic Party of Russia, headed by Igor Rodionov. The founding congress of the NNPR was held on February 23, 2002. The printed organ is the newspaper "Patriot". The party is focused on the social protection of the population and the re-creation of a strong state. The leadership of the party included people well-known in nationalist circles - for example, the leader of the Russian Party, Vladimir Miloserdov.

On the whole, it can be concluded that the radical national patriots turned out to be incapable of creating a broad and flexible coalition, similar to that created in the liberal-democratic camp in the person of the Union of Right Forces. The associations of nationalists turn out to be very narrow and weak. UNP, most likely, will not be registered at the All-Russian level, and the NDPR, it seems, has finally lost its registration. If the more stable (and at the same time narrower, more homogeneous) Narodnaya Volya and NPPR associations get registered, which they, in principle, have a chance of doing, their electoral successes in the upcoming elections are unlikely to be more significant than the successes of ROS or Movements in support of the army (the ideology and rhetoric of the DPA are practically copied by the NPPR) in the 1999 elections (0.37% and 0.58% of the vote, respectively).

It is impossible not to note an important detail: the largest and most serious of all the above organizations - S. Baburin's "Narodnaya Volya" and I. Rodionov's NPPR - are also the most moderate. Probably, even referring them to the right-wing radical part of the political spectrum can be disputed (therefore, we considered the case of Baburin's party in more detail in another chapter).

"Old Rightists": Black Hundreds and Orthodox Fundamentalists

Compared to the revolutionary "new right" the "old right" looks moderate.

The "old rightists" include neo-Black Hundreds ("neo-" is very conditional, since, as a rule, they use pre-revolutionary Russian conservative ideology in an unchanged or slightly modified form) and Orthodox fundamentalist groups. Within the framework of this chapter, we are less interested in the Black Hundreds, since the illegal activity on their part is much less active than on the part of the "new" national radicals, and, accordingly, their relationship with the authorities is much less conflicting (and the section in the chapter on religious antisemitism). However, to complete the picture of the radical right part of the political spectrum, it is worth briefly describing the evolution of the organizational forms of the "old right" in the 1990s.

At the time of the fall of the Soviet regime, the Black Hundreds seemed to have a fairly strong position. They had a solid political history, claiming to maintain (through emigration and dissident groups) continuity in relation to pre-revolutionary Russian nationalists. The "old rightists" were almost the only group that by 1991 had a clear idea of ​​how they see the ideal Russia. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, changes took place in the public consciousness that were favorable for the Black Hundreds - the idealization of the image of tsarist Russia, the revival of Orthodoxy, and interest in the cultural heritage of Russian conservatives.

However, the strength of the Black Hundreds quickly turned into their weakness. Dogmatic limitation to the ideological heritage of pre-revolutionary organizations, paranoid anti-Semitism, excessive attention to history to the detriment of current issues, sectarianism, conservatism, unwillingness to function in a fundamentally new political situation - all this led to the decline of the "old right". The most active right-wing radical leaders came out of the Black Hundreds groups (first of all, from the National Patriotic Front "Memory" of Dmitry Vasilyev, which was a real "forge of personnel" for right-wing radicals) and created new organizations, as a rule, even more radical and appealing rather to experience of European fascism than pre-revolutionary Russian conservatism. Promising associations of both "new" and "old" right-wing radicals (with a hint of Soviet state patriotism), primarily the Russian National Cathedral of Alexander Sterligov, finally disintegrated by the mid-1990s. "Memory", whose propaganda and activities in the late 1980s and early 1990s made a huge impression on journalists and caused a mass emigration of frightened citizens of Jewish origin, by the mid-1990s had become a small and completely insignificant group of Dmitry Vasilyev's admirers. The status of the latter at the moment is a political pensioner, and not at all a leader of an all-Russian scale and not even a patriarch of Russian nationalism (besides, in right-wing circles they talk about Vasilyev’s serious illness - the main “monument” has not been out of bed for a long time).

Of course, the "old right" groups (NPF "Pamyat", the Black Hundred of Alexander Shtilmark, various monarchist groups) continue to exist and still have influence on some part of society, but they are experiencing a deep crisis and are generally on the sidelines of the political process in country. The only sphere of public life in which the position of the Black Hundreds is strong is the near-church Orthodox organizations. The activities of such groups as the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods (SPB), the Union of Orthodox Citizens (CPG), the Union of Christian Revival (SHV) and, more recently, the Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers (SPKh) and the party "For Holy Rus'" practically exhaust the public near-church activity. Most of the popular Orthodox publications (newspapers "Russkiy vestnik", "Rus orthodox", the magazine "Russian House") are on the "old right" fundamentalist-nationalist positions.

Orthodox-fundamentalist groupings practically do not conduct their own political activity. They arrange various public events - religious processions, historical and theological readings, etc. - and no more. It is true that the general intensity of xenophobic emotions, primarily anti-Semitic ones, at the events of the SPKh/SPB/SHV is quite significant. For example, on April 20 (that is, Hitler's birthday) 2002, these organizations held a protest rally in front of the Israeli embassy in Moscow against Israel's policy in the occupied territories. The specific reason for the action was the confrontation between the Israeli army and Palestinian militants who had taken refuge in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. The very idea of ​​the possibility of the Jews storming a Christian shrine caused indignation among fundamentalists. During the rally, Leonid Simonovich, the leader of the St. Petersburg and the Union of Artists, and Vladimir Osipov, the chairman of the Union of Artists, constantly heard radical anti-Semitic statements in the spirit of Christian anti-Judaism: "Jews" are "visible demons", "children of Satan", "enemies of the Lord", etc. The fact that the day of the rally was not chosen by chance is evidenced by the title of Simonovich's article describing the rally - "The Leader's Birthday" (11) .

SPG (chairman - Valentin Lebedev), on the contrary, is gradually acquiring a respectable image. In the spring of 2002, the SPG, together with the pro-presidential faction of the State Duma "People's Deputy" and the centrist People's Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Raikov, held a series of protests against the establishment of Catholic dioceses in Russia by the Vatican. Although a certain intensity of xenophobia was felt at the SPG rallies, the very fact of cooperation with the authorities suggests that V. Lebedev is moving away from the radicals and becoming a "respectable politician." Lebedev's evolution can be illustrated at least by the fact that in 1999 he was nominated to the Duma as a candidate for deputies on the same list as Barkashov and Tokmakov - and in 2002 he did not give the floor to any of his radical associates at a rally (Osipov and Simonovich tried to get through to the microphones) .

Quite a significant number of activists gather at some public events of the SPKh / SPB / SHV (although this applies, for example, to religious processions on the anniversary of the assassination of Emperor Nicholas II, rather than to anti-Israeli rallies). However, this group of Orthodox fundamentalists practically does not conduct active propaganda in the media and the Internet, preferring to direct their energy towards "prayer stands" that, in their opinion, can miraculously change the fate of Russia.

On the contrary, the more radical Oprichny brotherhood in the name of the holy reverend Joseph Volotsky (the elder is Anatoly Makeev, the ideologist is Ruslan Bychkov) is engaged in very active propaganda in the press. The Brotherhood publishes three of its own newspapers ("The Tsar's Oprichnik", "The Enlightener" and "The Russian Partisan"), books (only in 2002: A. Makeev "Parallel Orthodoxy", R. Bychkov "Introduction to the Philosophy of Rebellion", the collection "Shaven-Headed Russia" ") and has a strong influence on a number of newspapers that are not formally printed bodies of the brotherhood ("Era of Russia" in Moscow, "Oprichnina" in Novgorod, "World View" in Perm). The ideologists and publicists of the Brotherhood quite successfully combine (at the level of synthesis, and not eclecticism, unlike most Russian Orthodox Nazis) in their propaganda neo-Nazism and Orthodox fundamentalism, richly mixed with anti-Semitism and, oddly enough, elements of the new left philosophy. The Orthodox community, which is in a deep intellectual and ideological crisis, perceives new elements in the ideas of the Brotherhood (for example, the thesis about the Orthodox revolution as the only way to overcome the "alienation" of the modern world), capable of resolving this crisis, caused primarily by the lack of creative processing of the traditional Orthodox system of coordinates in relation to to new conditions. However, the perception of the ideas of the Brotherhood by the broad Orthodox-patriotic public is complicated by the fact that the "oprichniki" for the most part are outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, being "catacombniks" or "foreigners". This allows them to sharply and consistently criticize the "decadent" elements in the ROC MP and modern Christianity in general and offer an alternative in the form of "parallel Orthodoxy" by analogy with "parallel" (informal) Islam, but this makes their propaganda unacceptable to most Russian Orthodox fundamentalists. . The ideology and propaganda of the brotherhood is sectarian in nature and has no chance of spreading not only among the broad masses, but even among the “target group” represented by modern Russian Orthodox fundamentalist nationalists.

An organization created with a claim to wide popularity is the party "For Holy Rus'". The founding congress of the party was held on December 1, 2001 in the Moscow region. Party chairman - Sergei Popov, his deputies - D. Merkulov, I. Shatalov and I. Starikov, chairman of the Presidium of the Central Council - Alexei Kuimov. In part, the party is the political hypostasis of the SPB, in part it is an organization created from scratch. The party "For Holy Rus'" is associated with a social movement with an almost similar name - "Holy Rus'". The movement is focused on organizing Orthodox brotherhoods, folklore groups, hand-to-hand combat groups (at Orthodox parishes!), and is not involved in politics.

The party has a relative organizational success, it is actively promoting its views on the Internet and in the press (newspapers "Pravoporyadok", "Serbsky Krest"). However, the breakthrough expected by the leadership of the party at the organizational level did not happen, despite the blessings of the elders, authoritative in church circles. In October 2002, the party "For Holy Rus'" was registered. Currently, negotiations are underway to create a bloc to participate in the elections, uniting the party "For Holy Rus'", the Military Power Union of Russia (Leonid Ivashov), the Union of Cossacks of Russia (Alexander Martynov) and a number of other groups. If the bloc takes part in the elections to the State Duma in 2003 in such a composition, it is unlikely that its result will be better than the result of the ideologically close association Russkoye Delo in the 1999 elections (0.17% of the vote).

Although the "old" right-wing radicals allow themselves unrestrained extremist and xenophobic (first of all, anti-Semitic) rhetoric, the mentality of the "old" ones is such that extremism in ideology rarely becomes their activity. Therefore, when considering in the next paragraph the activities of right-wing radicals (participation in elections and illegal actions), we will be primarily interested in the "new right".

2.2. Activities of right-wing radicals: electoral defeats and successes in crimes

Right-wing radicals in the elections

Electoral statistics are important information for assessing the popularity of right-wing organizations in society and their chances of coming to power in the country by constitutional means.

In the State Duma of 1993-1995 there was only one representative of right-wing radicals in the full sense of the word - Nikolai Lysenko, chairman of the National Republican Party of Russia, who won the elections in a single-mandate constituency in the Saratov region. However, none of the radicals could repeat the success of the leader of the NRPR in the subsequent federal elections.

For the first time, a candidate from the openly Nazi movement RNE ran for the State Duma in by-elections in the 109th single-mandate majoritarian Mytishchensky constituency. October 30, 1994. Alexander Fedorov, a candidate supported by the RNE, won 5.92% of the vote, finishing sixth out of twelve. This result turned out to be the best one received by a RNU candidate in federal elections for all subsequent years. However, at that time the leadership of the RNU was counting on victory, and after the defeat of Fedorov, they announced that he was not the official candidate of the movement. Offended, Fedorov really moved away from the RNE and created his own organization, which since 1998 has been called the Russian Patriotic People's Movement (RNPD).

In the elections to the State Duma in 1995, several national-patriotic associations equally unsuccessfully ran in the federal district. The only truly radical organization on the ballot, NRPR N. Lysenko, received 0.48% of the vote.

A number of right-wing radical candidates ran for the Duma in single-member districts. Their results were also very disastrous.

The candidates from the RNE went through two Moscow districts - University district No. 201 (Yuri Kapralny) and Babushkinsky district No. 192 (Larisa Dementyeva), Dzerzhinsky district No. 85 in the Kaluga region (Alexander Ushakov), Vladimirsky district No. 66 (Mikhail Borovkov), Stavropol district No. 55 (Andrey Dudinov).

Y. Kapralny received 0.62% (16th place, there were 17 candidates in total), L. Dementieva - 2.53% (9th place, 23 candidates in total), A. Ushakov - 1.43% (13- th place, total - 15 candidates), M. Borovkov - 1.52% (12th place out of 14 candidates), A. Dudinov - 1.51% (14th place out of 20).

Former RNU member Aleksey Vedenkin, who ran in the single-mandate Lyubertsy constituency No. 107 near Moscow, won 1.93% of the vote, finishing 12th out of 14 candidates.

The leaders of the NBP, E. Limonov and Alexander Dugin, also ran unsuccessfully for the State Duma in single-mandate districts.

A complete failure befell the right-wing radicals in the 1996 presidential election.

The initiative group nominated A. Barkashov, members of the RNU actively collected signatures in his support, but in April the leader of the organization said that he did not intend to run and did not submit signatures to the Central Election Commission. The formal reason for withdrawing his own candidacy for Barkashov was allegedly that many registered candidates handed in "fake" signature sheets, and the RNE leader did not want to equate the "dead souls" of other candidates with the citizens who supported him. In reality, most likely, Barkashov either did not collect the necessary million signatures, or even having collected them (which, in principle, was possible), he realized the meagerness of his own chances not only for success, but for any worthy result.

Other right-wing radicals, united in the KSRNP, tried to decide on a candidate for the upcoming presidential elections. After a short period of uncertainty (at first, the radical nationalists even announced their support for the candidacy of the then incumbent President Boris Yeltsin), the KSRNP presented its presidential candidate, the legendary weightlifter, writer and public figure Yuri Vlasov. Although Y. Vlasov managed to submit the number of signatures necessary for registration as a candidate to the Central Election Commission, he failed miserably in the elections, gaining 0.25% of the vote.

By the 1999 State Duma elections, the main national-radical organizations (RNU and NBP), despite repeated attempts, were unable to obtain all-Russian registration and, therefore, did not have the right to run in the federal district. The NBP tried to join the Labor Russia bloc of Viktor Anpilov and the Union of Officers Stanislav Terekhov (at first the association was abbreviated as the Front of the Working People, then the Stalin Bloc), but the representatives of the NBP were not included in the list of candidates from the bloc.

Members of the RNU leadership were nominated as candidates on the federal list of the electoral association Spas Movement, which was deprived of registration by a court decision on the eve of the elections.

A list of the right-wing radical Black Hundreds of the Russkoye Delo association ran in the federal district, which won 0.17% of the vote.

In addition, A. Fedorov's RNPD and the radical Orthodox-monarchist movement "For Faith and Fatherland" Fr. Nikon (Belavenets), however, they did not manage to open an electoral account in the bank in due time and could not take part in the elections.

In the elections, the RNU nominated several candidates for the Duma in single-mandate districts (some of them did not advertise their party affiliation).

In official and unofficial information about candidates, 15 single-mandate candidates indicated their membership in the RNE; of these, seven people applied for registration, three of them (in Karelia, the Voronezh region and Kaliningrad) were denied.

The results of RNE candidates were as low as in 1995. Andrey Dudinov (Stavropol constituency No. 55) won 3.4% of the vote, Sergei Galkin (Kavminvodovsky constituency No. 53, Stavropol Territory) - 4.03% of the vote, Nikolai Dengin (Kirov constituency No. 92) - 1.26%, Andrey Eremin (Volzhsky District No. 68, Volgograd Region) - 3.1%.

Anatoly Tishin, the NBP candidate in the Mytishchensky district near Moscow, received 2% of the vote.

Approximately with the same success ran in single-mandate districts and other radical nationalists. For example, the leader of the Russian Party, Vladimir Miloserdov, received 1.15% of the vote. The leader of the Russian National Union Igor Artemov, who won 14.94% of the vote in the Vladimir region, and the St. Petersburg Nazi Nikolai Bondarik, who received 6.08% of the vote in St. Petersburg, had the best results. Both candidates campaigned very actively and costly, but despite relatively broad support, they lost the election.

In the Russian presidential elections in 2000, right-wing radicals did not even nominate their own candidate, but called for either voting for others (in particular, for Vladimir Putin and Alexei Podberezkin), or against all candidates in general (12 ) .

At the time of this writing, the last elections in which right-wing radicals took an active part were elections to the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg in late 2002. The election results are more than eloquent. Three candidates from the National Bolshevik Party received from 1.2 to 1.4% of the vote; two candidates from the Freedom Party - 0.11% and 0.68%. N. Bondarik received the support of 0.85% of those who voted.

In general, it can be stated that right-wing radicals do not have wide electoral support in modern Russian society. This is due to both objective (society’s fatigue from radicalism, the desire for stability, negative associations associated with the Great Patriotic War) and subjective reasons (the nationalists’ lack of a solid financial base, low level of propaganda, initial orientation towards non-parliamentary strategy).

Illegal activities of right-wing radicals

Elections have never been an end in themselves for right-wing radicals. Nationalist organizations in Russia are not parties of an electoral type. On the other hand, the National Socialists and other "new right" tend to be active, clearly falling under the Criminal Code (13) .

Almost all right-wing radicals, from the RNU to the Black Hundreds, create paramilitary groups, which clearly indicates the non-parliamentary orientation of these movements. Officially, these groups are called "military-patriotic clubs", sports sections, etc., but at the same time, the hierarchical structure, military uniform and other details openly indicate the presence of a paramilitary formation. Naturally, the members of these detachments were not idle, and they were engaged not only in security activities on legal or semi-legal grounds. During the 1990s, right-wing radicals were constant figures in the criminal chronicle, accused of a wide variety of crimes - from illegal possession of weapons to murder and extortion. The RNU comrades-in-arms are especially distinguished in this respect.

The discrepancy between the declared "coolness" and the routine of party life often had a depressing effect on the rank and file members of the organization. Therefore, it is not surprising that, although the leadership constantly emphasized the "law-abiding" organization, Barkashov's militants often lashed out at violence against ideological opponents and "enemies" defined by nationality. Cases of beating by Barkashovites of political opponents, representatives of national and religious minorities are quite numerous. However, often the crimes committed by the Nazis did not have any "ideological" overtones. The Barkashovites got too accustomed to the semi-demonic image of "fascists" suggested by Soviet cinema and became ruthless killers, hired killers, robbers, racketeers and sadists.

It is obvious that the multiplicity of illegal actions is explained primarily by the mentality of RNU members. They are aggressive and prone to violence. The leadership of the movement, on the one hand, tried to restrain ordinary comrades-in-arms from actions that directly compromised the movement, and on the other hand, they tried to support the aggression smoldering in them. "We believe that the hour of light will come when the furious fist is clenched," reads the party anthem. The Barkashovites were impatiently waiting for the leadership to let them know that it was time to speak. The most unrestrained broke into stupid and ill-conceived actions. The more patient ones made and purchased weapons.

A simple enumeration of the crimes committed by the Barkashovites would take up many pages. Entire regional organizations of RNE turned into criminal structures. Barkashovites throughout Russia and abroad were accused of terrorism (Perm, Vladivostok), murders (Orel, Primorsky Territory, Moscow Region, Belarus), beatings (Kostroma, Omsk, Orel, Yekaterinburg, Moscow Region), robberies (Saratov, Latvia) , storage and trade in weapons (Moscow region), racketeering (Kostroma, Sverdlovsk region), pogroms (Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar Territory), inciting ethnic hatred (Kaliningrad, Karelia, Orel, Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, Estonia). In those cases when the leaders of local organizations were found guilty of criminal activity, the leadership of the RNU hastened to disown regional branches (for example, after the arrests of local leaders, the leadership of the RNU refused to recognize organizations in Orel and Vladivostok as its branches). If the crimes were committed by ordinary members of the RNU, then the leadership either ignored such facts, or tried to cast doubt on the actual participation of RNU comrades-in-arms in the crime, or hastily declared that the perpetrators had nothing to do with the RNU or had already been expelled from the organization. RNU inherited this technique from "Pamyat"; but in fact, such methods were characteristic not only for radical political structures. In many security agencies, a newcomer, at the same time as applying for a job, wrote and handed over a letter of resignation of his own free will (of course, without a date), in case of "unforeseen circumstances."

The same features - security activities with a smooth transition to banditry - were characteristic of almost all Russian right-wing radicals, for example, members of the Russian Party, NRPR or RNS. For members of the unorganized right-wing radical subculture of skinheads - skinhead racists - beatings of "foreigners" and pogroms are simply the main occupation and the meaning of existence. There were also directly terrorist right-wing radical groups in Russia - such as the Werewolf Legion or the Heavenly Aryans. One can also add here the organizers of terrorist attacks against synagogues, who remained unknown. True, even in comparison with Europe, right-wing terrorism was not particularly widespread in Russia.

The illegal actions of the National Bolsheviks are of a slightly different nature. The crimes organized by members of the NBP are more ideological in nature. Often these are hooligan actions against political opponents or embassies of various states (this is a kind of NBP "calling card") or symbolic attacks on individuals. In the style of the National Bolsheviks, it is more likely to throw a bottle of paint (in extreme cases - with a Molotov cocktail) at the embassy building, an egg - at a political opponent, or whip a bouquet of flowers of the ex-president of the USSR for "the collapse of the country" than to beat a passerby with a non-Russian appearance.

However, the National Bolsheviks did not limit themselves to simple hooliganism, realizing that it was impossible to bring the national revolution closer with a thrown egg. Based on a sound analysis of the situation in the country, the leadership of the NBP came to the conclusion that the only way to seriously shake up the national feelings of a passive and apolitical population is to play the "Russian card" in the post-Soviet space. The inner-party bulletin "NBP-Info" (No. 3, 1999) published a draft "Second Russia", which provides for active actions directed against some post-Soviet countries with a significant Russian-speaking minority - Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Latvia. Actions against these countries could have been of a very different nature, up to establishing control over part of the territory. Moreover, the formation of a "second Russia" was conceived by the National Bolsheviks only as the first stage of a national revolution in the country itself: "To create a second Russia, in order to then move it to the first."

After Limonov's arrest, one could suspect that the National Bolsheviks quite seriously made statements like: "We are organizing uprisings in those territories that we like and that are vital to the National Bolshevik Empire. We are talking mainly about the southern territories given to the CIS countries. <. ..> There is only one state, like a glove, deftly suitable for organizing the partisan base of the Russian liberation movement. This is Kazakhstan. <...> That is where, obviously, the partisans should be sent" (14) . In the spirit of the “Second Russia” project, Limonov wrote in one of his books: “Today it is impossible to start an uprising in Moscow for many reasons. First of all, the very outbreak of the uprising should be taken out of Russia. <...> It should be understood that the emergence of a conflict < ...> is not an end in itself, but only an inevitably necessary first stage of an armed uprising with the aim of changing power in Moscow" (15) . In the light of the quoted texts, the fact that Limonov and his associates were arrested on the territory of the Altai Republic, not far from the border with Kazakhstan, takes on a completely different meaning.

When Limonov's trial was in full swing in Saratov, one of the capital's newspapers published the memoirs of one of the participants in the National Bolshevik trips to Altai, Artem Akopyan (16) . According to the article, members of the NBP were at least scouting the situation on the border between Kazakhstan and Russia. True, it is impossible to draw an unambiguous conclusion from the article about the justice of the accusations against Limonov and his associates, and next to its end, a statement was published by the Central Council of the NBP, stating that everything stated by the author was fiction. However, there are no obvious absurdities and exaggerations in the text. In addition, Akopyan's information is quite plausible for another reason - Limonov himself did not hide the fact that in 1997 he went with a group of party comrades to take part in the failed separatist uprising of the North Kazakh Cossacks in Kokchetav. Most likely, the statement of the Central Council of the NBP was due to the fact that at the time of publication of Akopyan's article, the investigation into Limonov's case was still ongoing, and any carelessly spoken word could give law enforcement agencies extra evidence of the guilt of the NBP leader. This did not help - at the trial of Limonov, Akopyan acted as one of the key witnesses for the prosecution. True, in his testimony in court, which unequivocally testifies to the preparation of sabotage and terrorist actions in Kazakhstan by Limonov and his associates, there were many absurdities. It is possible that Hakobyan, having said "a" ("we went back and forth across the border"), under pressure from law enforcement agencies, was forced to say "b" ("we were preparing terrorist attacks"), even if this is not true. Based on these fragmentary facts, it is impossible to conclude whether the National Bolsheviks were preparing for any actions on the territory of Kazakhstan, or all the events preceding the arrest of Limonov and his comrades were a chain of accidents and / or the result of a provocation. In our opinion, even the decision of the court does not allow us to unambiguously answer this question.

All of the above applies only to the "new right" radicals - National Socialists, National Bolsheviks and racists. The "old right" - the Black Hundreds and Orthodox fundamentalists - were practically not noticed in extremist activities. Perhaps the only exception was a small group of monarchists in the city of Vyshny Volochek, Tver Region, whose leaders, Alexander Sysoev and Yevgeny Kharlamov, tried to start an Orthodox revolution in their city by storming the building of the city department of internal affairs and killed three police officers (17 ) .

2.3. State policy towards national radicals

In the late 1990s, after a long period of passivity and indifference to even outright violations of the law, government officials began to oppose national radicals (18) . Since 1998, the pressure of the authorities against the radicals has increased dramatically. For the past two years, this "crackdown" has been taking place within the framework of general changes in the political life of the country, and quite naturally in the new context.

Denial of registration

For the first time, right-wing radicals began to encounter obstacles in their activities when trying to obtain all-Russian registration. Registration was required to participate in the federal district in the elections. To participate in the last elections to the State Duma in 1999, registration had to be received no later than a year - that is, no later than December 19, 1998.

Since only two right-wing radical organizations - the RNE and the NBP - actually had an all-Russian scope, the following discussion concerns precisely these organizations.

The RNU held the All-Russian Congress necessary for registration in February 1997. By the end of the same year, the Ministry of Justice twice managed to refuse registration to RNU under various pretexts. Initially, having found a number of formal inconsistencies, the Ministry of Justice sent the RNU charter for revision. When resubmitted, the Ministry of Justice considered that the registration procedure was violated, since changes to the charter can only be made by the congress, and not by the Central Council, to which the congress delegated its powers. Barkashovtsy decided to appeal the decision of the Ministry of Justice in court. On January 5, 1998, the Tagansky District Court dismissed the complaint, confirming that it was impossible to amend the movement's charter without a congress. On April 22, 1998, the Moscow City Court denied the Barkashovites a cassation appeal against the decision of the Tagansky District Court.

Characteristically, the experts of the Ministry of Justice did not try to prove the inconsistency of the RNE program and propaganda materials with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal legislation, or the illegality of using the swastika in the emblem (which one could try, albeit at a great stretch, to bring under a ban because of the contradiction to the law "On the perpetuation of memory Victories of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" dated May 19, 1995 and the Code of Administrative Offenses), but found formal inaccuracies that made it possible to find fault with the charter of the movement. At the same time, Minister of Justice Sergei Stepashin stated that if the RNU continues to try to register, it will be denied in essence.

The situation with the NBP is exactly the same. On October 1-2, 1998, the party held an All-Russian founding congress. On November 6, the Ministry of Justice refused to register the NBP, complaining about the charter and allegedly falsified founding protocols of regional organizations. On November 14, the NBP urgently held the Second Extraordinary All-Russian Congress in St. Petersburg, which made the necessary changes to the charter. On December 18, the Ministry of Justice for the second time refused to register the party. On August 18, 1999, the Tagansky District Court dismissed the NBP's complaint against the Ministry of Justice.

However, the government's pressure on the RNU was not limited to the refusal of all-Russian registration. The leadership of the movement went into open conflict with the city authorities, which resulted in lengthy legal upheavals.

Trying to get all-Russian registration and participate in the elections, the RNU decided to hold the II All-Russian Congress, which was supposed to make the necessary changes to the charter. The congress was scheduled for December 19, 1998. However, the capital's mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, decided to ban the congress. Apparently, a sharp surge of anti-fascist zeal of Yuri Mikhailovich was associated with the beginning of the election campaign, in which the appearance of the mayor should be respectable, moderately democratic and tough, and his patriotism is balanced by anti-fascism. "Down" was lowered the command to raise a wave of public protest, on the basis of which it would be possible to ban the event (19) . After indignant anti-fascist protests initiated by the authorities, on December 15 the city government decided to ban the congress under the pretext that it poses a "threat to the peace and security of Muscovites" (Decision No. 951 of December 15). Luzhkov said: "There will be no gatherings of this kind in Moscow now and henceforth" (20) .

Obviously, the legal justification of the ban was questionable. The Moscow regional organization RNU operated in Moscow legally, according to the registered charter, the organization had the right to hold events in the city, and there were no formal grounds for banning the event. Emphasizing this, A. Barkashov announced his intention to apply to the prosecutor's office with a claim about the illegality of the decision of the Moscow mayor (21) . Even the then director of the FSB, Vladimir Putin, doubted the validity of the decision of the Moscow government: “As long as they [the Barkashovites - V.L.] act within the framework of the current legislation, they have the right to carry out their legal activities. Law enforcement agencies should not act on the verge of the law or even more so outside the law" (22) .

On December 16, 1998, the Moscow prosecutor's office gave a response, according to which nothing illegal was found in the decision of the Moscow government. The Izmailovo sports complex, where the congress was supposed to take place, was urgently closed due to the "emergency state of the chairs."

After the uproar, the headquarters of the RNE was urgently "evicted" from Terletsky Park on a formal occasion of non-compliance with fire safety rules. At the same time, the tax police began checking the activities of the RNU security structures, with the task of finding any violations. Entrepreneurs using the services of Barkashov's security agencies were asked not to use them.

On January 18, 1999, the RNU filed a lawsuit with the Moscow City Court to lift the ban on the movement's congress in the capital. On February 11, the Moscow City Court refused to satisfy the complaint of the RNU leadership. The lawyer of the Moscow government, Alexander Tarasenko, managed to prove that the statutory goals of the movement do not correspond to real actions.

In January 1999, the Moscow government issued an order to consider the emblem of the RNE "Nazi". Thus, in accordance with the capital law of January 15, 1997 "On Administrative Responsibility for the Production, Distribution and Display of Nazi Symbols on the Territory of the City of Moscow", there appeared grounds to fine Barkashovites for wearing a badge and an armband of the movement or distributing a newspaper. It is worth noting that a year earlier, in February 1998, the Moscow Prosecutor's Office had already considered the symbols of the RNE (at the request of the Moscow Anti-Fascist Center) with a view to classifying it as Nazi. Then an examination was carried out. According to the conclusion of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, it is correct to call Nazi symbols only the symbols of Germany from the period 1935-1945, i.e. "a black rhombus-shaped swastika inscribed in a white circle located on a red background." Thus, the examination recognized that "within the framework of the concepts of this law, the emblems of the RNE cannot be considered Nazi symbols" (23) .

As a result, a paradoxical situation developed: the authorities, as it were, could not clearly explain and justify the need to counteract the Nazis, which was obvious to everyone - both the authorities themselves and society. Instead, prepositions such as "emergency condition of the chairs" or "non-compliance with fire safety regulations" were used. The fact that the police, instead of once again targeting "persons of Caucasian nationality," received a clear order to detain the Nazis, did not give the impression of the legality of everything that was happening. It is quite obvious that the city authorities were driven by political, not legal, motives.

In February 1999, employees of the Moscow city prosecutor's office, reinforced by riot police, searched the Moscow premises of the RNE, including those registered as front organizations (for example, as parishes of the True Orthodox Church) (24 ) . According to the RNU Central Council, more than 20 searches were carried out in the offices and apartments of the movement's activists.

On March 26, 1999, the Supreme Court considered the cassation appeal of the RNU leadership against the decision of the Moscow City Court of February 11, which considered the decision of the capital administration to ban the RNU congress to be lawful. At the trial, the Barkashovites pointed out that any restriction on the activities of a political organization is possible only on the basis of the Federal Law "On Public Organizations": according to the law, regional authorities do not have the right to such bans; the mayor's office "was guided by a set of emotions", namely letters from anti-fascist and human rights organizations, which in themselves "are the subjects of a lawsuit."

However, referring to the Federal Law "On the status of the capital of the Russian Federation", the court dismissed the cassation appeal.

Prohibition of existing organizations

On March 3, 1999, the Moscow prosecutor Sergei Gerasimov applied to the Moscow City Court with a request to cancel the registration in the capital of the RNE organization. According to the materials collected by the prosecutor's office, "the activity of the RNU movement contradicts the organization's statutory requirements and tasks, the requirements of the Constitution, federal laws and other normative acts." On the same day, the Moscow City Duma adopted in the first reading a law on liability for the distribution, production and display of "any images resembling the Nazi swastika."

On April 16-19, 1999, in the village of Severny, in the House of Culture, an exit session of the Butyrsky Court of Moscow was held, which considered the application of the Moscow Prosecutor. Barkashovites were charged with violating the law, namely: distributing a newspaper in unauthorized places, involving minors in political activities, and also spreading the activities of a regional organization to a neighboring region (Moscow region). As it is easy to see, in this case the claims of an exclusively formal nature were brought against the RNU. On April 19, Judge Marina Golubeva issued a decision to liquidate the MRO RNE as a legal entity.

On April 22, the registration of the newspaper "Russian order" was liquidated in court. Initially, the argument of the State Press Committee, which sought to close the newspaper, was that the publication had not been published for more than a year. After RNE representative S. Poluboyarov showed the court documents showing that the last year's (last) issue of the newspaper was regularly reprinted, the Press Committee reformulated the claims. It turned out that the editorial board and the founder, after registration (in 1991!) did not provide the Committee with the newspaper's charter or an agreement replacing it. The claim of the State Press Committee was satisfied.

Despite the absence of its own registration, the RNE nevertheless made an attempt to take part in the elections as part of the registered all-Russian movement "Spas". The list of candidates for the movement in the federal district, certified on October 18, 1999, was headed by A. Barkashov.

Immediately after the nomination of the list of candidates, the Ministry of Justice filed a lawsuit with the Supreme Court to cancel the registration of Spas. The lawsuit was based on the fact that, during registration, "Spas" provided false information about regional branches - ten of them were not found during the check. Despite the formal nature of the claims, it was obvious that, in fact, Spas had problems because of Barkashov. Minister of Justice Yury Chaika stated that "persons who share the fascist ideology cannot go to representative bodies of power" (25) .

The application in the Supreme Court lay for a week, after which the Ministry of Justice was denied for two reasons: firstly, there is no formal basis - not a single warning was issued; secondly, the Ministry of Justice was required by law to apply to a lower court. The Supreme Court could only suspend an organization if it was against the law; the oversight of the Ministry of Justice, which registered a fictitious organization, must be corrected in the court of first instance.

On November 2, 1999, the federal list of the Spas movement was registered by the Central Election Commission. The Ministry of Justice, in turn, filed a lawsuit with the Zamoskvoretsky Court of Moscow.

On November 9, 1999, the first court session took place. In order to have time to please the Ministry of Justice, all current cases were postponed. Usually, at least several months elapse between the filing of a claim with the district court and its consideration (for example, the NBP's claim against the Ministry of Justice was filed in December 1998, and the case was considered only in August 1999). On November 12, the court ruled: due to the lack of a sufficient number of regional branches, cancel the federal registration of Spas.

On November 16, 1999, a criminal case was initiated against the Spas movement on charges of forging documents. During the inspection by law enforcement agencies, it was revealed that when registering the movement in 1998, falsified data on the number of regional branches were provided.

Spas lawyers attempted to appeal against the decision of the Zamoskvoretsky District Court to invalidate the registration of the movement, but on November 24 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision.

November 25 at a meeting of the CEC "Spas" was excluded from the ballot (unanimously). On November 29, representatives of "Spas" filed a complaint with the Supreme Court against the decision of the CEC. On December 3, the Supreme Court dismissed Spas' complaint against the CEC. On December 16, 1999, the cassation board of the Supreme Court confirmed the legality of canceling the registration of Spas. In the voting ballot on December 19, "Spas" was included, but crossed out by hand.

The victory of the authorities over the national-radical movement clearly demonstrated two things. First, it became obvious that the existing legal framework, if there was a certain political will, was quite enough to counteract the Nazis. But, on the other hand, the story of the ban on the RNU congress, the liquidation of registration of the movement in Moscow and the removal of Spas from participation in the elections just as clearly demonstrated the lack of political culture among officials, their inability to provide a meaningful and intelligible response to extremism, and their desire for behind-the-scenes manipulations.

The "rout" by the authorities of the RNU provoked a crisis in the movement and its split. The place of "extremist organization No. 1" in Russia smoothly passed to the NBP, and soon the authorities and law enforcement agencies got their hands on it.

In March 2001, local Barkashovites approached NBP activists in Saratov, offering to buy several machine guns. The deal was completed, on March 10, the National Bolsheviks bought two machine guns from the Barkashovites, then four more. National Bolsheviks who tried to transfer the purchased machine guns from Saratov to Ufa were arrested. The circumstances of the case suggest that the Barkashovites played the role of provocateurs (26) . They weren't even arrested. The leader of the Vladimir branch of the NBP, Nina Silina, and party members from Nizhny Novgorod and Saratov, Oleg Laletin, Vladimir Pentelyuk, and Dmitry Koryagin, were arrested. In the last days of March, a wave of searches took place in the premises of the NBP and in the apartments of party activists in Moscow and the regions.

On April 7, 2001, Eduard Limonov was arrested by the FSB in an apiary 12 kilometers from the village of Bannoy, Ust-Koksinsky District, Altai Territory. According to eyewitnesses, about a hundred people participated in the detention. Together with Limonov, the founder of the Limonka newspaper, Sergei Aksyonov, was arrested. On April 9, both National Bolsheviks were taken to the Lefortovo prison on charges of "organizing a criminal armed group." Limonov was suspected of preparing for an armed uprising in the north-east of Kazakhstan with the aim of creating a Russian Autonomous Republic there.

Initially, Limonov and Aksenov were charged under Art. 222 part 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation ("illegal acquisition, storage and transportation of weapons").

On September 6, 2001, Limonov was additionally charged under Articles 205 part 3 ("terrorism committed by an organized group") and 208 part 1 ("creation and leadership of an illegal armed group") of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. On November 28, 2001, Limonov was charged with another charge under Art. 280 part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation ("public calls to change the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, made with the use of mass media").

Limonov considered his arrest a provocation by the FSB. In any case, even if the deal for the purchase of machine guns was not staged by the special services, Limonov's involvement in the acquisition of weapons was eventually proved only after the testimony of one of the suspects (the rest denied this). Other allegations were eventually rejected by the court.

On August 9, 2001, the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation for the Moscow Region filed a lawsuit with the regional court to terminate the activities of the NBP on a formal basis. The justification for the claim for the liquidation of the registration of the party was the loss of its legal address in connection with the liquidation of the organization that provided it, the Association of Afghanistan Veterans of the city of Elektrostal.

Officials of the Ministry of Justice sent notifications to the former legal address of the NBP with instructions to provide information about their activities. The lack of answers became the formal reason for the lawsuit. At the trial, evidence was presented that the party exists and has repeatedly submitted documents for registration at the all-Russian level.

On September 27, 2001, the Moscow Regional Court recognized the correctness of the NBP, refused to satisfy the demand of the Office of the Ministry of Justice to recognize the Interregional Public Association National Bolshevik Party as having ceased legal activities and did not agree to exclude this organization from the unified state register of legal entities. Representatives of the Ministry of Justice appealed against the decision of the Moscow Regional Court to the Supreme Court, but on November 19, 2001, the latter upheld the decision of the Moscow Regional Court.

On January 9-10, 2002, the Moscow Regional Court considered and rejected another claim for the liquidation of the NBP, filed by the Moscow Regional Prosecutor's Office.

The prosecutor's office insisted that the NBP violated Article 16 of the Law on Public Organizations, in particular, prohibiting the activities of associations whose goals or actions are aimed at forcibly changing the constitutional order of the Russian Federation. As evidence, representatives of the prosecutor's office used the materials of the Limonov case. The court, however, agreed with the arguments of NBP lawyer Sergei Belyak, who argued that it was impossible to make a decision based on the materials of an unfinished criminal case, and the very fact of using these materials was a gross violation of the principle of secrecy of the investigation. The court suspended consideration of the prosecutor's claim until the completion of the criminal case against Limonov.

By March 2002, the investigation into the "Limonov case" was completed.

In July 2002, the newspaper of the NBP "Limonka" was closed. The NBP began publishing a new, pre-registered newspaper called Generalnaya Liniya, while retaining the layout (including the logo and title in large print on the front page) and continuous numbering of Limonki.

In September 2002, the trial of Limonov and five party activists began in Saratov. The prosecutor asked the court to sentence the NBP leader to 14 years in prison. Thanks to the virtuoso performance in court by Limonov's lawyer, S. Belyak, the defendants were found guilty only under the article "illegal acquisition, storage and transportation of weapons." According to the verdict passed on March 14, 2003, Eduard Limonov received 4 years, the other defendants received even shorter terms.

On June 18, 2003, at an off-site closed court session in colony No. 13 in the city of Engels, a decision was made to release Limonov early.

Realities and prospects of the right-wing radical movement

The right-wing radicals have been operating quite freely in Russia for a long time. Calling for a change in the constitutional order, acting in constant violation of Russian legislation, the radicals, however, until the end of the 1990s, practically did not encounter any noticeable opposition from the authorities or law enforcement agencies. There was even a point of view that the existing legislation does not allow to properly suppress extremist activities and propaganda.

The events of 1998-2002 showed that the existing legal framework, given the necessary political will, is sufficient to at least cut off right-wing radicals from participating in elections and persecute the most extremist and arrogant Nazis. However, these same events also showed the other side of the problem - the government is fighting manifestations of extremism, using formal pretexts, and only when it seems beneficial to the current political situation. Of course, the relationship between the authorities and right-wing radicals is part of the general problem of state and legal norms in the modern Russian Federation - the law works fully only when it is necessary for representatives of the authorities, and applies only to those who did not please this authorities with something specific. .

The actions of the state, sometimes inconsistent, not always competent and often raising doubts about the legal validity, nevertheless, have their result. Direct pressure on the NBP is gradually forcing the most "outrageous" party to follow its actions and propaganda. In the future, apparently, the eviction of the central headquarters of the party from the occupied premises, the complete curtailment of propaganda and the condemnation of the leaders will follow. If the most consistent and uncompromising National Bolsheviks try to continue their activities under these conditions, then it is obvious that this will be a struggle by non-parliamentary methods. The crisis and split of the RNE was also not least caused by the ban on holding a congress of the movement, the closure of the newspaper and pressure on the Moscow organization. Now the RNU no longer has a chance not only to be revived as a single organization and participate in the political process, but even to be transformed into an underground extremist group (which the NBP has chances for). In the future, in connection with the adoption of the Law on Combating Extremist Activities, and to an even greater extent - in connection with the awareness by officials of the need to counteract right-wing radicalism, one can only expect an intensification of state actions in relation to the most radical organizations (such as the NBP) and at the same time - to "tame" moderate nationalists (such as the SPG).

However, despite some pressure on the right-wing radical parties and movements from the state, it was not this pressure, but other factors that led to the decline of national-patriotic organizations. Subjective reasons undoubtedly played a certain role. Even the new Law on political parties of the Russian Federation, which stimulates party building, could not, despite repeated attempts over the past year, force the right-wing radicals to form a powerful all-Russian organization. Any associations turned out to be loose, eclectic and narrower than they were intended from the beginning. There was no broad unification of radical nationalists. The parties that claim an independent role are objectively too weak and small in number to claim success. On the other hand, it can be noted that the new law on parties did not become the "sieve" that would weed out dwarf organizations - despite the increase in the quantitative parameters required for registration, the requirements for organizations are still formal ("paper") in nature, and in reality without special need, no one checks the information provided.

The current crisis of right-wing organizations is caused by a number of reasons, both objective and subjective. The objective reasons include the general socio-ideological climate in society, the high level of consolidation of society around the incumbent president, the fact that the Russian political elite intercepted slogans from right-wing radicals that could attract the sympathy of the general population and competently used them for advertising purposes, thereby depriving radicals their main propaganda weapon - the ability to criticize the government. The subjective causes of the crisis include an extremely low level of propaganda, a primitive ideology, a lack of a creative approach to the main problems of our time, a repetition of ideological clichés that have not corresponded to the surrounding realities for a long time, personal ambitions of leaders, etc.

This situation generally creates extremely uncomfortable conditions for the existence of right-wing political organizations and deprives them of the slightest chance of success, at least in the short term. The old nationalist organizations are increasingly losing their footing in society.

All of the above, however, does not mean that the themes of nationalism and xenophobia are losing their relevance for Russian society. New problem areas are emerging. Teenage nationalist activity is no longer expressed in participation in the activities of political parties (for the most part, boring and fruitless), but in street beatings and pogroms of "enemies" chosen on a national basis. The level of xenophobia and nationalism in society is expressed in modern Russia not in electoral support for nationalist parties, but in a sympathetic attitude towards the rioters and demands from the authorities for repressive measures against "illegal immigrants", etc. This knot of ethno-demographic and social problems is tightening ever tighter. According to the author, so far, in the near future, the prospect is rather pessimistic. The situation will worsen, the level of xenophobia will grow, and with it the number of victims of street fights, the authorities will flirt with such sentiments due to their popularity in society, and this is fraught with significant problems for Russia as a multinational country in the future. The current situation makes the crystallization of the civil nation "Russians" problematic, which is an indispensable condition for stability in society. The Russian consciousness still attaches great importance to ethnicity, and the tension between ethnic communities is growing and sometimes turns into outright violence. Only a conscious and consistent policy of the authorities in various fields - from law enforcement to education - can turn the tide. So far, there is not even a simple awareness of this problem in the highest echelons of power.

1 Verkhovsky A., Papp A., Pribylovsky V. Political extremism in Russia - M.: Institute of Experimental Sociology, 1996; Verkhovsky A., Pribylovsky V. National Patriotic Organizations in Russia. History, ideology, extremist tendencies - M.: OOO "Panorama", 1996; Verkhovsky A, Mikhailovskaya E., Pribylovsky V. Nationalism and xenophobia in Russian society - M .: Panorama LLC, 1998; They are. Political xenophobia: radical groups, ideas of leaders, the role of the Church - M.: Panorama LLC, 1999.

2 Laker U. Black Hundred: the origin of Russian fascism - M .: Text, 1994. P.12.

3 Such a classification has already been reflected in the literature (see, for example: Verkhovsky A. The New Opposition - Verkhovsky A., Papp A., Pribylovsky V. Decree op. pp. 70-73), but, more importantly, it is recognized as an objective fact by the national radicals themselves (see, for example: Dugin A. New against the old / / Limonka , No. 1, 1994; Vanyushkina V. Russian New Rights / / Nation , No. 2, 1996. P. 37). There is, however, some confusion, since the term "new right" is used in Western political science in relation to at least two ideological and political trends - neo-fascism a la Julius Evola and Alain de Benoist and neo-conservatism a la Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. However, in our opinion, due to the alienness of these realities to the domestic reader, the term "new right" as an opposition to the "old" is quite convenient and functional.

4 The RNU leader's passport name is "Barkashev", through "e", however, since he himself prefers to write his last name through "o", and this is how it entered the literature, we follow this spelling.

5 Russian Order , No. 8 (11), August 20, 1993.

6 See, for example: Mitrofanov A. Alexander Barkashov: "I'm not a fascist, I'm a Nazi" [interview with A. Barkashov] / / Moskovsky Komsomolets , August 4, 1993.

7 See, for example: Petukhov Y. Hope of Russia [interview with Nikitenko K.]// Voice of the Universe , 1994 No. 3. At the time of the interview, Konstantin Nikitenko was the head of the Moscow regional organization of RNE.

8 For more information about RNE, see: Likhachev V., Pribylovsky V. Russian national unity: History, ideology, regions of Russia, documents - M .: ROO "Panorama", 2001.

9 The activities of the NBP are described in more detail by Limonov himself, see, for example: Limonov E. My political autobiography - St. Petersburg: Amphora, 2002.

10 For more information about Russian skinheads, see, for example: V. Likhachev. Skinheads in Russia// International Jewish Newspaper , Nos. 39-41, 2001; Likhachev V., Pribylovsky V. Skinheads beat and kill "non-Slavs" // Russian Thought , No. 4385, November 15-21, 2001; Tarasov A. Skinhaeds ou naturel. Interview with comments// Emergency reserve , No. 5 (7), 1999; He is . Generation of reforms: skinheads, they are skinheads // Svobodnaya mysl' - XXI , No. 5, 2000 skinheads" (Moscow: Publishing Center of the Russian State Humanitarian University, 2002).

11 Simonovich A. Birthday of the Leader// Era of Russia , No. 11-12 (79-80), June 2002; Nos. 13-14 (81-82), July 2002.

12 For more details on the results of the 1999-2000 elections for right-wing radicals, see: Verkhovsky A., Mikhailovskaya E., Pribylovsky V. National Patriots, Church and Putin. Parliamentary and presidential campaigns 1999-2000 - M.: OOO "Panorama", 2000.

13 Just listing all the illegal actions committed by national radicals would take up a lot of space. A detailed description of these facts is almost entirely devoted to the book: Likhachev V. Nazism in Russia - M .: ROO "Panorama", 2002. See, for example, also: Likhachev V., Pribylovsky V. Bandit "patriots" and patriot bandits / / Russian Thought , No. 4250, December 17-23, 1998; Russian Thought , No. 4251, December 24-30, 1998; Mendelevich E. Swastika over the city of the first salute. Trial of Barkashovites in Orel - Voronezh, Small Press Support Center, 1998; Nazi games - M .: Peak, 2000; Khinshtein A. Six moments of Russian fascism / / Moskovsky Komsomolets , December 5, 1997.

14 NBP-Info . 1999. No. 3.

15 Limonov E. Anatomy of a hero - Smolensk, 1998. S.465-472.

16 Hakobyan A . How I made a revolution in Kazakhstan // Stringer , No. 2, February 2002; No. 3, March 2002.

17 For this little-known story, see: Bloody Easter // Oprichnina , No. 11, 2002. Sysoev occasionally published articles in the Orthodox-patriotic press in the spirit of religious anti-Semitism, see, for example: Sysoev A. The Truth about the Holy Fire// Oprichnina , No. 9, December 2001.

18 Here we do not consider the extent to which the existing Russian legislation is sufficient to counteract national extremism and neo-Nazism. For more on the legal side of the problem, including the new Law on Combating Extremism, see: Verkhovsky A. The State Against Radical Nationalism. What to do and what not to do? - M.: ROO "Panorama", 2002.

19 Oral communication of the Chairman of the Moscow Anti-Fascist Center Proshechkin E. .

20 Babichenko D. Moscow banned the congress of blackshirts / / Today , December 16, 1996.

21 Ibid.

22 Amelina Ya. The ban on the RNE congress is illegal// Express-Chronicle , December 21, 1998.

23 Letter to E. Proshechkin on the letterhead of the Moscow Government Office dated March 3, 1998, signed by the head of the department for work with law enforcement agencies Shilov I. - Photocopy, author's archive.

24 G. Sudovtsev. Temples are defiled// Tomorrow , No. 10, March 1999; see also: Statement of the Central Council of the Russian National Unity of March 3, 1999. - Photocopy, author's archive.

25 Kamyshev D. Barkashov will enter every house / / Kommersant , November 3, 1999.

26 Latysheva M. On the role of "Russian National Unity" in the arrest of Limonov