A. Morozov. "Orthodox factor" at the start of the 2003 election campaign

Alexander Morozov - observer of the portal "Religion and Mass Media"

The so-called "Orthodox factor" during the entire post-Soviet period has been peripheral in the election campaigns in Russia. The elections to the State Duma in 2003 are no exception. However, some events and trends related to the participation of Orthodox activists and organizations in the election campaign are of interest because they contain novelty.

The phenomenon of Sergei Pugachev
The creator of Mezhprombank and the "oligarch of the security forces", Pugachev, without a doubt, is a deeply religious and church-going person. S. Pugachev personally and without any PR participated in the funeral of the elder Father Nikolai Guryanov on Zalit Island last year. The very fact of the presence of such a person in the business elite is indicative. Pugachev does not finance the political projects of Orthodox organizations, he is a systemic investor in the ROC, i.e. in fact, the financial donor directly to Patriarch Alexy, as well as very large events, such as the celebrations in Sarov-2003.

At the same time, the so-called "St. Petersburg group of security forces" cannot be qualified as Orthodox, since most of its members simply cooperate favorably with the Patriarchate at the same level at which this cooperation developed between the heads of departments and the Patriarch under Yeltsin.

Pugachev's phenomenon lies in the fact that "Orthodoxy" (we have to put it in quotation marks here), as a kind of context, was actively drawn into the media accompaniment of the struggle for resources between "Moscow" and "Petersburg". The demonization of the image of Pugachev, undertaken by his opponents and competitors, is carried out through catchy formulas "clerical-Chekist group", "Orthodox Chekists", etc. It seems that this is a very painful PR for the Patriarchate, since the MP tried in the 90s to "be friends with everyone", but not to associate itself with any group so closely that one could talk about some kind of church-political alliance.

Pavlovsky phenomenon
Gleb Pavlovsky is Pugachev's media antagonist. This follows from Pavlovsky's analytical note . Pavlovsky's struggle with the "Orthodox Chekists" is somewhat complicated by the fact that in 2002-2003. Pavlovsky's connection with the so-called Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church became known, which, from the standpoint of the MP, qualifies as schismatic. This is what made it possible for Izvestiya columnist Maxim Sokolov to point out to Pavlovsky the ambiguity of his attacks on Pugachev, saying that we know that Pavlovsky has a "different parish". This means that Pavlovsky belongs to an Orthodox group that broke away from the MP and is hostile to the MP.

The press secretary of the Union of Orthodox Citizens, Kirill Frolov, repeatedly accused G. Pavlovsky of inspiring an "information conspiracy" against the Russian Orthodox Church (see, for example, here ). However, in relation to Pavlovsky, it must be emphasized that his personal religious identity is one thing, and participation in the struggle for resources on the side of the "Moscow" against the "Petersburg" is quite another. Pavlovsky's attack on the "clerics" is probably dictated by a pragmatic intention to deprive Pugachev of support from the MP, to force the Patriarch to distance himself from Pugachev. In an interview with G. Pavlovsky, the NGR clearly emphasizes that "Orthodox and conciliar President Putin" does not need the mediation of "clericals" (ie St. Petersburg Chekists) in his relations with the Patriarch and the MP.

Quasi-Orthodoxy of "populists"
The election campaign of 2003 is taking place against the backdrop of an intensifying struggle between "family" and "St. Petersburg security officials." This struggle - because of the media images of Pugachev and Pavlovsky - has, as it were, an "Orthodox projection." Thus, Orthodoxy is placed on the political agenda in a special way, much more significant than the inclusion of Orthodox activists on party lists or the emergence of new Orthodox parties. Of course, it must be emphasized that we are talking about "virtual Orthodoxy", that is, about its media image, constructed in the course of the struggle for real economic resources on the eve of Putin's second presidential term.

The People's Party falls into the force field of this confrontation and the artificial field of "media Orthodoxy". It seems that this party arose without any intention of being the political head of the "Orthodox-Chekist group", and this is exactly how Pavlovsky characterizes it in his memorandum. Gennady Raikov and Valery Galchenko are unchurched people. Yes, and the exit of "people's deputies" to the elections was designed as a separate list, as they say, by Surkov.

Already at an early stage of party building, at the end of 2001, Galchenko attracted Valentin Lebedev, Kirill Frolov, Viktor Saulkin, activists of the Union of Orthodox Citizens (SPG), to round tables in the Duma, and in the spring of 2002, under the patronage of the "People's Deputies" Raikov-Galchenko, the SPG organized anti-Catholic rallies and pickets, which were attended by up to 5 thousand people in more than 20 cities of Russia. However, this did not mean at all that the "People's Deputies" were going to become an "Orthodox party", Galchenko simply carried out a run-in of various possibilities of a conservative nature. The participation of the SPG in the Raikov-Galchenko affairs was limited to the personal cooperation of Lebedev and Frolov, moreover, some of the members of the SPG followed Glazyev (who, we recall, is the co-chairman of the SPG).

Apparently, during 2002 - the first half of 2003, Valentin Lebedev did a lot of work with the leaders of the "People's Party", convincing them of the fruitfulness of the Orthodox component in the image of the "populists". Lebedev managed to show that this component may not be marginal (ie, nationalist), as it was throughout the 1990s, but respectable. The press conference of the populists on August 24 showed that they intend to go to the polls with the following topics: tariffs, protection of the countryside, support for high-tech industries, development of municipal self-government, as well as "strengthening spiritual values" (family, demography, limiting the "permissiveness of the media") and including support for the foundations of Orthodox culture in schools. In other words, in the course of the election campaign, Orthodoxy could almost be lost.

And now, following the publication of Pavlovsky, the Narodniks will be drawn ever deeper into "virtual Orthodoxy." Now they have to work to strengthen their hypothetical and intriguing connection with Pugachev and the "clerical-Chekist" party. This intrigue gives a sudden flavor of complete independence of the Narodniks from the "Kremlin" (ie, read "Moscow", "family") political technologists. Thus, Nikolai Derzhavin, assistant to Patriarch Alexy, appears third on the federal list of NPs, which is undoubtedly called upon to testify precisely to the "respectable Orthodoxy" of the Narodniks. Valentin Lebedev takes first place in the list of the Moscow region. And on the same days he was awarded the Patriarchal Order of St. Innocent.

Where all this will lead Raikov and Galchenko - only God knows. The following is clear: the mobilization potential of the Union of Orthodox Citizens, and of all other Orthodox organizations, is negligible. But the mobilization potential of the image of the party of "respectable Orthodox security officials" may turn out to be risky, but not without prospects.

It must be emphasized right away that the beneficial realization of this image, of course, does not imply any emphasis on Orthodoxy. Orthodoxy should be present only nominally, "by request", and it is already as a "signal for its own" is contained in the name of Pugachev, allegedly standing behind the party, it is indicated by the presence of Nikolai Derzhavin. In this scenario, the People's Party does not need an ideology, since it is clear for the whole society: the security forces are a new "roof". To whom it is pleasant - those also vote for populists. Narodniki is SPS-2, that is, a party of new oligarchs and high-ranking state officials, consolidated mainly on the fact that they got less than they would like, and Chubais and Khodorkovsky got too much. Therefore, it seems to me, the Narodniks will not get carried away with Orthodox rhetoric. After all, the main slogan of the struggle between St. Petersburg and Moscow is "Drive the dough!". The rest can only confuse their electorate.

True, a week ago, answering a newspaper question about how he spent his weekend, the "brain of the party" Galchenko said that he bought books on the "Russian idea" in the State Duma stall and read them with enthusiasm. This suggests that the "brain of the party" is pondering: is it possible to create any intellectual product that would resemble the respectable ideology of the "people's Christian-conservative party of large and medium capital." The main intrigue is that we have before us not just a "party of siloviki", but a party of siloviki - Putin's friends. This is precisely the "trick" of the Narodniks, and it is precisely at this point that Pavlovsky hits. His note is intended to show that they are "not Putin's friends," but, as it were, adventurers using Putin's name. Therefore, instead of the idea of ​​"soil" according to Dostoevsky, Orthodoxy according to Ivan Ilyin, it is enough for Galchenko to simply remind him - "yes, friends." Real, true friends of our president. Honest, patriotic-minded people, many are Orthodox, like the President himself.

Glazyev and others
The "respectable Orthodox" at Raikov's, and the national-patriotic losers huddled with Sergei Glazyev. They systematically mourn for themselves that although the “national-patriotic electorate is huge” (see the article by Anatoly Stepanov on Russkaya Liniya ) and surpasses the liberal and even communist, these microscopic organizations cannot organize a mass movement, they quarrel. Each small group and each leader has too much ideology, too much "thought out and suffered through", too many books read on the "Russian idea". Therefore, no compromise is possible.

True, so far we have only a preliminary list of those who intended to participate in the Motherland bloc (Glazyev-Rogozin-Baburin). Therefore, we do not know whether Alexander Burkin (the Orthodox Russia movement), Alexei Kuimov (the For Holy Rus' party), Alexander Krutov (Russian House media holding), Nikolai Burlyaev, Zhanna Bichevskaya, part of the activists of the Union of Orthodox Citizens will remain there , Russian National Union (RONS) Igor Artemov.

Where is General Ivashov as a result? Indeed, on June 25, an agreement was signed on the creation of the Sovereign Union of Russia (DSR), which was headed by Ivashov and which included the Military Sovereign Union of Russia, the All-Russian Party "For Holy Rus'" and the Union of Cossacks. "The first three persons of the Union, representing the main parties and organizations - Leonid Ivashov, Alexei Kuimov and Ataman Alexander Martynov, - according to Russkaya Liniya, received a blessing for their unifying activities from Archimandrite Kirill (Pavlov) himself." As A. Stepanov enthusiastically writes: “The bloc’s ideology is based on the idea of ​​sovereignty, understood in the context of Orthodox dogma, the leaders of the bloc declare that one of their priority tasks will be to protect the national interests of the Russian people. In a word, the bloc is built on the basis of an ideology that is in demand in modern society. Sociologists testify that the pre-revolutionary patriotic slogan "Russia for Russians!" Today is supported by about 10% of Russian citizens. Even if such a radical idea has such massive support, then one can imagine what the potential of patriotic ideology as a whole!"

Leaving the Glazyev bloc on September 19, the well-known writer Alexander Dugin (Eurasia party) explained his decision in a very literary way: “The main reason is the presence in the bloc of racists, anti-Semites and members of the RNE, as well as a certain “Savelyev”, a translator of “Mein Kampf”. the same bloc, conceived as a correct, left-wing patriotic and anti-oligarchic, has acquired the character of a rabble of any "pseudo-patriotic" mug with a clear chauvinist orientation. Vyacheslav Igrunov put it mildly in his statement about leaving Rodina: "Our patriotism has nothing to do with nationalism and xenophobia."

Thus, it turns out that Rodina is Le Pen. Perhaps playing on crude, brutal nationalism would allow breaking through the five percent barrier. But, undoubtedly, Glazyev is not capable of such a rough game. Also, it's hard to imagine media owners and curators allowing this energy to be channeled into an election campaign - it's an unnecessary risk.

Therefore, the Orthodox in the Glazyev bloc should have apparently been "reduced" and hidden deeper. In ten days all the patriots were purged from Glazyev's bloc. First, by decision of the CEC, especially desperate Barkashovites were thrown out of Baburin's list. About which Baburin circulated a pathetic letter, but did not leave the bloc. And Glazyev said that there were never any Barkashovites in the Motherland. (See the version of these events in "NG" ) Then General Ivashov went to Borodin. And finally the party "For Holy Rus'!" together with A. Kuimov, after long consultations, she set off on an independent voyage (see political confession of Kuimov ).

Orthodox deputies and the position of the Moscow Patriarchy
For the MP, getting into the Duma of certain Orthodox figures is not essential. After all, it is obvious that two or three completely systemic representatives of the MP in the deputy corps do not in any way influence the defense of the interests of the MP as a religious organization in the legal field. It is important to understand that it is generally not beneficial for the Patriarchy to have some small faction or an inter-factional group of deputies that will declare its kinship with the MP. This will only lower the stakes of the MP in settling problems in state-church relations.

Today, for example, the question of church lands and buildings, as you know, is the main one on the agenda.

Recall that Glazyev has already come up with a bill on church lands, but this did not lead to anything. Probably, he will take such a step in the new composition of the Duma, but taking into account the position of the "United Russia" and the Communists on this issue, this will lead nowhere. And the very mechanism for resolving the issue does not lie on the plane of Duma initiatives. The situation is the same with the introduction of "the foundations of Orthodox culture." The statement that the People's Party will fight for this "introduction" will obviously only worsen the prospects for resolving the issue for the MP. Simply because the transformation of this topic into the slogan of a separate political party will immediately cause the appearance of a counter-slogan and a new wave of counter-PR. Thus, instead of the public consensus that the MP is interested in on this issue, the polarization of public opinion will only increase.

Although there are no signs of preparations for the next World Russian People's Council, its holding - as in 1995 on the eve of the elections - suggests itself. The MP is interested directly in the then scenario to show that she is "above the fight" and equally welcomes both St. Petersburg and family, and will work with all "healthy forces."