Alexander Verkhovsky. Power and religion in modern Russia

*This article was published in the journal Svobodnaya Mysl-XXI, N4, 2004, and was written back in March 2004.

After a decent pause, we will publish the article on our website.*

In a modern secular society, it is very difficult to assess the place occupied by religion: there is uncertainty with the religious identification and self-identification of citizens, with the allocation of those religiously defined subjects with whom the state intends to build relations, and finally with the very concept of religion.

As part of the proposed review, we will proceed from the framework conditions that are set by the Russian Constitution. First, it postulates freedom of conscience and beliefs, so that from the point of view of the state, the question of what kind of beliefs are religious is of no fundamental importance. Secondly, the Constitution affirms the equality of religious associations, that is, the state singles out associations of citizens on the basis of religious beliefs and renounces any kind of discrimination against such associations.

The current specialized law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" of 1997 was widely and rightly criticized [1] for restricting and even distorting these constitutional principles, but in practice the distortions turned out to be not so great. For example, religious studies expertise, designed to separate the actual religious grounds for creating associations from some others (that is, based on beliefs of a different kind), works quite liberally, cutting off only the most exotic extremes [2] . The most dubious provision of the 1997 Law, depriving new (officially existing for less than 15 years) religious groups of the right to obtain the status of a religious organization, i.e. formation of a legal entity, obtaining the right to teach religion and a number of other rights, was very strongly limited by two circumstances: firstly, nothing prevents members of religious groups from creating various funds, centers, etc., and secondly, a 15-year qualification , according to the decision of the Constitutional Court of November 23, 1999, is applicable only to religious groups that did not have registration in 1997 and were not included in other organizations, and there are very few of those after the "religious boom" of the early 90s. Of the many religious groups that encountered difficulties in registering, some almost did not exist, the other did not even have the minimum means for bureaucratic play (primarily, this applied to traditional Muslim communities in the outback), the third experienced more or less consistent resistance, motivated by ideologically ( Jehovah's Witnesses, a number of Protestant communities, etc.). But in the end, these groups either registered or found ways to exist without registration.

Thus, in principle, the Law of 1997 now almost does not prevent religious associations and movements existing in Russia from developing as rapidly as their own resources allow: the attractiveness of dogma and ritual, the activity and qualifications of missionaries, financial opportunities and, of course, relations with local authorities . Indeed, we see a continuing growth in the number of religious organizations and groups. Moreover, if groups are difficult to count, then organizations (parish-type communities, monasteries, schools, etc.) are counted by the Ministry of Justice, and this allows us to say something about the dynamics of recent years.

Let us compare, for example, the data for the end of 2000 and the end of 2002. (there are no more recent ones [3] ), that is, during the period when confessions in general made up for the backlog in the number of communities caused by re-registration under the 1997 Law. The number of organizations of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate, Russian Orthodox Church) has slightly increased - from 10,912 to 11,299, i.e. by 3.5%, for the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) the figure remained practically unchanged (40 and 41), while for other "Orthodox jurisdictions" the figures dropped noticeably. For Old Believers and Catholics, the growth in percentage terms is exactly the same as for the Russian Orthodox Church - from 278 to 288 and from 258 to 268. The growth of Islam is much more noticeable - from 3048 to 3467, i.e. by 13.7%, and Buddhism - from 193 to 218, i.e. by 13%, but this is probably due precisely to the lag of Muslims and Buddhists in re-registration.

As for the Protestants, the growth leaders are now the Methodists - from 85 to 104 organizations, i.e. 22% increase, and Seventh-day Adventists from 563 to 643, i.e. 14%. The earlier rapid growth among Pentecostals is gradually slowing down: the number of their organizations has grown from 1323 to 1435 (by 8.5%), while the growth of other Protestant denominations is even slower. For example, the Baptists - from 975 to 1015 (4%). Lutherans as a whole seem to have "remained with their own", but in fact, the most famous Evangelical Lutheran Church is rapidly losing in the number of organizations - from 150 to 123, and the Church of Ingria is growing rapidly - from 42 to 67, i.e. by 60%. The Presbyterian Church is also losing organizations, from 192 to 140.

Russian Mormons are growing rapidly - from 33 to 47 organizations. The rapid advance of Jehovah's Witnesses also continues - from 330 to 407, i.e. by 23%.

As for the new religious movements that cause the most concern in society, such as Scientology, the Unification Church (Muna), the Church of the Last Testament (Bessarion), etc., their number of organizations has stabilized. Just like Krishna Consciousness.

But we can see the rapid growth of Judaism - from 197 to 270 organizations (37%), and primarily not Orthodox, but progressive (reformist) - from 21 to 73 - three and a half times!

And finally, apparently, these two facts are somehow connected: the number of non-denominational Christian churches fell from 156 to 41, while "other denominations" increased from 7 to 240.

Thus, the dominance of the ROC remains, but if we count the organizations, it is already in question: 52% of the total number of religious organizations. And growing at a faster pace, first of all, is not the "competitors" that are accustomed to propaganda - Catholics, Muslims, and even more so not new religious movements, but Protestants of some denominations, Jehovah's Witnesses and communities of progressive Judaism. It is clear that this trend cannot be simply extrapolated: high percentages of growth are nevertheless associated with relatively low absolute figures; the growth of religious movements cannot be linear; if there are no special reasons, it gradually slows down.

It is much more difficult to take into account the number of believers. The fact is that not so many religious organizations keep a formal record of their members. The largest organizations associated with a particular ethnic tradition, that is, Orthodox, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, Catholics, etc., do not keep such records in principle. Other organizations, mostly new or small ones, keep records, but researchers often have serious doubts about the reliability of this record [4] .

For example, the Orthodox can be considered - we give the criteria approximately in order of increasing severity:

• by cultural roots (brought up in a culture based on Orthodoxy, and this means Russian culture as a whole),

• by birth (comes from an ethnic community, the majority of which traditionally professed Orthodoxy),

• by self-identification (in sociological surveys, different figures appear from about 60 to 80 percent, depending on the nuances of the methodology [5] ),

• on the fact of baptism (however, we could not find a single nationwide survey on this topic),

• recognition of at least the basic religious provisions of Orthodoxy and / or observance of at least certain practical prescriptions, recognition of the dogma and more or less systematic practice associated with the Church (the last two criteria can be formulated in a variety of specific options [6] ) ,

• on the fact of belonging to the clergy or to a permanent church function or structure for the laity (translated into secular language, this is an "asset" of a religious association).

Note that only the last two criteria for counting Orthodox correspond to the methods of counting, for example, members of a particular Pentecostal church. (And in this sense, the figures for the number of organizations among the same Pentecostals give an idea of ​​the size of the "active", no more than one order of magnitude inferior to the "active" of the Orthodox.)

If Muslims and Buddhists consider "their own" as Orthodox, then, for example, Jews or Catholics experience difficulties. Russian Jewish leaders understand that the Western understanding of Jewry as a religious phenomenon does not work in Russia, and no one undertakes to clarify exactly what percentage of ethnic Jews (by self-identification) consider themselves religious Jews and in what sense. Before the conflict with the Russian Orthodox Church in 2002, Catholics usually gave self-assessments based on the number of parishioners, but then they mastered the method of counting by ethnic origin.

We should also not forget that the very division of the population into religious organizations and categories such as "atheists", "deists" or some other, is very arbitrary, since the majority of our fellow citizens adhere to a very eclectic set of religious and other worldviews. Mass religiosity exists, but is too unconventional to lend itself to simple classification [7] .

Of course, religious leaders are free to determine the size of their flock as they please, but society as a whole is interested in having some kind of unified idea about this subject. The theory of determining faith by blood can hardly seem convincing to secular society (although, alas, it seems convincing to many of our citizens). But so far there is no obvious preference in the enumerated methods of counting. We can distinguish two methods of non-denominational value.

The first - by analogy with public associations, that is, by the number of registered members in one way or another. Then one should ignore such facts as the origin or even the ritual of inclusion in the association (for example, baptism): a secular society cannot be guided by the mystical meanings of a particular religion. It is possible to take into account only those who at least sometimes somehow participate in the life of the association (for Orthodoxy: at least once a year they come to worship, etc.).

The second - on the public authority of the leaders. If many people listen to the opinion of this or that leader, then this is a socially significant fact, even if these people are very far from any understanding of the dogma. Then the closest method of calculation is a sociological assessment of the authority of religious leaders, or at least an assessment of religious self-identification.

Obviously, according to both criteria, the social weight of religions will be located in the usual order, at least at the top of the list: Orthodox and Muslims will lead by a wide margin from the rest and from each other. The obvious third place is now occupied by the Protestants, and it seems that their main denominations, i.e. Baptists and Pentecostals, even individually, have more influence than Buddhists or Jews. But then it is already very difficult to compare.

In addition, the more or less active core of different religious organizations will be very different, and this is reflected in their missionary potential. But it is unlikely that this consideration should affect the perception on the part of secular society. As with political parties: we know and take into account that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has many more activists than the Union of Right Forces, but we also know and take into account, first of all, that their electorates do not correlate in the same proportion.

Due to the difference in social weight, building a certain hierarchy in the relationship between the state and religious associations is simply inevitable. Another thing is how exactly this hierarchy is built. There are actually three questions. Firstly, does this practical hierarchy violate the constitutional equality of religious associations and is there any discrimination against citizens? Secondly, should this hierarchy be somehow legally fixed, somehow institutionalized, get some ideological justification, or is some practical inequality sufficient (as in the case of the same political parties)? Thirdly, isn't practical inequality excessive in comparison with the relative weights of religious associations determined in one way or another? Of course, we will not undertake to analyze these issues in detail within the framework of one article, but some preliminary remarks can be made.

The unconditional preference given by the federal authorities to the Russian Orthodox Church manifests itself systematically and in many ways, and more than once has become the subject of a detailed description [8] , so we will not dwell on this. The leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church themselves and patriotic politicians ideologically close to them (here "patriot" is self-determination, it hides a wide spectrum from communal-nationalist figures like Gennady Zyuganov to radical Orthodox nationalists from groups like the Black Hundred or the Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers) believe that such a preference it is natural for Russia, as an Orthodox country for the most part, which is the successor of the Orthodox Muscovy and the Orthodox Russian Empire. In view of the historically developed multi-religious composition of the population of the state, it is assumed that the traditional religions of non-Orthodox peoples should also have a special status; apart from Orthodoxy, we are always talking about the three so-called "traditional religions" - Islam, Buddhism and Judaism (the latter sometimes falls out of the list), named in the preamble of the 1997 Law. The preamble itself, by the way, only expresses respect for a number of religions, but does not contain either the term "traditional religions" or a closed list of "respected" [9] , but, alas, the idea of ​​just four "traditional religions" has become a commonplace in recent years.

Moreover, if during the 90s the Moscow Patriarchate [10] agreed with the official definition of Russia as a multi-confessional country, then just over a year ago the situation changed: now the main political ideologist of the Patriarchate, the chairman of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR), Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev ) believes that

We should generally forget this common term: a multi-confessional country: Russia is an Orthodox country with national and religious minorities [11] .

And it seems that the main leaders of the rest of the "traditional religions" are ready to agree with such a definition. Only the chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Ravil Gainutdin, from time to time speaks in favor of the full equality of Orthodoxy and Islam.

But it is still unclear to what extent such views are shared by the administration of President V. Putin.

The problem here, of course, is not the degree of personal religiosity of the president or someone from his entourage. It is unlikely that people who went through the school of political struggle in the 1990s, and even more so those who came from the KGB, can afford to be seriously guided in politics by their religious impulses, whatever they may be. Therefore, the president's trips to the monasteries with Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov; abbot of the Sretensky Monastery in Moscow) do not entail any visible political consequences, except for the president's interest in such purely internal church subjects as reunification with the Church Abroad. Another thing is that closeness with archim. Tikhon, the recognized leader of the conservative wing of the Russian Orthodox Church, cannot but affect how the president perceives the problems one way or another connected with the Russian Orthodox Church, and this is alarming. (We leave aside the popular question of whether Archim. Tikhon is the president's confessor: this is their own business, and in any case, it is impossible to imagine that Archim. Tikhon's influence goes beyond the possibility of priority information.)

The President speaks about the place of Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church in society in a rather uniform way: he demonstrates the priority of Orthodoxy and does not forget to emphasize its equality with other major religions of the country. For example, the participation of the president in the celebrations in Diveevo in 2003 was indicative: Putin spoke for the first time at a purely religious anniversary - the centenary of the canonization of Seraphim of Sarov - but did not say anything about the priority of the Russian Orthodox Church, but non-Orthodox clergy were clearly visible behind him. In response to the Patriarch’s reminder of a certain continuity with respect to the arrival of Emperor Nicholas II a hundred years ago and the statement that the celebrations have become “a symbol of the unity of the Church, people and power,” Putin did not forget to mention that the celebrations became possible due to the expansion of religious freedom [ 12 ] .

On the other hand, the aforementioned misunderstanding of the preamble of the 1997 Law seems to have taken root in the President's mind. This is how he explained the situation at a press conference in September 2003:

*... we have a religious freedom law. I do not remember the exact name of the law, but it speaks of four main religions: Christian Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. All other religions have equal rights in life and under the law, but these four are recognized as the main ones.

... the most numerous of them is the Russian Orthodox Church. And, of course, I must, I must take this into account [13] *.

A number of high-ranking officials nominated by Putin are much more definite, demonstrating full solidarity with the position of the Russian Orthodox Church and the communist-patriotic circles on this issue. For example, Georgy Poltavchenko, the presidential representative in the Central Federal District, publicly declares that he considers Russia to be God's chosen country in the same sense in which the Jewish people are God's chosen [14] , and, obviously, he builds his firm belief in the priority of Orthodoxy on this. And his colleague in the Southern District, Viktor Kazantsev, stated that without religious education, the authorities would not be able to instill in Russians the sense of patriotism lost during perestroika [15] .

Since the 1990s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken a special position in relations with the Russian Orthodox Church: at that time, our diplomats considered it necessary to intervene in the jurisdictional conflict in Estonia between the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates and even in monastic conflicts on Mount Athos. But the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs manifested itself most clearly during the conflict with the Vatican, which decided in February 2002 to turn its temporary administrations in Russia into ordinary dioceses: then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only supported the Moscow Patriarchate, officially recommending the Vatican to coordinate its church decisions with it, but also expelled from the country five clergy, including one bishop. Officially, the expulsions were not linked to the inter-church conflict, of course, but when the intensity of the conflict was already subsiding, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Fedotov unexpectedly frankly said that Russia: was building relations with the Vatican, taking into account the position of the Russian Orthodox Church;, and the opinion of the Russian Orthodox Church was taken into account in the reaction Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create: without agreement; four Catholic dioceses:

We have taken a clear consistent position, showing how unacceptable this behavior of the Vatican is for Russia [16] .

At that time, many politicians and officials joined the anti-Catholic campaign. And this was indicative: if earlier it was considered normal to support the ROC in conflicts with new or simply insufficiently known religious movements in Russia, now such support was provided in conflict with the largest religious organization in the world and long operating in Russia.

This campaign, coincidentally or not, coincided with the establishment in the official lexicon of the concepts of "traditional religions" and "traditional religious organizations" in a very specific sense. The central event here is the conference: The State and Religious Associations. Conceptual foundations of relations, on the example of the subjects of the Russian Federation of the Central Federal District;, held in Moscow on January 25, 2002, which marked the transition from unsuccessful discussions of projects of state-confessional relations to a campaign to promote Alexander Chuev's bill "On Traditional Religious Organizations" [17 ] . This campaign has so far not brought any results, and could not bring: because of the low quality of the bill and the low political weight of Chuev himself. (In order to overcome the conceptual confusion already obvious to everyone, since the end of 2002, the preparation of a new draft concept of state-religious relations has begun at the Department of Religious Studies of the Russian Academy of Public Administration (RAGS). [18] . But we cannot discuss this qualitatively new initiative within the framework of this article [19] .)

Having retained the title of "traditional" only for specific four denominations, government officials could not but choose, after this, specific religious organizations that were supposed to represent these denominations. They naturally turned out to be the largest organizations. This also corresponded to the wishes of the leaders of these organizations themselves, who, with rare exceptions, perceive their co-religionists who do not obey them as schismatics (we do not go into how this perception corresponds to the actual confessional norms, since for a secular society and its state this is not should be important [20] ).

As a result, quite noticeable political (or, if you like, bureaucratic) changes took place. The Council for Interaction with Religious Associations under the President, which includes representatives not only of the "traditional four", but also of Catholics, Adventists, Pentecostals, etc., as well as secular religious experts, has not met once since May 2001. The composition of the Council, formed almost exclusively by position, was revised twice, the members of the Council participated in certain expert work, but as such the Council is not functioning now. Instead, an increasingly prominent role is played by the Interreligious Council of Russia (ICR), which, in fact, form the very seven religious organizations to which it is now customary to apply the term "traditional" - the Russian Orthodox Church, three Muslim associations, two Jewish and Traditional Buddhist Sangha. Representatives of other confessions are not invited to work in the MSR.

Organizations - members of the MSR, indeed, represent the vast majority of believers of their confessions. The leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate is not recognized only by a few parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR), groups and jurisdictions that have separated from ROCOR (now, in the prospect of unification that arose in 2003, the Russian parishes of ROCOR also find themselves in a difficult situation), as well as diverse groups of "catacombniks" . Three Muslim structures - the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia (DUMR), headed by Talgat Tadzhuddin, the Council of Muftis of Russia, headed by Ravil Gainutdin, and the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus, headed since April 2003 by Ismail-hadji Berdiev, unite the absolute majority of Muslim communities, but some regional muftis are actually independent, and a number of groups, especially those oriented to one degree or another towards "pure Islam" (and with more or less reason called "Wahhabis" by their opponents), have nothing to do with organizations - members of the MSR [21] . The Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR), whose chief rabbi is Berl Lazar, and the Congress of Jewish Religious Communities and Organizations of Russia (KEROOR), whose chief rabbi is Adolf Shayevich, control almost all Jewish communities (except for some Orthodox), and some of them are in both associations, and the rapidly developing (see above) Reform Judaism is represented not by its Association of Religious Communities of Modern Judaism in Russia (OROSIR), but through KEROOR, of which OROSIR is a member. But the Buddhist Sangha, headed by the pandido Khamba Lama Damba Ayusheev, represents only Altaic-Tuvinian Buddhism, but not Kalmyk Buddhism, and some small groups in large Russian cities are not related to this Sangha.

"Traditional religious organizations" (the quotation marks here indicate not doubts about their traditionality, but the specific political meaning of the term - belonging to the MSR as a club of the "chosen ones") have long been cooperating with various departments of the state machine at the federal and regional levels. By the way, this cooperation itself, although sometimes it clearly encroaches on the freedom of conscience of citizens, is absolutely inevitable precisely in such forms: bureaucratic structures are not adapted to cooperating with a large number of counterparties, that is, many individual religious organizations of various confessions, it is easier and more familiar for them conclude an agreement at the level of governing bodies, so that this agreement can then be "lowered into place", where it is already being implemented to the extent of the efficiency of the bureaucratic machine and someone's personal preferences or interests. In particular, this is why it was easier to sign all sorts of agreements with the Orthodox than with the Muslims, who do not have a unified federal leadership.

On the other hand, locally, religious organizations, which are clear minorities across the country, can act as quite effective and negotiable structures. Therefore, at the regional and municipal levels, the absence of agreements at the federal level may not prevent certain religious organizations (primarily Protestant ones) from finding a common language with the authorities. Of course, in some cases this can happen through corruption [22] , but, presumably, corrupt relations are not the prerogative of religious minorities [23] ; such relations are one of the pillars of the functioning of modern Russian society. Cooperation with local authorities can also be quite normal, based on the social activities of religious communities [24] .

Of course, in many cases there are outright persecutions of the authorities against one or another religious organization: most often there are problems with premises for worship, with visas for foreign clergy (the situation was further aggravated after the adoption in 2002 of the excessively harsh law "On Foreign Citizens") , there are also cases of direct violence [25] Thus, it is still impossible to speak of proper respect for freedom of conscience, and the authorities can violate not only constitutional principles or international legal norms, but also the requirements of specific laws and even court decisions [26 ] . On the other hand, these violations in recent years, after a period of tension around the adoption of the Law of 1997 [27] , do not have a pronounced quantitative dynamics; it can be said that the general level of freedom of conscience is declining, but slowly [28] .

Sometimes intra-confessional minorities are in a more difficult position. Depending on how the term "confession" is understood, we will talk about different groups.

If a confession is defined through a community of faith (traditional definition), then we are talking about religious associations (registered or not) that are not part of the structure of large organizations. Such associations usually do not get on well with the authorities: the regional authorities easily agree with the position of the "big" ones, that the "small" ones are schismatics and thus are not quite legitimate. The exception is the Buddhists in Kalmykia: their organization is not part of the MSR, but lives in harmony with the authorities. Almost the same exception is the Old Believers: they are, of course, Orthodox, but "other Orthodox", and most officials understand this. In Orthodoxy, the most famous of the numerous organizations independent of the Moscow Patriarchate is the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church, headed by Metropolitan (of course, the Russian Orthodox Church does not recognize this dignity of his) Valentin (Rusantsev), and it has considerable problems even in its "capital" - Suzdal.

But the most significant minority are the supporters of "pure Islam" (Salafiya), who operate outside the official structures that are part of the MSR. There are indeed political extremists among them, so it is not surprising that any authorities are biased towards Salafis. Another thing is that this prejudice cannot be justified. Especially when from time to time purely religious or administrative conflicts between Muslims are resolved with the involvement of state power structures [29] . The opinion has been repeatedly expressed that the "Wahhabi enclave" in Dagestan, liquidated by the troops in 1999, arose precisely as a result of excessively harsh pressure from the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Dagestan, controlled by Sufi authorities [30 ] . In fact, in such cases, one can say that some religious leaders, appealing to public concern about Islamist terror, use the power potential of insufficiently competent authorities in their intra-confessional conflicts.

If a confession is defined, as is sometimes proposed [31] , as a vertically organized system of religious organizations, when, for example, the ROC and ROCOR are different confessions, then the intra-confessional minority is an internal opposition to the confessional leadership. Of course, as in any more or less significant organizations, there is also such opposition in confessions; except that certain rules of public behavior encourage its members to demonstrate greater loyalty than is customary, say, within political organizations. And that is not always the case.

The situation within the ROC is best known, and indeed the most significant on a national scale. The so-called "liberal wing" of Orthodoxy, which is a vast conglomeration of groups, united only by rejection on the part of opponents, includes primarily the followers of Fr. Alexander Men and the community of Fr. George Kochetkov. But now, in contrast to the early 1990s, these groups are quite isolated and, although they are trying to expand their influence, they almost do not participate in public intra-church polemics [32] . Another thing is another wing, referred to by various authors as fundamentalist, nationalist or ultra-conservative. It is much more influential, numerous and aggressive. But even it is far from homogeneous, its disagreement with the leadership of the Church and the degree of radicalness of statements and actions vary greatly from group to group [33] . For society as a whole, the most significant thing is that this part of the Church is to a certain extent (of course, different for different groups) associated with the Russian nationalist movement, represents its consistently Orthodox wing, which allows us to speak of a specific phenomenon of Russian Orthodox nationalism.

This wing is also represented in big politics; one can even say that the Church is present in politics to the greatest extent precisely through Orthodox nationalists. This is not indifferent to society and, let us note, does not benefit the Church itself [34] . Their presence became most obvious after the last parliamentary elections, when the Moscow Patriarchate extremely unsuccessfully delegated an assistant, Patriarch Nikolai Derzhavin, to the top three of the People's Party, which received only 1.18% of the vote on December 7, 2003, and, contrary to some forecasts [35], the Patriarchate intercepted from the Orthodox nationalist flag "Orthodox politics" did not take place. A whole dozen members of the Union of Orthodox Citizens (UCC) [36] ended up in the Duma , who passed mainly on the Rodina list, but partly also on Unity and in single-mandate constituencies from the People's Party. Some of them can be safely attributed to the radical nationalists - Andrei Savelyev or Nikolai Leonov. The leader of the Motherland faction, Sergey Glazyev himself, is a co-chairman of the SPG, and he actively develops the "Orthodox component" in his policy, relying on both Orthodox nationalists and the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church; adopted at the VIII World Russian People's Council (VRNS) in February 2004 with his active participation, the "Code of Moral Principles and Rules in Management" can be considered a model [37] . But formally, of course, the Patriarchate did not show any sympathy for Glazyev as a presidential candidate. Unlike the SPG, which actively supported it.

Returning to the elections, it should be emphasized that the entire electoral experience of Muslim parties showed their inability to mobilize voters [38] , and the last elections are far from an exception. has been even more deplorable so far The experience of Orthodox politicians [39] , and only the successful accession to the "Motherland" has, perhaps, reversed the trend. Now, on the example of Orthodox nationalists, who seemed to be a completely marginal movement a few years ago, one can see that religious and political movements in modern Russia have not such bad prospects even at the federal level. Of course, for successes like those of the SPG, a certain internal restructuring is required to get rid of the image of incorrigible outcasts, but even the tiny party "For Holy Russia", which in the last elections reduced all its campaigning to citing biblical commandments, and did it in the most unattractive form, received 0.49%, which is very small, but still three times more than the result of the only partially Orthodox-nationalist bloc "Russian Cause" in the 1999 elections - 0.17%, and twice as much as the current result of the Islamic party " True patriots of Russia" - 0.25%. And the "Unification" party, based on the para-religious concept of "Dead Water" and supported by the new religious movement "Anastasia", managed to get even 1.17% of the vote.

Long-term arguments about the insignificance of the religious factor in the elections [40] , it would seem, were refuted in December 2003. But the notorious "factor" must still be used, and this is not only a question of oratorical talents (as in the case of the leader of the "Unification" General Petrov), but also the ability to find those topics that are important for a significant part of the voters, and at the same time - the ability to interpret them religiously in a form that would be accepted by the non-religious voter. There are no recipes here. And for the time being, it is probably too early to predict a further increase in the role of religion in elections.

True, big politics is not only about elections. And in our current political situation - not so much elections. The place next to the authorities, federal, regional or local, is becoming increasingly important. Due to the prevailing public ideas about the need to appeal to "national traditions", this place is most easily given, of course, to the "titular" religion of the region, although, we repeat, a lot depends on the personal positions of secular and spiritual leaders and on their relationships, which can be both successfully fortified, and completely ruined for completely subjective reasons. But sometimes it is not about a vague craving for traditionalism, but about a more or less thought-out ideological line of some group in the political elite. One can cite vivid regional examples of the authorities' firm orientation towards an alliance with dominant religious leaders - Belgorod region [41] and Dagestan [42] .

But the strategic development impulses in our country still go predominantly from top to bottom, and not vice versa, so the prospect of conscious political and ideological cooperation between the authorities and religious organizations at the federal level is of greater interest. It is clear that we can talk practically only about Orthodoxy and Islam.

In the case of Islam, the main interest of the federal government is to neutralize radical Islam by supporting traditional structures. And the situation here is complicated by several factors. First, it is not clear who to support. In the 1990s, the chairman of the Council of Muftis, Ravil Gainutdin, rather enjoyed the patronage of the federal government, then the leader of the DUMR, Talgat Tadzhuddin, who was the supreme mufti back in Soviet times and was supported, moreover, by the Moscow Patriarchate [43], but after a scandalous anti-American speech, took the place of such a favorite Tajuddin [44] the period of "equidistance of muftis" began.

In general, the anti-American (and anti-Israeli, but this is not so important) demarches of Muslim leaders [45] do not fit well into the current course of maintaining the "anti-terrorist coalition." It can be assumed, and secondly, that such demarches increase the suspicions of the current government, many of whose representatives, due to their experience in the special services and the conspiracy theological view of the world acquired there, tend to see in the Muslim environment, first of all, a web of poorly visible connections, some of which goes into the hostile space of radical Islam.

Thirdly, it is not very clear how to support traditional structures. Of course, it is possible to cooperate at the level of law enforcement agencies, jointly prosecuting Islamic "dissidents", and there are such cases, but this is clearly not enough, moreover, it is fraught with the involvement of the state in conflicts between the traditional structures themselves. It would be better to somehow increase the attractiveness of the latter in the eyes of those people who could potentially turn to radical Islam. But the only concrete project put forward, the so-called "Russian Islam" [46] , was declared unsuccessful, and there are no others yet.

Thus, strategic cooperation between the federal government is only possible with the Russian Orthodox Church. The Moscow Patriarchate has its own vision of such cooperation, and it is quite clearly expressed in the documents and speeches of church leaders. In the sphere of socio-economic relations, the Church advocates moderate state paternalism and a greater social orientation of the economy. In the sphere of politics, he certainly supports the course of President Putin. In the sphere of ideology, it offers state support for Orthodoxy at the federal level, combined with support for Islam and Buddhism in the respective regions, primarily through the introduction of teaching religion in schools precisely on a regional basis, through greater access of the Church to law enforcement agencies, to television, to the possibilities of control Mass media and pedagogical activity. In the field of international relations, the theory is supported regarding the separate development of "civilizations" defined through religion; Accordingly, Russia is offered the position of leader of the "Orthodox civilization" opposed to the post-Christian West and the world of Islam. (We will not dwell here on the religious motivation of these positions. [47] ). And this global position has a direct conclusion for Russia itself: in such a system of coordinates, the Russian people should be defined not as Western, but as Orthodox, and this entails the requirement of some retreat from liberalism in favor of traditional, in the sense of pre-revolutionary tradition, values ​​and social mechanisms. .

In principle, one can observe a positive reaction of the state in all these areas, but it is impossible not to notice that this positive reaction is shown by representatives of practically only one political circle. There are enough statements in favor of state intervention in the economy, but not in the liberal wing of Putin's circle. High-ranking officials in every possible way support the idea of ​​introducing religious education on a regional basis (by the way, extremely dangerous for the federation), but not all [48] . On state TV channels, the Church is becoming de facto more and more visible, although, of course, there is no question of the direct allocation of broadcasting quotas by the ROC: time on TV is too expensive both in a commercial and political sense. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at the VIII World Russian People's Council made a speech about "Orthodox civilization" [49] no worse than the Patriarch himself [50] or a member of the Central Council of the SPG (and a deputy from United Russia) Konstantin Zatulin [51] . Adopted at the beginning of Putin's rule, the "Concept of National Security", linking terrorist threats to certain threats to ethnic or religious identity emanating from abroad, laid the foundation for numerous political and legal incantations on the topic of security in the religious sphere. [52] . Well, the retreat from liberalism and democracy in domestic politics is no longer a declaration, but a fact.

It can be seen that the positions of the Moscow Patriarchate are drawing closer not to the federal government as a whole, but mainly to its anti-liberal wing. Here it would be wrong to speak of a specific group [53] , rather, one should speak of the totality of groups in the ruling circles. And whatever the personal religious feelings of some representatives of these groups, the rapprochement is more of a pragmatic nature. So far, it can be said that some politicians are offering the Russian Orthodox Church and some other religious organizations to receive the status of privileged partners of the authorities (how far this turns out, it will be possible to see in the near future by observing the fate of Sergei Glazyev's bill "On Social Partnership" [54] ) . And the activists of the Union of Orthodox Citizens call on "Orthodox security forces" to implement the LNG program [55] .

At the same time, neither high state officials nor the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church are striving to restore something like the pre-revolutionary status of the Church [56] . Therefore, one can still hope that the inertia of rapprochement will not lead too far. Which, however, no longer depends on the relationship between the authorities and the Church, but on the development of relations within the authorities themselves.

---

[1] Andrey Lebedev. Law "On freedom of conscience and religious associations" in the light of the international obligations of the Russian Federation // Dia-Logos. Religion and Society, 2000-01. M., 2001 (hereinafter - Dia-Logos). pp. 156-162; earlier criticism of the Law was summarized by us in: Alexander Verkhovsky. Religious xenophobia // Nationalism and xenophobia in Russian society. M., 1998. S.180-182

[2] For interesting discussions about the problems of religious expertise, see Igor Kanterov. Expert councils as subjects of confessional policy // Overcoming state-confessional relations. Nizhny Novgorod, 2003. P.11-19

[3] For the dynamics from the moment the Law came into force in 1997 until the end of 2000, see Alexander Zaluzhny. Some results of the registration of religious organizations in accordance with the Federal Law "On freedom of conscience and religious organizations" // Religion and Law. 2001. №2

[4] Not to mention the spreading myths about the size of new religious movements. See: Sterin Marat. New religious movements in Russia in the 1990s // Old churches, new believers. Ed. K. Kaariainen and D. Furman. M-SPb, 2000 (hereinafter - Old Churches). pp.159-162

[5] For example, let's cite the ROMIR data for 2002: almost 70% called themselves Orthodox, almost 3% - other Christians, 2.5% - Muslims, 0.5% - Buddhists, while they said that they believe in God, 60% (about 78 % of those who called themselves Orthodox). See: Russian Orthodoxy in the Mirror of Sociology // Sedmitsa.Ru. 2003. January 30

[6] Statistics of this kind tend to be controversial because they are small percentages. With regard to the 90s, see: Kaariainen Kimmo, Furman Dmitry. Religiosity in Russia in the 90s // Old Churches. pp. 7-24

[7] Alexander Shchipkov. What does Russia believe in? St. Petersburg, 1998. S.174-175; Filatov Sergey. Religion in Post-Soviet Russia // Religion and Society. Essays on the religious life of modern Russia. M., 2002 (hereinafter - Religion and Society). pp.475-477

[8] From the publications of recent years we will name: Alexander Soldatov. Sacred "capital" and its "oligarchs" // Otechestvennye zapiski. 2001. No. 1. S.24-29; Buryanov Sergey, Brain Sergey. Some trends in modern state-religious relations in the Russian Federation // Law and Politics. 2003. No. 1. S.63-76; Verkhovsky Alexander. Restless neighborhood. Russian Orthodox Church and Putin's State // Putin's Russia. Passionate look. M., 2003 (hereinafter - Restless Neighborhood). pp.79-134; He is. Church in politics and politics in the Church // Political xenophobia. M., 1999. S.76-93

[9] Here is the relevant fragment of the Preamble of the 1997 law: The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, reaffirming the right of everyone to freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, as well as to equality before the law, regardless of attitude to religion and beliefs, based on the fact that the Russian Federation is a secular state, recognizing the special role of Orthodoxy in the history of Russia, in the formation and development of its spirituality and culture, respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions that are an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia, considering it important to promote mutual understanding, tolerance and respect in issues of freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, adopts this Federal Law;

[10] Under the term: Moscow Patriarchate; we mean not only the totality of church institutions directly subordinate to the Patriarch and located in Chisty Lane, but also other higher church institutions, that is, the Synod, the Department for External Church Relations (DECR), the Synodal Theological Commission, etc., as well as their leaders and representatives, of course, in cases where they express not their personal point of view, but the agreed point of view of church leadership.

[11] Metropolitan Kirill: "Russia is Orthodox, not a multi-confessional country // Radonezh. 2002. No. 8.

[12] Daniil Shchipkov. Sarov "project" // NG-Religions. 2003. August 6

[13] The publication of the press conference in The Washington Post on September 29, 2003 is given in Russian translation on the Inopress website )

[14] : Russia is a country chosen by God; - says Georgy Poltavchenko, Presidential Plenipotentiary in the Central District // Credo. 2002. December 18 .

[15] Kirill Vasilenko. The law of God in the first reading // Vremya Novostei. 2002. October 11

[16] Russia is building relations with the Vatican, taking into account the position of the Russian Orthodox Church // Regions of Russia. 2002. November 14.

[17] For details, see: Restless Neighborhood. pp.88-103

[18] At the time of writing, the latest version of the published fragment of the project, written by Olga Vasilyeva, head of the RAGS department in collaboration with Alexander Zhuravsky and Alexander Kyrlezhev, is available: The Concept of the State Religious Policy of the Russian Federation // Religion and Mass Media. February 5, 2004

[19] So far there has been only one major discussion of the project: Round table "State-church relations. A new concept" // Religion and Mass Media. November 3, 2003

[20] Although the issue of canonicity, in Orthodox terminology, of a particular religious organization is interesting from the point of view of religious studies. Secular experts, of course, can also express their point of view on the degree of this canonicity. But the recognition by an expert of some organization (for example, the Russian Autonomous Orthodox Church) as schismatic should not entail calls for its discrimination.

[21] For a detailed review of the current situation in Russian Islam, see: ( Mikhail Tulsky. Spiritual Administrations of Muslims of the Russian Federation: the history of emergence, splits and unifications // Religion in a secular society. 2003. October 3 )

[22] Yuzzell Lawrence. The problem of freedom of conscience in modern Russia // Religion and Society. S.30-31

[23] The topic of corruption is most widely interpreted in: Sergey Buryanov. Systemic corruption in the field of relations between the state and religious associations. consequences and directions of their overcoming (anti-corruption strategy) // Law and Life. 2003. No. 6

[24] See for example: Roman Lunkin. Pentecostals in Russia: Dangers and Achievements of the "New" Christianity // Religion and Society. p.348

[25] If we take only the events of the new century, then 2001 is successfully summarized in: Lukashevsky Sergey. Freedom of belief, conscience and religion // Human rights in the regions of the Russian Federation. Report 2001. M., 2002. S.146-163; For a detailed chronicle of events since January 2003, see the "Persecution" section of the "Religion in a Secular Society" website.

[26] Examples can be found in particular in: Alternative Report of Non-Governmental Organizations on Compliance by the Russian Federation with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights // Human Rights in the Regions of the Russian Federation. Report 2002. M., 2003. S.91-93

[27] At that time, many religious groups had serious problems with re-registration, which gradually, albeit extremely unevenly (for example, the authorities in Moscow or the Voronezh region showed surprising persistence in refusing registration), faded away. But it could not be argued that, on the whole, the 1997 Law had led to a dangerous increase in pressure on religious minorities. See for example: Agadzhanyan Alexander. Religious theme in Russian mass media // Old Churches. pp.127-128; Yuzzell Lawrence. Decree. Op. p.22

[28] Yuzzell Lawrence. Decree. Op.

[29] For example, supporters of Mufti Tadzhuddin in Yekaterinburg prompted the local FSB to confiscate what they considered “doubtful” literature from supporters of Mufti Gainutdin: Sverdlovsk Region. The Regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims declared war on banned Islamic literature // Regions of Russia. November 28, 2002

[30] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

[31] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

Conclusion of the Historical and Legal Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church dated April 4, 2003 on the draft Federal Law "On the social partnership of the state and religious organizations in order to preserve national spiritual traditions and ensure social protection of the population of Russia" // State and religion in Russia. 2003. May 18

[32] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

So far very little has been written about the "liberal wing". As an introduction to the topic can be considered: Kyrlezhev Alexander. Liberal tendencies in Russian Orthodoxy: to the formulation of the problem // Untouchable reserve. 2003. No. 6

[33] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

In fact, the use of the term "fundamentalism" in Russian Orthodoxy is rather problematic. We should rather talk about the politicized nationalist and conservative wing of Orthodox clerics and laity, whom we prefer to call Orthodox nationalists. And only some of them can, in our opinion, be considered fundamentalist. Details about the movement of Orthodox nationalists, the ideology of its constituent groups, the concept of "fundamentalism", etc. we wrote in the book: Verkhovsky Alexander. Political Orthodoxy: Russian Orthodox Nationalists and Fundamentalists, 1995-2001". M., 2003

[34] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

Kostyuk Konstantin. Orthodox Fundamentalism: Social Portrait and Origins // Political Studies. 2000. №5

[35] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

Morozov Alexander. Orthodox before a choice // Russian magazine. November 18, 2003

[36] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

The Union of Orthodox Citizens is a rather motley coalition of Orthodox-nationalist activists that emerged back in 1995. Since the beginning of this decade, the SPG has become more and more respectable and organized, turning into the most famous Orthodox political organization, its activities begin, apparently, to be coordinated with the Moscow Patriarchate.

[37] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

See full text .

[38] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

Pribylovsky Vladimir. Politicians under the banner of Islam // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2003. October 1

[39] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

Verkhovsky Alexander. The religious factor in the parliamentary and presidential campaigns in Russia // Dia-Logos. pp. 33-49

[40] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

To be more precise, confessionally biased politicians and political scientists always spoke about the importance of the "religious factor" closer to the elections, but few shared their hopes. See, in particular: Mikhail Tulsky. Russian Orthodox Church - towards the elections-2003 // Portal Credo. 2003. January 18 ); "Echo of Moscow": Live - Svetlana Solodovnik, columnist, Alexander Ryklin, journalist of the Weekly Journal, Mark Smirnov, editor-in-chief of NG-Religion, Maxim Shevchenko, editor-in-chief of the magazine "Sense" // Credo . April 14, 2003 ; Nedumov Oleg. Sacred PR: Spiritual leaders and political scientists are sure that religious organizations will not participate in election propaganda // NG-Religions. 2003. July 16

[41] Magomadov Gadzhi. What is worse than Wahhabism // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2001. August 7

Fagan Geraldine, Shchipkov Alexander. Can Russia live by the law of Belgorod? // NG-Religions. 2001. May 30

[42] Magomadov Haji. Decree Soc.; Abdullayev Nabi. Islam and power in Dagestan // Dia-Logos. P. 208-215; Lunkin Roman, Filatov Sergey. North Caucasus: mountain peoples in search of religious identity // Religion and society. P. 162-169;

[43] Out of solidarity with the Russian Orthodox Church and, apparently, because of his pan-Abrahamist sentiments, Mufti Tajuddin even stated that the DUMR adopted a second name - the Islamic Central Spiritual Administration of Sacred Russia obedient to God. See: Talgat Tadzhuddin: "For two weeks the Antichrist of the world has been fighting with his head up, an infection" // Conservative. April 11, 2003

[44] At a rally in Ufa on April 3, 2003, Mufti Tadzhuddin spoke out against the US in extremely rude terms and said that the DUMR had declared a "holy war" on the US. See the full text of the speech: Ibid.

After that, the DUMR even received a warning in accordance with the law "On counteracting extremist activities." Assurances that the concept of "jihad" can be understood not as war did not convince anyone in this case: after all, the mufti, who spoke in Russian, did not speak about jihad, but about war.

[45] Talgat Tadzhuddin, the Supreme Mufti of the Asian part of Russia Nafigulla Ashirov and the leader of the Eurasian Party Abdul-Vakhed Niyazov distinguished themselves after 9/11. See: ( The Supreme Mufti of Russia: terrorist attacks in the USA - an echo of events in "hot spots" // Newsru. 2001. September 12 ; Sigida Adelaide. Muslims found the guilty // Kommersant. 2001. September 19

[46] This is a project of state-controlled "indigenization" of Islam in Russia, put forward by a group of advisers to the presidential representative in the Volga region, Sergei Kiriyenko. The most detailed presentation of the concept of this project is contained in the article of its main author: ( Gradirovsky Sergey. Cultural borderlands: Russian Islam // State and Anthropopotok. 2003. July

This project caused an unusually heated discussion in the Muslim and Orthodox environment. For details, see the "Religion in a Secular Society" website: here and here

[47] For a brief description and main sources, see: Restless Neighborhood. pp.81-85

[48] ​​See: Restless Neighborhood. pp.120-129; as well as a large selection of materials on the site "Religion in a secular society"

Orthodox education is being introduced into the state education system slowly but steadily. See: Nikolai Mitrokhin. Orthodox education in Russia // Otechestvennye zapiski. 2001. No. 1

In the same way, and even more successfully, the teaching of Islam at school is being introduced in a number of predominantly Muslim regions.

[49] Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation I.S. Ivanov at the VIII World Russian People’s Council // DECR Communication. February 3, 2004

[50] Word of His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia at the opening of the VIII World Russian People's Council // DECR Communication. February 3, 2004

[51] "Moscow - the Third Rome" - K.Zatulin's speech at the World Russian Council // Radonezh. 2004. №1

[52] Including an attempt to codify the concept of "religious extremism" or develop a special state strategy to combat it, speculation on the topic of "spiritual security", as well as the adoption of the law "On counteracting extremist activity", which is dangerous for any religious associations. For more details, see: Restless Neighborhood. pp.108-117

[53] As it was done in the well-known and rather informative report of a political strategist who temporarily found himself in opposition to the "siloviki": Gleb Pavlovsky. "On the Negative Consequences of the "Summer Offensive" of the Minority Opposing the Course of the President of the Russian Federation" // Novaya Gazeta. 2003. September 11

[54] Draft Federal Law "On the Social Partnership between the State and Religious Organizations" (Introduced by deputies S.Yu. Glazyev and A.N. Belousov, March 2003) // State-Confessional Relations. March 12, 2003

At the time of writing, this bill is being finalized.

[55] Frolov Kirill. Orthodox security officials - to be, not to seem // Collection of articles of the SPG. 2003. №3

[56] Fundamentals of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church // Public all-Russian readings of the Fundamentals of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church. M., 2001. S.24-37

The president's last principled statement at the time of writing: "We have the Constitution and laws of Russia, according to which the church is separated from the state and, accordingly, the state from the church. And there are no plans to change anything in this sense." See: Putin - The decision on teaching the law of God in schools should be made after a broad public discussion // RIA Novosti report. 2004. February 9.