On August 1, 2005, the Political Journal published an article by the co-director of the Center for New Sociology and the Study of Practical Politics “Phoenix”, Alexander Tarasov, “Under High Control,” which provides a comparative description of the modern ultra-right in Russia and Germany.
Neo-fascism is an international phenomenon, due to a number of reasons, including objective ones. Therefore, one should not be surprised by the presence of admirers of Hitler and Mussolini in any particular country. Another thing is that the traditions, opportunities and potential of neo-fascism are not the same in different countries.
For comparison, A. Tarasov takes Russia and Germany. “In today’s Germany, neo-fascism has a long and rich history; it can be said to be traditional. In fact, “classical” German fascism (Nazism) gave birth to neo-fascism immediately after the collapse of the Third Reich in the war.” In the USSR, of course, nothing like this could happen. Here, the years of emergence and formation of the dissident movement, in which right-wing conservative, sometimes even ultra-right figures (Igor Shafarevich, Vladimir Osipov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn) were present, were the end of the 60s. However, the ultra-right wing was never constituted, and the ideas of rehabilitating Hitler were unthinkable even in an environment extremely opposed to the Soviet regime.
The situation changed only during the period of perestroika, with the emergence of the People's Patriotic Front "Memory". “It was the NPF “Pamyat” that gave birth to all the major neo-fascist organizations of the 90s. “Pamyat” itself, however, although it is usually characterized as fascist, in reality it was not a fascist organization, but a proto-fascist one, duplicating the pre-revolutionary Black Hundred organizations. This revealed its originality perestroika Soviet Union, in which - even after the defeat of fascism - the emergence and existence of a proto-fascist organization turned out to be possible,” notes A. Tarasov.
During this period (late 80s - early 90s), the ultra-right of the USSR (Russia) and Germany began to rapidly converge ideologically, “and this rapprochement was in the nature of borrowing more developed German models.” As an example, A. Tarasov cites Russian National Unity (RNE), which he evaluates as “a completely modern (from a Western point of view) organization, practically devoid of Russian specifics” and recalls that A. Barkashov himself later proudly argued in court that “ is not an “abstract fascist”, but a Nazi.” At the same time, skinheads also appeared in Russia - as a direct reproduction of Western youth subculture.
The period of the early 90s is the time when the German far-right is most active in its desire to establish contacts with Russian neo-Nazi groups. “In the mid-90s, emissaries and entire delegations from neo-fascist organizations (including illegal ones) constantly arrived from Germany to Russia, and it was they who convinced the Russian neo-fascists of the need to launch propaganda and recruitment work among skinheads, citing the great the success of such work in the eastern states of Germany." However, only a few agreed with this, and only a few organizations achieved noticeable success in this area (the most famous of them are the People's National Party (PNP) and the Freedom Party). “Moreover, the NNP was the only neo-fascist party that was able to recruit into its ranks the entire already existing skin organization - the Russian Target group. Against the background of the interaction of the German ultra-right with the Nazi skins, such successes must be considered extremely modest.”
Russia began to experience rapid quantitative growth of Nazi skinheads precisely during the presidency of V. Putin. This situation is similar to the situation in Germany in the 80s, however, in terms of the level of activity and organization, Russian Nazi skinheads are inferior to German ones. In addition, “staff turnover” is disproportionately high in Russia, and most Russian “branches” of international skin organizations (Blood & Honor, Hammerskin Nation, etc.) are not recognized by the Western right-wing radical community and are hardly noticeable within the country. According to A. Tarasov, the Russian ultra-right is also incapable of organized terrorist struggle.
Despite the fact that “outside the skin scene, the Russian and German far-right seem similar to each other,” A. Tarasov believes that this similarity is imaginary.
Firstly, this is to a large extent determined by the different level of control over neo-fascists by the authorities. “If in Germany far-right organizations, as a rule, are infiltrated by agents of the federal special services, then in Russia the largest ultra-right organizations are simply under the secret control (and, in fact, the leadership) of the security forces. Thus, control over RNU has long been the object of confrontation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and In the end, when the head of the RNU Barkashov took an openly anti-Putin position, supporting the temporary opposition to the president from the top officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the RNU was simply split into three large parts, two of which were under the complete control of the special services (and one of the parts led by the brothers). Lalochkin, a creature of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, after Putin “strengthened” the Ministry of Internal Affairs with reliable personnel from the FSB, left the political scene, proclaiming itself a religious association). At the same time, the total number of all “splinters” of the RNU decreased by an order of magnitude.”
It is precisely this high level of control by the special services, according to A. Tarasov, that is one of the reasons for the electoral failures of Russian right-wing radicals.
Secondly, A. Tarasov draws readers’ attention to the fact that not only the attitude of the special services differs, but also the legal conflicts surrounding right-wing radical organizations in Germany and Russia.
In Germany, attempts to ban neo-Nazi groups are made when “the authorities manage to collect sufficient evidence of their illegal actions - starting with terrorist attacks (as was the case, for example, in the early 80s with the Hoffmann Military Sports Group) and ending with the propaganda of anti-Semitism and racism (as was recently the case with the groups “Kameradschaft Tor” and “Berlin Alternative Zuid-Ost”) In Russia, in recent years, the activities of over 30 branches of RNU at various levels have been banned, but all these branches were branches that did not join after the split of RNU. to one of the three main organizations. As a result, many - and, apparently, rightly - view this campaign of bans as forcing undecided "splinters" of RNU to join one of the main groups."
And finally, according to A. Tarasov, German and Russian ultra-rightists are distinguished by their attitude towards religion. Right-wing radicals in Germany are currently experiencing a “renaissance” of paganism: “It is believed that the appeal to paganism is largely pragmatic in nature: in conditions where Nazi symbols and ideology are directly prohibited, the corresponding attributes of German paganism may well act as a legal replacement for Nazi ones. propaganda purposes."
In Russia, according to the author, the opposite phenomenon is currently observed. “Although pagans have long been represented on the Russian far-right scene, there is no unity among them (Slavic and Germanic paganism compete with each other, as well as more exotic options: neo-Hinduism, Slavic-Germanic symbioses, Slavic-Ugric, etc.) and they remain marginal. The majority of the ultra-right declares themselves to be champions of Orthodoxy - apparently, also mainly for purely pragmatic reasons, hoping to use the strengthening of the positions of the Russian Orthodox Church under Putin for their own purposes" (Compare with the opinion of A. Mitrofanova ).
“So, we can state that, although the Russian far-right scene has been in the spotlight of the world press in recent years and has received a lot of advertising, in reality it is completely incomparable in terms of organization, influence, financial and electoral capabilities with the German far-right scene,” he concludes. article by A. Tarasov.
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