Parshev and rubles (part 1)

We continue to analyze the soviet mentality, represented by A.P. Parshev.

All countries have money as money, and in Soviet Russia, certainly wooden. And that's right, our hero believes. He correctly guesses that the matter is non -competitiveness. Only confuses concepts. We should talk about the incompetence of the socialist economy, and then the cause of the wooden currency in climatically prosperous social stumps such as the DPRK, Cuba and other freedom -loving Africa is understood. But admitting this is like giving the bourgeois the secret of a boys-kibalchisha. Therefore, the reason for the non -competitiveness of the ruble is any other. For example, climate.

After all, the truth: to the south of the 38th parallel grace, exotic fruits like “Samsung”, “Hyundai”, “Kia” are blooming, the currency is freely converted. And to the north, where socialism triumphs, drilling is twelve months a year, two million people died with starvation, people for their wooden money cannot buy extra hundred grams of rice. Not a climate, but trouble.

If Parshev and other soviet economists read their classics, they would better understand the reasons for the non -competitiveness of Soviet rubles. This is what V.I. Lenin in May 1918 “Money, pieces of paper - all that is now called money - these evidence of public well -being acts up and dangerous in that the bourgeoisie, keeping the reserves of these pieces of paper, remains with economic power. To weaken this phenomenon, we must make the strictest records of the available pieces of paper for the complete replacement of all the old money with new ones ”(Report at the All -Russian Congress of representatives of the Finnish financials).

Lenin is right in his own way. If full -fledged money goes in the country, then it is natural for them to flow to the one who offers the market something in real demand. For example, food or clothes, which in conditions of military communism immediately became a shortage. But then the “pieces of paper” gather in the hands of the bourgeoisie and the Bolsheviks lose their economic power. The manufacturer has accumulated “pieces of paper” is able to offer employees a higher wage than in the public sector, independently, and not by ordering, buy raw materials and again make something necessary for the consumer. The market will again pay with him by capable “pieces of paper” and will further increase its resource of financial independence.

In this situation, the young Soviet state remains to be quietly standing on the sidelines and gently inject new liquidity volumes into the economy, making sure that they correspond to the increase in costs. That is, behave like a trivial bourgeois government. That Comrade Lenin categorically does not suit. He intends to rule sovereignly and unconditionally, as the dictator from the proletariat approved. He understands that it is uncompetitive in an economic competition. Therefore, he translates competition from the field of economics into the field of repression. Including repressions against the ruble-lifting environment.

Having destroyed the capable ruble, the proletariat resurrects the bourgeois resources, but at the same time deprives the economy of the incentive to work for the consumer. There is only this - from now on, he is doomed to periodically castrate his own, already proletarian, rubles. It is worth allowing them to perform the functions of a payment fund (i.e. to become what, in fact, the money should be), how they cease to obey again and strive to those who produce something in real demand. If we accept Soviet terminology, to the “speculators”, “nepmans”, “farmers”, “shadow collar”, etc.

Lenin was not a very experienced financier, otherwise he would have realized that it was possible to kill a firm currency (and with it the bourgeoisie), and without any exchange, simply turning on the printing machine. Then the previously accumulated liquidity reserves will turn into a zilch without leaving the competitor pockets. Yesterday's million will become a penny, and the rich, who had three million full rubles, will be only three pennies richer than the proletarian.

However, this wonderful mechanism was quickly felt in practice, when the Soviet government began to cheerfully print proletarian rubles and give them to the workers not for the goods and services produced, but for reasons of political expediency. It immediately turned out that fair proletarian money has no economic meaning, because they are not attached to the amount of value produced. Real economic life, since it is always arranged unfairly (from the point of view of the Communists), immediately went underground. Consumer costs began to exchange for each other in kind, bypassing the meaningless Soviet money -know. Shilo was changed to soap, salt on the chintz. However, this primitive exchange did not suit power, for it implied the presence of an economy independent of leadership.

As the extermination of the domestic economy, it looked in practice, describes Baron Wrangel (the father of the famous general), who worked in the Russian gold and industrial society before the revolution.

1918 Society, of course, has already been nationalized. The commissioner from the new government (a locksmith of twenty years), set to command the entire mining industry of Russia, comes to management. The following dialogue takes place.

- If you do not send supplies to the workers on the mines, you will be shot for sabotage.
- Where to get the money for supplies?
- Where they used to take it, and take it there.
“But the workers now take the extracted gold.”
- We do not concern us. In winter, when the mines stood, where did you get the money before?
- The bank financed.
- So let it finance.
- But the banks are nationalized.
- Then finance yourself. But the first complaint about sabotage is execution.

Not “sabotage,” writes the old Wrangel, it was physically impossible. It remained to run.

A typical situation. The winning working class on the mines appropriated gold, but requires provisions. Profit as the motivational mechanism of the gold industry society is now outlawed. A hard ruble, as part of this mechanism, is destroyed. Banking infrastructure of payments is trampled. From which source, through which channels and why the company from the hungry Peter will supply Siberian workers with provisions? Even if they did not steal the final product, the money for which it can be sold will depreciate before the next production cycle passes. What fool will play these games?
On the other hand, if the rubles had not depreciated, then again they would have accumulated in the hands of Wrangel and the like. And this is a sabotage!

Having destroyed the effective infrastructure of ruble motivation, the authorities are forced to introduce direct force coercion as an alternative. But it helps a little: you will not attack the Mausers with the Mausers for each office. The economic infrastructure degrades to the level at which locksmiths with a Mauser, as a less effective, but class control mechanism, are still able to manage it in the very least. From this moment, a unique type of socialist economy begins to form, which systematically reproduces, on the one hand, a wooden ruble instead of the present, and on the other, the class of Soviet overseers who perform the function of the controller and the drummer instead of the ruble.

The communist dogma provided for the complete absence of money - since it is a mechanism of operation. However, this brilliant thought failed to put into practice. Some kind of, and a means of economic incentives and payment is still necessary. Otherwise, the rollback is completely into the primitive communal hunger strike. So the Bolsheviks Russian ruffing their legs torn off so that they would not go too far, but they still allowed to crawl on the karachi. And thank you for that.

The leader of the world proletariat formulates clearly: either a solid ruble and a bourgeoisie, a skillly interested in filling the market with goods. Then a locksmith with a Mauser, and with him Demiurge V.I. Ulyanov is becoming an extra detail of the political landscape. Or, on the contrary, all power to the Soviets, and then a full -fledged money becomes an extra (“dangerous”) detail of the landscape. And after them the market, saturated with consumer goods.

Sorry if it turns out boring. But it is necessary to once explain to Parshev and his supporters that the wooden ruble appeared not as a result of a climatic catastrophe, but as a result of a disaster of a completely different kind. When a normal economic mechanism, where manufacturers compete for a solid ruble and therefore are forced to increase efficiency, labor productivity, save resources, etc., was forcibly replaced by a politically competent locksmith. The main task is to maintain power in the hands of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship did not win because it made it better and more, but because it shot faster and more decisively. The economy, of course, crashed. And since then, the Lenin Guard has a constant headache: to make sure that in Russia a competitive economy model is not revived, normal money associated with it and a class of more effective economic agents.

It is quite strange to expect strong positions in the world market from such a state and from such a currency. And Russian winter is not to blame here.

By 1921, the country was opened in unprecedented, hitherto widespread hunger. Lenin still departs from the communist dogmas and proclaims a new economic policy. Overcoming the resistance of the plucked comrades with the Mausers who demanded the continuation of an administrative banquet. The new policy begins with a return to solid currency - a golden chervonets.

A certain secretary of the party district committee innocently tells how it looked in the Donbass: “They used to live richly, and people died in hunger after 1921, there were even cases of cannibalism.” But since 1924, agriculture was already “... rose like on yeast. The stimulant was the Leninist policy of the NEP, which became the engine of private initiative. As a result, agriculture quickly recovered to the pre -revolutionary level, and some of which surpassed it. In 1925, we had as much as possible and cheap. After 1922, an abundance of products came with his hunger and cannibalism ... It was just a miracle. "

There is a miracle. Is it a joke, the climate has changed. And all the business-the locksmiths were asked to take a break on the sidelines, and the solid chervonets was allowed to revive the market. Food appeared, the dictatorship of the proletariat was bored. It became easier for everyone. In addition to large and small dictators. What a party activist from Donbass (his name was Nikita Khrushchev, “Memories”, Moscow, MN, 1999) and tells the naivety of the baby.