Brake!

Why it was not possible to intimidate Europe with a lack of gas

Regarding the Russian-Ukrainian gas war, its goals, circumstances and hidden meanings, it seems that all conceivable expert opinions, assumptions and conspiracy theories have already been expressed. And the more versions, numbers and technical ...

Regarding the Russian-Ukrainian gas war, its goals, circumstances and hidden meanings, it seems that all conceivable expert opinions, assumptions and conspiracy theories have already been expressed. And the more versions, figures and technical details, the stronger the feeling that we are being fooled.

Initially, the situation boils down to the fact that Russia sells gas to Europe and this gas can get to Europe so far only through Ukraine. At the same time, Europe buys gas from Russia on its border, and it is not interested in how it gets there. This was the position of the EU in past years and at the beginning of the current crisis. As a result, it turns out that Russia is responsible for delivering gas to the European border, which means that it depends on Ukraine and its pipeline.

The position of Ukraine is also clear. Its pipe is so far the only way for Russia to sell its gas to Europe. But Ukraine itself needs gas and is limited in money, so it links the issue of transit with the issue of gas prices for its internal needs. There are no supplies for Ukraine - there is no transit for Russian gas destined for Europe in full. It turns out that Russia, as an ordinary seller, cannot set the price for gas to Ukraine. If Ukraine does not agree with the price, it simply takes gas, and Russia, in order to fulfill its obligations to Europe, is forced to replenish these volumes. Ukraine has certain legal arguments in this regard. She has a long-term contract for the supply of gas from Russia. True, the specific price of gas must be approved anew every year. However, Ukraine proceeds from the assumption that the absence of an agreed price for the new year does not mean the termination of a long-term gas supply contract. Just its price will be determined later, based on the results of negotiations. And there is a reason for this: otherwise, what is the point of a long-term contract?

Russia, of course, wants to separate the issue of gas transit from the issue of its supply to Ukraine. Like, the pipe is separate, and the gas in it is separate. Separately - a contract for transit, separately - a contract for gas for Ukraine. And in principle, this approach looks reasonable and convincing in the mouth of anyone who formulates it ... except - Russia. The fact is that Russia itself refuses to accept Central Asian gas for transit into its pipeline and forces Uzbekistan to sell all its gas to Gazprom. In the same way, in Russia, all gas producers are forced to sell, or, to be more precise, to hand over their gas to Gazprom at the prices that Gazprom sets.

Actually, the logic that the Russian authorities would like to apply in their gas relations with Ukraine is the logic of the famous European Energy Charter, which Russia indignantly rejects and declares “destructive” for energy security. The Russian authorities, therefore, would like the principles of the charter (that is, the principle of "pipe - separately, and gas - separately") not to operate on the territory of Russia and Europe, but would operate exclusively on the territory of Ukraine.

And this asymmetry – in the opinion of Russian bosses, invisible to anyone, but in fact visible to everyone – mainly determines the impression of Moscow’s actions and rhetoric in the gas conflict. Her rigoristic enthusiasm and beautiful words about "market prices", the execution of contracts and others look like trivial manipulation. Of course, Ukraine is twisting the arms of Putin's team, linking the problem of transit to the price of gas for itself, but it is clear to everyone that otherwise Putin's team will twist the arms of Kiev with all the inspiration inherent in it in such cases.

By actually suspending gas supplies to Europe for the first time this year, the Russian leadership has used its most powerful weapon of blackmail against the Europeans. In fact, it did not give European politicians a chance to evade participation in sorting out relations between Moscow and Kiev. The Russian leadership has finally achieved that the issue of resuming transit is decided in Brussels, European representatives will oversee the transit, and an international consortium will provide money for the purchase of process gas. All this will finally allow, as Moscow hopes, to separate the issue of transit and the sale of gas for Ukraine proper. As a result, Moscow will be able to dictate the price of gas to Ukraine, which means it will be able to exert a decisive influence on the economic and political situation, which could not be achieved in previous years. Frightened by the shortage of gas and freezing Bulgaria, Europe itself will surrender Ukraine to Moscow!

The design is almost flawless, except for the fact that Moscow's victory is a direct salvo on its own gas positions in Europe. The supply cut hit the new EU members, who had previously advocated reducing energy dependence on Russia, but its resonance undermined the position of those who took a relatively pro-Russian position on energy issues - Germany, Italy, France. It was the pro-Russian politicians of these countries who, in the eyes of European public opinion, were indirectly responsible for the suffering of Eastern Europeans. Now there is virtually no alternative to adopting such an energy strategy that would weaken the position of Russian gas on the European market. Moreover, Europe is likely to take urgent action in this direction this year. And this is against the backdrop of the inevitable decline in demand and prices due to the crisis, and increasingly likely financial difficulties for Gazprom itself.

In fact, Putin's team once again found itself in captivity of the myth propagated by itself. The myth that Europe cannot do without Russian gas. Of course, Europe has nothing to replace Russian gas, which accounts for 25% of its gas consumption. But Russia cannot but sell this gas to Europe. For Russia, this is also prohibitive costs. The fact is that the seller's dictatorship in the energy market exists when even a short-term interruption in supplies can lead to unacceptable costs for the buyer. If there is a reserve, the seller's dictate is immediately replaced by the buyer's dictate. That is why oil prices can jump within a decade in the range of $12 to $120, depending on which side (seller or buyer) the ball is on. That is why, in the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet pipeline gas looked in the eyes of Europe as an attractive alternative to unpredictable and politicized oil supplies. But over the past three years, the Russian leadership has made every effort to reduce the attractiveness of Russian gas supplies. And it played along with its European ill-wishers as much as possible.

The fact that the Russian authorities at the last stage of the gas operation felt trapped is eloquently evidenced not so much by the frantic activity of the Putin team on the European political scene in recent days, but by the ever louder and more insistent version sounding in Moscow that behind the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict stands Washington. This is a sure sign that the strategists are in a puddle.