I would prefer soft, gradual reforms ...

From the editorial office. Today, December 16, at 54 years of life, economist Yegor Gaidar died suddenly. It is he who is considered one of the main ideologists of market reforms and privatization in Russia. He held key posts in the Russian government in the 1990s: he was the first Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation, the first deputy, and then the acting chairman of the government, however, then, Gaidar was forced to leave the public service, heading the "democratic choice of Russia", which was transformed in the early 2000s into the "Union of Right Forces". In 2001-2003, he was part of the leadership of the Party of the ATP, of which he remained a member until October 2008. In April 2009, Yegor Timurovich gave an interview to the "Russian magazine", in which he outlined his vision of modern Russia and the economic problems that she forced to fight.

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RG: Dear Egor Timurovich, in his entry into the State Duma, Vladimir Putin said that banks are gradually recovering. Is it possible to say that in the dispute of the two parties-a short crisis and a long crisis-the Prime Minister supported the first? Is this a certain line in discussion?

Egor Gaidar: Only the economy itself leads the line of discussion on such topics. With all my respect for the point of view of any of the leaders of our state, I believe that it is not so easy for them to determine whether the peak of the crisis is passed or not. I would like to believe that they will be right.

RG: Nevertheless: is there a reality under statements about the lull of the crisis?

EG: Of course there is. Only in the conditions of large -scale crises, no one ever knows what is a pause, and what is the beginning of the exit from the crisis . Some signs of stabilization of the situation were evident several months ago. How stable they are - it is better to judge in four months.

RG: As you know, the positions of the Minister of Finance and the heads of the Central Bank are significantly diverge. How can these differences be motivated? Are these errors in forecasts or a matter of different economic strategies?

EG: These people are obliged to express their opinion. As a private person, I can say that I do not know the answer to the question, what will be the depth of the crisis and its length. They are forced to answer at least somehow. At the same time, it is unnecessary to optimistly believe that they are absolutely confident in their answers, although they are trying to give out the most accurate forecasts.

RG: Are there any discrepancies between the interests of the real sector of the economy, the financial sector of the economy and the state itself?

EG: Of course, they exist. The state made a choice - the priority of the financial stability and stability of the banking system. If we talk about the real sector, then it is necessary to distinguish between short -term and long -term consequences.

In the short term, the real sector wants to get money from the budget or from the Goldoval Missile Reserves of the Central Bank. But if you threaten the financial sector, to allow the development of events according to the scenario of the 98th year, but on a greater scale, long-term damage to the real sector can be immeasurably larger. I'm not talking about the interests of depositors.

RG: Does this situation resemble a conflict of real and financial sectors in the United States?

EG: In a sense - yes. Although our response to what is happening asymmetric is an American and European reaction . Americans and Europeans reduce the interest rate, helping the real sector. We, on the contrary, increase the interest rate.

But the Americans and Europeans have world reserve currencies, say, the Swiss, the British, the Japanese - the backup currencies. The ruble is not yet.

For us, pursuing us a symmetrical policy with respect to America is a huge risk. When there is no reserve currency, reducing the interest rate and increasing budget expenditures can lead to additional outflow of capital from the country. This will be followed by an uncontrolled ruble devaluation, with lost savings, an disorder of the banking system, inaccessibility for the purchase enterprises of imported components, with forced stops and mass layouts. I would like to avoid this script.

RG: And how do you feel about the idea of ​​Alexei Ulyukaev about the buying by the state of “toxic assets”?

EG: Strategically, this is reasonable. The main thing for us is now - to prevent bank panic. When the crisis is passed, we will deal with who issued loans and how, how the policy of specific banks was conducted. It is possible that some banks will be forced to change their owners and managers. But this is not today.

RG: Is the continuation of current policy fraught with serious social consequences?

EG: Such risks really exist.

True, Russia is not Iceland, which has not encountered serious crises for decades . Many adult Russians, and their children through parents know what the economic crisis is. That is why, despite the radical changes in the dynamics of income and a sharp deterioration in the situation in the labor market, we still did not have serious large social upheavals, especially related to violence.

RG: In an interview with RS, Jacques Attie spoke out for the nationalization of banks. And in Russia, many talk about the need to create a state banking corporation. Why do you not agree with this position?

E.G.: I would not entrust the Russian state apparatus, at which both compatriots and foreigners look at the extremely corrupt, deal with the crisis in the banking system.

If the indicators of trust in the Russian state apparatus (according to the VTsIOM and international organizations) began to grow steadily, I would be ready to seriously discuss this script. It is extremely dangerous to give money to the banking system to the state apparatus, and then begin to improve its quality. One could discuss this strategy if it was about Norway or New Zealand.

RG: Many people believe that the twenty summit was unsuccessful. How do you evaluate the solutions of the summit?

EG: The results of the summit surpassed my expectations. A fairly consolidated position was demonstrated, in particular, on the issue of strengthening world financial infrastructure. IMF and MB are not sufficiently capitalized in order to cope with crises of this scale. So, it is necessary to change the mechanisms of making decisions.

This is precisely what was said on the “twenty”. The consent itself is important that last year’s measures are a palliative, and not a solution to the problem.

RG: Speaking in the State Duma, the Prime Minister proposed to delay the reform of a single social tax. At one time, you said that you do not need to cancel the value added tax. How do you evaluate the situation with tax reform in Russia today?

E.G.: This is a very correct solution - not to go to the VAT reform on the eve of the financial storm. VAT is the most stable part of our tax system that does not depend on the oil market . The idea that everything can be shifted to nonpi, export duties, and, relatively speaking, income tax, was very seductive in June last year, when oil prices were in the region of $ 140 per barrel. Only it did not take into account the probable change in these prices and the problems arising from this, with the salaries of teachers, doctors, with the contentment of military personnel. The next months showed how real this threat is. I am very glad that the Russian authorities did not make a serious mistake.

RG: Are there any possibilities for diversification of the Russian economy? If so, what strategies can there be here?

EG: Of course, they exist. But economic diversification is possible only with improving the quality of Russian institutions. We need decent guarantees of private property. The conviction is that the judicial system is fair and not controlled by the executive branch. We need a free press, which ensures a decrease in the level of corruption of the state apparatus. It is necessary to reduce the level of secrecy in the development of state decisions. The most private sector is needed, because it works better in Russia than the state.

Money is invested in the oil industry with any quality of institutions. Even in Nigeria, although it is unlikely that the institutions are perfect there.

RG: It is logical to assume that in a social crisis in a free election, anyone will win, but not liberal forces ...

EG: I'm not saying that free elections should be held the day after tomorrow. The restoration of democratic institutions should be gradual. I would begin with the restoration of freedom of the press, then with the cessation of repressions in relation to non -state organizations, with the liberalization of social life. And only then would he approach the liberalization of the political regime itself.

Unlike many others, I was related to the management of Russia in conditions when the socialist regime collapsed. And I absolutely did not want to repeat anything like that. I would prefer soft, gradual reforms that allow you to avoid a new round of deinstationization .

I recently completed the work on the book “Institutes and Troubles”, dedicated to the analysis of situations in different societies in which the institutions of the past regime collapsed. Moreover, they collapsed instantly, as, say, in Russia between 27th and 28th on February 1917.

So far, the crisis has not led to a large -scale trouble. But it is generally very difficult to predict the turmoil.

RG: You stood at the origins of the creation of the institutions of the new Russia. Is it really possible that they have not passed the strength test?

EG: Of course not. They are still young. Only tradition gives strength to the institutions. Moreover, they should not only be stable, but also flexible. Like, say, the English political system, which was formed after the “glorious revolution” of the 17th century and then experienced crazy changes in the country and the world.

Talked by Boris Mezhuev and Lyubov Ulyanova