Elections in the test tube

With the help of the most banal sociological technologies, it is possible to create a “electoral standard” to control the honesty of summing up voting results

Today in the "plot 11/12" - atypical material. Its authors understood the meaning of the heading dedicated to the upcoming federal election in 2011 - 2012, literally. Therefore, they offer a variant of some actions that, in their opinion, may well ...

Today in the "plot 11/12" - atypical material. Its authors understood the meaning of the heading dedicated to the upcoming federal election in 2011 - 2012, literally. Therefore, they offer a variant of some actions that, in their opinion, may well make the upcoming “elections” more similar to the elections itself.

By golly, they got conversations about the immaturity of civil society and the infantility of social institutions. There is a specific opportunity in a simple, absolutely legal way to take such an important sphere of public life as elections under civil control. The only question is: are citizens of Russia and public organizations ready to take the initiative and take responsibility?

1. A specific example

In three areas where the leadership voted, manipulations were not allowed for obvious reasons. The press, numerous observers, emphasized correctness. The plots taken for example are located in different areas of the city - Ramenki, Gagarinsky, Tverskaya. All of them give a similar picture, markedly differing from the official Sredmoskovskaya. Especially in terms of turnout and support of United Russia. Up to the point that on the site where V.V. voted Putin, the Communist Party, according to official results, was ahead of United Russia.

However, in Moscow 3274 polling stations. On the vast majority of them, transparency is less and the results are more doubtful. What does the distortion of “ordinary” protocols in the urban outback look like, it is easy to understand by the example of the Mozhaysky district, where two identical polling stations are located in the same school: No. 2515 and No. 2516. Both with the number of voters are slightly more than 2 thousand.

On the site No. 2515, the results are believable, from turnout and ending with the number of invalid ballots. In addition, they generally resemble the numbers recorded on three previously mentioned “elite” areas - with understandable discrepancies in the support of “United Russia”, the LDPR and “Yabloko”. You can’t say this about the site No. 2516: “United Russia” is almost twice as much; Communist Party, Yabloko and Fair Russia - 10 times less. Although voters are almost identical.

Apparently, election commissions and methods of their work are distinguished.

Fortunately, in Moscow there are many election commissions, where manipulations are not held for a number of reasons. Somewhere because of the presence of the high authorities, somewhere because of the fundamental of members of commissions or party observers, somewhere for other reasons.

Consider the polling stations of Moscow by groups depending on the officially shown turnout. Where the turnout is below 25%, it was at least not “pulled”. Such sites in Moscow 588 are approximately a fifth. What are the results here? They are very different from the official Sredperskovsky, but they resemble those on which manipulations were apparently not allowed.

Support for United Russia is noticeably lower, the support of the Communist Party of the Communist Party, and the voices of the supporters of the LDPR, Yabloko and Just Russia diverge in the same proportion. All of them overcome a 7 percent barrier.

Starting from the level of turnout is 25%, the voices are surprisingly stubborn to “United Russia”, and only to it. The share of other parties and invalid ballots, of course, is blurred. This is amazing. Under normal conditions, there should be no connection between the percentage of voters and the support of one of the parties. The percentage of men, women, boys, girls and dogs in a random street sample with a volume of 1000, 3000 and 5000 objects should not differ significantly. In Moscow, it turned out differently: the larger the “sample” (above the turnout), the greater the share of “United Russia”.

In other words, the growth of a conditional street sample over some line for some reason is provided exclusively at the expense of, say, women. The ladies go in a jamb, and men, children and dogs from that moment, as if disappear from the streets of the city. Explanations can be invented by different ones, but in any case, it is clear, firstly, a fracture and, secondly, the falsity of the result: in fact, there are not many women in the city as the official report shows.

In our case, obviously, between 20 and 25%, the real percentage of the appearance of Moscow voters lay. That on top is provided almost entirely by ballots in favor of the EP. The increase in the number of voting starting from the moment of the fracture goes in parallel with the indicator of the support of the party in power. It is logical: if you “pull up” the turnout, then not empty ballots, but with a mark for whom you need.

This means that the turnout in Moscow is about a third for about a third. About the same amount of the support of the United Russia support. Its real result was somewhere between 45 and 50%. More precisely, it is difficult to say due to the lack of a representative “standard” with which official numbers could be compared.

Three elite sites: No. 157, 2079, 2627 are correct in the sense that there was no manipulation. But they, strictly speaking, are not representative. Firstly, there are too few of them for statistically reliable judgments; Secondly, they represent only one of the varieties of the city electorate, typical of aristocratic areas.

Experts call such a displaced sample.

Idea

And why, together with the joint efforts of public organizations, parties, conscientious members of election commissions, media, bloggers and observers, do not organize a representative sample-test from a small number of polling stations (“standard”) in advance and guaranteed to provide a benign account there? This is quite possible for us - if there is desire and will. Then it would be possible to correctly compare the official results with the numbers of the control sample and draw much more specific and accurate conclusions.

Why is this necessary?

Obviously,:

- In recent years, the scale of electoral manipulations has increased;
- Their geography became wider;
- They became a fact of public opinion.

Falsifications speak openly, but with hopeless intonations. Negativism will increase with the further discrepancy between the life experience of citizens with reports of the electoral administration.

The posts turned into doping, without which EP, like an exhausted runner, can no longer show the desired result. Refusal of doping leads to failure. Further use of doping leads to a scandal. Zugzwang. The electoral bubble is swollen similar to the exchange: earlier or later it will burst. As always, at the most inopportune moment, against the backdrop of social, economic or other exacerbation, which reduced the level of social inertia.

In the mutual interests of the state and society - to stop the inflation of electoral trust and allow the bubble to blow away.

The task requires accuracy, responsibility and trust. At the same time, for the opposition, it is much more constructive than any permitted or unresolved street processions and rallies.

A specific sentence

On the initiative of public organizations and political parties, on the basis of open public agreement, a five percent representative sample of polling stations is organized in advance, where transparency and reliable calculation are guaranteed by joint efforts.

The remaining 95% of the plots let them work as usual. Our modest task is to provide a comparative standard. If there are no statistically significant discrepancies, then everything is fine, the party and public audit confirms the benign election. If there are significant discrepancies, you will have to explain. In order to make sure that you were offered a rotten beiftex in the restaurant, it is not necessary to eat it entirely. It is enough to take a piece of 5%for analysis.

The advantage is the specificity of the task and concentration of general efforts. The technology can be worked out on one of the regions on a single voting day in March 2011. The time is still enough to prepare.

Scientific justification

Hundreds of thousands or a million or two voters live in an ordinary Russian region. For them, about a thousand polling stations are created. A 5% sample means several dozen sites and tens of thousands of voters.

From the point of view of mathematical statistics - more than a sufficient volume for a very accurate (up to a share of percent) judgment on the distribution of votes in the general population. The general population in this case is the entire voting electorate of the region.

Recall that sociologists analyze the mood of the population of Russia (142,000,000 people) based on a selective survey of only 1,500 - 2000 citizens. A small sample volume determines the method of the method of 2-3%. A mathematical mistake can be slightly reduced if you significantly increase the sample size - say, 10 times. In practice, this does not make sense, because the cost of the survey is growing sharply, and the accuracy will remain de facto the same. Public opinion is always a little vague, during surveys, some people get confused, consciously or unconsciously deceive the interviewer or themselves. An increase in the formal accuracy of the account is not paid off by increasing real knowledge.

Completely wrong in the case of electoral results. Here we are not about opinions, but about the numbers officially recorded in the protocols. No humanitarian vague, some dry numbers. The data of the "standard" (test-slander) either coincide with the numbers by general population, or do not coincide. The permissible limits of discrepancies (the so -called confidential interval) are strictly calculated according to the rules of mathematical statistics. With a sample of tens of thousands of voters, you can be sure of the very high reliability of mathematical control. Discovers in plus or minus one percent of the vote will already allow to reasonably talk about the presence of some “unexpressed factor”. If the discrepancies amount to 3-5 percent or more (in Moscow, recall, they reached 20%!), This will be a reason for serious issues to organize the counting of the remaining 95% of the sites.

From a scientific point of view, the main subtlety in ensuring the representativeness of the “standard”. The sample should include polling stations that correctly reflect the share of urban and rural population, formed and not very, taking into account ethnic, professional, age groups, etc. In the “Standard” all administrative areas of this subject of the Federation should be represented, and not only by one or two sites. The task is quite solved and even trivial for any conscientious sociologist.

With a reasonable minimum of professionalism, it is not a problem.

Organization

Paradox: All efforts are called up to only ensure strict observance of the law by 5% of pre-designated sites.

The rest of the general population remains on the traditional care of election commissions. They will have a choice: if we count “as always”, then you will have to explain why the result is different from the reference sections in the same territory. Maybe it’s better to consider how it really is? The standard will help the usual precinct commissions protect themselves from administrative pressure: few people want to get a scandalous gap in the results and then explain.

The task is obvious: to concentrate efforts and withstand the defense from the desperate pressure of the administrative resource. Do not succumb. It would be reasonable to form a public commission (for example, on the basis of the Presidential Council for the promotion of the development of civil society institutions, the Voice Association, Human Rights Rights) and the Inter -Party Headquarters, choose an experimental region and control plots, conduct training and preparation of controllers, inform the press, local authorities and relevant election commissions.

Everything is publicly, openly, with better intentions and mutual respect, in partnership with the electoral system. But firmly. If the society does not get the strength to solve such a local, in fact, task, it means that it is worth the elections that has.

Expected results

A massive workshop on the formation of the rule of law and the fight against legal nihilism. The goal is not to grab someone's hand and punish, but to ensure the implementation of the law and folk control.

The electoral system receives an incentive to improvement. Society is awakened by interest and self -esteem. The media has an informational occasion. In the future, you can extend experience in federal elections.

For the country's top leadership, this is an opportunity to confirm the status of modernizers and bring the electoral system under the control of the company. Will they want?

Parties participating receive a lesson in interaction. Their prestige is growing. Members of the election commissions receive a bona fide lesson. Society receives a lesson in positive civil activity. Citizens receive a lesson in solidarity and the ability to defend their common interests in interaction with the authorities.

Both possible outcomes are positive: if there are no discrepancies, then everything is fine. If there are discrepancies, then the “standard” allowed to find failure in law enforcement practice. The society and the state are faced with a specific task of eliminating it.

From a legal point of view, the procedure is absolutely correct.

Was this project to experience the example of the Kirov region?

Poor, poor N.Yu. White! That's who in such a situation you certainly will not envy.