Seminar "Democracy and Nationalism"

On May 30, 2012, a seminar was held at SPC "Memorial" "Democracy and Nationalism". The event was attended by: Lev Gudkov (Levada Center), Emil Pain (Carnegie Moscow Center, National Research University Higher School of Economics), Alexander Verkhovsky (IAC "SOVA"), Carl Wilkens ("The World Outside My World / World Outside My Shoes"), Sergey Magaril (RGGU), Ilya Lazarenko (NDA), Alexander Khramov (RGS), Sergei Simonov (Social Democratic Youth Union) and others. Chaired the meeting Tatyana Vorozheykina (independent researcher).
We publish video from the seminar.
See below an abridged and edited transcript of the seminar posted on the Radio Liberty website.

Part 1.

Part 2.

abridged transcript

Elena Fanailova: Freedom in Memorial Society. nationalism and democracy. A joint project International Memorial "Democracy in Russia" and Analytical Center Yuri Levada.

Sociologist, director of the Yuri Levada Analytical Center Lev Gudkov; political scientist Emil Pain, director of the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional research, head of the Center for the Study of Xenophobia and prevention of extremism of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Alexander Verkhovsky, director of the information and analytical center "SOVA"; political scientist Tatyana Vorozheykina.

Tatyana Vorozheikina: Why in some cases nationalism serves as a stimulus, a condition for democratization, modernization, national consolidation, while in others it acquires a conservative character, becomes a factor hindering the socio-political changes? I must say that this question is strange for me, because that it seems to me that this question is beyond the scope of post-imperial or imperial situations where people fight against the empire are usually foreign to them. This issue seems to have been resolved, but nonetheless, it's worth it.

What are the main elements of Russian nationalism? Can nationalism Russia to lead to the strengthening of the fundamentalist reaction, to develop according to scenario of fundamentalist archaic conservation? I would like to add There are two more questions to this. This is a question about the nationalist component modern democratic movement in Russia, which before our eyes unfolds. Who are they, relatively speaking, participants or fellow travelers? Here I am particularly interested in the Navalny phenomenon. This issue is discussed under mute, but it seems to me that it is worth discussing it, because it is just represents, in my opinion, the epitome of this problem. Suffice it to say that the former slogan of the fascist rallies is “One for all, all for one!” became the slogan of democratic rallies. Him, nothing hesitating, chanting all those who, apparently, know or do not know where he comes from was born. I certainly don't mean The Three Musketeers. Respectively, if the speakers could comment on the relation of the three elements of the protest movement: democratic, social and nationalist - I think it was interesting.

And the last thing is the change, and in my opinion, the strengthening of the national-xenophobic discourse of the authorities and the church.

Lev Gudkov: Can there be nationalism an incentive, a condition for democratization, modernization, or is it brake? We know examples, and I was a living witness when exactly nationalist consolidation was a factor in securing the transition. It was in all Baltic movements in 88-89s. It could have been to see in Poland, Hungary, when exactly national unity and appeal to national traditions, national values ​​acted in as a consolidating, integrating factor, revealing the exit from the Soviet system. In a sense, this is a more general problem that once put by Max Weber, which made up the central nerve of his research: how ideas and interests interact, under what conditions set of ideas can stimulate the institutionalization of relationships and contribute to the establishment of new forms. He considered this as an example capitalism, but in the same way he considered the example of political forms, music, economics and law, and so on. Trying from this posing a question, look at our situation, I want to say that myself in itself nationalism, or belief in the unity of origin or destiny, is not matter. What matters is the constellation of interests that uses this mythology, and not only uses it, but also against whom it directed. Because in one case nationalism can be emancipatory, and we saw this many times, especially in the 19th century, in moment of formation of nation-states. In our case it is because the keeper of national myths, national culture first of all, the state acts and controls the whole composition myths, then nationalism will always be built around, even if it includes issues of social justice, infringement and others, he will always appeal to the archaic layers of culture, to archaic set. And everything is built around the institutions of coercion, then there are state institutions.

Therefore, I would define the main features of Russian nationalism as defensive-compensatory nationalism. He is not mobilized. I don't know such material, whenever the nationalists put forward whatever project future, the prospect of development in this sense, one or another option modernization. On the contrary, nationalist appeals are always built towards past, worked out routine symbols, so these are always some variations on the theme of infringement, protection from an external threat, in short, overcoming the trauma of the failure of modernization. These are protective features. nationalism. Another, compensatory, it is already clear: we are poor, but we spiritual, we have very important advantages. What - not quite It's clear. “In any case, we are higher than others, because we had heroic past, there were achievements", mainly concentrating, of course, around the symbols of military victories and the creation of a giant empire territorial.

Emil Pain: What political role in modern conditions are carried out by movements and organizations that call themselves nationalist, Russian nationalist and non-Russian nationalist? I believe that the word "post-imperial" is absolutely doesn't explain anything. Something after the empire. The nation is also after the empire. But since we say “post-imperial”, it is understood that the empire is some kind of there is, but it is somehow not so, wrong. Although no one knows what proper empire. The role of this nationalism is absolutely impossible evaluate without its relation to the empire.

My first thesis is that talking about Russia as a normal state, will be a conversation in such circles as long as there is save the empire. 'Cause the empire pretty much holds back the possibility of all forms of modernization.

Secondly, I believe that Russian nationalism performs extremely important role today, because it is the main critical factor the extermination of the remnants of a fizzling empire.

And the third factor. Nationalism can be quite positive at the stage scrapping, but directly go into the category of civil movements, he cannot be reborn and become, say, a part of civil society, but along the way will play extremely important roles in our fading empire. Today, science has no data to confirm whether there will be Russia democracy or not. But witness the final fading empire, I think we will all. So, to understand what is empire, I will outline it very briefly and schematically in three projections. She consists, in my opinion, of the imperial body, reflected in the areas traditional population, peoples - Tatars, Chuvashs, Yakuts, Chechens and etc. This imperial body is constantly reproducing the problem instability, conflict, disintegration. And about this problem parasitizes and forms the second part of this system - the imperial consciousness. One of the elements of this consciousness, characteristic of ethnic majority, is a constant fear of disintegration, conflicts, in relation to which needs some action, and in relation to which it is very reasonable and useful third part of the system. Imperial consciousness is replaced by the complex messianism: they are better off with us, they cannot live without us, they cannot live without us survive and so on. But it is important for us that there is a third element - imperial order, vertically organized power. Or is it a system governors, each successive governor is appointed by the superior, and governs his part of the provinces. This imperial system we call vertical of power exists.

Our leader, national leader as his main achievements did not cite an increase in wages and pensions, but "I saved Russia from collapse." Our main party is not even called "Great Russia", it is called "United Russia" maintains integrity. That is, maintaining stability integrity is the main evidence of the need for tough vertical, authoritarianism, which is reproduced, and which is the main problem in relation to which everyone is now grouped ...

Under normal classical conditions, the empire is supra-ethnic, tends to based on universalist ideas. But in times of crisis inevitable changes. And when the consolidation mechanisms are exhausted, power abandons complete universalism in favor of support ethnic majority. In this sense, what is happening with Putin is absolutely not unique. Let me remind you that until the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman empire was characterized by a very high level of tolerance for attitude towards different religions, ethnic groups. And by the beginning of the century, instead of Ottoman consciousness - the transition to Turkish consciousness, the Young Turks, the first nationalists are brought to power, and then - pogroms and so on. Instead of the standard situation of relying on universalist requirements there is a certain hybrid model of the late empire based on ethnic majority. And this is a sure sign of the end of the empire, and this is the basis for its future collapse, because the empire can resist for centuries minority nationalism, but it is unable to sustain nationalism the majority.

The Ottoman Empire is one example, and the Russian one in today's conditions is an absolutely new, fundamental thing, which is given very little, and yet gigantic changes are taking place. In my opinion, pure Russian nationalism appeared in 2011, and what happened before, at the beginning of the twentieth century with parties, is a form imperial chauvinism, which outwardly looked like signs of a Russian nationalism. But in his idea, he did not put forward the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bcombining an ethnic group and states. What is the essence of all nationalism? ethnicity is the source power, it determines the nature of life. Never Russian nationalism he did not come up with such an idea, he was protective, he was imperial. AND only now we are seeing a divorce. People are scared: if we remove now central government, so everything will fall apart! "And let it go," says the Russian people. "Down with the Caucasus!", "Stop feeding the republics!" - they say nationalists. More recently, we wrote that despite all the differences between organizations called imperial and nationalist, with describing the foundations of one's consciousness - what is the Russian soul, what is Russian character, all nationalist politicians said: “For Russian national consciousness "imperial" is an integral part.

All Russian nationalism, one that at least called, was absolutely authoritarian. His political models were built either on the monarchy or on the leader. What's going on today? Radical changes in phraseology. A Russian nationalist may say: "Russian For a thousand years, the people have suffered for themselves the right to choose their own leader.” - This completely different question. Further. Today most of all numerous movements of Russian nationalism went into opposition to authorities, however, for various reasons. Some - because she is too liberal. But the mass transition of various detachments of Russian nationalism to opposition is extremely important. Another question - can it become an element of democratization? Getting rid of the remnants imperialism does not yet mean a direct transition to democratic forms of government. Any type of structures, including many times worse than we know, including those fundamentalist. After the Shah's empire, during the time of Shah Reza Pahlavi the first republic appeared. But God forbid me to live in such republic. And who knows if we won't have some fundamentalist a republic with elections, but of a certain kind. The situation is not predetermined, and it's not about nationalism.

Russian nationalism is already weak because it has no tradition. AND people who come out under the label "nationalists" today, come out tomorrow under the label "Udaltsov". Sakharov Square and rallies near Abay, and so further show that other forms of civic engagement may well have been to involve those who used to call themselves a nationalist, Orthodox activist, and God knows who else. Under certain conditions, this the masses could follow Navalny, whom I do not consider a nationalist, and this is just a person who smells, the wind, who understands what they are doing now publicity is a politician, not an ideologue. But since our movement civil does not promise any benefits, no program, agenda, and so further, then movements in the other direction are very likely. Especially for the reason that we live not only in evolutionary conditions, but also in conditions which suits us the project of power. Power creates some action, we do not just live in a vacuum, it builds forms of self-defense. And the idea she came up with today this is late imperial: we call Russians “beloved wife”, she will the state-forming people, but to the national republics, so that they did not run away, we give you the full right to do whatever you want, arranging that including Sharia courts, Wahhabi life, their independent life in the governorship.

This will not save the country, of course, on the contrary. But from the point of view of the phenomenon under consideration - action gives rise to reaction. most a serious form of consolidation of Russian nationalism are all forms cultural radicalization of those whom they consider "they", that is, against whom they mostly rally. To the rally, to Manezhnaya Square they came out not against the arbitrariness of the police, but about the fact that "our offended”, and not “ours were encouraged”. And this element of xenophobia can be used and will be used to mobilize and direct this forces by no means into the sphere of civic activism, but into the sphere of interethnic confrontation.

The question is open: in which direction will the nationalist movement move, which, from the point of view of breaking the imperial system, certainly fulfills and will play a positive, important role in the near future?

Alexander Verkhovsky: First, I want to say that before, even in the 90s, there were specifically anti-imperial formulated positions in Russian nationalism, and especially they intensified with the growth of the movement, which was then called skinhead, who simply did not care about the empire. It is clear that a great tradition imperial Russian nationalism affects everyone who is capable of read texts. But the process of release from under it is underway, and it did not begin in 2011. Secondly, the opposition of Russian nationalism is also thing is not new. In the 90s, too, mostly nationalist organizations were in opposition. Another thing is that in general in most political movements in Russia, this applies not only to nationalists, opposition is, as a rule, a forced thing. If you are not taken authorities into consultants, which means you fall into the opposition. At the same time, in in any case, it is clear that this is all movement, even the one that was in The 90s was undoubtedly part of the reaction to the modernization attempt, undertaken during the perestroika period of the early 1990s. And accordingly, when there was a return wave, which we see already embodied, somewhat even frozen in the form of Putin's rule, the nationalists were her part.

But every wave then has a return move. And now we are all hopeful We think that the move in the opposite direction has not already begun. And the question arises: can those nationalists who are, or those who may be, appear tomorrow, be part of the pro-modernist movement? not formally for democracy, the question is not whether these movements, groups are sincere or not sincere, or maybe they are encrypted there, but in fact hidden Nazis, to put it bluntly. I think who is what, what is called, but it is not The main thing. The main problem is that they are very small. Mentioned Navalny, whom I also include in this category, it seems to me that his nationalistic views are sincere. He is a popular person. But when he came in the fall, before the protest boom, to the nationalist rallies, no one came for him at all. That is, as a nationalist he is not a popular leader. Not to mention those who go there anyway, they were not very glad to see and hear him.

Those nationalist groups that exist are more organized, they number in the tens of people. Can it change with time, we we can't know for sure. It's not about organizational talent or the absence of such, or something like that. It's not that nationalism may or may not be pro-modernization. The thing is, who is he opposing, to put it bluntly. If he opposes another nationalism, overwhelming, then maybe, maybe, and maybe No. Not every movement that in the good old days we called national liberation, is pro-modernization. It can be pro-modernization if it opposes what is usually called the old regime, that is, some kind of pre-modern rule. Neither one or the other version of modern Russia is not suitable. No matter how the present regime is bad, it is not what is called the old regime.

What matters is how it all works. Nationalism is not just one, naked taken the idea that an ethnic group should have a nation. First, he can be somewhat different, and secondly, it is always a certain complex, people perform with a wide program. The question is how in this program accents are placed. For example, the founders of civic nationalism, leaders of the French Revolution, they were also quite xenophobic, and they weren't too shy about it. But that was secondary, so they gave birth to what they gave rise to. And in modern Russian nationalism we we see the exact opposite picture: the destructive, separating message is too strong, outweighs any other.

Now in Russian nationalism, roughly speaking, there are two main, large currents. One is conditionally called "civilizational nationalism", who understands Russia not as a national country, but as a great idea and mission. The idea can be different - communist, Orthodox-monarchical, Eurasian - and all without exception existing versions of such nationalism are fundamentally anti-modern. This their essence and meaning is always to reconstruct in some way the tradition and a mission lost in opposition to the West and modernization. dominates simple ethnic nationalism, most often just racist. And in it there may be a modernizing element, but it is too strongly dominated by precisely this destructive-separating element. Suffice it to say that the vast majority of real participants in the Russian movement nationalists are neo-Nazis who call themselves neo-Nazis and not one bit shy about it. And all we see are speakers some groups that somehow declare themselves - this is a small part, which does not enjoy the special support of this mass.

There is an opportunity to give birth to something greater than it is now. the existing group of these national democrats. I'm not very into it it is believed, but, in principle, it is possible, because the existing government, if it continues to develop in the way it is now, it will become so archaic for a developing society that something will gradually resemble the old mode in the classic spawn scheme nationalisms in Europe. And then, perhaps, nationalism there is a chance. But this is a very promising prospect.

Tatyana Vorozheykina: A couple of clarifications, and to sharpen some of the questions raised in the discussion. First clarification is connected with what I said about the empire. I think that the democratic potential of national movements is exclusively situational. It is connected with the situation of the national liberation movement against a foreign empire, whether it be a state, as it was in XIX-XX centuries, or whether it was the Soviet empire, where formally preserved states. That is, here Estonia and Poland cost the same - they fought against the empire. And exactly in this interval one can speak of positive, not modernization, namely democratic potential nationalism. Democratic in the sense that these movements are at a certain stage are interested and are supporters of the creation institutions that are competitive, differentiating society, and in this sense - democratic institutions. But if we look at history of Poland after Soviet domination, after 1989, then we we will see the period of the Kaczynski brothers, in which it was the nationalist component of the liberation movement, shall we say, the national confessional was anti-democratic. Many Poles perceived it as growing anti-democratism on national grounds, even under much more forgiving conditions than ours.

We are talking, in general, about the democratic potential of nationalism. I though questioned this question, but the very situation in which we live, participation of nationalists in the general democratic movement, makes all these questions in a new way. I give the floor for questions from the audience.

Ilya Lazarenko, National Democratic Alliance, co-chair: In I agree with Emil Pain to a great extent, by 90 percent. But I would I wanted to substantially add and, perhaps, to object in some way. First, it was rightly said that the anti-imperial the component of Russian nationalism was by no means formed in the 11th year. Quite clearly articulated and brought to its crystal clarity She was already 5 years ago.

As for the very posing of the question: can nationalism be a force, conducive to modernization. Certainly it can. And the world experience is shows quite clearly. Does this apply to Russian nationalism and Russia is a much more complicated issue. Because until then while Russia is being built in accordance with the imperial matrix, while the psychology of the state and society remains imperial as long as the state has an imperial structure, Russian nationalism will certainly conservative, of course, anti-modernization. And this will be it, one might say, a practically irresistible historical function. But if we will consider Russian nationalism as an anti-imperial force, which seeks to destroy the imperial structure, including the dismantling of the imperial state, the situation fundamentally changes. If we will assume that the post-Soviet, Russian statehood will be dismantled, and not only at the level of psychological and political, but also at the level of the vertical of power, in this case, of course, Russian nationalism can act not only as a democratic, but also as modernization force. But for this you need to seriously change civilizational vector and structure of the country. That is why we are talking about that a real federation and education in its composition is needed Russian republics on a par with the existing national republics. This will balance the federation, will solve a lot of problems, associated with the status of the Russian people. And finally allow reverse the trend that is commonly called imperial, which can be called Eurasian, anti-Western, anti-democratic and traditionalist, in the worst sense of the word.

Therefore, I would put the question in this way: will Russian nationalism be able to take an absolutely anti-imperial character; can he recognize that the fact that the interests of the Russian people may not coincide with the interests of Russia. And very often the interests of Russia, as an imperial state, and the interests of the Russian people may be in complete conflict. If these theses will be accepted, then, I think, the modernization potential Russian nationalism will be revealed, and will be revealed especially strongly in the result of the dismantling of the imperial system of the state.

Alexander Khramov: I am also one of representatives of the National Democrats. It turns out that I am like an elephant who is currently speaking at the Department of Elephant Science. I would like to answer that such, let's say, a synthesis of national and democratic ideas is a trend that has emerged, perhaps not even in 2011, but earlier, and it is wider than mentioned here. I can name works, recent articles by the late Dmitry Furman, who expressed similar ideas. I I will read literally a couple of phrases of one person, whom, probably, all those present here know: “Russia is quite ready to become a national legal state of the European type. The main thing here is culture. IN In Russia, more than 80% of the population considers themselves Russian culture. World experience shows: the stage of creating a nation-state is necessary, without it does not form a civil society. Man is a pack animal he needs to feel his belonging to a certain “flock”. National society is the cultural space where a person feels himself he considers his own and those around him to be his own. In general, I think that without going through the stages nation state, Russia is doomed. Who said that? It said Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky. These are excerpts from his autumn interviews. 2011. This is to the question that in similar positions there are by no means only some handfuls of not very numerous national democrats, some sort of Navalny. In fact, this trend is gradually spreads, and spreads primarily in the intellectual environment. In the early stages, it spreads not as an organization, not organizationally, namely as a kind of discourse. The trend towards the synthesis of some national and democratic moments did not go unnoticed at the most top. If we turn to Vladimir Putin's article on national question, which came out in February, in my opinion, in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, one of the main theses, to which they oppose, well, not Putin, probably, and those speechwriters who wrote the text to him, this, in fact, trend of national democracy. Putin, or Putin's speechwriters, in this article say that there are bad, bad people who talk about national self-determination of the Russian people, they are fighting the empire, they say “stop feeding the Caucasus”, these are very bad people, but in reality we must move towards sovereignty, spirituality. And this discourse national-democratic exists, develops and began already at the very the tops give way, and it is painful, perhaps already noticed. And some it can bear fruit.

Sergei Simonov, Social Democratic Youth Union: I want to ask a slightly perplexed question: why can't you build legal, federal, modern state all together, all of Russia within its current borders? And why do some experts here identify is it an aspiration with an imperial idea? I am not at all to the "imperials" I count and count Dagestanis, Buryats, Penzyaks, Khabarovsk residents and so on their fellow citizens, and I am sure that together we can perfectly aspire to a legal democratic state. And nothing that we interferes, I can't hear. Please, if there are such arguments, bring them to me. It can be crushed, in my opinion, to infinity. Already in Petersburg, groups of citizens declare that "we need to disconnect Petersburg, because we are some kind of Ingrians.” so us prevents everyone from striving together for this legal state in Russia, in its current borders?

Oleg De-Roberti, independent researcher: I want to answer the young man with a banner that Radio Liberty gives regularly. One girl says: “Now it’s better to live, because whoever wants to live better can strive for it.” So, to this we can also strive for unity, but reality does not give us grounds for this, she tears us apart. Before our eyes, materially we see that what you want is hard to achieve.

Now regarding the previous speaker. National Democratic discourse - I don't believe in it either. I would also like him to help us. But the question posed by respected Alexander Verkhovsky is that the idea nationalism brought nothing to anyone - this is very truely said. We would wanted it. Historically, it so happened that I was in the very mainstream Russian national idea thanks to roots, connections, relatives - Kostroma, Mikhail Romanov, Volga, St. Petersburg, Moscow, and all my life I've been over I think this. On the other hand, I lived in the Baltics. So, nationalism The Baltics, the nationalism of the eastern countries of Europe is nationalism, who had a core, he is tangible. He was nationalistic nationalism, pardon the tautology, and it was anti-imperial. Russian nationalism never found itself. I completely agree with Pain here. It hasn't been in virtually all of history. You won't find him, sir Lazarenko, it's hard to find, it's late, there's no time, we missed this time. You do not create it, this democratic nationalism that will help us revive Russia. Catch-up development, late, you can not catch up with anyone.

It seems to me that the process of the collapse of the empire has already gone too far than we even imagine here. The owl of Minerva has already taken off, and I the empire seems to be bursting at the seams. We see the convulsive attempts of power cling to one fragment, then another, then a third, and all this is us leads to dead ends. I do not believe that nationalism can be revived, that in general, there was once a genuine Russian nationalism. I don't believe that he can promote democracy and I don't believe he can promote modernization. The only thing I believe in is that everyone who has a Russian passport is a Russian. And that little one Negro from the movie "Circus", he is Russian. And if Obama's daughter wants get a Russian passport, she will be Russian. And this is the only exit. And who wants to engage in specifically Russian ethnic - Please. These are cultural codes, genetics of behavior, which is still 40 years old. ago Corresponding Member Krushinsky at the university researched on animals. Ethnography, ethnology - please. Give it all away nationalisms, and leave only the Russian passport, which is evidence of Russianness.

Evgenia: I would like to record some moments. The first point is the trend that, in my opinion, is evident, and about which many from different environments have spoken today. Actually Sociologists have already warned about this. In a 2006 article by Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin wrote that the danger of radical nationalism lies precisely in the indirect influence of these ideas on the entire political spectrum and gradual internalization, adaptation of radical ideas across a broader political spectrum. I think this situation happened, there is a trend.

Secondly, I would like to support Tatyana Evgenievna Vorozheykina with the point of view of the situational nature of the modernization potential. I think, that in this sense Eastern Europe is not the main model for us today. It seems to me that in the situation of a post-totalitarian empire, we may it makes sense to focus on other samples. And I believe that one of the most striking examples and models in this regard can serve as post-Nazi Germany, in which - the struggle for normalization, on the one hand side, the endless theme that Germany must finally become a normal nation, overcome the accursed past, stand in line with normal countries, which was primarily supported by the West German conservatives. And the struggle for the rejection of nationalism, from other grounds identities other than those that support the principles of universalism, constitutional values, for which she fought primarily leftist public. The idea that Germany has generally lost the right to be a nation state. Günter Grass spoke with this idea, many left-wing liberals supported it. This approach was not unequivocally and automatically predominant in post-war Germany, but gradually, since about the 60s, and especially since the 80s, this concept national identity became dominant. And I think that she is very important and significant for us.

Alexander Verkhovsky: I'll start with what Alexander Khramov spoke. Why are the National Democrats conditionally noticeable? What is this a big trend? If it consists of several organizations and Dmitry Furman, then this is not enough. Khodorkovsky, well, what is he didn't write, to be honest. State performances on high level of Putin and others, they are not addressed at all to national democracy. They are built on opposing something growing ethnic nationalism, including ethnic majority nationalism. This is fundamentally important for the authorities, and it is tries to do from time to time. But because, important as it is, apparently not so important, there are more important worries, so she trying to do about once a year. And nothing happens. Here was Putin's article, and I assure you, there will be nothing for some time take place. A year ago, a whole concept of state, it can still be read, only nothing else happened.

The fact is that there is a large mass of violently oriented young people, they are in favor of an ethnic Russian state: "Russia for Russians”, in the simplest, biological sense. They are in the majority they are no longer skinheads, the fashion has passed, but many practices have remained. These there are many people, and there are similar things not only in Russian nationalism. Actually, because of this, and all the fuss. If everything was limited individual quotations from Khodorkovsky... Can such a trend have any meaning, as it is now, other than as a threat to authorities? I think not. The authorities, of course, will be afraid, we will all be to be afraid when some kind of massacre happens again or something like what happened on Manezhnaya Square, but nothing more than we see it doesn't happen. And that's largely because the majority of citizens mentioned here who are in favor of “Russia for Russians”, about 50%, cannot associate themselves with this movement in any way. This doesn't just apply to some anonymous young Nazis, it's just any picture from the "Russian March" disgusts the average man in the street, as if he was xenophobic. If he inadvertently tell biographies leaders, he will be even more frightened. So here's the perspective weak. When I tried to say what are the possible prospects positive for Russian nationalism, I think, to be honest, that they associated not with current leaders, in any case.

And can it be directed towards democracy? I think none strategically long-term phenomenon, like nationalism or social democracy, does not necessarily have to be directed for democracy or against. It's always situational. Lots of examples. And let situational, because by situationality we do not mean the situation of one year or two, but some historical period in which some political force is interested in democracy. It might end badly, how did Hamas' desire for democracy end for the Palestinian people, and may end well. Anyway when we try imagine historical analogies, we have to be very modest, because we have a difficult situation, and from it to a good situation quickly can't get in. Focusing on Germany is simply not our rank in in some way, according to the degree of development of our society, we cannot focus on post-war Germany, neither in the 50s, nor in the 40s, to none.

And about the participation of nationalists in the protest movement. Why are they did you participate well? This is only possible because people who make some decisions in this area have no common programs. Therefore, they cannot weed out anyone but some Tesak, because you can say about him: well, he was in prison, like us let's put him on stage? And if a person, for example, has not been in prison, but limited himself to a milder punishment, like Mr. Lazarenko, then his can be put on stage. Well, like, nothing, not so scary. And again However, when he was released on stage, as I understand it, they didn’t really figure it out. There is no common platform, so it is impossible to cut anyone off. Impossible to say that "we will not go along with the Stalinists." How can we not go? At us Udaltsov is one of the leaders. We can't say that "we won't go together with the nationalists," because we don't know where to spend the border where nationalists begin in our country - directly from Navalny or further somewhere. And to most people, to be honest, that's pretty much it. equally, it seems to me. If no excess occurs, then Fine.

Emil Pain: I came up with ideas that nationalism has a positive meaning at the stage of destruction of the imperial heritage. And since we have it, then there is a function for this nationalism. Tatyana Evgenievna has a different point of view, she believes that positive and anti-imperial only the nationalism of minorities, Most of it doesn't exist.

Tatyana Vorozheikina: The nationalism of minorities has democratic potential in this particular situation.

Emil Pain: And I think that it happens, in the sense that it clears the way for the nationalism of the majority.

Now a very important question, because it was not understood not only by the young the man who had just come out with indignation: “How do you want destroy our country?!" - but also Sasha Verkhovsky, who said: "How So, where will our federations go?! When I talk about breakup empire, I don't mean any territorial changes. She can stay in the same state, with the same territories, only stop to be an empire, but to become a federation. difference between empire and federation not that one is greater than the other or one is mono-ethnic and the other polyethnic. Renan once said: “Why is Switzerland, with its four languages ​​is a nation, and the Duchy of Tuscany, with its one language, is not nation?". The point is not that one is multicultural and the other monocultural, but in the fact that they are based on different principles organizations. One is a civil society in which sovereignty belongs to the people, this is the nation in the political sense, and the other built as a kind of vertical state. That's what it's all about. So that we can live in peace both with the Tatars and with the Bashkirs completely. About the possibility of replacing the universal category, under which everyone will fit, we will all be called "Russians". A very big mistake. Picture of that the fixed term, as ethnic, can be used as universal, state, it does not justify itself not only, by the way, in Russia, where the Chechen, Yakut and many other peoples historically will not be able to remake themselves and suddenly stop being called Chechens and so Further. While they have a spare word, territorial - "Russian". Previously called "Soviet".

I was recently at a conference in Germany, and it turned out that the Turks are ready to join their society as citizens, but to call themselves Germans, the Turks are clearly not ready. And they won't, and there are already 3 million of them, and nothing can be done about it. This is a vain expectation. There are other mechanisms for transition to universal categories.

And there is the main question. I repeat once again, I consider the positive function nationalism at the stage of destroying the remnants of the imperial order, not territory, but order. As for the following modernization roles, then there is a rather complicated situation with nationalism. For the most part he turned out to be positive when it ceased to be nationalism. After the collapse of many empires, the first parties were nationalist - in the Czech Republic and in many other countries. Then the demand for this consolidating idea disappeared, the same people in the same parties stopped using this basis for consolidation and became social democrats, conservatives, because they were asked more than what “We, the Czechs, are against the Germans,” but about: “How are you going to pay us? Everyone Will you give benefits or only to the elite? And this trend is more of all, will triumph in Russia. About the feeling of nationality superiority, or rather, exclusivity. Most nationalist parties that call themselves that, the national exclusivity, this aspect is present.

Answering a question about when it appeared ... I said - in 2011 year. How, in 2011? Yes, even in the 90s there were, and so on. There is a wonderful an experiment that was recently carried out by analyzing the change the spread of the words "party of crooks and thieves." It was not Navalny who said this. This phrase was found in the 19th century, in the 20th century. But the most curious thing is that In the 1990s, it was distributed in the Zavtra newspaper, only by the "party crooks and thieves" called Chubais and his team. And then the same tracing paper switched over to the ruling party. Question: when did this term begin to work in that the way it works today? When did it become mainstream? So here it is the question that some Russian nationalists in the 90s fought with imperial, and I know I've written about it many times. But the mass rejection imperial idea is happening before our eyes.

Lev Gudkov: Russian nationalism is a product after all, the expansion of a fairly unified ideology, which was enshrined behind the Soviet ideology. All disputes so far are about ideas: only you need to launch this idea, and then it somehow itself take root, spread or become a material force. In fact ideas do not spread on their own, they are accepted either organizations, or groups, or institutions. Main Structure national consciousness is reproduced by the same routine institutions. First of all, by schools that reproduce over and over again, generation after generation of a rather routine design with all the imperial symbols and standards, patterns, stereotypes, and the media. And most importantly, this reproduced in the daily, routine activities of the institutions of power and institutions of violence, law enforcement - above all. Therefore, the main corpus of these poor ideas, it reproduces and settles down. We are already talking about it spoke. To a lesser extent, it is United Russia that is infected with xenophobia, because she does not need it, she reproduces routine, long completed presentations.

If we talk about our data on protest rallies, then the number nationalists were 6-10% at various rallies. And I generally agree that in some situations it is quite possible to combine nationalism with criticism power, with the problem of social justice, and even with democracy. What counts for democracy is increased diversity and the emergence of various mechanisms that would harmonize this diversity and interests associated with ideological representations. Only there, in case the emergence of peace conventions, mechanisms for reaching compromises, coordination, some formalizations and institutionalizations are already possible procedures for the presentation of interests and the development of some kind of policy. But this not in our conditions, by the way. I do not think that Russian nationalism in the current situation is able to give impetus to both modernization and democracy. This is still an appeal to the spent layers of culture, the simplest and best known form of appeal to the majority. Nothing there is no content behind this. It's just as empty as "special way" of Russia. It can be filled in our conditions most different content. Both plus and minus, so far nothing meaningful No.

Sources

• Fanailova Elena. Nationalism and Democracy // Radio Liberty. 2012. August 19.