On June 25, 2012, an open meeting of the scientific council of VTsIOM “ROC: challenges, fault lines, risks in the new socio-political situation” was held at the Russian State University for the Humanities.
The event included a presentation of a study conducted by VTsIOM and presented by V. Fedorov, reports by M. Mchedlova, A. Agadzhanyan, A. Ignatiev, a discussion with the participation of O. Kryshtanovskaya, N. Malikova, Yu. Sinelina, A. Zudin, E. Kardina, A. Muravyov, R. Lopatkin, V. Levashov, E. Minchenko and other scientists.
For discussion, the expert community was asked the following questions: “Protests against the church – are they actions of the marginalized or a symbol of a new stage in society’s attitude towards religion and the church?”, “What are the reasons for dissatisfaction with the modern role of the church? Who are the bearers of discontent, what motivates them, what are their goals?”, “Who benefits today and who loses from the strategic alliance between the government and the church?”, “What are the opportunities for other Christian denominations to expand their influence in Russia, taking into account the rejection of a political position by part of society ROC?
The main thesis of Alexander Agadzhanyan (RGGU) boiled down to stating “ the beginning of the formation in Russia of a Western European version of the pluralistic, relativistic and extremely individualistic consciousness ” of believers, which inevitably leads to a crisis of religion. In such a situation, in his opinion, the best path for the Church is the path of social service. He is also convinced that “ the ruling elites are quite secular, and the principle of separation is deeply embedded in them .”
Andrey Ignatiev (Russian State University for the Humanities) suggested that his colleagues pay more attention not to the relationship between the Church and society, but to the relationship within the “Church as a special corporate community” and the relationship between the Church and its “interested public.” In his opinion, if “until recently the conflicts remained latent,” then today “the situation on the border between the Church and its public has changed” (“ partly due to the general crisis of the system, partly due to the changes that are associated with the personality of the new patriarch and his proclaimed policy of going beyond the church fence ." At the same time, “on both sides of the border between the Church and the interested public there are many orthodox who would like to see this border remained locked, there are many extremists who are not inclined to take into account the reality of this border”, and there are no people “ who would try to somehow explore and develop this border.” A. Ignatiev is convinced that “ if there are any obvious or latent conflicts between the Church and its interested public, then the question should probably be raised about the role of the state in resolving or even preventing them .” In his opinion, “ The Church should become the center of consolidation of civil society in our country .”
Olga Kryshtanovskaya (Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences) emphasized that “ the Russian Orthodox Church today is sick, just as Russian society is sick: corrupt and disconnected from the people ,” and “ those who strike at it, strike at the state .”
Alexey Zudin (Center for Political Current Affairs of Russia), answering the questions proposed for discussion, emphasized that the protests (and especially the protests of the Pussy Riot group) are “ an echo and a by-product of the election campaign, a response to religious mobilization before the election campaign .” . He is convinced that this was a “protest of the marginalized,” but “it will have serious consequences,” because we are talking about “ persons with higher education, residents of large cities, a highly resourced minority, which until recently perceived itself as a provider of reference points, claiming to a politically avant-garde role ." In addition, this is “ the first act of attack by opponents on the sacred territory of the Russian Orthodox Church ,” and in this sense we can talk about the beginning of a new era (“a minority is attacking”). But “ the likelihood that the Russian Orthodox Church will cope with the problems is quite high .”
According to Evgeniy Minchenko, the worsening attitude towards the Church is associated with “changes in relations within the elite,” in which the Church becomes a lobbying tool (“the local elite solves its problems through the Church”). He also noted that “ the dominant religion in Russia is not Orthodoxy, but paganism ” (judging by the reaction to the “belt of the Virgin Mary”).
Ivan Fomin (Praxis Publishing House) is convinced that “ the Russian Orthodox Church is one of the bonds associated with the re-establishment of Russia as a powerful state, the re-affirmation of the key role of the USSR as a positive factor, and what led V. Putin to power .” An attack on the Church, in his opinion, is “ an attack on one of the institutions of the Putin system ,” and it “ will be long-term .”
Viktor Levashov (Institute of Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences) drew attention to the existing contradiction: “ The Church occupies key positions in public life, but society is collapsing, is in a state of catastrophe .” In his opinion, this is due to the fact that “ the Church has fallen into a gap between two dominant ideological models - liberal-soilism and liberal-Westernism .” He emphasized that we are not dealing with the protest of the marginalized, but “ with a generation that was late to the division of resources of the 1990s, grew up and claims, and is pushed out .” In this sense, protests against the Church cannot be separated from political protests.
According to Alexey Muravyov, we can seriously talk about a change of eras - “ we are at the end of an era that began with Peter’s reforms and put the Church in a special position .” At present, either a “ rethinking of new conditions” by the Church or “ retheocratization ” must occur.
Remir Lopatkin summed up the problem this way: “ The Church received a huge credit of trust from society in advance; in the process of receiving large preferences, it began to lose its understanding of today’s Russian society, that society has changed .” In this sense, protests are a completely justified reaction to the behavior of church hierarchs and church policies. The activists of this protest are “ not marginalized, but an awakening civil society that has responded to the Church’s encroachments on its own dignity .” He also emphasized that the large percentage of Russians’ trust in the Church, as represented by the VTsIOM survey, is not an indicator of “trust,” but an indicator of the “expectations” that society associates with the Church.
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