Down the "secularity scale"

We present an article by Alexander Verkhovsky, published in "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" December 4, 2013.

The constitutional principle of separation of religion from the state for 20 years hesitated, but persevered.

The 1993 constitution established some rules regarding functioning of religion in society and its relationship with the state, and these norms already at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were not at all generally accepted.

Thus, the basic norm of Article 28 on personal freedom of conscience includes representations that a person enjoys freedom of conscience, including through association in religious organizations and dissemination of their views. But at this very time the topic of “totalitarian sects” was actively discussed in society, using the example of a violent developing new religious movements, both foreign and domestic origin. The Supreme Council even adopted very repressive amendments to the law about freedom of conscience, but already being under siege. Then the events of October 1993. Perhaps the inclusion of freedom of conscience in the repertoire of the then political crisis led to emphatically liberal formulations Constitution.

New religious movements have long passed the peak of their activity, but concern about certain threats related to religion has not disappeared, it’s just that not “zombie” began to play a big role in it, but religious and political phenomena that relate - with greater or lesser grounds - to the category of public safety. And as a result, the actual restrictions on the freedom of religious associations and the freedom to spread their beliefs are now clearly tougher than they were 20 years ago. main tool restrictions became anti-extremist legislation, which concerns both real security threats, and obviously fictional ones. Among the latter, one can for example, to attribute the persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses: citizens can be dissatisfied with both the form and the content of their sermon, may condemn the ban on blood transfusion, but the presentation of this religion as an extremist movement clearly inadequate. Meanwhile, direct restrictions on the constitutional rights of Witnesses: one local organization and a whole a number of texts are banned only because the "Witnesses" insist on superiority of their religion. And these decisions are approved by the courts up to the Supreme.

Of course, freedom of conscience does not mean that religious motivation is indulgence for any violation of the law. After all, al-Qaeda or "Emarat Caucasus" act in accordance with their convictions, but this is not releases them from liability for non-compliance with the minimum restrictions on constitutional rights and freedoms. These restrictions are generally described in Art. 55 Constitution; and although its wording may be the subject of discussion, but, probably, it should be clear to a reasonable person that the statement is "false" someone's beliefs is one thing, and calls to kill for "false" beliefs are other.

It must also be borne in mind that the state can hardly be completely regardless of really mass prejudices, and they are very strong: for example, ascetic practices in some religions are perceived as due, and in others - as a tool of "zombie". But we must not forget when that the authorities that control television bear a considerable share responsibility for the prevalence of these very prejudices.

So, Article 28 of the Constitution is not fully effective in Russia: if personal confession of faith, including change of belief, is completely free, then religious associations and dissemination of religious views are clearly illegal restrictions. And the rapidly growing federal list extremist material makes these restrictions increasingly versatile and often, frankly, strange, given the numerous absurdities in the process prohibitions on religious literature.

Approximately the same situation with Article 14 - on the secular nature of the state. This article includes a rather rare provision in constitutional law on equality of religious associations - and not just the religions themselves - before the law. This position is rare because historically there has been no such equality anywhere. It is difficult to follow it even in a post-Soviet society cut off from the previous tradition. space. If only because the relations of the authorities with the huge Moscow Patriarchy can never be the same as with a few "alternative" Orthodox jurisdictions.

If the state enters into relations with some associations of citizens, it cannot enter into equal relations with them all, it is impossible even technically. But one can strive to avoid at least the codification of differences, and before the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian authorities succeeded, if not consider symbolic preferences such as the inclusion of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' in some nomenclature lists. Explicit patronage of "traditional religious organizations” and discrimination against some others were still not documented in any legal act.

The first exceptions were decrees on the lessons of religious cultures at school and priests in the army state, who fixed in the legal field the rhetorical the concept of the four "traditional religions". The constitutional norm was slightly shattered, but generally held together. Politically motivated convergence of power and Church in 2012-2013 has not yet led to a clear rejection of this norm. Another initiative of Deputy Elena Mizulina is to consolidate a special role Orthodoxy in the Constitution is unlikely to be approved. However, it cannot be excluded some not so radical attacks on the discussed constitutional principle. For example - that it will be possible to push through certain amendments that introduce the concept "traditional religions" in the actual legislation, which could not be done in early 2000s.

But it should be recognized that now the attack on equality is more relevant. religious associations, but on the secular nature of the state. concept secularism has been discussed a lot in recent years, and the only thing that is indisputable is that it is not has neither in Russia nor in Europe an unambiguous interpretation. Therefore, the degree the secularity of the state can de facto change without abandoning what is written in Constitution of principle.

Discussions about secularism always cultivate the same logical substitution: anti-secularists insist that they do not claim power, but from Religion cannot be separated from society. And indeed, they do not pretend to say on elections or on appointment to leading public positions. Of course, the state or anyone else has no right to drive religion "in church fence" simply because the Constitution forbids anyone drive anywhere. The constitutional provision stating that "no religion cannot be established as a state or obligatory”, also - with some exotic exceptions - is observed in its literal sense. But the thesis that Russia is a secular state cannot be reduced to a literal compliance with other norms in the same Article 14 of the Constitution, it also has an independent meaning.

The question thus boils down to how much power can bring one or another religious organization closer to itself, as far as it can with they are unequally dispensed with, what forms of “soft” imposition of views concerning religions, the authorities can practice, so as not to violate the principle of all this secular state. Looking back 20, and even five years ago, we we can say that the authorities are gradually moving along the conditional "scale of secularity" down. Of course, religious organizations are happy about this: they, of course, always insist on increasing the role of religion. But their independent influence is not so large, so it all depends primarily on how far ready move the authorities along this conditional scale in exchange for the political support of large and medium religious organizations. Sources

• Verkhovsky A. Down the "scale of secularity" // Independent newspaper. 2013. December 4th.