The course of events in Ukraine has shown that big business there is far from being as powerful as it was thought

The column will appear in the March issue of Forbes magazine, which goes on sale February 27.

We are accustomed to thinking that in Ukraine the word “oligarch” still retains the meaning lost in Russia with the imprisonment of Khodorkovsky in 2003: a businessman who promotes his people into politics, a puppeteer of politicians and officials. This is a forgivable misconception: Ukrainians themselves talk about “oligarchs”.

When Viktor Yanukovych returned from Moscow in December with promises of $15 billion and gas discounts, Ukraine's main political prisoner, Yulia Tymoshenko, accused a certain "deliberative oligarchy of nine people" that allegedly runs the country together with Yanukovych of "transferring the country to the control of the Russian Federation." But she didn’t mention them by name, and it makes sense to wonder whether we were talking about those who are commonly called Ukrainian oligarchs.

In 2010, Yanukovych's rise to power was considered the result of a consensus between the semi-criminal Donetsk clan and big business. In this adhesive, the “oligarchs” were responsible for the media. They control 80% of the country's television market: the Inter channel is Dmitry Firtash, No. 14 in the top 100 of Ukrainian Forbes; “Ukraine” is Rinat Akhmetov, No. 1; “New Channel”, STB, ICTV, M1 and Q-TV - Victor Pinchuk, No. 2; 1+1 - Igor Kolomoisky, No. 3; Channel Five - Petro Poroshenko, No. 7. It is not a fact, however, that owning TV channels gives power in Ukraine. The protest was coordinated on the Internet, and it had its own television - Internet channels like Espreso.tv and Hromadske.tv, made on the knee, but instantly reacting to events. And the protest was opposed by soldiers, police, hired gopniks and women brought by buses from the eastern regions, who only watch TV series.

But even if television is still important, it is impossible to understand for whose benefit television power is being used.

In the first weeks of Euromaidan, “oligarchic” TV surprised with its coverage of the protests. Since then, the channels have moderated their ardor, except that the Fifth, as in 2004, is a kind of banner of the Maidan. However, its owner Poroshenko is constantly on the Maidan, seemingly striving to become prime minister of the opposition government. Pinchuk initially supported the protests, but then did not show much activity. The wise Kolomoisky, the patriarch of Ukrainian Jewry, remained silent. And the statements about the situation in the country that Firtash and Akhmetov issued sounded more like the bleating of trembling lambs than the roar of lions. “The only way out is to move from street confrontation... to constructive negotiations and achieving results. Negotiators must be guided by the interests of the entire country” - this is from Akhmetov’s SCM holding. “We need to understand and remember that there are Ukrainians on both sides of the barricades. We are citizens of one country” - this is Firtash through his Group DF. Both texts seemed to be written by the same copywriter; Firtash, like Akhmetov, calls for “searching for a compromise through negotiations.”

Let’s say that the fact that the “oligarchs” issue colorless statements about negotiations, but do not participate in public discussions themselves, means that their element is behind-the-scenes struggle, that is, puppetry. But if big business does something behind the scenes, there are no results. After the parliamentary elections of 2012, political scientists counted how many deputies the oligarchs brought into parliament: Akhmetov - 40 people, all of them in the ruling Party of Regions, Firtash - 15 “regionals” and almost as many independents and oppositionists. If 55 deputies from the largest faction in the Verkhovna Rada voted in solidarity with the opposition, the latter would have almost a majority. Real oligarchs would always be able to get the few missing votes from non-factional legislators.

“I haven’t heard such swearing for a long time, they threatened to roll us all into the asphalt and transfer us to such and such a mother, they said that they have a case against each of us,” one “regional” told the Kiev publication Insider after Yanukovych’s meeting with the faction.

So are people from the first lines of the top 100 included in the nine that Tymoshenko spoke about?

During the time that the opposition leader spent in prison, Yanukovych finally no longer needed the former “oligarchs.” The All-Ukrainian Development Bank, owned by his son Alexander, whose board is headed by his mother and. O. Prime Minister Sergei Arbuzov, in 2012–2013 moved from 88th place in terms of assets to 25th. Close to the presidential family, Sergei Kurchenko, a 28-year-old businessman who got rich from state tenders and importing fuel, bought the country's largest non-television media holding UMH, and most of the funds were given to him on credit by the state-owned Ukreximbank.

Like Putin, Yanukovych tried to create his own business circle, which had nothing in common with the oligarchy, which he essentially threw out of the political field. Unexpectedly, he was helped in this by the technological revolution, which devalued the once important television resource.

As a result, it was not the “oligarchy” that dealt with the President of Ukraine, but the people.

And big business - what is big business? While he defended his narrow interests, both society and government learned to resolve issues in their own way, without his participation.

Oligarchs, get away: what distinguished the participants of the Ukrainian Forbes list