The report “Orthodoxy in Public Space: War and Violence, Heroes and Saints” was presented at the Carnegie Moscow Center

"Orthodoxy in public Space: War and Violence, Heroes and Saints" - a report with this title was held at the Carnegie Moscow Center. Chair moderated the meeting Program of the Carnegie Moscow Center "Religion, Society and Security" Alexey Malashenko.

Speaker, Deputy Editor-in-Chief Publishing houses of the Moscow Patriarchy and executive editor of the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy" Sergei Chapnin set out to analyze the paradoxical the situation in which the Russian Orthodox Church found itself by 2015. He defined it as a phenomenon of the "new silence" of the church.

In public space, in fact, only the voice of Patriarch Kirill sounds. Young the episcopate almost does not manifest itself in any way, while it is not clear for what reason - not wants, does not know how or is afraid, but does not show. Responsible for relations with archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin acts as a society, as a rule, fragmented in a postmodernist way, his holistic position often has to be reconstruct. However, precisely because of Vsevolod Chaplin, according to speaker, the relationship between church and culture is becoming more and more caricatured character, and the situation cannot be corrected by the “grassroots voices”, which also are heard in public space - to Protodeacon Andrey Kuraev, priest Alexei Uminsky or the biblical scholar and publicist Andrei Desnitsky. Especially since on about. Vsevolod "works" and the right, hyperstate wing of the church - priests Alexander Shumsky and Sergey Karamyshev, editor-in-chief of Russkaya folk line" Anatoly Stepanov.

Main trouble Sergei Chapnin believes that the church has no strategy of action, the actions of actors are situational - this is partly because the accepted church documents (even good ones, the speaker emphasized, for example, about public activities, perpetuating the memory of the victims of repression) do not work. In public space, in general, everything remains discrete, and if anything acquires some kind of stability, then only at the parish level.

Chapnin inclined to positively assess this general "state of uncertainty" of the church, on his view, the main thing is that a model of parish life has been built and parishes determined in relation to the activities of the church in society.

Ideological disputes in the church are mainly around two topics: different models of the device church life and the relationship between church and state. Someone is sticking opinion that everything is good in church life and there is no need to change anything (say, translate liturgical texts into Russian), others speak of the need for radical change. As for the relationship between the Church and states, then there is such a fork in the views: the Russian Orthodox Church has always been and will be the church of the empire, it must remain close to the state. - The church must become part of civil society, and keep a distance in relations with the state.

Analysis key statements on topics of current events and a number of undertakings in some strata of society, according to Chapnin, allows us to talk about the formation of a certain hybrid religiosity, which has all the hallmarks of what is called in the US civil religion. This is especially true in recent times, moreover, in connection with events of a very different order - from the military operation in Syria before the fight against abortion. Air strikes by the Russian Air Force Vsevolod Chaplin called "sacred struggle”, a just attempt by Russia to resist terror; he also calls for declaring a "sacred war" by private clinics that do not comply with mandatory national standards for termination of pregnancy.

By order Izborsk club made a corporate "icon", which depicts Stalin surrounded by marshals of Victory. After the demonstration of the "icon" at the meeting club, its chairman Alexander Prokhanov took her to several cities Russia. Sergey Chapnin sees in these actions an attempt to inscribe the heroes of the Great Patriotic War into church iconography in order to combine their cult with the traditional ideal of Orthodox holiness. This dressed in Orthodox rhetoric, paganism did not cause, to the surprise of the speaker, any controversy among members of the Izborsk club, to which belong such not the last in the church establishment people like Bishop Tikhon Shevkunov or socio-political activist Natalia Narochnitskaya.

Moreover, if we take into account the nostalgia for the empire that persists in society and a surge of sympathy for everything Soviet after the annexation of Crimea, it becomes the specifics of the interpretation of the civil religion in Russia with a by no means theological content. Soviet genes defeated Orthodoxy, people never became Orthodox, became vaguely acquainted with the Holy Scriptures, and now they it seems that Orthodox and Soviet are organically combined.

The formation of a "political religion” goes in two directions: the first is to inscribe the logic of war into historical rhetoric; the second is inscribing all the same logic of war into actions Orthodox activists. Physical violence is not only not rejected, but also presented as a virtue. In particular, it came as a surprise to the speaker the fact that Enteo's action in the Manezh found so many supporters. For big number of priests and laity violence turned out to be attractive.

Sergey Chapnin ended on a disturbing note: violence does not cause Russian Orthodox rejection and rejection, and it seems to him that they are more and more towards him ready.

report on such provocative topic, of course, raised a lot of questions from the audience. Here excerpts from discussion and discussion.

Konstantin Eggert, columnist for Kommersant FM radio station: There was a takeoff during the reign of Patriarch Alexy fundamentalists led by Bishop Diomede. Where is it now fundamentalist wing?

S. Ch.: We live in another era. Diomede is foam on the wave of church revival. Now Romantic fundamentalists like Diomede are of no interest to anyone.

K.E.: But where support group - gone underground, hiding?

S.Ch.: Those people were looking for an enemy when they were told that the enemy was Europe, America, the search for an enemy in the outside world turned out to be so captivating that they completely merged with the mainstream.

Alexander Verkhovsky, director of the SOVA Information and Analytical Center: What is the scale strata supporting political religion? Maybe these people are enough too marginal?

S.Ch.: Because we do not see any groups, mass actions, then it is very difficult to judge. We we are in a situation of new silence, we can talk about some new tendencies, but we cannot determine the degree of their mass character.

Boris Kolymagin, literary critic: What is an Orthodox reader?

S.Ch.: Churches as a whole does not exist, there are different subcultures. Shumsky refers to his audience is about 40-60 thousand, father Dmitry Smirnov - to his. Outsiders may not even know their names. The most interesting thing happens even not within the actual church groups, but in the border areas. Estimated sociologists that I trust, approximately 36% of people are in search of Christian worldview, but they are offered archaic models.

Viktor Khrul, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology of Mass Communications, Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University: Doesn't the church have the tools to assess the scale of the "war party"? Or a new silence is a convenient way to stay away so that at the right time take the right direction?

S.Ch.: Situation silence is artificial, and someday it will end, but now the silence conscious. I think that the voice that will sound will not be from the church environment, but somewhere near.

Roman Lunkin, Leading Researcher employee of the Center for the Study of Religion and Society: As for the sources ideologies of violence - the Orthodox environment reinforces the moods that exist, or provokes new ones? Perhaps it is no coincidence that we have one after another pass exhibitions about the Romanovs, about the Soviet past?

S.Ch.: In its public actions, the church is not free and very much depends on the mood of society.

Mikhail Shakhov, professor, member of the expert council of the State Duma Committee on Public Associations and religious organizations: Is there public opinion in the church with which the patriarch and the hierarchy are forced to take into account - for example, the authenticity of the relics. The behavior of the church is explained by the fact that it is forced to reckon with public opinion or are there other motives?

S.Ch.: Interesting question. It would seem that if you do not believe in the authenticity of the relics, then create your own version of events. But the position is completely irrational: we do not have our own version, but we do not believe yours. This is an example of the deepest opposition between the church and science that we can observe today: we do not want to see reality, we we want to hide somewhere.

Alexander Verkhovsky: In in the early 2000s, in the church environment, the concepts of “Orthodox civilization”, “Russian world”, but it so happened that the church could not take advantage of the fruits of their labors - the state enjoys and strongly don't pay the church. Is it possible to assume that attempts to create a civil religions are explained by the desire to offer themselves as a support, without which it is impossible manage?

S.Ch.: Everything should be designed so that it can be used - the state required for very specific tasks. If these tasks are not answered, then it is impossible to use. I think the Lord God keeps the church in this way.

O. Innokenty Pavlov, retired priest: In the nature of Orthodoxy, political servility comes first place. Those who are commanded to speak speak, but not everyone always gets into the field. media perspective. Take, for example, Metropolitan Aristarkh of Kemerovo - such servility that Kisilev is resting. In the propaganda orchestra at the church a certain role - she enters at the ringing of a bell.

Roman Lunkin: To my look, we can talk about a real social revolution in the regions, parishes are very active, and their activities are increasingly visible in society. IN Krasnoyarsk diocese, for example, the brotherhood "Holy Cause" simply works wonders, it took shape even under the old metropolitan.

S.Ch.: The main problem young episcopate - they are completely unaware of church life, they are from monks for the most part and do not understand the problems of married clergy. Social functions are really something that they more or less cope with.

Alexey Malashenko: But where there is socialization, there is secularization. How to avoid in this case politicization and "ISIS"?

S.Ch.: All over the country there are parishes with a default figure in place of patriotism in the style of Channel One - in a parish, everything depends on the position of the rector.

Sergei Filatov, religious scholar, head of the research project "Encyclopedia of modern religious life in Russia”: I do not agree with the main thesis of the speaker: in my opinion view, the church is now the main opposing force of the Soviet restoration, creates another ideological pole, although there is almost no liberalism in no society left. Those cases of church speakers reacting to some events, oh which Sergei spoke, perhaps also work to emasculate the Soviet stereotypes rather than resurrecting them. ideology of violence state Orthodoxy, always came from the state. The church is silent because that she does not like to contradict the authorities, but she supports her so inactively that we can assume that it does not support. It is difficult for parishes to impose one political doctrine, yes, the majority is characterized by such lazy patriotism, but Orthodox life is strengthened in particularism and provincialism. When priests will be imbued with the values ​​and interests of the people, Orthodoxy will become much more democratic.

S.Ch.: Interpenetration of Soviet and Orthodox quite natural, since the Soviet is the only living tradition. There are practically no bearers of the living Orthodox tradition in the modern world. left. Based on this dominant, church administration, rhetoric, parish life — we stand on the threshold of a new era.

Alexey Malashenko: We have gone a bit away from the topic of the report: war and violence, heroes and saints. Summing up, I note that Sovietism is such a mimicry, mutual adjustment. The state needs the church, and the further, the more will be needed. Nothing new, in fact, is happening, the behavior of the church corresponds to Russian church political culture. Sources

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