Konstantin Mikhailov: “Criticism itself is not too dangerous for the Russian Orthodox Church, in some sense it is even useful”

Especially for the SOVA Center, religious scholar Konstantin Mikhailov commented on Patriarch Kirill’s recent speech on human rights and the “heresy of man-worship.”

In 2006, speaking at the X World Russian People's Council, Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev) noted that “the concept of human rights covers lies, untruths, and insults to religious and national values.” Back then, in 2006, the radical rejection of human rights was still a long way off. The Church remembered that “it was under the influence of this concept... that the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious communities in Eastern European countries freed themselves from the shackles of atheism.” The social and political climate was different, so instead of directly attacking the idea of ​​rights, the Metropolitan limited himself to asking questions. Including the question of “whether recognition and adherence to the norms of the concept of human rights in the form in which it is embodied today in international and national legislation conflicts with God’s plan for man?”

In 2008, speaking to students at the Institute. Bauman (MSTU named after N.E. Bauman), the same Metropolitan Kirill stated that “if we do not change the criteria in assessing human activity, if the only criteria are those that are offered to us by liberal philosophy associated with rights and freedoms, We will legalize pedophilia.” The prospects for this from the metropolitan’s point of view are extremely tragic: “This process will end in hell, in the fire of the Apocalypse.” Postmodern philosophy and liberal human rights were already considered by him as the cause of the sins of modern civilization. There was no duality left, and gratitude for the newfound freedom disappeared. Now rights were the ideology of the Enemy.

There were a great many such statements - more or less official - throughout the 2000s. Quite a few of them were heard in the 2010s, both from the lips of Kirill himself, already a patriarch, and from the lips of various church hierarchs and officials. In a positive context, human rights were remembered only when it was necessary to protect the rights of Christians. Universal human rights were assessed more and more negatively every year.

On March 20, 2016, the patriarch again condemned them in his next sermon, this time linking them with the “heresy of man-worship.” Is there anything strange about this? Not at all. This is a natural development of his old ideas.

True, what adds additional interest (and some irony) to this story is that the sermon was devoted to a completely different issue. The recent meeting with Pope Francis, as expected, led to criticism from internal church conservatives, and the patriarch found himself in a position of almost making excuses. It was just such a justification, not too bright, however, that was the entire sermon on March 20 - from assurances of an irreconcilable fight against heresies at the beginning to attempts to find positive results from the meeting at the end. The passage that excited the public was only a minor episode, designed to remind that the Russian Orthodox Church now has more serious opponents than Catholics.

It was a good idea. If Orthodox conservatives do not like anyone more than Catholics, then only “champions of human rights,” which means supporters of same-sex marriage, opponents of domestic violence, oppositionists and other “liberals.” But it turned out the other way around: for conservatives the sermon was unconvincing, but outside the Church they noticed it.

In itself, criticism in the media is not too dangerous for the Russian Orthodox Church. In a sense, it’s even useful - negative advertising is also advertising, and attacks from another camp force the allies of the patriarchy to mobilize. In addition, it is unlikely that any of the opponents of the Church will now be able to write something about it that has not already been written before. It’s not news to anyone that the Russian Orthodox Church is conservative, at times calls for a revision of constitutional norms and is wary of social innovation. So the only question that, it seems to me, deserves attention here is not the question of the position or policy of the Church, but why exactly now the patriarch’s opinion on human rights has aroused general interest.

The answer, it seems to me, lies on the surface. Didn't cause it. Nobody is interested in the position of the patriarch. Attention to the deeds and words of Orthodox figures in modern Russia, in principle, is rarely associated with attempts to delve into real internal church processes and alignments. They are of interest only to the clergy, religious scholars and some churchgoers. For most media speakers, criticism and defense of the Church are part of secular political discourse. We write “Orthodoxy” - we read “government”, we talk about the patriarch - but in our minds we keep the president. This is also true for the current situation. An awkward moment in the patriarch’s sermon became an occasion, but not a reason, for the usual political battles, and the fact that it was the patriarch (and not the prime minister, deputy, or artist) who said it is nothing more than an accident, although it gave a curious flavor to the generally understandable conservative statement.

Although the very formulation “heresy of man-worship” has the potential to turn into another political cliché or Internet meme, things are unlikely to go further than this. For full development it is necessary that both sides are not afraid to sharpen their position. In the current climate this seems unlikely. The Patriarchate will not completely reject the idea of ​​human rights, since it widely uses it in its foreign policy. Opposing critics will continue to maintain at least an outward respect for religion, bearing in mind the unpopularity of atheism in modern Russia, and will not dare to express more strident anti-clerical ideas in the spirit of French laïcité. This means that what we have seen in the last week is not ideological battles or even polemics (because the parties, in general, have little interest in each other’s opinions), but simply a way to maintain the intensity of political passions. However, all this has already been described by Griboyedov: “Why are you so angry? “We’re making noise, brother, we’re making noise!”