We are publishing the abstracts of the report by Ksenia Sergazina, associate professor at the educational and scientific center for the study of religions of the Russian State University for the Humanities, expert at the SOVA Center, read at the St. Petersburg conference “Freedom of Conscience in Modern Russia” on April 25, 2017.
It seems to me important today to look at the relationship between Russian society and the Russian Orthodox Church, at the relationship between the Church and the state. It is customary to talk about the patronage of the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church. But how exactly does it manifest itself, what are its consequences for society? How are conflicts resolved between society and the Church, whose side does the state take?
Local residents and environmentalists protest against such construction, but the Church - not without the support of city authorities - continues to build churches in park areas and at the same time stigmatize the townspeople - its potential flock - accusing them of atheism. This controversy is very harsh and often - as in Moscow inTorfyanka Park - leads to violations of public order and physical violence .
The most egregious example here is, of course, St. Isaac's Cathedral, the transfer of which to the Church will entail the closure of the museum as a legal entity and the loss of jobs of most of the employees. It is more or less clear why the Church needs the scandal with Isaac - it will receive a large tourist attraction in the city center and income from visitors equal to almost a billion rubles. But why the conflict is needed by the authorities of St. Petersburg and the country as a whole is not very clear. However, it shows “who’s boss.” The protest movement that arose around Isaac is connected precisely with this - with the understanding that the interests of the leadership of a particular religious organization are higher than the interests of the citizens of the Russian state.
And here we can distinguish processes from below - that is, the actions of specific people who are offended by this or that exhibition or work of art, often contemporary - and processes from above - situations when the state takes on the role of protector of religious feelings, as if by default, without a statement from the injured believers .
The two most high-profile scandals in this area are the case of an Ekaterinburg blogger who caught Pokemon in a temple, and the not yet released film by Alexei Uchitel “Matilda” - about the romance of Emperor Nicholas II and ballerina Matilda Kshesinskaya.
The scandal with the film began with a statement to the prosecutor's office from the head of the Orthodox Mission for the Revival of the Spiritual Values of the Russian People - Igor Smykov accused the director of slandering the “martyr tsar,” inciting hatred and insulting religious feelings. Later, the organization “Christian State - Holy Russia” sent letters to cinema directors demanding that they not allow “Matilda” to be released on the screen, threatening otherwise to resort to “radical methods of struggle.” Finally, Natalya Poklonskaya, State Duma deputy and former prosecutor of Crimea, joined the demands to ban the film. After this, an expert conclusion was made, the authors of which prove that the film “Matilda” offends the feelings of all Orthodox believers (the film has not yet been released - and, therefore, none of the believers have seen it).
As a historian, this precedent seems significant to me: indeed, Emperor Nicholas II was canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church, but he remains a historical character, with his biography recorded in the emperor’s diaries (available to researchers). The diaries also talk about meetings with the ballerina. In addition, on the pages of his diary, the emperor recorded the number of crows and cats shot while walking. The authors of the examination consider the demonstration of these facts offensive to believers. And we see in this example how protecting the feelings of believers covers up the religious censorship that is emerging in Russia.
Many associate both the liquidation of the Moscow Church of Scientology and the recent recognition of the Administrative Center of Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia as an extremist organization with the anti-sectarian policy of the Russian Orthodox Church.
We see, therefore, at least four conflict zones in the relations between the Church and society, in which the support of the Russian Orthodox Church for the authorities turns out to be a priority than the support of citizens. The state is incurring significant reputational losses (and financial losses, if we take into account the budget money allocated for the restoration of churches), probably hoping to receive symbolic capital from the Church in the form of a protective and conservative ideology.