
The head of the analytical department of the Taiga.info Alexei Mazur about the scenarios of the change of power in Russia and the prospects of local communities of activists.
The approval has become a common place - the political system created in Russia cannot ensure the development of the country. At best, stability. Such is the nature of the prevailing neo -feudalism .
No one understands whether the transit of the regime will take place in the foreseeable future. And if it is, then where? Meanwhile, this transit is already coming. Only not where the eyes of observers and researchers are addressed.
Everyone is passionate about the Kremlin tower war, the confrontation of Kiriyenko and Volodin, the results of the elections to the State Duma. But in order to understand how the transit of the regime will occur, you need to look not up, but down.
Neo -feudalism passed several phases in its development - from the feudal fragmentation of the times of Yeltsin to the absolute monarchy of recent years. But even in the phase of absolutism, neo -feudalism failed (or did not want to) abandon its nature (the vassal dependence of large officials and businessmen on corrupt clans).
The problem is that when a nature change to democracy or meritocracy, almost all the currently influential participants in the political system will be under threat. If there are some objective mechanisms for the selection of officials (and the functioning of business) in the state, then there can be no such concentration of people who served in the same universities and lived in the same country cooperative among members of the government and the Forbes list.
That is, with your mind you can and understand that you need to change something. But for this you will have to sacrifice someone from friends and associates. Therefore, so far we will treat gangrene compresses.
The political system in the current form has developed under the action of three important factors.
From 1999 to 2012, there was continuous economic growth, with a small failure in 2008-2009. This growth made it possible not only to satisfy the increasing appetites of the participants in the neo -feudal system (I recall that it includes participants in the political system, but the majority of residents of large cities are not included), but also to share with the people.
From 1999 to the present time, an extremely high rating of the president (Vladimir Putin) has been preserved. In the previous period, neo -feudalism existed with a low rating of the head (Boris Yeltsin). And at a time when Yeltsin had a high rating (1990–1991), neo-feudalism has not yet been formed. The time of its formation is somewhere in 1993-1996 (the second electoral cycle in modern Russia, when the ideological vote was asleep, PR and bribery came in its place, and the raiding economy has also formed).
From 1998 to 2009, approximately in Russia, there was practically no civil activity of the population.
What did this lead to practice? Neo -Feudals received legitimacy in elections with a low turnout, in which an administrative resource, PR and buying voices played a decisive role. And the system as a whole received its legitimacy through a high rating of Putin, which was confirmed in large federal elections. Let us recall the Putin Plan in 2007, the contents of which no one knew. There was an opaque wall between the people (the main mass of the population) and the political system. People did not know what and how is happening behind the fake scenery.
The legitimacy of Putin (and the federal center) was incomparably higher than that of regional barons, because they were easily subordinated. And even completely deprived of legitimacy (the abolition of the elections of governors and mayors).
Since 2011, the "legs" of the systems began to weaken.
The activity of the population has increased. The protest against dishonest elections in 2011 is only the visible part of the iceberg. In fact, by that time there were more and more civil movements in the regions - from motorists to parents for kindergartens. During this period, volunteer and charitable organizations grew rapidly, which also indicates the awakening of Russian society.
This has not yet led to the rebirth of the neo -feudal system into a democratic one. For such a degeneration, the emergence of political force is necessary, capable of overturning any of the system parties in the degenerate election. About how it happened in France. There is no such political force yet-both because of the resistance of the system and because of the internal difficulties of the opposition.
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But on the other hand, the emerging civil society has become a new player in the non -factual resource market (generalized power and money). Neo -feudalism is forced to make concessions to civil society, and these concessions are far from symbolic. For example, the abolition of housing and communal services rate by 15% in Novosibirsk is an amount of about 1 billion rubles. It can easily calculate that each participant in the Novosibirsk rallies of protest “squeezed” about 100 thousand rubles from the neo -feudal system. And this is far from a record. The record belongs, probably, the RDDDO - the relatively small movement of parents who required places in kindergartens “launched” dozens, if not hundreds of billions of budget rubles for the construction of kindergartens throughout the country.
Economic crisis. As it was understood by a little back in 2009, a systemic economic crisis began in Russia. For some time, the Russian economy fluctuated along with the world, but since 2013, economic growth has ceased in Russia. There was still high oil, there were no sanctions. Further, as we know, it got worse.
We will not dwell on the causes of the crisis (surprise - they are in the neo -feudal control system), let's look at its investigations for the political system.
Since the total rental pie decreased sharply, and the appetites remained, the pressure inside the system increased sharply. This leads to the growing struggle of clans. See how the “real Igor Ivanovich” eats his opponents one after another. Already this factor alone carries serious risks - people who have appeared before the prospect of losing tomorrow everyone can decide today for very extraordinary actions. For example - turn the chessboard (see the "game of the throne").
But there is another, no less important consequence - neo -Feudals are increasingly violating an unspoken ban on excessive requisitions from the population. After all, the population, in fact, today is almost the only resource that can still be cut.
More and more sophisticated schemes arise. In general, they look like this: “Look, what kind of disgrace we have in such and such. Let's finally put things in order. To do this, we will change the legislation, we will oblige to purchase certified equipment (the production plant belongs to the right people), we will oblige to work through licensed organizations (the right people will be distributed), and we will become like in civilized countries. ” And now all entrepreneurs throughout the country urgently change the cash register, waste training grounds in all cities declared “outlawed” (and for the ostracles they scare Balashikha), the garbage must now be sorted (although there are no processing capacities). The truckers were covered with Plato to build an unnecessary paid bridge for the money collected from them in Novosibirsk. Concessions breed like mushrooms, and around the residues of the future budget (the current dry one has already been drunk), flocks of potential concessionaires are curling. And of course, housing and communal services tariffs.
Each separate scheme seems to its inventors the riding of grace and the method of extracting money from the air. But in reality, it all lies on the population. Every day of expenses is more and more, and income does not grow. And the malfunctions begin - then there will blame discontent, then here.
Putin rating. By 2011, it decreased from sky -high 80% to 60% (which is also a very high figure), but then the Crimea and a wave of mobilization occurred. On the one hand, this mobilization rallied the gnawing elite, and on the other, it provided the rating of up to 80%again. Now this is the only "leg" that has preserved strength. What will happen when (or “if” Putin’s rating will fall too?
The Putin system was built in Russia in most regions before Putin. This means that it is not Putin’s at all, but is objective.
In the same way, today the defrosting takes place in large megacities like Novosibirsk and Yekaterinburg. If we take an intra -regional policy for the model of the political system, discarding federal stories, then we see the following.
The unpopular governors are harder to ensure political unity. Dissatisfaction from below forces system players to work with this discontent and partly express it. In Novosibirsk, the mayor and the governor are from different political parties. Deputies of the Legislative Assembly allow themselves to criticize the governor and demand the resignation of its ministers. And he is forced to make concessions. The imposed concessions meet all growing resistance. Partly-due to the dissatisfaction of the population, partly-because of the desire of participants in the political system to participate in concessions themselves.
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Non -systemic players have an increasing effect on the political system. Today in Novosibirsk it is difficult to say whose influence on decision -making are higher - with conditional "deputies" or conditional "social activists". These two sets have already become intersecting (which was not in stable years). And system players are increasingly going beyond the system.
That is, the main trend in defrosting the regime is neo -feudalism from a state of absolutism rolls back to feudal fragmentation. As the legitimacy falls, the center becomes more independent, and the inter -plane struggle, driven “under the carpet”, again more and more enters the public plane.
But still this is not a primitive return in the 90s. There are two very important differences.
The first - the beginnings of civil society appeared, and based on an understanding of their interests and the ability to fight for them. In the early 90s, social movements were based on phantoms. “Patriots”, “Democrats” and “Communists” fought with each other, but this had nothing to do with the real processes. And in real processes, corrupt officials took the top, who, like chameleons, took the coloring that was beneficial. Today they are patriots, in the 90s they were democrats, and before that they wore the CPSU party card in the pocket.
Federal information waves, it would seem, completely determine the political landscape of Russia. The struggle for honest elections, Crimea and Novorossia, Orthodox activists, Navalny headquarters and so on. But from under these waves, local communities are growing more and more-motorists, ecologists, communal activists, urbanists and so on. I don’t know how in Russia as a whole, but in Novosibirsk people who have different views on the federal agenda can agree and act jointly on the agenda of the local one. This inspires some hope.
The second difference from the 90s-a reputation has accumulated. In the early 90s, people jumped out of nowhere. Yesterday's excitement became a deputy of the State Duma only because he beautifully performed at a rally. What are his personal qualities, how much he holds the word and how much he holds the blow, no one knew. Yes, and could not know, because there was no real political life, with all its trials and temptations.
Today it is more or less known who is worth what. Who was the first student at the dragon, and who is the last who reached the extent to what extent. The reputation has ceased to be an empty sound, and this does not understand either the most frostbitten or the most stupid.
Probably, in tsarist Russia, the early 20th century could find many positive trends that allowed us to hope for an enlightened and prosperous future. But everything was covered with a copper basin.
The gradual growth of civil society from below, its acquisition of subjectivity and pushing their political space in the neo -feudal system (or even at all - the change of rules of the game in politics) would be the best option. We will return to him again, but first we will consider more radical. But alas, no less real.
The General Staff is always preparing for the past war. This rule is followed by the Russian government and the Russian opposition. “Past War” is both the Maidan and our own 1991 and 1993. The authorities fasten the ranks, builds power structures and breeds the conditional "ours." The opposition goes to rallies, hoping that once again the number of people at rallies will develop a certain symbolic value, after which the power itself will run away.
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The authorities do not remember that the problem of the USSR was not that there were not enough power structures, but that even the employees of these structures did not understand what and why they should protect. The opposition is not very aware of the fact that in addition to the mass rally, you still need support for people in different cities and regions, you need a minimal idea - what to do the next day. In general, the presence of extremely negative historical experience (namely the 90s, and not at all the consequences of the Maidan) makes a color revolution in its classic version unlikely.
But the pendant of "rallies-consumptions" can swing for quite some time for a long time, and the fierce of the struggle can increase.
Alexei Navalny achieved undoubted political success. If earlier there was a meme “If not Putin, then who”, then today we can also say about the opposition: “If not Navalny, then who?”
Due to the infantility of our public consciousness in Russia, a request for a good king is high. The recipe for solving all problems is to build a good king to the throne, and he already decides these problems. For most Russians, Putin plays the role of the good king (who doubts it - review any of the direct lines with the president). For those who are dissatisfied with Putin, the niche of the good king is ready to occupy Navalny.
On this occasion, it is quite funny to listen to reproaches to Navalny from the “true democrats”. “He is authoritarian,” “He will not develop democracy,” “It will be Putin-2.” All this does not depend on Navalny, but on us. Navalny is a good politician who is trying to satisfy the existing political demand. This demand in Russia is paternalist. To change the situation, we must work with the people and civil society, and not make claims to Navalny.
But back to forecasts. By itself, Navalny with his headquarters will not overturn the “vertical of power”. But he already took a position that will allow him to participate in the political struggle at the highest level in case of weakening the vertical. As the example of the 19th century shows, after the collapse of Napoleon III, both Republicans (analogue of Russian democrats) and monarchists were widely represented in power. There were even more monarchists, but some of them were for the Bourbon (an analogue of Russian nationalists), and some were for Bonaparts (an analogue of Russian Putinists). All analogies are very schematic. Most likely, there will be no pure victory and a full coup, which oppositionists dream of. Maybe it's good.
If Navalny nevertheless becomes president (now it is completely incomprehensible how exactly this can happen), then a repetition of the fate of Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia is possible. In some ways, successful reforms, somewhat unsuccessful, will break firewood somewhere, the charm will be replaced by disappointment.
The healthy process that is now going on is the growth of civil society in cities. First, in the form of the emergence of local communities, the appearance of subjectivity and pushing part of the resource and powers in the neo -feudal system. Then - in the change in the rules of the political game. Deputies cease to be the owners of the bought mandate, and become real representatives of voters. Now it seems to be some kind of fantastic, but, according to my feelings, we are standing somewhere on the threshold of a phase transition.
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Further - the entry into the process of endless negotiations with the federal center. Of course, he will always strive for yesterday's ideal fortune - rushing and meek regions that take on more and more obligations. But in real politics, everything is built on compromises. With increasing competition and the presence of civil control in the regions, it will be increasingly difficult to explain why taxes need to be collected in Moscow and distributed from there.
Of course, this path has its own risks. For example - sliding into populism. While the process of squeezing the resource in the neo -feudal system is underway, you can not go into complexity. We do not want to pay anymore, that's all. But it turns out that the pipes are really rotten in some tomorrow, and they need to be repaired. And that money for the next increase in salaries is not.
Navalny is closest to this. By the number of active supporters, it surpasses any Russian party, including all systemic ones.
However, the headquarters of Navalny are not a modern party for a number of indicators. They do not have any specific program except “Navalny-to the presidency, and then it will understand” and the fight against corruption. They have no regional agenda. Волонтеров штаба Навального в Новосибирске волнуют «дворцы премьера», а не «дворцы губернатора». Нет системы согласования интересов и коллективного принятия решений. По сути, они построены по самой примитивной схеме «лидер и его сторонники». Пока что эта схема оказалась самой эффективной, что не очень хорошо говорит о состоянии гражданского общества в России.
Массовая политическая партия может строиться на двух основаниях.
Первое — система согласования интересов сообществ активистов.
Второе — выработка некого консенсуса по поводу развития страны. Это зона ответственности российских экспертов и интеллектуалов. Пока они не очень справляются.
Но я бы призвал вспомнить тезис Дэн Сяопина: «Переходя реку, надо ощупывать камни под ногами». Если по каким-то проблемам есть разные рецепты решений, давайте опробуем их все, кроме самых безумных, в разных регионах и посмотрим, что работает, а что нет.
Не нужно ставить эксперимент на всей стране, не отмерив семь раз.
Также можно сильно улучшить федеральную бюрократию, внедрив в нее контролируемую конкуренцию. Об этом я уже писал .
Alexey Mazur