"Sadly, but Putin is not a king"

The presidential campaign in Russia began, although the official nomination of the main thing-and de facto the only one-has not yet been announced.

A certain liveliness in the course of the campaign made a statement by Ksenia Sobchak that she intends to claim the post of head of state - though, it seems like not seriously, but as a candidate replacing the “against all candidates” in the electoral ballots. Nevertheless, this circumstance did not seem to decrease seriousness to the very post of head of the Russian state.

About what the Russian presidency is in the era of Vladimir Putin, how it can transform when this era is coming to an end, and whether Putin will replace another authoritarian leader, in an interview with Radio, the political scientist, professor of the European University in St. Petersburg, Grigory Votov :

- Let's start, this is inevitable, with the relevant. The nomination of Ksenia Sobchak finally turns the presidential election into a parody, as they write on social networks ? Can, in your opinion, such combinations are damaged by the reputation of the presidency institution in Russia?

"Sobchak does not have a political future"

- What was initially assumed as a fiction cannot turn into a fiction. From this point of view, Sobchak simply adds an additional stroke, but in essence it does not change anything. The situation is that Putin should defeat in this election with a great advantage. But at the same time, in order to demonstrate the Russian and international public that the elections were competitive, other candidates must receive some kind of share of votes. It is desirable that not one of them bursts forward in relation to others, therefore it is useful if there is a spraying of votes. But this is already a secondary consideration in modern Russian conditions. Once it was important when, say, Prokhorov’s nomination was. And now exclusively reputation consideration comes to the fore - maintaining the image of elections as elections. It is this picture that Sobchak's advance fits. Unlike the same Prokhorov, who planned for himself some kind of political future, when he was drawn into this story, Sobchak does not have such a future. Whatever she said during the campaign, it is clear that immediately after the completion of the elections about her political role, they will simply forget. Everything is a foregone conclusion.

- Navalny is completely excluded, they will not allow him to the elections, in your opinion? For this, in fact, Sobchak?

- She is not only for this, in any case he would not be allowed. There is, obviously, the idea that some people who come to the polls could vote for Navalny, and now they will make such a choice in favor of Sobchak. There are obviously a little of them. The calculation precisely on the fact that as a result it will be possible to give a good picture of the election results, and at the same time say: here are your vaunted liberals, they do not enjoy support. Look, we allowed Sobchak to advance so that they voted for her, so they did not vote, because they simply did not.

- Recently there were protests on October 7 , and on them, in addition to other slogans that their participants shouted, was an entertaining slogan "Down with the Tsar!" It is clear that there is a symbolism of the centenary of the revolution, but this, apparently, also suggests that the presidential power in Russia is a little with an autocratic aura, especially under Putin. What do you think, sooner or later this aura will have to be rid of this aura - or it's okay, these are such national traditions, and you can have "super -presidentiality" if it is surrounded by the real -acting branches of the authorities, institutions that will not be imitation, but real?

- Here is the main terminological confusion, which is natural for political slogans. If you understand meaningfully, then Putin is not a king, and this is in a sense sad. Because any absolute monarchy is a highly institutionalized phenomenon. In any case, if we talk about the format in which absolute monarchies once existed in Western Europe , and now, say, in Saudi Arabia .

King of France Louis XIV surrounded by courtiers. Absolute monarch does not always rules as he wants

"What exists in Russia now is precisely a personal dictatorship"

- And in tsarist Russia?

-And in Russia, Tsarovsky, among other things, is not as much as in Western Europe and now in South-West Asia. Absolute monarch is a rather constrained character. It is connected by numerous traditions, legal establishments, there were many cases in history when its real power was not very great. This is still an authoritarian regime, because the circle of persons who are involved in the decision -making process remain extremely narrow, and the influence of citizens, more precisely subjects, on this process is minimal. But this is not a personal dictatorship. And what exists in Russia now is precisely a personal dictatorship. The powers of the Russian president from the very beginning, the 1993 Constitution, was established quite blurred. But this did not exclude the fact that both Yeltsin, when the rules, and then Putin, when he was inherited, acted within some formal and informal restrictions. These restrictions are now absorbed. The personalist nature of the regime is becoming increasingly expressed. This has an indirect relationship to national traditions, but it is related to the internal logic of the regime, which at some point began to become personalistic dictatorship and continues to develop in this direction. Naturally, if the political regime in Russia is replaced, then certain new institutions will be created that can be authoritarian or democratic, but which, at least at first, will completely exclude the situation of personal dictatorship. When the authoritarian regime is established, the coalition always rules. Such regimes acquire such regimes a little later. Even in Hitler Germany, where Hitler’s role in the leadership of the Nazi movement was certainly extremely large, he was a universally recognized leader, but even there, at first, the regime functioned as a more or less collective enterprise.

- To change this situation, Hitler needed to eliminate some associates during the "night of long knives" , as I understand it.

- Yes, for this it was necessary to eliminate associates. This, in principle, can be done in different ways, brutal or not very. But the fears that one personalist dictatorship in Russia will replace another will immediately come, are not logically justified. It’s just that the policy is arranged that you cannot actually be the sole ruler from the very beginning.

- That is, how will it not work in Turkmenistan? There was one sole ruler - President of Niyazov , or Turkmenbashi I, he died, and he was replaced by the same sole ruler - President of Berdimuhamedov , or, as he is sometimes called, Turkmenbashi II .

- A very dark business with this Berdimuhamedov. We know little the history of its elevation. I find it difficult to somehow comment on exactly whether the second president of Turkmenistan is such an sole ruler, and if it is, then what path he had to go in order to get such a position. In general, it is clear that if the power is inherited, then the new ruler can immediately pull over part of the powers and power procedures that have developed around the previous one. But in Russia we are not discussing such a case - we are discussing the case of the really change of the ruling group. Of course, if Putin sits in power for another 6, 12, 18 years, completely cleanses the entire political space and prepare the successor to whom he will absolutely trust and gradually transfer his powers at the last stages of his reign, then this successor can become a sovereign leader almost from the very beginning. But there are quite few historical precedents of such a development of events. And if you still proceed from the fact that the new president will not be Putin’s successor, carefully prepared and resigned, but someone else, then he will definitely not have sole authority.

Vladimir Putin has already "prepared and banged" one successor. He did not last long

"The first elections will be held, parliament will be formed, the parties will not be very stable"

- And the model of the Parliamentary Republic of European type, as in Germany or Italy, with the president relatively formal, representative - is this possible in Russia or is it utopia? If so, what is needed for this?

- This is completely not utopia, I consider this a completely realistic option for the further development of events. I have some arguments in favor of the fact that the active presidency in a truncated form could be preserved, but I do not consider these arguments too strong. The basic prerequisites for the parliamentary system to function normally, known. This is primarily needed by the party system. I do not consider its actual absence at the moment as a critical drawback. At the electoral level, creating a party system is quite simple, and this can happen quickly, which showed the experience of Eastern European countries. There, after all, parties after the fall of communist regimes arose almost from nowhere. After some time, party systems stabilized, then, however, they survived the stage of destabilization in the zero years, but nevertheless, parliamentary or semi-presidential systems with the strong power of parliament in these countries still function and, with some exceptions, quite successfully. That is, the first elections will be held, parliament will be formed, the parties will be, of course, not very stable, it will take some time to settle all this. But in itself, this instability may not be destructive. I see no obstacles to this in Russia.

- We are talking about central political institutions - the president, parliament, but Russia is a huge country, formally it is called the federation, although there is great doubt whether it really is it. The current government is often frightened by the fact that in the event of a change in the regime, the collapse of Russia will begin, some uncontrollable processes and so on. Is this real danger or federalization of Russia in the event of a change in the regime that does not particularly prevent the regime?

- In truth, I do not see that the authorities have recently been scared by this recently. Once there was such an argument that we will leave, and Russia will fall apart, but now, apparently, even state propagandists believe that this argument, on the one hand, is not very believable, and on the other hand, there is no need to assign responsibility for such a potential development of events. It is better to assume that these problems have already been resolved. And the problems were really pretty modest, that is, they were painful in several cases, first of all, of course, Chechnya and to some extent Tatarstan. Both of these republics strove for the real branch in the 1990s. But in all other cases, in general, there was more talk about this very sovereignty, and these conversations were not aimed at separating from Russia, as a rule, but simply to evolve great powers, budget independence for regional authorities.

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I believe that if the regime in Russia is replaced, the regions will receive a large real political autonomy, this is practically inevitable, we will again go through a strip of such conversations. Of course, we can, with a high probability of expecting some exacerbation of the situation in the North Caucasus. But this is not the same as the frontal collapse of Russia, which was talked about in the 90s. There were publicists who wrote that Russia would get clever to the size of the Vladimir Principality territorially and the like. This is nonsense, there is no such potential in the Russian regions, no one actually abandon the chicken that carries gold eggs and which is called oil revenues of the federal budget will not become voluntarily. As for clarifying the status of regions within the federation, this will be a necessary task. Because you need to finally come to some optimal solutions that would provide a balanced distribution of powers between the federal center and regions. This is a task for the future legislator, I believe that it is completely solved. Constitutional reform is necessary in any case.

"Putin knows what to do, and he will do everything right. And what exactly he will do, you do not need to know"

-From Putin and his people of some reforms of the institutions of power, whether this applies to federalization or the ratio of branches of power at the federal level, it is completely unrealistic to wait? The fourth program, in your opinion, is the inviolability or options possible?

-The program of the fourth period has not yet been formed, I believe that it will not be in a hurry to form it in some specific form. I do not exclude the option that in the end they will tell us once again that the elections are a referendum, vote for Putin simply because you are experiencing personal trust, Putin knows what to do, and will do everything right. And what exactly he will do, you do not need to know, because it depends on the situation. The funny thing is that this argument may coincide with Putin himself. That is, of course, he collects different projects - from Kudrin, from liberal economists, from other advisers, but I do not exclude that he himself believes: let them write everything, and then I will solve the situation. The only thing that can be said with confidence is that he is interested in maintaining power, this power will be of his personal character. He cannot create another system, and does not want to. From this point of view, of course, there is no need to expect any cardinal reforms in the field of politics. Just lead in manual control mode, neutralize immediate risks, maneuver on the international arena, and that's all.

- If we talk about the hypothetical post -Putin era, that is, such an idea - often about this, for example, Grigory Yavlinsky loves to reason , - that the Russian system of power needs to be reloaded. To do this, in particular, to convene the Constituent Assembly. Do you think this idea is a reasonable?

- I always believed that the 1993 Constitution needs to be changed, it is simply not very good for democracy, this is a bad mechanism. How to change it? In fact, it is written in the constitution itself that for this it is necessary to convene a constitutional assembly, but there is still no law on the constitutional assembly. It can even be good, because the current Duma will take a bad law. In the case of political changes and the election of a new parliament, it will be possible to accept more reasonable. The constitutional assembly will gather, will decide. Whether it will be called the Constituent Assembly, it does not matter whether it will actually act as the Constituent Assembly. I consider this as an option, on the one hand, desirable, and on the other - almost inevitable, ”says political scientist Grigory Golov.