Anti-extremism: balance of struggle and prevention

We are republishing an article by Alexander Verkhovsky published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta on the HRC's project to reform anti-extremist legislation.

After the president instructed the All-Russian People's Front to prepare proposals for partial liberalization by September 15 - although such a word, of course, was not uttered - anti-extremist legislation, many officials and semi-officials took an active part in the discussion of the topic of "excesses", not to mention about those human rights activists and journalists who have been talking about this for years.

We do not know what decisions the Kremlin will make as a result, but it already seems that the partial decriminalization of Art. 282 of the Criminal Code (which is about inciting hatred on various group grounds) and, perhaps, other articles of the Criminal Code can really happen, and the Code of Administrative Offenses can be adjusted in terms of the ill-fated article on prohibited symbols and at the same time replenished with those pieces of the Criminal Code that will be from the last removed.

But the Human Rights Council (HRC) would like more. It is important to note at least some of the recommendations of the HRC: remove from Art. 282 the concept of “humiliation of dignity”, as the usual “insult” was previously derived from the Criminal Code, to narrow the very definition of extremism in the framework law only to those acts that have something to do with violence, to abandon the practice of injunctions against “extremist materials” as having proven itself completely useless and bringing a lot of problems to ordinary citizens, to partially decriminalize “insulting the feelings of believers”, etc. In addition to the laws themselves, it is important to change the practice of courts and law enforcement agencies, which now, in relation to the topic of extremism, completely ignore the concept of “minor act” established in the Criminal Code (part 2 of article 14 of the Criminal Code), and in fact it is quite applicable to the huge mass of currently persecuted statements on the Internet .

I would like to think that some of the HRC's proposals will be taken into account and reflected in the proposed reform of anti-extremist policy. If liberalization takes place, it will reduce the incredibly growing number of criminal cases (in 2017, the number of those convicted only or primarily for “extremist statements” noticeably exceeded 650). It may well be that the reduction will not be by percentages, but by several times. And this is undoubtedly good.

But there are two questions that immediately arise. First, will this not harm the fight against “real extremism”? Second, will the authorities find other equally effective mechanisms to put pressure on oppositionists of all stripes and on active citizens in general?

To the first question, I would answer unequivocally in the negative. If ideologically motivated violence and everything directly related to it, such as serious campaigning for such violence, financing, organizational activities, are considered “real extremism”, then the vast majority of those involved under various articles of the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offenses for posts on social networks are not related to such activities. . At least, this is how things stand now, although five or seven years ago it was, perhaps, on average, different. Therefore, to consider cases under Art. 282 as prevention, as the head of the Altai Investigative Committee recently said directly, is not only somewhat unethical, but also incorrect in essence.

For now, the second question can be answered as follows: of course, pressure mechanisms will not disappear and new ones will appear, and we will see how effective they will be. After all, no one thinks that the political task of exerting pressure on real or only potentially opposition communities can now be removed, and Art. 282 and similar tools have never been the only ones in this business.

From the heads of law enforcement agencies, more than once I heard the right words that there should be less repression and more prevention. At the same time, prevention was simply understood very broadly - up to not the most severe criminal penalties. And if there really will be fewer criminal penalties in the anti-extremist sphere, some other preventive (with or without quotation marks) tools will be used more.

First of all, the proposed partial decriminalization does not mean the disappearance of certain offenses from the legislation, but their transfer from the Criminal Code to the Code of Administrative Offenses. Cases under the Code of Administrative Offenses entail less serious consequences, but on the other hand, they are “drawn up” more easily. For comparison with the above number of sentences, it is worth noting that the two anti-extremist articles of the Code of Administrative Offenses in total produced about 3.5 thousand court decisions in 2017. And this number can grow quite significantly with the advent of new formulations.

At the same time, it is planned to expand the possibilities of blocking on the Internet. Anti-extremist blockings already number in the thousands, and often take place extrajudicially by orders of the Prosecutor General's Office. So the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications is now proposing to expand the already broad grounds for extrajudicial blocking by “justifying” terrorism and extremism. Of course, as is the case with all anti-extremist norms, law enforcement will also be very selective here, but there is no doubt that the flow of blocking will become even more full-flowing. And in general, the accumulated legislative tools of restrictions on the Internet are not yet being applied even halfway, and at the same time, new bills of the same direction are on the way.

Summing up all this, it can be expected that with the reform of anti-extremist legislation, the pressure will become softer, but wider. For better or worse, I think we'll see in time.

But there is no doubt about one thing already now: pressure, even if it is necessary both from a political and legal point of view, cannot be the main tool for preventing ideologically motivated violence of any kind. Such an approach, even in the medium term, is ineffective and often counterproductive.

Judging by the fact that the discussion of the reform was launched "from above", somewhere at the top this idea was realized, at least in relation to the criminal aspect of anti-extremist policy. But it should also be understood in a broader sense: the state policy of counteracting ideological violence and incitement to hatred cannot and should not be based primarily on instruments of pressure. Sources

• Alexander Verkhovsky. What exactly does the Human Rights Council offer politicians and law enforcement officers? // Independent newspaper. Carte blanche. 2018. August 26.