In March 2008, Rosobrazovanie (later abolished and reorganized into the Ministry of Education and Science) provided all Russian schools with licensed software packages, which include a content filtering program for Internet access. As it turned out, this program does not cope with the task, which was found out as a result of prosecutorial checks throughout the country. It is quite obvious that the fault for the fact that schoolchildren, despite access filters, have the opportunity to visit neo-Nazi and other inappropriate sites from school computers, lies not only with schools that do not update software with the necessary regularity, but also with the Ministry of Education and Science, which has installed an insufficiently effective product. Note that not all items of the Federal List of Extremist Materials are designed in such a way that they can be used as a guide to action (sometimes, when it comes to a website, its address may not be displayed completely or even completely absent, and the titles of books and articles are given no output).
In addition, we cannot fail to note that the very idea of fighting extremism in schools with the help of filters seems wrong to us. Firstly, any filter can be bypassed if desired, and secondly, it is in principle impossible to compile an exhaustive list of addresses and keywords.
However, prosecutors everywhere and regularly punish local officials and school leaders for this. We believe that the Ministry of Education and Science should be responsible for the imperfection of the content filtering system, and the negligence of the leadership of schools that do not update the program is a problem of labor discipline rather than law enforcement. Similarly, we treat the claims of prosecutors to the leadership of educational institutions regarding access to resources from the Unified Register of Prohibited Sites - in cases where it is known that a school or university is trying to stop this access.
We combined such cases into a single list, the first part of which covers the period from December 2009 to June 2011, the second - the period from July 2011 to June 2012, the third - from June 2012 to November 2013, the fourth - from November 2013 to the end of 2014, fifth - from January to December 2015, sixth - from January to December 2016, seventh - from January to December 2017, eighth - from January to December 2018. The continuation of this list is in front of you.
On May 20, 2019, the prosecutor’s office of Magadan, during an inspection of MBOU secondary school No. 7, discovered that a computer in the computer science office allows access to the book by B.S. Mironov "Russian Nationalism" (item 4868 of the Federal List of Extremist Materials). The inspectors concluded that the content filtering system was applied at the school “not in full”, in connection with which a submission was made to the principal.
On May 6, 2019, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Kostroma Region reported that the Prosecutor’s Office of the Mezhevsky District had made submissions to the directors of three schools where computers in computer science classrooms could access content included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials. It is not clear from the report whether content filters have been installed in schools, but we assume that otherwise the prosecutor's office would have clearly indicated their absence.
On April 30, 2019, the prosecutor's office of the Chelyabinsk region announced that by a decision of the justice of the peace, the director of the Miass Medical College was sentenced to a fine of 5 thousand rubles under part 1 of Art. 6.17 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (violation of the established requirements for the distribution among children of information products containing information that is harmful to their health and (or) development). During the audit, the Miass prosecutor's office, together with the territorial department of the FSB, found that it was possible to get access to an audio recording from the college classroom, which is included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials. It is not clear from the report whether the college had a content filter in place, but we assume that the prosecutor's office would otherwise have indicated that it did not exist. The prosecutor's office also noted in a press release that similar fines had previously been imposed on the heads of three educational institutions (we know of two fines in 2017 and one in 2018; in all cases, it was either a medical or geological exploration college).
On April 17, 2019, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Lipetsk Region reported that the Gryazinsky Interdistrict Prosecutor’s Office made a submission to the director of the Gryazinsky Technical College. The audit showed that the college provided all visitors with wireless Internet access, while users could access extremist materials, as well as resources with information on suicide methods and the manufacture of drugs. It is not clear from the message whether a content filter was installed at the school, but we assume that otherwise the prosecutor's office would point out its absence.
On April 16, 2019, the North-Western Transport Prosecutor's Office reported that the Arkhangelsk Transport Prosecutor's Office had made a submission to the director of the Arctic Maritime Institute. V. I. Voronin (branch of the State University of the Sea and River Fleet named after Admiral S. O. Makarov). In the course of the prosecutor's check, it was found that the content filtering system installed in the institution did not work effectively: it did not prevent access to materials recognized as extremist.
On February 6, 2019, the prosecutor's office of the Republic of Mari El reported that the prosecutor's office of Yoshkar-Ola demanded that the heads of three schools in the city make changes to the rules for using the Internet. In these local acts, approved by school directors, it was stated that " the school is not responsible for accidental access to information, including extremist information, that is not related to the educational process and the content of which is contrary to the legislation of the Russian Federation ." From the point of view of the prosecutor's office, the obligation to ensure protection from information harmful to minors is assigned to schools under subpara. 2 p. 6 art. 28 of the Federal Law "On Education", which refers to the creation of " safe conditions for learning, educating students ."
On January 28, 2019, the prosecutor’s office of the Vologda Oblast reported that in 2018, the prosecutor’s office of the Babushkinsky district, during an inspection of the Babushkinsky secondary school, revealed that students had free access to information harmful to minors, including extremist materials. What measure of the prosecutor's response was chosen, is not specified. It is not clear from the report whether a content filter was installed at the school, but we assume that otherwise the prosecutor's office would more clearly indicate its absence.
On January 10, 2019, the prosecutor’s office of the Nizhny Novgorod region reported that the Sergach interdistrict prosecutor’s office established during an audit that content filters did not function on school computers in the computer science classrooms in two educational institutions of the Krasnooktyabrsky district. As a result, children had access to extremist materials. The head of the administration of the Krasnooktyabrsky district was presented with a proposal to eliminate the violations. It is not entirely clear from the message whether content filters were installed, but we assume that otherwise the prosecutor's office would more clearly indicate their absence.
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