Translated material
Putin's plans? Do not look at the calendar
The future of the regime does not depend on the terms established by the Constitution, and above all on the level of confidence in the population to Putin, Fedor Krashennikov believes, continuing the NT discussion about the alternatives of the change of power in 2024
When we are talking about the “problem-2024” (read the beginning of the discussion here ), we are still a little cunning. Donald Trump has this a problem of 2024 - even if he retains his post in 2020, in 2024 he in any case will leave the political arena. A completely different and much closer to the situation in Russia gives us the history of neighboring Uzbekistan. When Islam Karimov last participated in the procedure of popular elections, meticulous foreign observers suddenly found that, according to the then constitution of Uzbekistan, he had no right to participate in them, exhausting all the presidential terms permitted by the Basic Law. But this did not interfere with the course and result of the elections, there were no people who wanted to protest inside the Uzbek political system, and they traditionally spat on the opinions of all the others. As a result, power in Uzbekistan still changed, but a little later in a natural way: Karimov died.
Russia, of course, is not Uzbekistan, but also to hope that the norms of the Constitution for the current president and its environment are indestructible and sacred is definitely not worth it.
The law is not a decree
In 2024, Putin only expired the current presidential term. It is important to remember that this is not just the fourth presidential, but also the second elongated presidential term by Vladimir Putin. If you return to the point of view that the creators of the Constitution of Russia were assumed that one person could be the president of Russia at a maximum of 8 years and once, then Vladimir Putin has already provided himself the opportunity to rule 12 years longer - while the constitution seems to be like the same.
Already these facts should suggest that as such a constitution is not a problem. Firstly, it can once again be renewed in a convenient way, and secondly, it can be corrected without any problems in the right places and calmly rule further. Age is also not a hindrance: modern medicine works miracles, and the history of Russia for the last decades gives us examples of the reign of even hopelessly sick leaders.
By 2024 and after it, the most fantastic schemes and scenarios can be implemented, but only in one case: if by then the socio-economic situation will remain acceptable for most active population and Putin’s rating will remain at a fairly high level.
The dictatorship of the ratings
The regime of the authorities of Vladimir Putin in a sense is unique in its combination of archaic authoritarian practices and modern social technologies. The environment of the president and he himself is well aware of which audience he relies on and how strong support she provides him. Measurements of public moods are constantly being conducted, and these sentiments are taken into account - just some groups of society, obviously negative to the authorities, have long been ignored by it.
As such, the Constitution is not a problem: firstly, it can once again be renewed in a convenient way, and secondly, it can be corrected without special problems in the right places and calmly rule further. Age is also not a hindrance
The highest level of confidence in the majority of the population to the president, until recently, forced ordinary citizens of Russia and different layers of the elite to reconcile with the most unsuccessful personnel decisions and take even the most absurd restrictions on their own rights and freedoms.
The personal rating of most of the major officials and politicians admitted in the public sphere or extremely low, or is simply absent, the level of popularity of the Duma opposition is also extremely low and is limited by its own service behavior.
In the current state of affairs, Putin, of course, can demand the fulfillment of any of his orders, even if they contradicted someone else's interests: even the current, decreased, indicators of the population’s trust in the president remain too high for someone to speak publicly, referring to the opinion of the people or some other circumstances.
However, many decisions and instructions of Putin have recently been sabotted at different levels: it seems that there are doubts inside the power vertical whether to do everything as the boss says. This should also include rather miserable, but quite obvious attempts by some prominent persons (Dmitry Medvedev, Valentina Matvienko, Vyacheslav Volodin) to get their own rating distinguishable from zero.
What's next
So far, the majority of the population for Putin, any street protests can and should be ignored, and it is not worth criticizing his decisions and politics, because there is no one to rely on this criticism. That is why the protests of 2011-2012 could not be the reason for a serious hardware attack on Putin, but rather, they began to demonstrate fidelity to the leader. He remained too popular against the backdrop of a still rather prosperous socio-economic situation in the country, and in such a situation it was suicidal against him that Sergei Mironov demonstrated, whose reckoning activity did not go unnoticed in the Kremlin.
But what will happen if at some point the rate of the rating continues and Putin’s popular support will no longer become so obvious?
If the observed trends in confidence in authority and personally Putin will develop and gain strength, then the question of Putin's departure from power may arise much earlier than 2024
How will the highest echelon of power behave in such a situation? No one knows the answer to this question - there were no precedents in the recent history of Russia.
My hypothesis is as follows. As soon as Putin’s real ratings decrease so that other members of the ruling group discovered that their general rating is at least Putinsky, or that the current president has become unpopular to such an extent that his removal from the authorities will not only cause mass discontent, but even contribute to the growth of the rating of the Putin’s presidency, will be numbered. What will happen next and how much can Putin’s environment without Putin be restrained in power - this is the sphere of sucks of free fantasies. But this scenario itself is becoming less fantastic.
If the observed trends in confidence in authority and personally Putin will develop and gain strength, then the question of Putin’s departure from power can arise much earlier than 2024. Moreover, he may not arise at all on the streets of cities: no matter how massive protests are, in any case they cannot change power if it itself does not want it. However, they can become catalysts and an occasion for intra -elite transformation.
What is Putin himself counting on? Read the opinions of our experts here and here .
Photo: Scanpix via Postimees.ee