The President of Russia approved a new version of the Strategy for countering extremism until 2025.
On May 29, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new version of the Strategy for countering extremism until 2025. Its preparation became known in March 2020, when the Ministry of Internal Affairs submitted a draft amendment for public discussion (the approved text, however, differs somewhat from that draft).
In the previous version of the Strategy, approved in 2014, definitions were given to the concepts of "ideology of extremism", "manifestations of extremism", "subjects of countering extremism", "countering extremism" and "radicalism". In the new version, these definitions are somewhat changed, in addition, the concept of "ideology of violence" is introduced into the Strategy. It is defined as a set of views and ideas that justify the use of violence to achieve political, ideological, religious and other goals.
If in the old version of the Strategy the concept of "radicalism" was defined as "deep commitment to the ideology of extremism, contributing to the commission of actions aimed at forcibly changing the foundations of the constitutional order and violating the integrity of the Russian Federation", then in the new version it is given the following definition: "uncompromising commitment to the ideology of violence, characterized by a desire for a decisive and radical change in the foundations of the constitutional order, the violation of the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
In addition, the definition of "manifestations of extremism", which referred only to acts committed motivated by hatred and enmity or contributing to the aggravation of inter-ethnic, inter-confessional and regional conflicts, is now extended to acts that threaten the constitutional order and violation of the territorial integrity of Russia. The new edition also includes activities to minimize and eliminate the consequences of extremism as "countering extremism".
The new version of the Strategy provides a new description of external and internal extremist threats. External threats are now considered "support and stimulation by a number of states of destructive activities carried out by foreign or international non-governmental organizations aimed at destabilizing the socio-political and socio-economic situation in the Russian Federation, violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, including inspiring "color revolutions", to the destruction of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, as well as to promote the activities of international extremist and terrorist organizations, in particular the spread of extremist ideology and radicalism in society."
The definition of internal threats in the new Strategy is specified. Such threats include attempts to carry out extremist activities by nationalist, radical public, religious, ethnic and other organizations and individuals, the spread of the ideology of violence, inducement, recruitment or other involvement of Russian citizens and foreigners located on the territory of the country in the activities of extremist communities and other illegal activities, and the formation of closed ethnic and religious enclaves.
A separate paragraph states that internal threats also include interethnic and territorial contradictions and conflicts caused by historical and socio-economic characteristics and leading to separatist manifestations in certain constituent entities of the Russian Federation.
The clarification "nationalist, religious and political" was removed from the list of the most dangerous types of extremism (obviously, because these terms are not defined).
Extremism in several paragraphs of the Strategy includes the holding of uncoordinated public events, including protest actions (in the previous edition, the less accurate term "uncoordinated actions" was used).
Special attention in the new version of the document is given to the involvement of minors in extremist structures.
As a potential source of threats, the new Strategy mentions hotbeds of terrorism in the Middle East, the creation of clandestine cells of extremist and terrorist organizations (including through remote recruitment), and the danger of radicalization of labor migrants. At the same time, the mention of "illegal migration" that violates the "ethno-confessional balance of the population" is replaced by a discussion about the "unfavorable migration situation", which destabilizes the labor market and the socio-economic situation and has a negative impact on interethnic and interreligious relations. A separate mention of sports schools and clubs as hotbeds of youth radicalization is also new.
The next point mentions the "informational and psychological influence" of foreign special services, which have the goal of "eroding traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, destabilizing the internal political and social situation in the country." If the old version of the Strategy further referred to the activities of foreign NGOs to spread extremist ideology, now it is clarified that "a significant negative impact on the situation" is exerted by the "destructive activities" of both foreign organizations and Russian structures controlled by them "under the guise of humanitarian, educational, cultural , national and religious projects, including inspiring protest activity of the population using socio-economic, environmental and other factors."
In particular, the following changes have been made to the directions of the state policy of countering extremism:
in the field of lawmaking, the directions of anti-extremist policy are supplemented by "improving the mechanisms for counteracting the destructive activities of foreign or international non-governmental organizations";
in the field of law enforcement - the fight against "inspiring" color revolutions "";
in the field of national politics - "prevention of any form of discrimination", "the formation in society of an atmosphere of rejection of propaganda and justification of extremist ideology, xenophobia, national or religious exclusivity";
in the field of migration policy, instead of improving the mechanisms of deportation and strengthening border control, the Strategy fixes: the development of adaptation programs for migrants; counteracting the emergence of spatial segregation, the formation of ethnic enclaves, the social exclusion of certain groups of citizens; involvement of civil society institutions and comprehensive information of the society about migration processes and counteracting false information about them that causes hatred and enmity;
in the field of information policy, anti-extremist areas include, in particular: introducing young people to "traditional Russian spiritual and moral values" both through the media and through the Internet; as well as "revealing the ways in which extremist organizations provide information and psychological impact on the population and studying the peculiarities of perception and understanding of information contained in extremist materials by various groups of people";
the educational process, according to the new version of the Strategy, should form in children "an all-Russian civic identity, patriotism, civic responsibility, a sense of pride in the history of Russia", as well as cultivate a culture of interethnic and interreligious communication;
in the field of international cooperation, the priorities are supplemented by: preventing the use of international anti-extremist cooperation "as a tool for the realization of political and geopolitical goals"; strengthening the leading role of states in anti-extremist activities; exchange of best practices and development of international legal instruments; organizing interaction between the competent authorities within the framework of the SCO Convention on Combating Extremism of 2017 and taking measures to accede other states to it;
the Strategy includes a list of areas of anti-extremist policy related to civil society. It included state support for civil society institutions fighting extremism, including veteran and youth organizations (in the previous version, these measures were related to cultural policy), work with socially oriented NGOs, participation of public councils in activities to harmonize interethnic and interreligious relations; assistance to the media "in a broad and objective coverage" of the activities of the subjects of countering extremism.
The tools for its implementation are fixed in the Strategy (normative legal acts of the Russian Federation, documents of strategic planning and state programs); it is determined that it is implemented by the subjects of countering extremism (that is, state authorities and local self-government), as well as civil society institutions; and that its implementation must be supported by information.
It is important to note that, in the new version of the Strategy, unlike the previous one, it has targets. The list of these indicators in the approved text of the Strategy includes: * dynamics of the number of registered crimes, administrative offenses and identified persons who committed them, by years;
the share of crimes of a violent nature in the total number of crimes of an extremist orientation by years;
the number of public, religious associations and organizations recognized as extremist;
the number of resources on the Internet with extremist materials that were blocked and from which these materials were removed.
The expected results are:
reducing the number of extremist threats in the Russian Federation;
a decrease in the share of crimes of a violent nature in the total number of extremist crimes;
preventing the spread of extremist materials in the media and the Internet;
increasing the level of interaction between subjects of countering extremism;
active participation of civil society institutions in the prevention and prevention of extremist manifestations;
formation in society, especially among young people, of an atmosphere of intolerance towards extremist ideology, rejection of extremist ideology;
increasing the level of protection of citizens and society from extremist manifestations.
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