Nazification of denazification

Is the comparison of the Russian regime with fascism justified?

The attack on Ukraine put the regime of Vladimir Putin to new challenges. First of all, to the need to justify aggression and, accordingly, to the need for a deeper and more expressive study and processing of those ideologies, cliches and narratives that justified its course in recent years. Full -scale military aggression against a neighboring country from these ideologies and narratives did not flow in any way.

How much can we talk about the formation of a new "ideology of the regime"? What are its coordinates and support ideologems? Almost a common place today was its comparison with fascism, but how much these comparisons are a substantive characteristic, and how much is part of the “war of emotions”? The Kremlin’s ideology with fascism became almost a common place, but how much these comparisons are a substantial characteristic, and how much is part of the “war of emotions”? What is meant by “fascism” and what its elements and features reveal themselves in “ideology z”? Ivan Kurill, Grigory Yudin, Marlene Laryuel, Arkady Ostrovsky and Alexander Morozov - in discussion about the new ideology of the Putin regime.

Historian Ivan Kurill, sociologist Grigory Yudin, political scientist Marlene Laryel, journalist and author of The Invention of Russia, Arkady Ostrovsky and publicist Alexander Morozov discuss these issues in different, sometimes opposite prospects.

While Grigory Yudin grinds the substantial parallels with fascism in the interpretation of the relationship between the nation, the state and the leader, Ivan Kurill sees here only the cosplay of the narratives of the middle of the last century, Arkady Ostrovsky returns to the discussion of the fascist and antifacium utopia, embodied in the popular film image of the Stirlitsa, Alexander Morozov notes that Alexander Morozov notes that Alexander Morozov notes that Alexander Morozov notes that Alexander Morozov notes that In the case of Putin, the anti-Westernity is not transformed into the ideology of the reconstruction of the world, and Marlene Laruel believes that the identification of the Putin regime with the fascist allows the West to recreate the black and white picture of the world, characteristic of the time of the past Cold War, and evade discussing the internal problems of the liberal doctrine, which today weaken.

Discursive remake

Ivan Kurill

First of all, it seems to me that the use of the term “fascism” does not help, but complicates the understanding of the phenomenon we encountered. With the obvious similarity of some practices, today's Russian regime belongs to another generation of authoritarianism, and scientists need to develop their own language for its adequate description.

The main differences in the current version of authoritarianism are, in my opinion, a developed information society and the presence of nuclear weapons (and awareness of the catastrophicity of its use). If in “classical” fascism the information was transmitted by a single stream, which was controlled by the regime, then in today's authoritarianism the “time of the Internet” is supported by the polygothy, and the state is improving cynicism - disbelief in any picture of the world. If the military aggression of the mid-20th century was based on the confidence of leaders in their own military-economic superiority over the united forces of opponents, now the main guarantee of “invincibility” is the possession of nuclear weapons. This guarantee unexpectedly reduced the threshold of the outbreak of war.

Finally, we see that the war began not under the flag of new ideology, but using the language of the middle of the last century in a situation of ideological eclecticism. Attempts to offer new symbols in the form of the letter Z or white sleeve, we did not find mass support, as a result of which we observe the spontaneous return of Soviet symbols - red flags and monuments to Lenin. But modern Russian symbolism is not connected with the “big idea”, and you cannot go to fight against neighbors for it.

The very use of the word “fascism” in the description of the regime means consent to play the discursive game “We will fall away in the 1940s” proposed by Putin. Russian propagandists are fighting in Ukraine with Nazism, in response the Russian regime itself is called “fascist”, and the United States adopt the Lend-Lis law. The word “genocide” is increasingly found in the speech of propagandists, as well as references to the Nuremberg Tribunal. But those phenomena to which these names are referred do not correspond to the initial meaning of the words used.

It is interesting to trace the connection of this global “cosplay” of the middle of the last century with the popularity of the movement of reconstructors, which in 2017 stormed the funny “Reichstag” and reported on the success of the Minister of Defense Shoigu, or with “renaming” cities invented by Volgograd deputies who decided in 2013 during the days of commemorative dates and holidays to call the Volgograd (followed The authorities of the DPR, who "renamed" Donetsk in Stalin) made a similar decision to Volgograd. In general, it is not surprising that the Soviet flag is again popular with some of the Russian elites, and in the Duma they even discuss its return as the state flag of the Russian Federation.

Is it necessary to participate in this costume performance? It seems to me that this transition to the language of the last century only obscures modern realities and makes a more difficult task to characterize modern evil. The above does not mean that I know the best description options or are ready to offer new terms. I just propose not to use old, suitable for propaganda, but not for understanding.

Real fascism

Grigory Yudin dispute about the definitions of fascism is limitless and has not lends itself to ordering for a long time - therefore, any characteristics of the political regime as a “fascist” look like an attempt to rhetorically equate it to an absolute evil. For this reason, I always refrained from using this term. However, in February 2022, the political regime in Russia underwent a mutation, which makes the term “fascism” most adequate. At the same time, in such an incorrect characteristic it is not necessarily assumed that now it has become an identical to the absolute evil: there were not fascist regimes that destroyed more people and brought more evil. So this is a qualitative characteristic, not the “depth of evil”.

The key feature of historical fascism is the combination of (1) of the state, (2) the people and (3) the leader in the Unified Vector (4) of the political movement.

1. The state is a key here - fascism is built on sacralization of the total state, and therefore no individual fascists or even fascist parties can create a fascist regime until the state is captured. The Russian Bonapartist regime made a sharp fascist U -turn in February. The zones free from the state slammed sharply. Thus, the rapid ideologization of education has started, which is from now on is defined as a propaganda zone (it is not only about a lecture on Ukrainian history in kindergartens, schools and universities, but primarily about a sharp strengthening of the propaganda element from the new school year). The social and humanities also lost autonomy and collapsed to propaganda: the topics of research are now directly approved by political officials. In other areas (medicine, police, public service, etc.), autonomy is also eliminated: there can be no reasons, goals or logic that does not correspond to the current tasks of the state as a moving machine. A sharply increased level of violence in law enforcement agencies shows that they understood the signal: bureaucratic logic gives way to the logic of suppression of the enemy/traitor by any means.
2. In the fascist equation, the people are always equal to the state and the leader. Anyone who is opposed to the state and the leader is excluded from the people. To a certain extent, this problem was solved until February (the principle of “no Putin - no Russia” worked as a matrix of the formation of regular policy, and Putin’s opponents did not have the right to participate in public administration in any form). However, in February, a powerful attempt was made to fill the figure of the “people” with content. This was done using the term “denazification”, which was sharply introduced into circulation and determined the self -description of the Russian regime in this war. “Denacification” means emphasis on national purity, and in this sense refers to Nazi, and not to the fascist imaginary. The idea of ​​decomposition of Ukrainians on pure (Russian) and dirty (Ukrainian, Nazi) elements led to cleaning, genocide tactics in Ukraine (intelligentsia extermination, filtration camps, research of Ukrainian bodies). It was also turned inside: the requirement to cleanse the people through the “spitting” of the unclean is aimed at determining the people. The fascist aesthetics within Russia (the folding of hemispheres from human bodies, especially children's bodies and bodies on the knees, in a humiliated position) introduces a completely new experience of belonging to the people through bodily symbolism for modern Russia. It is also necessary to carefully monitor information about the threats of infection (“biolaboratory”) from Ukraine, since it enhances the perception of the stranger as an infectious, violating the purity of the folk body.
3. The absence of a personality cult in Russia is an important feature of Russian fascism. However, she should not obscure the main - total symbolic identification of the leader with the people and the state. Plebiscitarism/Bonapartism is also built on the “Fuhrer principle”, on the idea of ​​representing the historical choice of the people in the decisions of the Fuhrer. As in Germany of the 1930s, the principle of the Fuhrer leads to a mutation of Bonapartism to a total state. The impressive transformation that occurred with the authorities of Vladimir Putin in February is associated with the role of violence in his government system. The legendary meeting of the Security Council is an unprecedented monument to the organization of power through violence. The idea of ​​the ruling Russia “click” needs obvious adjustment: the Führer simply frankly humiliates and terrorizes his immediate environment (which is probably the same with his subordinates).
4. The movement is the most controversial moment of Russian fascism. Bonapartism is based on passivity, and fascization requires the activation of the masses. However, the whole left critic, starting with Adorno and ending with tenant, suggests that it is from the passive mass that the perfect substrate arises for fascization. A cynical, closed to a private life, accustomed to the power of ordinary violence, the mass easily switches to a fascist modus. Contrary to prejudices, this does not require her to suddenly “believe” in an ideology: fascism is a visceral, somatic phenomenon. It is moved by fear: people are fascized not because they suddenly believed in the greatness of the Aryan race, but because they are monstrously scary and they feel that if they do not kill someone, they may be killed themselves. The capture of the state of 20% of marginals in the absence of joint resistance structures in society quickly switches another 50% to the fascist regime, after which the remaining 30% turn out to be a convenient victim.

It is quite obvious that there was no lower class request in Russia. However, Ilya Budraitskis draws attention to the fact that in the conditions of late capitalism, the state can itself take the function of generating the lower motion and, as it were, “lower” fascism on society from above.

Whether this will happen in Russia in full - not yet obvious. In general, fascization gives results (a sharp increase in the number of denunciations, a sharp increase in domestic violence, initiative support for aggressive war). However, for the middle -aged Vladimir Putin, the police regime built on hypercontrol was always more comfortable. For him, who hate the people and does not trust any spontaneous collective action, to trust the energy of the masses is probably a difficult and uncomfortable decision. Perhaps the final switching to fascism will require the elimination of Putin. Until then, we will observe the Russian society in the semi -position.

The main analytical benefit from the characteristics of the Russian regime as fascist is that this allows you to form the right expectations. This is not an “authoritarian regime” from political science books, it will not “persist with the probability of x%”, change, or “democratize”. This is a fascist movement, moving imperialist impulses and setting the state for a total war. It will not stop until it subjugates the whole of Europe or suffers an absolute defeat.

Performance of fascism

Arkady Ostrovsky Vladimir Putin appeared in the imagination of Russian voters, who still did not know the future president in the face, in the form and image of an officer of the Nazi security service of the SS Max Otto von Stirlitz (aka Maxim Isaev). It was Stirlitz who chose Russian citizens as one of the most desirable characters as president. On March 14, 2000, Kommersant Power magazine placed a portrait of actor Vyacheslav Tikhonov, who played this role, on the cover with the heading of Stirlitz is our president. The image was fixed.

A repeated VTsIOM survey, conducted twenty years later, showed that Stirlitz rose in the rating of characters-presidents to the first position. As VTsIOM explained , “a kind of inversion occurred: if in 1999 Putin looked like a preferred candidate, because he looked like a Stirlitz, then in 2019 the image of Stirlitz remains relevant because he was implements the most popular politician of the country-Putin.”

It is significant that the “seventeen moments of spring”, a film about charming fascists performed by their favorite Soviet actors (which Oleg Tabakov was worth), was ordered by Yuri Andropov to attract young personnel in the KGB of the USSR. The film with an audience of 80 million spectators, it seems, did not hide admiration and envy of the Nazi uniform (sewing the USSR Ministry of Defense), which, like a glove, was sitting on a Soviet intelligence officer.

As Dmitry Prigov wrote, “our wonderful Stirlitz remarkably reveals the ideal fascist and ideal Soviet man simultaneously, making transgressive transitions from one to another with conquering and unknown ease ... He is a harbinger of the new time - the time of mobility and manipulation.”

Mobility and manipulation of images, the ease of reincarnation of the Soviet intelligence officer into a Nazi officer fully manifested themselves in the very first days of the war against Ukraine. The war, begun under the flags of Soviet victory in World War II, draws up and describes itself with signs and words that refer to the aesthetics of German Nazism to a much greater extent than to Soviet canons.

The visual and state -owned style of the Russian propaganda - Solia Solovyov splashing in a black tunic, Olga Skabeeva with her emphasized by the “Aryan” features and metal in his voice, the letter Z in all its versions, the cut head of the pig, thrown under the door of Alexei Venediktov, would cause a rack of the Soviet party chiefs, but it was quite embedded, but it was quite embedded In the style of the KGB. (Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev, one of the main politicians of the post-Talin era, who openly opposed the chauvinist wing of the party and led the democratic reforms of the late 1980s, believed that it was the KGB who was a chaser of Russian fascism.)

In the Soviet years, the KGB was connected by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, although he treated it with a great degree of cynicism. However, distant and getting rid of party ideology, its heirs turned into the ministers of the state cult (which gave them, however, the possibility of uncontrolled enrichment). Fascism with his cult of the state was removed from the regiment as the most suitable outfit. Stirlitz is a symbol of this common fascist-antiphashist cult.

Walter Benjamin wrote that the logical result of fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life. And the main aesthetic experience of fascism was, of course, a war. Aesthetization of the war - the construction of the Temple War, the reconstruction of the pompous and gloomy Stalinist Parade of Victory, which sharply contrasted with the popular glee on May 9 - carrier the constructions of the current Putinism.

The war, begun on February 24, 2022, was obviously conceived as the sequel to the annexation of Crimea, which would solve the problems of decreasing legitimacy and growing generational and economic contradictions. As Hitler explained to Goebbels in the spring of 1943, "War allows you to solve a series of problems that could not be solved at the usual time."

The “performance” of fascism began simultaneously with the annexation of Crimea and the first phase of the war against Ukraine. The demoniac “anti-Maidans” in Moscow, the processions of hired pumped up people in the center of Moscow with photographs of the “national traitor” Nemtsov, who headed the anti-war movement at that moment, were part of this “performance”. A full -scale war against Ukraine demanded its radicalization. Thus, it was not the war that was the result of the fascist movement, but the fascist “performance” was the design of the war.

The “performance” of fascism is carried out mainly through television, which involves the passivity (sofa) of the masses. We do not observe mass ecstasy and mobilization. Putin is not a charismatic leader: his attempts to speak in stadiums look unconvincing. В отличие от немецкого фашизма, путинский режим в качестве символического материала выбирает не молодое поколение или «человека труда», а пожилых и детей — «бабушку» с флагом и ее «внука» Алешу. Идеальных зрителей и статистов телешоу.

Как говорил Немцов в своем последнем интервью: «Сам Путин не фашист. Он просто цинично использует некоторые элементы прошлого, смешивает их с другими — например, с советскими традициями — и рождается гибрид, современный гибридный фашизм… А гибриды чрезвычайно устойчивы».

Это не фашизм: почему это важно

Марлен Ларюэль Ответ на вопрос, является ли российский режим после 24 февраля фашистским, разумеется, зависит от того, как мы определяем «фашизм» — используем ли минималистические или более детальные его определения. Этот ответ также будет зависеть от того, где мы локализуем наш поиск фашистского конструкта — в официальных нарративах, государственной политике, в обществе или в действиях российских военных.

Литература о фашизме чрезвычайно обширна и имеет давние традиции, но я отталкиваюсь здесь от [классического определения Роджера Гриффина]( https://brill.com/view/journals/fasc/1/1/article-p11.xml?language=en.) , согласно которому базовым здесь является миф о возрождении нации, формирующий «фашистское» видение мира и общества, а потому фашизм лучше всего определить как идеологическую систему, прославляющую национальное возрождение посредством войны.

Поэтому главным элементом, который делает сегодняшнюю Россию не подходящей под определение «фашистской», является для меня полное отсутствие общественной мобилизации в поддержку проекта возрождения нации через войну. Российский режим скрывает войну и даже грозит пятнадцатью годами тюремного заключения тем, кто называет «специальную военную операцию» войной. Он никоим образом не превозносит войну публично и не развивает нарративы прославления насилия как способа возрождения нации. Он стремится избежать широкомасштабной мобилизации мужчин и призывников. Он не верит в насилие как механизм tabula rasa, создающий нового человека и новый мировой порядок.

Так что же тогда собой представляет сегодняшняя Россия? Это все более авторитарный, персоналистский, патримониальный и империалистический режим, но не прибегающий к мифу мобилизации/регенерации нации и предпочитающий, наоборот, чтобы его граждане оставались демобилизованными и пассивно поддерживали его.

Есть, впрочем, и другие черты нынешней России, которые не подходят под определение фашизма. Здесь отсутствует систематическое насилие против заявленного «врага» внутри самой России. В то время как российская армия демонстрирует полное пренебрежение гражданским населением на поле боя, совершает многочисленные военные преступления и потенциальные преступления против человечности, такие как убийства и изнасилования, мы не наблюдаем никакого насилия, направленного против украинцев, живущих в России. Отсутствует идеология уничтожения всего этнически украинского в России помимо идеи уничтожения Украины как государства. При том что с начала войны часть российского политического истеблишмента демонстрирует отчетливые признаки восточнославянского империализма, это не ведет, однако, к отрицанию мультиэтничности самой России и идеологии этнического превосходства русских. Все эти особенности также говорят о том, что случай России не соответствует определению «фашизма».

Почему же так много политиков, публичных интеллектуалов и часть исследователей обращаются к мантре «русского фашизма»? Потому что это имеет политический смысл. Во-первых, это создает образ России как абсолютного Другого для Запада и демократии, как безнадежного случая, неизбежным результатом последних двух или трех десятилетий истории которого с самого начала являлось вторжение в Украину. Такое ретроспективное прочтение нынешней войны как неизбежности стирает любую историческую неопределенность, равно как и ответственность самого Запада за те или иные решения, обернувшиеся в итоге стратегическим тупиком и сползанием к войне.

Во-вторых, превращение России в абсолютного Другого помогает укреплять зеркальный образ Запада как «свободного мира», противостоящего тоталитаризму, и возвращает нас к бинарности холодной войны. Оно восстанавливает черно-белую картину идеологического противостояния, в которой «Запад» выступает как представитель «сил добра», и подразумевает, что картина этой новой решительной битвы автоматически восстановит легитимность либерализма, избавив его от необходимости искать ответы на те внутренние вызовы, которые его ослабляют.

И в-третьих, оно подразумевает, что война должна закончиться полным поражением и полным унижением России. То есть таким исходом, который представляется в реальности не только труднодостижимым, но и неточным в своем целеполагании, а потому опасным, и который призывает к максималистскому решению проблемы и предельно завышает ожидания, а следовательно, и формирует риски последующего глубокого разочарования.

Торжество ресентимента

Александр Морозов На мой взгляд, это «тот же самый» политический режим, он сложился во всех своих конструктивных элементах после рокировки, после возврата Путина в Кремль в 2012 году. Это тот же самый режим, но «вступивший в войну». Разумеется, война заостряет его черты. Но я не вижу фазового перехода.

Описание этого режима через «неофашизм» или «неосталинизм» носит публицистический характер. Это вполне оправданно с точки зрения борьбы с угрозами, которые создает режим Путина. Но если смотреть политологически, то ситуация, скорее, напоминает вступление Ирака в ирано-иракскую войну. Изменился ли политический режим Хуссейна в результате войны? Нет, он остался тем же баасистским режимом, с той же идеологией, с тем же характером принятия решений, с той же моделью работы аппарата и т. д.

Идеологический репертуар путинского режима очень беден. Есть корпус риторики и символики. Весь этот контур сложился задолго до войны. В сущности, вся риторика стоит на одной теме: «Россия защищается от гегемонии/агрессии/коварства Запада». В отличие от нацизма или сталинизма путинская модель не предполагает ни «создания нового человека», ни масштабных альтернативных культурных форм, ни культа «возвращения к античности». Идеологическая схема путинизма покоится исключительно на «обиде на Запад». Иначе говоря, путинизм использует топливо ресентимента, то есть смеси «обиды и величия», как и нацизм, но в отличие от исторического межвоенного фашизма в Европе для этого топлива у Кремля очень слабый движок.

Идеология Z, как мы ее видим на этом этапе, не содержит в себе «альтернативного универсализма». Нацизм и сталинизм — это системы с большими творческими возможностями, системы «большого стиля». Путинизм — это очень узкая, слабая рамка в этом смысле. Кремль пока ничего не смог прибавить к ядерному оружию и инерционному статусу члена пула стран — устроительниц мира после Второй мировой. Все это досталось ему от СССР. Ничего убедительного, никакой масштабной философии к этому не добавлено.

Безусловно, есть Дугин, есть Прилепин, есть аналог «фольксдойч» в образе «русского мира» и концепта «разделенного народа», есть инструменты гляйхшальтунга, то есть способы обеспечения «партийной лояльности», и другие узнаваемые элементы, которые можно квалифицировать как протофашизм, но все эти элементы, на мой взгляд, слишком нечетко стоят в повестке Путина. Кремль не в состоянии выстроить устойчивую мировоззренческую рамку, внутри которой фашизм смог бы начать «работать сам».

Путин обменял возможности экономического продвижения по всему миру (2005–2014) — а вместе с тем и возможности успешного идеологического закрепления своей модели на глобальном рынке идей — на абсолютно безнадежную модель «самоизоляции на почве ресентиментного антизападничества» (2014–2022). В 2005–2014 годах можно было предполагать, что путинизм разовьется в направлении концепции «новой Европы». Но сейчас уже ясно, что путинизм выбрал путь закрытия собственного «европейского проекта» и всех своих возможностей глобального продвижения. Я бы сказал, что это «тот же самый» политический режим, что и до войны 2022 года, просто окуклившийся и лишенный жизнеустроительной энергии и претензий на универсализм.