The failure of the blitzkrieg in 2022 was a serious but, as it seemed at the time, entirely recoverable setback for Putin. Russia held a manifold advantage over Kyiv in terms of human resources and economic capacity, making its victory in a prolonged war of attrition appear almost inevitable. Four years later, it is possible to state with confidence that this logic has failed and has largely run its course.

The failure of the blitzkrieg in 2022 was a serious, but, as it seemed, completely fixable, setback for Putin. Russia had a multiple advantage over Kiev in human resources and economic capabilities, which made its victory in a long war of attrition almost inevitable. Four years later, we can definitely say that this logic has not worked and has largely exhausted itself. Russia's military costs are growing significantly faster than its army is advancing to the borders of the Donetsk region.

Over the past two months, Ukraine's asymmetric aerial counteroffensive has evolved from a series of strikes against the land corridor to Crimea into a systematic campaign to isolate the peninsula and disrupt Russian logistics across southern Ukraine.

In two months, the Ukrainian asymmetric air counteroffensive has transformed from a series of attacks on the land corridor to Crimea into a systematic campaign to isolate the peninsula and undermine Russian logistics in the south.

The gasoline crisis, which rapidly spread across Russia during June, has become the main social problem of this summer. Now, with a certain lag, its consequences are beginning to spread throughout the Russian economy, and their effect has not yet fully manifested itself and is not fully appreciated. Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries and oil infrastructure are shifting the already unbalanced Russian economy one step further towards a crisis trajectory.

The petrol crisis, which spread rapidly across Russia throughout June, has become the most significant social issue this summer. Now, with a certain time lag, its consequences are beginning to spread through the Russian economy, and their full impact has yet to materialise or be properly assessed. Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries and oil infrastructure are pushing an already unbalanced Russian economy a step further along the path to crisis.

The rapidly growing gasoline crisis is just as quickly changing the information agenda and social atmosphere in Russia. The nervousness and frustration of the population is clearly visible in social networks and journalistic reports. But how does the situation look in public opinion polls? The first blow to the information agenda of the Russian citizen was dealt by Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries and Moscow in mid-June.

The rapidly escalating petrol crisis is reshaping both the news agenda and the social climate in Russia with equal speed. Public anxiety and frustration are readily apparent in social media and journalistic reporting. But how does the situation appear in public opinion surveys? The first blow to the average Russian’s information landscape came from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and on Moscow in mid-June.

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russian manpower losses in June were the highest since March 2025. However, unlike the period at the end of 2024 - beginning of 2025, the current level of losses does not turn into kilometers of enemy territory taken under control. In June, Russia lost 465 people to capture one kilometer, and according to the results of May-June, this figure is more than 700 people.

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russian personnel losses in June were the highest since March 2025. However, unlike the situation in late 2024 and early 2025, the current level of losses is not translating into kilometres of territory brought under Russian control. In June, Russia lost 465 personnel for every kilometre captured, while over May–June this figure exceeded 700 personnel.

Vladimir Putin's and the Russian command's insistent and untrue statements about successes on the battlefield, again heard at a military meeting on June 3, are unlikely to convince, including domestic audiences, that the Kremlin is moving closer to achieving the goals of its military campaign in Ukraine.

Vladimir Putin's and the Russian military command's persistent and demonstrably false claims of battlefield success, repeated during a military briefing on 3 June, are unlikely to convince even a domestic audience that the Kremlin is moving closer to achieving the objectives of its military campaign in Ukraine.

At first glance, the militarisation of the Russian economy appeared to benefit the regions. Military spending supported those with a high concentration of defence industries, while strong demand for labour increased the share of wages in GDP. This should have benefited regional budgets, which are heavily funded by personal income tax.

The militarization of the Russian economy, at first glance, benefited the regions: military spending supported regions with a high concentration of defense industries, and high demand for labor led to an increase in the share of wages in GDP. This was supposed to benefit the regions, whose budgets are filled by taxing individual incomes.

Vladimir Putin’s assessments of the situation in Russia and of the theatre of operations in Ukraine are diverging ever more sharply from both reality and the views held by ordinary Russians and the Russian elite. Putin continues to insist that the Russian army is advancing along the entire front, while portraying the damage inflicted by Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure as limited and readily manageable. In reality, the Russian army is not succeeding on the ground.