
Against the background of the reduction in the Russian economy and sanctions, the economic optimism of the population is at the maximum. The share of “economic optimists” in April and May 2022 exceeded the share of “economic pessimists” for the first time in all the available observation time and amounted to 34–35% - with an average value of 24% in 2020–2021, the FOM monitoring data . The Levada Center surveys confirm this trend: the calculated Re: Russia based on them is the crisis expectations index (the share of respondents, fearing delays or reduction of salaries, dismissal and prices) decreased from 42 points in March to 35 in May.
The growth of optimism and a decrease in crisis expectations can be explained by the improvement of “iconic” macroeconomic indicators (dollar, inflation rate): their return to the previous values after the March failure appeared to the population as a kind of “miracle of the defeated dragon of sanctions”. At the same time, even at the time of consumer hype and banking panic, the data of sociologists recorded the level of long -term indicators of economic well -being, not very different from the norm, which apparently indicates the adaptation of the population to short -term macroeconomic shocks.
Apparently, the May economic optimism of Russians is based both on the overall effect of mobilization - the growth of indicators of support for the regime and positive assessments of the country's prospects (“rally around the flag”), and on the impression that the crisis was very short -term and limited in its influence. However, in the future of the second and more deep wave of the crisis coming in the third or fourth quarters, which many economists expect and predict, this economic optimism can be subjected to a new test, and the indices of economic well-being will most likely decrease by the beginning of autumn.
These sociological surveys help to understand how the population evaluates the current economic situation and what changes awaiting in the future. It is these expectations that affect economic behavior - on savings, credit and consumer moods. For its economic models and macrogenosis, the Russian Central Bank has been using monthly questionnaires that the public opinion fund (FOM), starting in April 2014.
The survey is conducted according to a three-stage stratified sample of households (method-personal interview with Face-to-Face) and represents the entire population of Russia over 18 years. The main goal of the study is to monitor the inflationary expectations of the population, which consist of assessments of changes in prices for different groups of goods over the last month and expectations of changing these prices in the near future. These data complement the data of the Rosstat consumer price index .
In addition to the basic indicators related to inflation, the Central Bank also uses the general indicators of the level of economic optimism of the population built in polls. Optimists are those who are on the majority of questions about the prospects of changing the financial situation of the family, economic conditions in the country and the standard of living throughout the next year are positively answered; Pessimists - those who, in answers to the same questions, demonstrates negative expectations; Neutral - those who give multidirectional answers.
Questions on the basis of which respondents are grouped: 1) How, in your opinion, will the financial situation of your family in the next 12 months change: will improve, will remain unchanged or worsen? 2) If we talk about the economic conditions in the country as a whole, what do you think, the next 12 months will be a good or bad time for the country's economy? 3) What do you think from the above will occur in the coming year in the country's economy in such an indicator as the level of production? 4) What do you think that of the above will occur in the coming year in the country's economy in such an indicator as the standard of living of the population?The first wave of the crisis associated with the invasion of Ukraine practically did not affect the ratio of optimists and pessimists among respondents interviewed by the FOM (see Fig. 1). In January 2022, 26% of respondents were optimistic and 32% - pessimistic. In March, this ratio only changed slightly (22 and 35%, respectively), while March became a peak of negative consumer expectations both based on the results of the FOM monitoring and on indirect signs: Sberindex data showed a short -term surplus of purchases of food and non -food goods, which suggests that the population was purchased for the future. Published later statistics confirm this.
At the same time, the FOM survey data for April and May demonstrate a sharp take -off of optimism: the share of those who positively assess the economic prospects of their family and the country as a whole (34–35%) has become maximum since January 2020. At the same time, the share of oscillations decreased to 36–37%, and pessimists - to 28-30%. Thus, it was in April that the number of optimists for the first time became more than the number of pessimists.
The growth of optimism in assessments of the socio-economic situation, reflected in the data of the Federal Antimonopoly Service, is also confirmed by the polls of the Levada Center. The Levada-Center regularly calculated by the social mood index , integrating the distribution of answers to a number of questions about the attitude to the nearest future family, country, about the trust of state institutions, etc., in May 2022, compiled peaks of 92 points. To a large extent, such index values are provided by political factors - an improvement in the assessments of the authorities and the direction of the country's movement, however, the passage of expectations and family, which are part of it, also demonstrate positive dynamics (+7 points in each). On the contrary, the consumer sentiment index , closer to the assessment of the purely economic mood of the population, demonstrates negative dynamics: in April it dropped to 70 points, which is 4 points less than in February, before the invasion.
The “Levada-Center” data allow, in addition to the indices of social and consumer moods, to build another index-the crisis expectations index, reflecting the fears of respondents regarding the reduction of income and the loss of work due to the crisis situation. The index integrates the answers of the respondents to the four questions asked by the Levada Center in March and May (Podmodnoy Poll Face-to-Face, All-Russian Representative Sample):
The number of pessimists, that is, people waiting for a reduction in income, dismissal or increase in prices, in March 2022 amounted to 42% - exactly as much as optimists. However, in May, the number of optimists increased to 50%, and the share of pessimists decreased to 35%. Such trends are repeated in each of the components (questions) of the index (see Fig. 2). Thus, 31% of respondents were expected in March, and in May - 23%, the same indicators were about the risk of dismissal. The greatest alarm is the increase in prices, but on this issue the number of pessimists decreased from 66% in March to 59% in May, and the share of optimists increased from 30 to 37%, respectively.
The tendency of growth of economic optimism and a decrease in fears is resistant in all key socio-demographic groups. For example, Figure 3 presents the distributions of optimists and pessimists on issues of reduction or delayed wages. The greatest reduction in the fraction of the pessimists and the increase in the share of optimists occurred in young age cohorts (18–24 and 25–39 years). In March, among the 18–24-year-olds there was the greatest share of pessimists compared to all other ages (38%). In terms of income, the greatest increase in optimism (+13%) is observed among the Russians who have chosen from poverty - those who have enough money for food and clothes, but they can only buy goods on long -term consumptions (TDP).
It is possible to explain the growth of economic optimism in May 2022, traced in the FOM and “Levada Center” from two positions.
On the one hand, as already indicated in Re: Russia “ imposed consensus. What do polls say about the support of war and can they believe them? ", During the foreign policy crises in the respondents 'answers, the phenomenon of" rally under the flag "manifests itself, that is, the short -term growth of respondents' loyalty to the government in many ways. All support and assessments are growing sharply, including, for example, an assessment of the general situation in the country: in 2014, after the “joining” Crimea, satisfaction with the state of affairs grew by 18 p. From January to March, and in 2022, after the start of the invasion of Ukraine, by 19 p. From January to April. However, still issues related to the assessment of personal economic prospects, the risk of dismissal or reduction of salaries should be less affected by this effect, the more general issues related to the country. However, in all data, including in the crisis expectations index, we see an unambiguous increase in optimism in these indicators.
On the other hand, perhaps the rebound of the indicators of economic optimism is associated with how the effect of the sanctions and the crisis caused by them is perceived by society. Initially - at the end of February and early March, at the time of the currency leap and mass departure from Russia of foreign companies - a significant part of the population panicked, which is discussed by the data about bank deposits removed at this moment and “purchases” made “in reserve” . However, later it turned out that the effect of introduced restrictions, at least, would not be instantaneous: the collapse of the banking system did not happen, most enterprises suspended activities, but chose a relatively soft scenario for leaving Russia - in compliance with the agreements on the transfer of assets and maintaining labor collectives, the currency course began to strengthen rapidly. By the end of March - early April, only inflation caused concern, but in May it began to slow down. In this regard, the essential part of the FOM respondents and the Levada Center could form ideas that Russia had already coped with the crisis, and did it as quickly and successfully, despite the gloomy forecasts. This "miracle" of a rapid getting rid of the crisis could affect the jump in economic optimism.
However, as various economic centers write, sanctions and restrictions on imports are most likely the deferred effect, which will manifest itself in the third or fourth quarters in the form of a second and deeper wave of the crisis. In this case, the economic optimism of the population can be short -term and already in early autumn is replaced by a wave of pessimism.