Three phases of adaptation

War with Ukraine in Russian public opinion

Despite the fact that anti-Ukrainian sentiments have been heated by Russian state media in the mid-2000s, these efforts had not had such a significant effect, until in the 2010s propaganda connected the theme of “Ukrainian nationalism” and “fascism”, destroying a sense of unity with Ukrainians, writes Lev Gudkov, the scientific director of the Levada Center, in the article “Three Phases of Adaptation”. This article Re: Russia opens a series of publications “Rhetoric of War”, dedicated to how the discourse of the war in political rhetoric, propaganda and public opinion of Russia operates and changes.

The radicalization of anti -Ukrainian propaganda at the end of 2021 caused a wave of fear in Russian society in Russian society, Lev Gudkov notes. As a result, the first reaction to the invasion of Ukraine was not quite consolidated: saying mainly about its support, almost equally respondents noted both positive and negative emotions as a reaction at the beginning of the war. However, this fear was largely stopped by the very concept of “special operation”.

In general, the reaction of society to the war (as it reflected in mass surveys) has passed three stages during this time. Insolidly consolidated support of war against the backdrop of fear and shock at first was replaced by the period of the greatest consolidation and mobilization of its supporters: March and April became months of the maximum declarative support of the war. However, since May, as the war took on a protracted character, the period of routinization began. It is characterized, on the one hand, by the decline in interest in news from Ukraine, and the most noticeable among young people and opponents of war, who, realizing the impossibility of changing the course of things, began to fenced off the problem. On the other hand, some growth of anxiety regarding the victims and destruction of war, its protracted nature and the uncertainty of the future. And although the share of those who feel responsibility for the death of people and the continuation of hostilities has grown somewhat, the dominant mechanism of compensation for this anxiety remains the “transfer of responsibility” for what is happening to “external forces”.

One European diplomat in a conversation with me said: “We thought that this was Putin’s war with Ukraine, and now, looking at the last data of the“ Levada Center ”, we come to the conclusion that this is the war of the Russian people with Ukraine.” It is not my business to refute the deep pessimism of Western observers and politicians who have long sympathized with democratic changes in Russia, but disappointed with the turn of the Putin regime to aggressive and reactionary imperial traditionalism. It makes no sense to dispute the ideological assessments hiding behind the conceptual entities like the “metaphysics of the Russian people”, and hence the Russians' eternal inclination to despotism. ” Their essence today is a farewell to the illusions of the peaceful relations of the West with Russia, bringing features under the 30-year period of post-Soviet development. The only way to keep some threads of understanding is an explanation of the technology justifying the war of totalitarian consensus, which is imposed by a repressive regime.

Background: the beginning of the conflict and the role of the topic of "fascism"

On February 24, it was a complete surprise for the Western public and opponents of Putin in Russia itself. In contrast, Russian public opinion has long and thoroughly prepared for war with Ukraine.

The anti -Ukrainian theme on federal television channels arose in parallel with the establishment of the “sovereign democracy” regime. Waves of hostility accompanied each elected period in Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution”, when a movement was clearly indicated in Ukrainian society in support of integration with the EU and entering NATO. The prospect of independent of Moscow and successfully developing Ukraine, a full -fledged member of the European community, posed a serious threat to the regime that unfolds the country towards the conservative and anti -iliberal dictatorship. However, until 2008, the propaganda effect of these efforts was insignificant, since the convictions of propaganda focused on the topic of threats of “color revolutions” as an instrument of Western geopolitics. The Russian population did not occupy this too much, it did not see problems for itself here and attributed the anti -Ukrainian rhetoric of the Kremlin to fussy bustle on self -preservation of the authorities. So, already in 2005-2007, from 49 to 53% of Russians recognized that “Ukraine is gradually approaching Western countries and moving away from Russia”, but this did not change the prevailing positive attitude towards it (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1. The dynamics of a positive and negative attitude towards Ukraine (the question “How do you feel about Ukraine now?”), % Of the number of respondents

The situation began to change after August 2008, when the Ukrainian leadership actually supported Georgia during the military conflict around South Ossetia. The release of Georgia from the sphere of influence of Russia caused a powerful wave of anti -Georgian propaganda, which reanimated the imperial representations of the population, which was indirectly reflected in mass relation to Ukraine (see Figure 1, 2008-2009). However, a radical change in sympathy for antipathy occurred only after the Maidan and the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014. The patriotic euphoria, which covered the Russian society, not only restored Putin’s popularity in 2011-2012, but also stimulated imperial and militaristic sentiments. The Crimean success of the "green men" was projected to the eastern regions of Ukraine, pulling the formation of separatist forces in the Donbass, impossible without the financial and military support of Russia. The next step of Russian expansion was to be the “Novorossia” - a repetition of the scenario of “Independence” not only Donetsk and Lugansk, but also Odessa and other regions after the introduction of pro -Russian armed groups, as was previously in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria.

The failure of the Novorossiya plan demanded explanations and work with public opinion, putting forward the theme of “Ukrainian Nazism” as the main line of propaganda. From that moment on, anti -Ukrainian demagogy has closely intertwined with the traditional anti -shipping of the Russian bureaucracy. The introduction in 2014 of not very thoughtful Western sanctions against Russia rather gave the opposite effect: their negative impact was relatively easily neutralized, but the very fact of their introduction became the basis for the identification of Ukrainian nationalism with Nazism, on the one hand, and with the Russophobia of the West, on the other.

The rhetoric of the denunciation of “Ukrainian fascism” connected the main motive of the late Soviet ideology: the justification of the USSR and Stalinism by the victory over fascist Germany, turning this victory into the moral and symbolic capital of Russia as the heir to the USSR, into a key mechanism of national identity and self -affirmation [1]. And if until this moment propaganda was not able to break the feelings of the mutual proximity of Russians and Ukrainians (in 2001-2004, two -thirds of Russians did not consider Ukraine a “abroad”), then the transition to the language of the “fight against fascism”, the language of World War II, almost completely undermined the consciousness of the proximity of Russia and Ukraine and sympathy for Ukrainians (see Fig. 1). Even during the Maidan, the bulk of the respondents (68–75%) believed that Russia should not intervene in Ukrainian affairs, and the course to join the EU is the internal business of Ukrainian society (only 22% considered it necessary to impede this by any means, including the military). But since March 2014, the attitude to events in Ukraine has completely changed. The theme of Ukrainian “fascism” and “Nazism” consistently “divided” Ukrainians, removing moral taboos and restrictions on violence in relation to them.

[1] The use of the word “fascism” in propaganda has a long history, which goes in the 1930s of the struggle against Trotskyism, denouncing European Social Democrats as traitors and allies of fascism, opponents of the Communists, transferring this rhetoric to the accused at the Stalinist processes, etc. During the Cold War, such a label was willingly reinforced on any critics of the USSR. In perestroika, this practice seemed to be forgotten, but in 2003-2007 it was again in demand to discredit the Baltic countries that joined the EU and NATO (you can recall the bloated scandal with the “bronze soldier” in Estonia, accusations of rehabilitation of Nazism in Latvia or Lithuania, etc.).

Theme of "War": rhetoric and factors of its excuse

The injection at the end of 2021 by the militaristic and anti -Western hysteria in the Russian media caused the strongest fear of the population in front of the approaching “large” (“world”) war. 71% of respondents were afraid of such a development of events (this is a maximum of more than 30 years of our research), but hoped that they would “carry” and the matter, as usual, would limit themselves to verbal skirmishes. With whom the war would be, it was more or less clear: 37% believed that with Ukraine, and 25% - that with NATO. In February 2022 (even before the “special operation”), 45%were already considered a probable war with Ukraine, and 49%unlikely. At the same time, 52% of the respondents were such a prospect of scarecrow, but the rest still did not believe in it and remained calm. “Bad” were 52% of respondents at this moment, and “good” - 36%. But already in May, similar indicators were: 66% (“bad”) against 22% (“good”), and the “Very bad” option prevailed in the first group - 41%.

Nevertheless, the beginning of hostilities caused Russians extremely contradictory feelings. “Pride of Russia”, “inspiration, joy” were experienced respectively 51 and 14% of respondents. On the contrary, anxiety, horror, fear felt 31%, shock, anger, indignation - 19%, shame, depression and numbness - another 14%. Some respondents at the same time experienced both fear and satisfaction (see Fig. 3: 65% of respondents noted the positive emotions that they experienced after the outbreak of war, and 62% were contradictory and negative). But the intensity of these emotions and their expressions differed markedly among different groups: negative experiences are more characteristic of young Russians, positive feelings - twice as high as average in older people and residents of the province (villages, small and medium cities).

The level of approval and personal support of the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine rose from 68% in February to 81% in March, stabilizing in the future in the range of 74–77% (see Fig. 4).

Figures 2-3. The level of support for a special operation and emotions caused by military operations in Ukraine, March 2022, % of the number of respondents

Support

Emotions (respondents could choose more than one answer)

Figure 4. The dynamics of support for the “special operation” (the question “Do you personally support or not the action of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine?”), % Of the number of respondents

It would be a mistake to consider such a degree of approval of Putin’s policy and war with Ukraine by an expression of the spontaneous reaction of society. An organized consensus is an indispensable condition for the functioning of a society that becomes totalitarian. It is impossible without a monopoly of the mode at the media, turned into a propaganda machine, which brings in mass consciousness simplified images of what is happening. At the same time, a complete ban on alternative information is introduced, which means that Russian society is isolated from information about military losses, looting, murders, rape and other crimes against the population of Ukraine. With the beginning of the conflict, dozens of famous independent media were closed, Facebook, Twitter, several thousand sites were blocked, the persecution of journalists, arrests and fines for discrediting the army and special operations began. Three quarters of the population of Russia were in the information bubble of propaganda. Only a small percentage of users (approximately 7–8%) with the necessary skills and competencies can bypass the locks introduced by Roskomnadzor. Free information space in Russia has been reduced significantly. The cynical technology for processing public opinion in such conditions sharply increased its efficiency.

Three quarters of those who approve the war (as well as the activities of the president) receive information mainly from the TV or trust only to him. While only 24%, and 54–59% of the opponents of the special operation to understand what is happening in the zone of military operations, mainly Internet and social networks, among the viewers do not approve the war. At the same time, the presence of relatives in Ukraine does not play a special role.

Additional support factors should be considered the arguments of the justification of war. Firstly, the argument “Our military operations were caused by a threat from the West” (“We” in this perspective-“victims” of someone else's aggression, NATO expansion). Secondly, references to the obligation to free the population of the Donbass suffering from Ukrainian Nazis. Thirdly, the war, which received the hypocritical name of the “special military operation”, was perceived from the very beginning (in accordance with the assurances of Putin and the military command) as a local event limited in terms and scale. Thus, it was emphasized that this is not the “big”, world war, which the population was afraid of. And these efforts made some reassurance in the mass consciousness, clinging to the versions proposed by propaganda, taking off a sense of internal discomfort. It is important that the vast majority of respondents (72%) are sure that military operations cannot switch to the territory of Russia itself and that such a scenario should be completely excluded from the consideration.

The March survey (at the peak of the approval of the “special operation”) showed the assimilation of ideas about the targets of war formed by propaganda: 43% believed that it was being conducted to protect the Russian or Russian -language population of Ukraine, 25% in order to prevent NATO attack, another 14% - to restrain NATO expansion. The goals of the “denazifications” present in the rhetoric of propaganda, due to the lack of visible successes, gradually fade into the background-only 21% of respondents mentioned it. It is even less believe that the task of the “operation” is to attach Ukraine to Russia - 3%.

Nevertheless, censorship, criminal punishments and propaganda cannot fully explain the high support of the war by the Russian population. It should be considered more important that the prolonged work of propaganda and other social institutions led to the reproduction of deeply lying layers of the totalitarian political culture of the Soviet type, paralyzing the very ability of the formation of subjective opinion and assessments of the actions of repressive power. This is the inertia of Soviet consciousness, the thinking of man of the totalitarian state.

We are also talking about mass identification with the "great power", its military power, values ​​and recognition of its sovereign right to impose its will to other countries. To the question (asked on February 27) "Did Russia have the right to start military operations in Ukraine?" ** 48% of respondents said: ** "Yes, she has the right to do so, she must protect her interests." In this type of consciousness, there are no ideas about international law and morality. Such answers are the expression of the significance of the imperial or great -power syndrome and the law of force as the norms of collective representations. Another 29% said that "in fact, Russia does not have the right to do so, but in the case of protecting the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, it behaves correctly." This opportunist version of the response can be considered as a transitional type or as a form of erosion of the dominant structure of consciousness: respondents use the arguments that propaganda back in 2014 for self -justification. And only stable 15% of respondents denied Russia the right to war, experiencing shame, indignation and despair.

In other words, the bulk of Russians are ready to use any reason to justify the actions of the authorities with which these people identify themselves as a part of a whole - “their” country. Among those who approve the activities of Putin as the President, the share of supporting military operations in Ukraine is 84–85% (opponents of the war in this mass of only 11–12%). And, on the contrary, among the opponents of Putin, the picture of opinions is the opposite: the share of the invasion of the Russian army to Ukraine is 62–66% and only 26–28% of the President’s critics approve of special operation (in May - 34% with 56% non -supporting ones). The proportion of Putin’s policies in relation to Ukraine is higher among young people (in June - 36% with 20% of “disagreed” on average in the sample) and minimum in older people (8%). In April, 58%supported the war in Moscow, in large cities - 69%, in the provinces from 75 to 80%. By June, the differences between the center and the periphery in this regard were practically erased, except for the slightly weaker condemnation of the war in small cities and villages (5-7 percentage points).

At the same time, refusing Ukraine in the status of a sovereign state, public opinion does not consider it as the initiator of the war or the cause of the conflict: the Russians invariably (as before the war with Georgia) were responsible for the US and NATO (60% in February, 57% in April; however, among 20-year-old respondents, the share of such answers is reduced to 36%). The Ukrainian leadership accused only 14-17%. Виновным в агрессии против Украины и оккупации ее территорий российское руководство считали всего от 1% опрошенных в феврале до 7% в апреле (примерно столько же, сколько и тех, кто возлагал ответственность за войну на непризнанные республики, — 1%). К маю появилось некоторое число тех, кто считает, что «никто не виноват» — 8% или «все виноваты» — 3%. Это демонстрирует появление типа людей, которые, ощущая неловкость и противоречия пропаганды, стараются размазать ответственность подразумеваемой ссылкой на некие непреодолимые обстоятельства, снимая тем самым вину с себя и с России.

Признаки новой фазы: рутинизация и перенос ответственности

Абсолютное большинство опрошенных неизменно уверено, что война закончится победой России (75%), в победу Украины верит лишь 1%, и эта цифра не меняется на протяжении трех месяцев. Но уже в мае 15% полагают, что военные действия затянутся надолго и ни одна из сторон не одержит верх. Среди последних заметно больше противников спецоперации — более молодых респондентов (19–20%), москвичей (22%). То же распределение в ответах на вопрос об успешности «спецоперации»: доминирующее большинство считает, что она успешно продвигается (73%, майский опрос), 15% не видят ее результатов, в том числе 4% считают ее провальной. Максимум уверенности в том, что «все идет по плану», приходится на периферийные города (75–77%), минимум — на Москву (65%).

Однако, несмотря на эту общую уверенность, война затягивается и внимание к событиям в Украине слабеет, причем в первую очередь — среди молодежи и противников войны. Если в конце февраля 48% были уверены, что «операция» займет несколько дней, максимум — несколько недель (лишь 18% считали, что это потребует месяцы и 11% — год и больше), то в мае уже 49% склонялись к мысли, что война будет длиться от полугода до года, а 21% полагал, что даже больше года. В июне последних стало 27%, а доля «оптимистов» сократилась до 3%.

Происходит рутинизация и привыкание к войне, к монотонным сводкам военных, а также — к вербальной агрессии одних и тех же участников политических ток-шоу.

В представлениях респондентов повысилась вероятность перерастания войны с Украиной в войну с НАТО (в феврале боялись этого 30%, в мае — уже 48%). Но этот страх рождается спонтанно, уже вне связи с пропагандой, из слабого, но все же начавшегося осмысления последствий политики российского руководства. В особенности пугает (в мае в этом признался каждый второй опрошенный) перспектива применения ядерного оружия российской стороной, встречающей упорное сопротивление украинской армии. Растут и сомнения в объективности освещения телевидением хода военных действий в Украине: 53% доверяют телевидению, полагая, что оно объективно подает события, 41% в этом сомневается или считает информацию необъективной; среди молодежи негативные оценки телевидения дают 59% опрошенных. Но и доверие к интернету и соцсетям ненамного выше: объективной подачу информации там считают 37%, необъективной — 42–44%.

Тревога, вызванная затягиванием военных действий, составляет психологический и социальный фон понимания текущих событий. О ней раз за разом говорили 80–82% опрошенных. Главные поводы для нее и причины недовольства военной операцией (март): «люди гибнут, разрушения» (43% опрошенных), вторглись в другое государство (19%), «наши мальчики умирают» (8%). В мае ответы стали более определенными: «гибель людей» беспокоит 47%, факт вторжения и военных действий — 26%, «неопределенность» — еще 13%. Эти три повода для беспокойства составляют три четверти всех ответов.

Рисунок 5. Причины беспокойства (вопрос «Что именно вас беспокоит в текущих событиях в Украине?»), % от числа опрошенных, которых беспокоят события в Украине, открытый вопрос

Таблица 1. Отношение к собственной моральной ответственности (вопрос «Как вы считаете, несут ли такие люди, как вы, моральную ответственность за гибель мирных жителей и разрушения в Украине?»), % от числа опрошенных

Несколько увеличилась и доля тех, кто ощущает моральную ответственность за гибель мирных жителей (c 28 до 36%). Поэтому нельзя сказать, чтобы антивоенные взгляды и моральные оценки, осуждающие действия российского руководства и армии, не проникали в сознание населения. Однако ответственность за войну принимает на себя незначительное меньшинство — лишь каждый десятый россиянин. Но даже очень расширительно толкуя такую категорию морали, как «личную ответственность» и «вину» (присоединяя к «безусловно несут» уклончивое «несут в какой-то степени»), приходится признать, что угрызения совести присущи не более 28–36% российского населения. Абсолютное большинство, как всегда, не хочет отвечать за участие в преступлениях своего государства.

Для большинства опрошенных всяческие сомнения «гасятся» переносом ответственности и возмущения на обобщенный «Запад». Причины резко негативного осуждения действий России абсолютным большинством стран в мире объясняются через банальные мотивы «русофобии»: «они подчиняются давлению США и НАТО» (36%), «западные СМИ сознательно дезинформируют и дезориентируют население этих стран» (29%), «мир всегда был против России» (27%). Лишь меньшинство в состоянии назвать реальные основания резкой критики России: «они возмущены действиями России», «Россия нарушила международное право» (12 и 16% соответственно), «они боятся, что Россия поступит с ними так же, как с Украиной» (15%, имеется в виду, конечно, в первую очередь позиция балтийских стран и Польши).

Примечательно, что мотивы, которые приписывают россияне западным странам, налагающим санкции на Россию, ее руководство и политический класс, лишены какой бы то ни было идеи права, человечности и морали. На вопрос «К чему стремятся страны Запада, ужесточая санкции против России?» 74% опрошенных уверенно говорят: «ослабить и унизить Россию» (60% респондентов в возрасте 18–54 лет и 80% в возрасте 55 лет и старше; образование, место проживания, степень материального достатка в данном случае роли не играют). 12% считают, что ими движет желание «остановить войну, разрушение и гибель людей» (22% среди молодых, и лишь 9% среди пожилых респондентов). И еще 8% согласны с тем, что Запад хочет «восстановить геополитическое равновесие, нарушенное присоединением Крыма к России».

Тем не менее часть респондентов (более молодых и образованных, что называется — «продвинутых») обеспокоена санкциями Запада, в особенности — заморозкой части золотовалютных резервов (49%), экономическими ограничениями (38%), равно как и уходом западных компаний из России (27%) и прекращением действия в стране платежных систем и карт (25%). При этом негативное действие санкций ощутили на себе, на положении своей семьи лишь 16%, остальные либо не сознают связи между войной и повседневными проблемами, либо действительно война их не затрагивает всерьез (май). Поэтому, по их мнению, действовать российское руководство в ответ на санкции должно как всегда: продолжать придерживаться своей линии, невзирая на действия Запада. Готовность к компромиссам предпочитают лишь 19% опрошенных.

Мои первоначальные предположения, что война с Украиной довольно скоро вызовет общее недовольство и протесты населения, шокированного немотивированной агрессией России, разрушениями и гибелью людей, не оправдались в результатах последующих социологических опросов. Неверной оказалась и посылка, что неизбежные санкции мирового сообщества, с одной стороны, падение жизненного уровня населения, сокращение социальных расходов, осознание последствий и влияния войны на благосостояние обывателей, с другой, непременно и в обозримом времени приведут к росту негативного отношения к власти.

Четыре месяца военных действий не вызвали серьезных потрясений в массовом сознании большинства населения. (Не надо путать это обстоятельство с реакцией радикального меньшинства.) Преобладающий осенью 2021 года страх перед большой войной и нежелание войны уже в марте 2022 года заметно ослабли. Март и апрель стали месяцами декларативной поддержки войны, в мае и июне появились признаки рутинизации, равнодушия, привыкания и ослабления интереса к происходящему, особенно у негативно настроенной к власти молодежи, почувствовавшей, что она не может повлиять на ситуацию и политику режима, и пытающейся найти оправдание собственному оппортунизму.

Возможно, в условиях тотального информационного контроля и усиления репрессий для понимания катастрофических последствий войны для страны в целом требуется гораздо больше времени и усилий по рационализации положения дел. Но на данный момент картина именно такова.