Alexander Verkhovsky - about the work of the SOVA Center and its liquidation

Human rights activist Alexander Verkhovsky has been the head of the SOVA analytical center for more than 20 years. This is the only structure in Russia that systematically studies xenophobia, nationalism and hate crime law enforcement. Also, SOVA experts monitor violations of freedom of conscience and evaluate the practice of anti-extremist legislation. For the last ten years, Verkhovsky was a member of the Presidential Council for Human Rights - but after the start of the "special operation" he was expelled. And in April, the Moscow City Court ruled to liquidate the "Owl" on a frankly far-fetched pretext. "Street" talked with Alexander Verkhovsky about the history of "Owl", incidents of law enforcement, the influence of the center on legislation - and about the problems of nationalism during the "special operation".

– How did you first become interested in the topics of political extremism, nationalism and xenophobia?

- In 1989 - scary to say! - we, a group of comrades, created an organization that existed in the form of the samizdat newspaper Panorama. Then it became known as the research center. The essence of both the newspaper and the center was in the study of new social movements. Actually, they were all quite new for 1989. And the nationalists were just one of many; I didn't specialize in them. But in the mid-1990s, I randomly got to do something about them. So I got carried away with this topic - and since then, in general, I have been doing it.

Further, this topic changed a lot, because the nationalists of the 1990s and the nationalists of the "zero" were quite different from each other. The first were mostly nostalgic people - some for the Stalinist Soviet Union, some for imaginary Slavic pre-Christian antiquities, some for something else. But they hardly practiced violence, it was secondary to them.

Basically, these were completely political associations that hoped to come to power through political means. They just got worse and worse at it - and then they basically fell apart from complete hopelessness.

They were replaced by a new wave, which emphasized street violence as the main tool for the revolutionary "transformation" of society - in a racist spirit of interest to them. Accordingly, the subject of our study has also changed. In 2002, the Panorama Center was divided, and thus the Owl Center was created.

- It turns out that the surge of violence occurred much later than the collapse of the Union. Can we then say that the new ideology of nationalism was influenced not by internal Russian ideas, but rather by global racism, global colonialism?

- Formally, it is. The new mass ideology has become very popular among young people - especially teenagers. In the press, it began to be called skinheading. But skinheading is still not an ideology, but rather a style. It's just that the majority of skinheads in Russia have historically turned out to be ultra-right. Yes, they professed completely Western racist views, and in this sense they were part of global events. But the emergence of this wave, which originated in the mid-1990s, was preceded by internal causes. When we talk about a political movement - even if it looks like a bunch of hooligans - it rebuilds itself from the existing reality. For them, that reality was what they called "old nationalists" from the 1990s.

[“Young people”] saw them as strange losers who fail at nothing and who spend their time in endless and useless discussions about how Russia should be arranged. Apparently, it seemed so hopelessly empty that it was replaced by a greatly simplified view of things. "We need a white revolution!" – and the rest will somehow follow and settle down. All other disagreements became secondary.

And since about 2000, the views of the new [far-right] political activists have been based on a sharply increased level of ethnic intolerance in society. Which really jumped at that moment - and since then has kept for many years at a fairly high level.

- Was this the reason or one of the reasons for the opening of the SOVA center?

- Not really. At first, Sova dealt only with the topic of freedom of conscience - religious-state relations - and hate speech in the media, which was very relevant then. And only then did we inherit from Panorama the theme of studying Russian nationalism as a political movement. And since nationalism has changed in the direction of street violence, it began to be perceived not only as a political problem, but also as a human rights problem. Prior to this, nationalism was seen as a matter of political controversy. And when people are killed in large numbers on the streets, that's another matter.

There was a task to reach out to society and the state - after all, something really had to be done with street violence. It’s not that the state didn’t notice it at all: in the same year with the advent of our center, the Law on Combating Extremist Activities was adopted.

It is clear that we had some complaints about this approach. Which have been discussed for more than 20 years since then.

– Yes, in a recent interview you recalled that many human rights activists considered the wording of “extremism” in the 2002 law to be too broad – while others, on the contrary, considered just such a law necessary at that time…

– You have to understand that the 1990s were full of talk about the threat of what was then called “Russian fascism”. This, of course, is not a good wording - it was precisely radical Russian nationalism in its various forms that was meant. But many human rights activists and generally democratically oriented people perceived him as a very serious threat. Everyone remembered how it happens when there are real street clashes with their participation - until the fall of 1993. On the other hand, in the early 2000s there was very active terrorism under the flag of radical Islam. And the anti-extremist law was designed in such a way as to cover everything at once in one fell swoop. This [in those years] could be perceived as a positive approach. And instrumentally, he really brought some benefit, this should not be denied. Another thing is that later the shortcomings of the law outweighed. Although at first some people simply did not see them.

It was 2002. Another country, other ideas about the limits of possible outrages. Yes, if we talk about the discussion among human rights activists, then critical remarks about the law [they] did not ignore. But then it was still possible to say: “Of course, our laws are written sloppily, who would doubt it. But they won't be abused the way you tell us here, will they? So don't scare us needlessly."

Why did you find it important to learn hate speech?

– It is important to study everything that seems to be socially significant. Back then, hate speech in the media was undoubtedly a significant topic. Approximately from the zero year the level of intolerance (intolerance. - “AU”) of the society jumped sharply. Then all this without brakes poured out into ordinary registered media - not somewhere on the Internet! - which were published in quite a wide circulation. And there was a feeling that the negative background around this topic would gradually rise, rise until it comes to bloodshed. It didn't happen - but the fears were real.

The problem was two-sided. On the one hand, it is bad when someone incites hatred towards some groups of people. On the other hand, if measures are taken to limit hate speech, then these measures should not restrict freedom of expression too much. And here there is no perfect balance, it cannot be found anywhere in the world - it is fundamentally impossible. But you have to look for it. And then our society was quite innocent in this regard: there were practically no restrictions in the mass media then, and no one thought about it very much. As well as the problems that may arise for freedom of speech.

And freedom of speech was then really tested. This censorship has almost outlived the language of hatred - and not at all someone's educational efforts, unfortunately.

- And in 2002, the government persecuted the nationalists more for violent crimes? Or were they persecuted for the words too?

- They were always persecuted for words, it was just piece events. We have been collecting data on the application of the relevant article 282 of the Criminal Code for a long time (inciting hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity. - “AU”). So, in the 90s there were literally a few such cases - separate well-known trials in which systematic propagandists of hatred were tried. And by no means always these processes ended with their condemnation. That is, [then] the article was applied more or less normally, as it is roughly applied now in Western Europe - in special cases. And in the noughties the situation was not very different.

And for violence in the early 2000s attracted, of course. Then the main complaint was that it was small and that the racist motive of the crime was considered an aggravating circumstance only in the case of murder. This changed only in 2007, and before that they generally tried to ignore it.

I well remember the speech of the then head of the Moscow police, Vladimir Pronin (he headed the capital's police department in 2001-2009. - "AU"). He said that reports about skinheads were all fiction. Like, there are just hooligans, “they fight, so what.” Pronin completely ignored the scale of the problem, which was quite impressive even then.

Gradually this changed - and it did not happen very abruptly. By and large, [hate-motivated] violence has been prosecuted on a large scale since about 2007. And then the scale of these persecutions grew very rapidly. As a result, the wave of violence was brought down radically - but in parallel, cases of hate propaganda began to be filed en masse. This mainly concerned statements on the Internet. You can even see on the graph how one category of cases has replaced another.

This was partly due to political reasons: accelerations were noticeable in 2012 and 2014-15. But in many ways it was a bureaucratic event - related to reporting on the category of extremist crimes. And this outrage continued for several years, until it was slowed down from above. Approximately in the second half of 2017, a strong-willed decision was made to end the multiplication of meaningless sentences for intolerant, but very insignificant actions - jokes, pictures ...

As a result, the number of “extremist” criminal cases for statements has dropped sharply. But then, unfortunately, it began to grow again - due to other articles of the Criminal Code.

The law on the partial decriminalization of Article 282 of the Criminal Code (“Inciting hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity”) was adopted by the State Duma at the end of 2018. It was decided that only persons who have committed at least two relevant administrative offenses during the year (Article 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses) are subject to criminal liability. The legislators went for a partial decriminalization of Art. 282 after a series of high-profile absurd criminal cases, such as the persecution of Barnaul resident Maria Motuznaya for publishing an Internet meme in May 2018.

- Is there any merit of "Sova" in the partial decriminalization of Article 282?

– We did not offer this particular option [partial decriminalization]. Like many lawyers, we believe that an administrative prejudice is not a good idea. On the other hand, it turned out much better than it was.

I think that to some extent, our analysis and criticism influenced the turn that happened even before the introduction of the prejudice, and the explanations of the Supreme Court.

– Ulitsa discussed with forensic expert Dmitry Dubrovsky* the following paradox: in the 2000s, many intellectuals supported the persecution of the ultra-right, including participating in forensic examinations. And now both forensic examination and the Criminal Code are used to persecute a completely liberal public ...

You know, it's not exactly a paradox. This is such a historical process. As I said, liberally oriented people, intellectuals and not-so-intellectuals of the 90s, were really very worried about the threat of Russian nationalism. People did not always quite adequately imagine this threat: their knowledge could be outdated or inaccurate. But if we look at the year 2000... If a person had to choose whom to support politically - Vladimir Putin or Alexander Barkashov, then he would choose Putin. Because Barkashov (the head of the Russian National Unity party, a recognized extremist organization. - "AU") - this is very, very bad. Even if the person had some serious claims against Putin. This inertia remained quite strong; Nationalists continued to be seen as a serious threat.

On the other hand, the law of any European country also implies the possibility of judging a person for public statements. Certain kinds of public speaking can be criminalized. The question arises: how adequate was the persecution in the 2000s, did it correspond to European practice? Answer: it was different. I saw a lot of examinations and many different cases. [Among those persecuted] there were many people who were tried for quite systematic, widely disseminated calls for murder and pogroms. There is nothing morally strange that a forensic expert could support the prosecution.

But later I noticed that there is something deeply wrong in the fact that scientific expertise is always required in cases of public statements. If a person engages in public incitement, if he incites hatred among a wide range of people, which poses a serious public danger, then it is obvious that he does this in a fairly intelligible form. It is not clear why the investigator and the judge cannot understand his appeals without the help of an expert with a doctoral degree?

Of course, there are exceptions - when the text is addressed to a specific audience and uses slang. Religious radicals use specific jargon that may be incomprehensible to an investigator or judge. Or worse, they think they understand it, but they don't really understand the allusions. In such cases, an expert is needed who will play the role of a translator from a specific jargon into a universal language. In the case of radical religious texts, such an "interpreter" should be a religious scholar. But in practice, this almost never happens - usually psychologists, linguists, and so on.

Or it could be a text addressed to a subcultural community. I remember the song in which there was a call: "Bravely earn white laces." A citizen is not obliged to understand what exactly the expression “earning white laces” meant for the then skinhead. And a person familiar with the subculture understands: this slang expression on a symbolic level meant a call to kill.

By the way, in this situation, a dispute between experts would be appropriate - what if the expert is mistaken. But such exceptions are in the minority. Usually everything is written in understandable Russian.

– You mentioned the infamous Article 282 of the Criminal Code. What other criminal and administrative structures are being monitored by the Sova Center now?

- Oh, the number of these trains, to our great regret, is steadily growing - and our staff is not expanding. It will take a long time to list everything, but the main anti-extremist article is 280 of the Criminal Code (public calls for extremist activity. - “AU”). This is probably the most corrupted article of the Criminal Code. Before the advent of anti-extremist legislation, it was formulated as calls for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order - and this was understandable. And since 2002, this article has been a reference to a very long and not always clear definition of extremist activity. And it implies a very broad interpretation, which, fortunately, is rarely used in practice. Basically, under this article, they are attracted for calls for violent actions.

Still widely applied Art. 205.2 of the Criminal Code (calls for terrorist activities, justification of terrorism. - "AU"). These are the main articles on public statements. Now they have been joined by article 207.3 of the Criminal Code on “fakes” (public distribution under the guise of reliable messages of deliberately false information about the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. – “AU”). In general, it does not apply to anti-extremist legislation, but in half of the cases accusations are made about the spread of "fake" about the army "motivated by hatred" - and then it becomes an extremist crime.

There are also mass articles - on participation in banned, extremist and terrorist organizations - 282.2 and 205.5 of the Criminal Code. There are many rules that apply to common crimes, such as violent acts and vandalism motivated by hate. Is it worth listing more...

- You said that the list is expanding. In the last decade, many articles have appeared that are jokingly called "staples". These are such exotic compositions as insulting the feelings of believers, the rehabilitation of Nazism, and many others. How do SOVA analysts characterize this trend?

– Of course, these are ideologically motivated squads. But they are by no means exotic. In an article about insulting the feelings of believers, the exotic wording arose due to the fact that they tried to pull it retroactively on the incident with Pussy Riot. The members of the group were convicted, of course, [for hooliganism motivated by religious hatred], but everyone understood that it turned out crooked. Then, right under them, they came up with an article - because of this, it sounds so ridiculous.

But in general, articles on blasphemy exist in probably half of the European criminal codes. Not directly about blasphemy - but about blasphemy, an attempt on sacred objects, insulting the feelings of believers. We are not unique here, I must admit. The practice, to be honest, is quite exotic everywhere in terms of these articles - including ours. We believe that such an article should not be in a good way in the Criminal Code, because the object of its protection is painfully incomprehensible. And legal certainty as a result is very lame.

As for Article 354.1 on the rehabilitation of Nazism, again, in most European countries there are certain articles that criminalize what is called “historical revisionism”. This is a denial of Nazi crimes, communist crimes, crimes against humanity… in different countries this is formulated differently. The Russian wording was initially similar to some others, except for one strange addition - about slandering the policy of the USSR during the Second World War (dissemination of deliberately false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War. - “AU”). Later, a lot of things were added to this article, now it looks very strange. The same thing happened with the practice: the bulk of the cases on it are ridiculous incidents, which, in a good way, should have been qualified as petty hooliganism. If someone urinated into the Eternal Flame, then this is a sad and outrageous fact - but people don’t do anything while drunk.

– There are scientific monographs published by Sova. And journalists often came to the presentation of new reports. How do you define the main purpose of the Owl publications?

– The main thing we would like is for society and the state to better understand what is actually happening in the areas we write about. After all, officials and ordinary people often form very simplified pictures of what is happening. Very inertial, describing the day before yesterday. And this is reflected directly in public policy, and in what people think and do in connection with what is happening. Of course, we would like to influence anti-extremist policy. It is necessary to find a balance between security threats and the measures that counter these threats. After all, these measures themselves can become a threat.

This problem exists in any country, both authoritarian and democratic. We do not hope to find a perfect balance - but we would like Russia to come as close as possible to the approaches and practices developed in international law, in the practice of democratic countries. Of course, we would like to appeal to the state: whatever one may say, law enforcement agencies are state-owned. It is very sad that our communication with the state has deteriorated greatly since we were registered as “foreign agents”. The state is less and less interested in us, but I suspect that our reports are still being read.

- "Owl" was recognized as a "foreign agent" in 2016. Have you been able to influence public policy before?

– Of course, they don’t report to us, but some changes are inspired by our persistent explanations. Sometimes we see that entire quotations from official documents are taken from the texts of The Owl. I won't point fingers, but it happened. And this is normal - people work with different sources.

Of course, we are always not satisfied enough with the result - and the further, unfortunately, the less reason to be satisfied with something. On the other hand, we never thought that we could radically change the situation. By and large, it does not depend on the activities of an individual NPO, but on the social structure. Therefore, alas, in many respects I had to perceive myself not as a driver of positive changes, but as a brake on negative changes. Well, that's a respectable feature too.

– You said that you indirectly influenced the practice of Jehovah's Witnesses**. How did it happen?

- We are still an analytical center and do not influence judicial practice. But the explanations of the Supreme Court - including those about the ill-fated Jehovah's Witnesses - are indeed adopted under our influence. They concerned the persecution of people for participation in a banned extremist religious organization, which does not apply only to Jehovah's Witnesses.

In this story, everything is quite transparent, since it was about the implementation of the presidential order by the Supreme Court. It arose due to the fact that I, as a member of the Human Rights Council, at a meeting addressed the president [on the issue of such religious associations], he gave instructions. Following clarifications from the SC, the [lower] courts issued several acquittals in witness cases. But the prosecutor's office won back everything - they challenged either all the acquittals, or almost all.

—Do you understand the reason for the persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses? It seems to me that this is the most harmless group for the state among all those persecuted ...

“It's really quite mysterious. I think that Jehovah's Witnesses have two important shortcomings in the eyes of policy makers. First, they have a center in New York. Although it is clear that the witnesses were unpopular even without New York. There are always a lot of unpleasant myths around new religious movements, and many people do not like them. But it is one thing not to love someone, and another thing to organize a very large-scale campaign of persecution.

Such a decision should have been motivated by something else - besides the fact that they [in the eyes of the state] are unpleasant people. And it was clearly motivated by considerations of a quasi-political nature.

My hypothesis is that Jehovah's Witnesses are not an ordinary association. There are a lot of Witnesses - and they are the only organization [of this size] that does not try to be friends with the authorities. They are not included in any councils; their leadership tried not to enter into communication with the state once again. Registered, paid taxes - and no more communication. For our authorities, accustomed to the mode of manual control of all more or less large objects in social life, the existence of an association that has more than 100,000 people and does not want to communicate looked very suspicious. And in what exact words they explained to themselves that this is such a dangerous organization that it should be banned and persecuted for years, I don’t know.

- Analysts of "Sova" look deeper than anyone at the enforcement of many articles of the Criminal Code. Can you remember your most unexpected discoveries in this area?

- If we are talking about law enforcement, then, of course, there are quite unexpected twists and turns. A surprising number of cases were filed last year for hate-motivated vandalism (Article 214 of the Criminal Code). The composition of this crime is a little strange. Firstly, the Russian language implies that some cultural, significant value can be vandalized. But in practice, cases are initiated about inscriptions on concrete slabs - which are not God knows what value. Secondly, it is not clear - did the inscriptions really damage them so much? Well, yes, they drew a slogan, doused something with paint ... But paint can actually be washed off. In essence, people are persecuted not for real damage, but for a public statement made in a material form.

Last year there were many cases of vandalism based on political and ideological hostility. But we are forbidden to incite hatred and enmity only according to a certain list of signs. And it is possible to incite political enmity in our country - this is not a criminal offense and not an offense at all.

But it turns out that if, based on the same hostility, a slogan is drawn on the fence instead of a post on the Internet, then this will be “vandalization of the fence” based on hatred. Something is wrong here, it is wrong – and this wrongness is multiplied.

A rather massive problem with articles 282.2 and 205.5 of the Criminal Code is participation in a banned extremist or terrorist organization. The law criminalizes an act that can be anything. What is membership in an organization? Just a man came to the meeting? Or should I join a party? What if you don't know it's banned? At what point does a person already participate in the activities of the organization, from what moment is he a criminal? In general, there are many questions - and there are really a lot of cases on these articles. Moreover, this is a serious crime with long sentences.

In the mentioned case with the explanations of the Supreme Court about prohibited religious organizations, the Court tried to dodge. He wrote that simple religious activity is not a crime - only participation in the activities of a banned organization. But the problem is the law itself. It is impossible to understand: if people gather for prayer, do they engage in religious activities - or continue the activities of a banned organization? After all, the activity of a religious organization is precisely to gather for prayer.

At some point, a group of human rights activists, in which I was also, talked on this topic with the Commissioner for Human Rights, Tatyana Moskalkova. There was a working group that worked out proposals in the anti-extremist field and tried to correct the norms. As a result, a bill was developed with a specific idea on how to get rid of one of the shortcomings. Tatyana Moskalkova even brought the bill to the Federation Council. But the relevant commission decided that the project does not correspond to anything. There he died.

- It turns out that the center managed to influence state policy a little. But in 2016, Sova was declared a foreign agent, and now they are trying to liquidate it. Do you understand why a small analytical center did not please the state?

I don't have a clear answer to this question. Because the state in no one's person presented us with any claims on the essence of our activities. There were libels about us, last fall there was even a story on Rossiya-24, where it was said in a very abstract way that we are “against traditional values”. And about Soros - for some reason always Soros! And the Ministry of Justice put forward formal claims to us, with which we do not agree.

- Let's recall the official "accusation".

– There is only one official complaint against us: we were operating outside our region. We are a regional public organization registered in Moscow. Accordingly, any participation in events - or the organization of such events outside the city - is considered by the Ministry of Justice as a violation of the rule of law by which a regional organization operates in its region. Such a norm does exist, but is understood by the Ministry of Justice in isolation from the context of the entire article. But the Law on non-profit organizations is already a quarter of a century old. And before the cases with the MHG, the organization "Man and Law" and the "Sova" center, there were no examples of an organization being closed on such a claim. It is clear that hundreds, if not thousands, of regional organizations were involved in activities outside their own region. And they continue to participate - and will, of course, continue to participate.

We were counted 24 episodes when we participated in seminars in other regions of Russia, in Central Asia and at OSCE conferences. Of course, legally this is all pretty ridiculous. In court, we tried to discuss with a representative of the Ministry of Justice; tried to understand how he imagines such "literalism" in understanding the norm. But the representative of the Ministry of Justice, to be honest, could not explain anything.

- Have you already received the "motivation" of the decision?

- Yes, it is posted on the website of the court. To be honest, the decision is practically empty: it simply lists the arguments of the parties and says that the arguments of the defendants are unconvincing.

- You were a member of the HRC for 10 years. It somehow protected the center?

- I want to answer "yes" because of a suspicious coincidence. A decree was issued to expel me (and not only me) from the HRC, and the prosecutor's office just the day before demanded an urgent check.

But membership in the HRC is only relative protection. Two current members of the HRC [Tatiana Margolina and Svetlana Makovetskaya – in the case of the Perm “Memorial”*] have just been searched – that is, membership did not protect them. But yes, I think my presence in the HRC was some form of protection. Because many repressive actions are not some carefully thought out and approved policy at all - they are rather random actions of various law enforcement comrades. I think that if a person is a member of the HRC, then those who make decisions regarding him should have other shoulder straps. This in itself reduces the likelihood of trouble.

- Remind me how you were expelled from the HRC?

“I don’t know how I was expelled. I just learned in the morning that a presidential decree had been issued to change the composition of the HRC. The new composition did not include me and several other members.

– With the beginning of the “special operation”, Russia actively uses specific rhetoric, calling the opposite side “nationalists”…

- "Nazis", what is already here.

– How correct is this?

- It seems to me that the words "Nazi" and "fascist" in the post-Soviet space are simply customary to swear at a political opponent. This is a widespread practice; it is sinned, unfortunately, more or less by everyone. In this case, the same is being done by our authorities, who designate the Ukrainian government with the word "Nazis."

Why the Nazis - is not very clear. One could say that the Ukrainian government is pursuing a nationalistic policy in one sense or another - and it would be true. After all, Ukraine is a nation-state under construction, where it is absolutely inevitable.

But there is another aspect. There are real neo-Nazis both in Ukraine and in Russia. And some neo-Nazis even moved to Ukraine from Russia. But it is not very clear what this has to do with the case.

– In your opinion, can the study of xenophobia and nationalism in modern Russia be the reason for the liquidation of the “Owl”?

- Hardly. Rather, someone may be annoyed by my comments - like the one I just gave you. On the contrary, it seems to me that the study of nationalism was interested in power; We were given presidential grants for this activity. It suited everyone.

– For many years, the movement and even the ideology of Russian nationalists were in decline, including due to persecution by the authorities. Is there a feeling that the new Russian ideology is a kind of outgrowth of Russian nationalism?

– The Russian nationalist movement really began to decline in the early 2010s. Largely for internal reasons, and political persecution was already finishing him off. But the state policy since then has been to some extent nationalist - it's just that nationalism has many varieties. These are not necessarily neo-Nazi street groups: nationalism can be anything, including quite respectable.

Yes, of course, public policy is a kind of nationalism, there is nothing so special about it. Putin himself said that he was "the most correct nationalist" - in contrast to the "cave" nationalists. But this is not to say that certain ideas will necessarily cause problems. For example, now we see an increasing scale of repression - but is it connected with ideological shifts? I think only to a small extent. Still, political repression is not mainly determined by this. Will there be further consequences within the country? Let's see if it's not very clear.

– But, on the other hand, these new “ideological shifts” affect, for example, the way repressions are carried out. After all, we see that many people write denunciations against each other - probably under the influence of some ideology.

Yes, people do it. Someone under the influence of ideology, someone obviously out of fear, someone out of selfish or other considerations. It's hard to understand, to be honest. Rather, it may turn out to be problematic that the changing ideological structure will very soon affect the education system. Young people will be formed in a more conflicted worldview. It is impossible to guess how the ideology will affect them, for example, in 10 years.

We don't even know simple things now. Unlike previous years, we do not know how the level of ethnic intolerance in the country has changed. Meanwhile, this is an interesting question, because the conflict in the Donbass in 2014-2015 led to a sharp increase in anti-Western sentiments and, at the same time, to a decrease in ethnic intolerance within the country. Is the same phenomenon observed now? If so, to what extent and to which groups does it apply? Nothing is clear, to be honest.

Literally the day before yesterday there was a meeting of the Presidential Council for Nationalities. The transcript was surprisingly blank. Usually there are more meaningful discussions - and here one after another the speakers say how the people rallied, how the common civic identity grew compared to the ethnic one ... I suspect that they referred to closed polls - but it is not clear what exactly they asked in such polls. Therefore, we have a very poor understanding of what is really happening now.

- At what stage is the liquidation of the center now? Will you appeal the court's decision?

- We will certainly appeal this decision in early June, but the consideration of the case may begin in a month or two. In addition, we are appealing against the very inspection of the Ministry of Justice, which was carried out without due notice. The trial in this case has been adjourned until June 21.

- What will happen to Sova if the court "overpowers" the liquidation?

- In its current form, the Center will cease to exist. But the people who work in it will not cease to exist - each of the employees will be able to decide for himself whether he wants to continue his activities. Of those who want, it is quite possible to form an organization - registered or unregistered, it does not matter. I myself would not want to stop working - "Owl" is engaged in socially useful activities. Why stop it?

* Included in the register of "foreign agents".

** The Administrative Center of Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia has been recognized as an extremist organization in the Russian Federation.

Sources

• "WORDS ALWAYS PERSECUTED" // Lawyer street. 2023. June 2.