Vladimir Milov

politician, economist, public figure

Two weeks after Prigozhinsky rebellion time to summarize some results. First of all, the allegations that the rebellion was completely unprofitable is incorrect: many commentators kept repeating for months that a long escalation between the Ministry of Defense and the Wagner group will lead to a dramatic denouement. Of course, it was difficult to anticipate that PMCs would take the capture of Russian cities, but here it was manifested that it was clear Prigozhin, but not obvious to third -party observers. He took advantage of the lack of significant troops in front-line rear regions (primarily in Rostov-on-Don) to occupy the actually empty territory without much resistance.

Wagner and Co.: did Prigozhin have associates in power?

It can hardly agree that Prigozhin, as many say now, had some "influential allies in power." The fact that he only succeeded the initial part of the plan and nothing of the next steps just speaks of the opposite - that there were no allies, and he simply found everyone by surprise from Friday to Saturday, when the leadership of the power structures is everywhere far from performance. For example, General Surovikin is recorded in the “associates” of Prigozhin, as we might assume, mainly because Prigozhin Surovikina once praised aloud. But in fact, it was the Surovikin VKS that were the only ones who really resisted the mercenary march. Actually, the entire cheese-brow formally arose due to the fact that Wagner, as Prigozhin himself claims, struck from the air, forces of Surovikin's subordinates. In response, Prigozhinians were shot down in the air. Good "allies in the coup."

The fact that Prigozhin was successful only the first steps means that he had no influential allies

Rumors of a certain “arrest” or persecution of Surovikin still have no real evidence. If some events were held with him, then most likely due to the fact that he could not cope with the task of bombing the Wagnerians from the air. But it cannot be said that he did not try, and his air forces suffered considerable losses in a very short period. In short, the strangest "allied relations" that can only be imagined.

In reality, it is very difficult to imagine that a certain one of those who are in power could seriously take the side of Prigozhin. Firstly, they all perfectly understood the ratio of forces and the doom of the Wagnerian rebellion. Given the fact that some of the militants remained in the camps and did not take part in the rebellion, and the part had to be left in Rostov-on-Don to control the captured territories, the number of participants in the “march to Moscow” could not be more than a few thousand. With such a number of rebels, the federal forces that were waiting for them on the approaches to Moscow would have coped. Everyone understood this in power offices.

Secondly, people in power, unlike active inhabitants of the Internet, are well aware of who the Prigozhin is, and do not experience illusions about his rhetoric about “justice”, “fight against corruption”, etc. Prigogine is primarily an unprincipled liar. It is necessary not to own his head at all in order to trust him even by gram and perceive his rhetoric seriously. In addition, he is well known for love for the game at all without any rules. What prize will the one who will go over to him receive? The question is rhetorical. But the risks are huge - what is Putin’s anger, everyone knows well.

Although the theme of the “conspiracy in the corridors of the authorities in support of Prigozhin” is now in fashion, all these conversations are extremely frivolous, and certainly there was not a single successful conspiracy in history, where the conspirators would begin an armed performance away from the capital, in Rostov-on-Don. A similar “conspiracy against power” at the maximum distance from the actual location of power is absolutely meaningless - it was possible to start with Magadan.

Survival game: why did Prigozhin start it all?

Yes, because he did not have a goal to take power. He had one goal - to keep his own skin. Apparently, he received a certain information about his upcoming liquidation - I don’t know in what form she could happen: in the form of arrest or what worse (Putin has a wide set of tools), and decided to go ahead of the lead, creating himself in the form of rapidly captured territories in the south of Russia. Actually, their too fast seizure and provoked many to suspicion of a “conspiracy within power”. But true explanations are much easier here. First of all, all the main forces were at the front; And besides, it is enough to recall any Russian putsch - our security forces always react to any unforeseen events slowly, this is the norm.

Why did the Prigozhinsky blitzkrieg miss the special services? They were too concentrated on the “external enemy” and missed the internal, and in addition, everyone knew well about the personal mandate on the activities of the Wagnerians from Putin himself, and no one suspected that Prigozhin would be able to leave him a personal challenge.

Prigozhin's calculation was justified. Putin was so frightened by the loss of control over the territories and the likelihood of fighting for Moscow-and in addition, the prospect of the assault on Rostov-on-Don, which agreed (for now) to any conditions so that Prigozhin immediately stops. Putin had to stop everything very quickly, because every day of tightening the armed confrontation within the country, I incredibly beat in its authority. And as they say, quickly raised is not considered fallen. If Prigozhin really achieved any changes in the administration of the army and the country, he would use his possibilities to put pressure on Putin: to gain a foothold in Rostov (in his own expression, “settled”), to promise, and bargain. I repeat once again: the assault on Rostov-on-Don would be completely unthinkable for Putin. But Prigozhin was quite satisfied with the guarantees received.

Prigozhin had serious levers of pressure, but at the first opportunity he was satisfied with the guarantees proposed to him

Did he have any far-reaching ideas beyond the limits of personal salvation? If yes, it was opened very quickly that it was the locks in the sand. It seems that Prigozhin strongly turned his head with his own media-imperia and a troll factory-he received a rare among those in power, the opportunity to inflate his own figure in the PR field and from an excess of publicity imagined himself a great one. Having no hardware experience (contrary to the image of the omnipotent, which was inflated in the media, Prigozhin was never made to real decision -making authorities, he simply fulfilled individual instructions), he apparently decided that publicity was equivalent to hardware. As it turned out, this is not so - there were no obvious transitions to his side.

Moreover, Putin quickly explained Prigozhin from where the source of financing of the PMC Wagner came from. And, as it turned out, she predictably sat on full budgetary support, there were no powerful independent financial sources there. This device was quite easy to pull out of the outlet. That's exactly why Prigozhin and the Wagnerians are now forced to quiet down - they do not have an independent hardware and financial base.

However, having won a quick hardware victory, Putin nevertheless received a crushing blow to the prestige of his entire system. Among the nomenclature and business, probably, a collective awareness arose for the first time that Putin in reality does not at all control the situation in the country, and unexpected problems and challenges may crawl out where they were not expected. His authority always kept on the fact that he somehow “solves problems” and even more so holds under the full control the situation in the field of notorious security, which was served as its main “horse” for the last quarter of a century and for which Russians, including those possessing power and money, forced to say goodbye to all their rights and independence.

But it turned out according to the classics - no freedom, no security. The Putin system has attributed uncontrolled armed thugs and the territory of lawlessness, which God can now manifest knowing where and how. For the first time since 1943, some strangers captured entire Russian cities-including the 11th largest city in Russia Rostov-on-Don, the military capital of the south of the country. For more than a day, the country has dominated the feeling of complete uncertainty and helplessness of the authorities. In Moscow, machine -gun nests began to install for the "meeting of the enemy" - for the first time since 1941. Ironically, a machine-gun nest at a congress from the Moscow Ring Road in the Yasenevo region appeared a few hundred meters from the obelisk with the inscription "here in 1941 passed the southwestern line of the Moscow defense zone." The weakness of the Putin system of power during these hours was obvious to everyone. As well as the fact that the cult of armed people, which was created personally by Putin, spent the legality against him.

The Putin system entrusted uncontrolled armed thugs and the territory of lawlessness

These sensations will not forget - Russia is extremely puzzled by what happened and began to say goodbye to Putin’s image as a strong leader. All this does not fit into the picture of “security”, “security” and “full control over the situation”, which Putin's propaganda painted for many years. Even the constant spectators of Russian TV began to actively say that "something is wrong." Particular harm to the positions of the authorities cause sharp reversals in the propaganda rhetoric: the negative lighting of the Wagnerians, who were raised with their own hands and podded as “heroes” yesterday, embarrasses people and causes only embarrassment. Propaganda works effectively when it gradually drives people into the heads of a certain thought - sharp turns of positions reduce trust.

All current processes will certainly contribute to further erosion of power. Perhaps this will not happen soon and at once. But the undermining of Putin’s authority and trust in him is another powerful blow on the basics of the system in the chain of other blows (military defeats, difficulties in the army, economics, sanctions), which will eventually inevitably lead to a breakdown of the system simply according to the elementary laws of physics.

What broke in the minds of the Putin nomenclature? More recently, they believed that Putin and his entourage, although they make gross mistakes and create difficulties, nevertheless ensure the stability of the system as a whole, and many considered it possible to invest - make business, career, look for survival paths and even try to work for development from the Western world. It seems that the economy is “restored”, the sanctions are “worried”, instead of the USA and Europe there are some kind of India and China. Import substitution can be good. Somehow we will live, they thought! And then suddenly the signal-this whole system, based on lawlessness and violence, can suddenly break through somewhere, and the appearance of stability will collapse. But what if Prigozhin would dug in Rostov and went to storm Moscow, and the real civil war would have begun? But what if the Chinese troops will take and take some eastern territories like this, because all the Russian units were transferred to Ukraine? But what if NATO, seeing Putin tremble, decides to act harder with him? But what if someone else with weapons in his hands-and now, “thanks to” Putin’s passion for Putin with militarism and aggression, it has been bred as a lot-he will decide to arrange something similar again, and this time will find allies in power?

The swarm of these “what if” is now buzzing in the brains of the Putin nomenclature, paralyzing the desire to do something to strengthen the system. If someone had this desire until June 23, now everyone is sharply sad there. Akela missed. There is no point in plowing on the success of this system, it is much weaker than it seemed. Of course, all this will accelerate the weakening of the Putin regime.

Potato Savior: what is the actual role of Lukashenko

Most likely, Alexander Lukashenko needed the Kremlin exclusively as a negotiator comfortable for both sides - due to the intensity of events, Putin and Prigozhin would be difficult to speak directly, and Putin of such a negotiator rushed to look for June 24 (he called the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but they probably refused such a role). As expected, Prigozhin did not go to Belarus, and, apparently, would not go-Lukashenko helped to repay instability in Russia (which he also threatened him directly), but he probably would not like to place thousands of armed with bessing predictors.

Putin, of course, will not forgive Prigozhin of the rebellion and the words “The President was deeply mistaken, no one is going to come with a guess at his request,” and will try to destroy him, but now he does not want to excite public opinion too much and does not fully understand the residual potential for the resistance of the Wagnerians, therefore, most likely, he will go out. In the meantime, there is a massive processing of the brain of Russians on the state media about the fact that Wagner is very bad. It is worth assuming that Prigozhin will try to hide in a certain third dictatorial country, but there is no problem for Putin to get it. Now the FSB also organizes the detailed profiling of the entire personnel of the Wagnerians, trying to lure to their side the least loyal handicraftsmen, and those who will be considered dangerous from the point of view of the non -controlled and probability of participating in possible future rebellions will be cleaned one way or another.

Now the FSB is trying to lure the least loyal handmade mercenaries to its side

Most likely, Prigogine Days are numbered. It is not clear what he hoped for, warming up the conflict from the Ministry of Defense and, as a result, Putin. Apparently, indeed, his own PR surv time overheated him. And, of course, independent Russian and international media played a role, who commented on each of his sneezes with an aspiration.

The failure of the rebellion and the flight of Prigozhin from the political scene exposed in a stupid light reasoning that the Russian democrats supposedly had to “support” his rebellion. The democratic opposition seems to offer society another model of life - the legality, the rule of law and democratic institutions instead of the arbitrariness of the armed thugs. And here - to support the bandits to establish democracy? .. How then are you different from all this Putin's pack, living according to gang concepts and imposing the right of strong to the whole world? And these people still reproached Yeltsin for something in connection with the events of 1993 and 1996. And if-purely hypothetically-Prigozhin won, why do he need it? As Gandalf said about Sauron: "He does not share power."

Candidate from the people: how much riot Prigozhin is supporting Russians