Three periods of repression: more than a thousand people in Russia are in prison for political reasons

A new database of politically motivated repressions in Russia over the past 12 years, published by OVD-Info, allows us to assess the absolute level and dynamics of the repressiveness of the Putin regime. During this period, about 3.5 thousand people were subjected to repression, more than a thousand of whom are currently in prison. OVD-Info statistics allow us to distinguish three periods in the history of Russian repressive policies. The years 2012–2018 can be called a period of limited repression—from 100 to 300 people per year were subjected to criminal prosecution during this time, and the increase was largely due to the persecution of religious groups—Jehovah’s Witnesses and Islamist organizations. In 2019, a period of expanded repression began, when its volume exceeded 400 cases per year, the share of members of religious organizations among victims of persecution began to decline, and the share of political activists began to grow. The beginning of the war marked a new period: over the past two years, about 1,200 people were subjected to criminal repression, most of whom were persecuted for expressing an anti-war position. Over the past decade, repression, and therefore political protest itself, has become significantly “younger”: in 2012-2013, the average age of those involved in “political” criminal cases was 47 years old, in 2016-2017 - 43 years old, and has dropped since the beginning of the war up to 39 years old. Women in general during the period became involved in criminal cases in only 14% of cases, but in 2023 their figure was already 20%.

In November, OVD-Info opened to users a database on politically motivated repressions in Russia since 2012, which had been collected by human rights activists over the past 12 years. The database is based on monitoring by human rights organizations that recognize a particular persecution as politically motivated based on their own criteria. In this case, we are talking about criminal prosecutions, although the fact of persecution is not necessarily a court verdict. The database allows us, finally, to substantively answer the question about the degree and dynamics of the repressiveness of the Russian political regime.

According to OVD-Info, over the past twelve years, about 3.5 thousand people have been subjected to politically motivated criminal prosecution, of which more than a thousand are currently deprived of liberty. If from 2012 to 2016 there were no more than 200 such cases per year, then in 2022 already 705 criminal cases were opened. Moreover, in 2012–2016 the number of prosecutions grew from a low base (87 cases in 2012) and quite smoothly, doubling in five years. In 2016–2019, growth accelerated sharply and reached a peak in 2019: the number of politically motivated repressions increased five times by 2019 compared to 2012. However, a significant portion of this increase came from cases against members of Islamist organizations and Jehovah's Witnesses. During the Covid years 2020–2021, the number of new criminal cases decreased noticeably, but already in the second half of 2021 it began to recover. Moreover, now the share of persecutions of members of Islamist organizations and Jehovah's Witnesses was decreasing, and the number of cases against political activists was growing - the authorities, in particular, were engaged in the defeat of the FBK. In 2022, with the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the number of prosecutions increased sharply again, with the lion's share now being made up of “anti-war” cases, that is, cases of persecution related to the expression of an anti-war position. The data for 2023, of course, is not yet final, but it is already clear that the total number of repressions this year is unlikely to reach the peak that occurred in 2022.

Dynamics of politically motivated criminal prosecutions, 2012–2023

Demographics and geography

Most often, men between the ages of 30 and 50 are persecuted for political reasons, according to OVD-Info data. Women in general during the period became involved in criminal cases in only 14% of cases, but the number of persecuted women is growing: in 2023 there were already 20%. There are likely more women involved in anti-war activism than is typical in opposition activism. For example, according to the same OVD-Info , the proportion of women detained at anti-war protests (44%) and protests against mobilization (51%) is significantly higher than the proportion of women detained at rallies in support of Navalny (from 25% to 31% ).

In addition, the number of minors involved is growing: if before 2021 there were no more than one such cases per year, then in 2021 there were already three, and in 2022 and 2023, seven cases of criminal prosecution of minors were recorded. According to OVD-Info, almost half of the cases of persecution of teenagers in 2022–2023 are related to arson or attempted arson of military registration and enlistment offices. But in general, over the past 12 years, repression (and therefore resistance to the regime itself) has become “younger” by almost 10 years: in 2012-2013, the average age of their victims was 47 years, in 2016-2017 - 43 years, and the war period of 2022–2023 has dropped to 39 years.

The territorial scope of repression is also expanding: in 2022-2023, political criminal prosecutions were recorded in 82 regions of Russia, while in 2020-2021 - only in 77, and in 2018-2019 - in 65. The most “repressed” “Moscow became the region in 2022–2023, St. Petersburg was in second place, and annexed Crimea was in third place.

From unfreedom of conscience to unfreedom of speech

Politically motivated repression is persecution that infringes on certain fundamental human rights. If we talk about the topics of criminal cases, before the start of a full-scale invasion, most often, according to OVD-Info calculations, people were persecuted for freedom of association and freedom of conscience. The persecution of religious groups—Jehovah's Witnesses and members of Islamist organizations (for example, Hizb ut-Tahrir)—falls into this category. After the start of the war, the situation changed dramatically: now more than half of all persecutions are related to violations of the right to freedom of speech, that is, with public statements and expression of one’s opinion in various forms.

“Topics” of politically motivated criminal prosecutions, 2012–2023

Most of the “political” cases opened since the beginning of 2022 are new “anti-war” articles. The most “popular” of them is Article 207.3 (“Public dissemination of knowingly false information about the use of armed forces”) - 244 criminal cases. The usual plot of such repressions are posts on social networks about the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine (for example, about those killed as a result of the attack on the drama theater in Mariupol or about what happened in Bucha).

Politically motivated criminal repressions under articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2022–2023

Next in terms of “popularity” is Article 205.2 (“Justification of terrorism and calls for it”) - 148 criminal cases, most of which also have “anti-war” themes: the reason for them was, for example, public approval of the explosions on the Crimean Bridge or talk about the regiment “ Azov". Despite the fact that the article has existed since 2005, it began to be widely used only during the war: for the entire period until 2022, only 46 cases were opened under it.

Under the article “discrediting the army” (Article 280.3), 132 cases were initiated. It is important to note that this article applies only in the case of repeated “discredit” - it is always preceded by a case under administrative article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses. There are significantly more people convicted under it: according to Mediazona , as of October 2023, more than 8,000 cases were brought to the courts under this article. According to the content of the sentences, “discreditation” includes, for example, participation in anti-war pickets, distribution of anti-war leaflets, as well as posts on social networks (for example, comparing the Russian regime with the fascist one).

Thus, in the history of political persecution in Putin’s Russia, three periods can be distinguished. A period of limited repression from 2012 to 2018, when between 100 and 300 people per year were subjected to criminal prosecution, with the increase largely driven by persecution of religious organizations. Then came the period of expanded repression from 2019–2021, when the volume exceeded 400 cases per year and the share of religious organizations as victims of persecution began to decline. And finally, the war period, when in two years about 1,200 people were subjected to criminal repression (including the remaining months), most of whom were persecuted for expressing an anti-war position.