Dead Worldly War: How the Russian views on the "military operation" changed during the second year of the conflict

In the media and even among experts today, Russian society has adapted to war, pulled away from it and lives some kind of parallel to the war, and the numbers of support for the war in public opinion surveys have been frozen and practically do not change. However, a significant, although ambiguous dynamics is found behind this static: sociological studies indicate that the core of real supporters of the war during its second year has decreased, and the “audibility” of the wire position in society has decreased. This, nevertheless, did not lead to an increase in the share of visible opponents of the war. Rather, we can talk about the situation of a kind of impasse in public opinion, due to the fear of repression and the consciousness of the impossibility to influence the course of events, on the one hand, and fears related to the fact that the scenario of leaving the war looks like obscure, potentially conflict and alarming, on the other. The decrease in wire moods and the level of real support of the war is adjacent to the misunderstanding of ways to get out of the situation.

CONTENT

The data of sociological surveys about the attitude of Russians to the war somewhat left the focus of the attention of the media. Among the experts, the idea was established that Russian society adapted to war, pulled away from it, and the numbers in mass surveys, demonstrating attitude towards it, practically froze on the spot. However, a more detailed analysis allows you to see important trends that may turn out to be the harbingers of new trends in public opinion, if not in the near future, then in the medium term, and more accurately understanding groups of factors affecting the dynamics of public opinion about the war.

Thus, the article of sociologists Vladimir Zvonovsky and Alexander Khodykin helps to understand how the opinion of others or the idea of this opinion affect the respondents' own attitude to the war and to express it publicly. Does the “spiral of silence” act in today's Russia - a social effect when supporters of a certain opinion, considering it unpopular, do not dare to express it and thus only strengthen its inappropriation in a public field? The “railway test” used by sociologists to detect the “spiral” shows that Russians are not inclined to talk about “military operations” with unfamiliar people, but its opponents express their opinion more than one and a half times less than its supporters (22% versus 35%). This means that if, for example, in some group, the number of supporters of the war is one and a half times larger than its opponents (60% versus 40%), then due to the lesser readiness of the latter to express their position to the observer will seem that the number of supporters of the war surpasses the number of its opponents two and a half times (70% versus 30%). As a result, the opinion of opponents of the war will be perceived by the surrounding (and by themselves) as marginal.

However, in general, the situation looks more complicated. Sociologists found that in 2023, the share of the military operation supporting in polls was somewhat reduced, but the share of those who say that in his environment the majority supported it is much more. About 70% of respondents declare their support, and about 20% of the incontinence; At the same time, only 57% of the respondents say that in their environment the majority supports the “military operation”, and 30% claim that supporters and opponents of the war in their environment are equally. This is shown by the researchers, it is due to the fact that part of those who join the normative majority of support of military operations, without having their own real motivation (the effect of a “van with an orchestra”), is not inclined to express their position publicly, discovering themselves in a mixed environment, where both supporters and opponents of the “military operation” are present.

As a result, opponents of the war are not inclined to express themselves when they believe that they are in a wire -minded environment, while “weak”, declarative supporters of the war cease to protect their opinion, finding that they are not in the middle of the wireful majority. The latter situation, apparently, is especially characteristic of the youth environment, where the share of even purely declaratively declared support for the “operation” is no more than a third.

However, the noted phenomenon of reducing “audibility” in the company of a wire position may also have an additional explanation, as follows from the second part of the report - the article of Elena Koneva and Kirill Rogova. In the second half of 2023, in polls of public opinion, one can observe a slight reduction in the share of the respondents who declared support of hostilities, and a much more significant reduction in the nucleus of supporters of war - a wire -minded segment of society. This nucleus decreased by one and a half times and has become a proportional proportion of those who generally adhere to anti -war views rather (27% versus 25%). The share of those who are not ready to support Putin’s decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops without achieving the targets of the “operation” was also reduced - by the end of the year it has become noticeably less than the share of those who are ready to support such a decision (33% versus 40%).

At the same time, however, a fairly significant reduction in the wire nucleus did not lead to an increase in open, consistent opponents of the war (10%), not a share of people with anti -war views (25%), but led to the expansion of the circle of those who either express conflicting views, or tries not to express any, or, declaratively joining the “imaginary majority” of the supporters of “Swings”, at the same time, wants to be a secrecy at the same time. War even without achieving its declared goals.

This situation of demobilization of the supporters of the war, however, has been manifested by the second time for two years of conflict. The highest indicators of the support of the “military operation” were observed in the spring-at the beginning of the summer of 2022, then the phase of partial demobilization of the supporters of the war came associated with the awareness of its protracted nature, high costs and obscure prospects, which reached the peak in September 2022, after the declaration of real “partial mobilization”. However, after the autumn retreat of the Russian troops in the winter of 2022/23, the second phase of mobilization of supporters of the war was observed, stimulated by the fear of defeat and the information campaign of Prigozhinsky turbitarism, which included not only the frantic polemic of Prigiron with the military command, but also the informational effect of the military bloggers dedicated to the federal media science.

Finally, since the spring of 2023, one can observe the second phase of demobilization - a noticeable reduction in wire -minded groups after the fears associated with the Ukrainian counterattack were dispelled, Prigozhin disappeared from the political scene, and the wire -wire bloggers were under pressure from the Kremlin censorship.

The expansion in connection with this second demobilization of the share of people with a fuzzy or hidden position is incorrect, however, to interpret as exclusively the growth of Russians indifferentity for war. The war remains the central problem of Russian society, even if the Russians seek not to discuss it and not to speak about it. Rather, this is a situation of a kind of impasse in public opinion, due to the pressure of the fear of repression and the consciousness of the impossibility of influencing the course of events, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the fears associated with the fact that the scenario of the exit from the war and the hypothetical output of the troops looks like obscure, potentially conflict and alarming. So, despite the fact that 40% support the immediate withdrawal of troops without achieving the targets of the operation, 37% believe that the situation in the country as a result of such a scenario will deteriorate.

Suddenly breaking through the repressive context of the local campaigns of political mobilization, such as recent protests in Bashkiria or the campaign of the collection of signatures for Boris Nadezhdin as an alternative candidate in the presidential election, can be considered as signs of growing political stress, which, however, has no ways and methods of crystallization around certain positions and dividing lines.