Between the "Spiral of Silence" and the "van with the orchestra": the influence of others on the opinion of Russians about the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict

Does the “spiral of silence” act in today's Russia - a social effect when supporters of a certain opinion, considering it unpopular, do not dare to express it and thus only strengthen its underdevelopment in public discourse? The Railway Test, used by sociologists to detect a “spiral”, shows that Russians are not inclined to talk about “military operations” with unfamiliar people, but its opponents express their opinion about one and a half times less often than its supporters.

However, polls reveal another phenomenon. In 2023, the share of the military operation supported was slightly reduced, but the share of those who say that in his environment the majority supports it, decreased much more. The study discovers that part of those who join the normative majority of support of hostilities, without their own real motivation for this (the effect of the “van with the orchestra”), is not inclined to express their position publicly, being in a mixed environment, where both supporters and opponents of the “military operation” are present. As a result, the “audibility” of the wire position in society is reduced and does not correspond to the level that could be expected by looking at the share of those who express the declarative support of the “military operation” in answers to sociologists.

Hypothesis "spirals of silence"

How to find out what the Russians think about hostilities in Ukraine, in conditions when you can get a fine or to be behind bars for a statement of an anti -war position, and the conflicts of supporters and opponents of the “military operation” from its very began to have become commonplace? The difficulties in studying public opinion in the face of a threat of repression and social pressure caused criticism of the results of mass surveys of Russians even before, but especially after the beginning of hostilities. Some Russian sociologists even opposed any mass political polls due to doubts about the reliability of their results. The argument is most popular that, in the conditions of stigmatization of the anti -war position, many of the Russians holding it refuse to participate in surveys, not wanting to discuss with strangers potentially fraught with negative consequences and expressing a socially unchanged opinion that leads to a shift in the results of polls in favor of a wire position.

Another hypothesis explaining the dominance of a wire position in the results of mass surveys is the theory of “spirals of silence” proposed by Elizabeth Noel-Nemoman in the 1970s. The effect of the “spiral of silence” explains how the fear of encountering the pressure of others can encourage people to refuse to express their point of view on a potentially conflicting question if they convince them of the unpopularity of their position. Thus, analyzing the events of the Great French Revolution, Alexis de Toville noticed that the prevailing picture of expressed opinions was displaced and misleading: “People who adhered to the former faith were afraid to be in the minority of devoted religion. And since the isolation scared them more than mistakes, they joined the majority, without changing their thoughts. The views of the only part of the nation seemed to the opinion of all and that is why they introduced into the irresistible error just those who were the fault of this deception ”(“ Old Order and Revolution ”, 1856).

Noel-Namiman suggested that people who were not very interested in politics, before expressing their opinion on a politically significant issue, evaluate the risk of facing the social disapproval of others and, if this risk seems high to them, refrain from the articulation of this opinion. At the same time, she focused on the dynamics of this process: those who are afraid to stay in isolation, people refrain from expressing their own opinion if it seems unpopular to them; Accordingly, this opinion sounds less often, which strengthens people in the impression that it is really unpopular, and as a result they are ready to express it even less often. So the “spiral of silence” is spinning, making an increasingly less popular point of view, which seems to its adherents of a weakly widespread. State pressure in the form of political repression enhances this effect, complementing the threat of social ostracism with the risk of punishment. So, in the early days of the start of the “special military operation” in February 2022, the ratio of supporting and non -supporting invasion was 58% against 23% at 19% of the undoubted ( survey Extremescan ). But after a couple of weeks, this ratio became 79% against 14% (survey of the Social Research Fund).

It should be clarified who are others. Noel-Namoman does not directly emphasize this, but, based on her experiments and questionnaires, it can be argued that those around them are people who interact with the respondent or potentially capable of it. This is not necessarily the social environment, which includes friends, relatives, colleagues, but not the whole society as a whole: a compatriot living in another city, an unfamiliar to the respondent and is not able to contact him, is not for him, and the fellow traveler in transport is not, even if the respondent does not have communication with him - it may potentially arise.

We can say that in the Russian public opinion regarding the “military operation” there were all the conditions for the “spiral of silence”: the presence of two sharply conflicting positions on military operations, the support of the authorities of the wire point of view and the efforts of state propaganda to discredit the opposite opinion and the conviction of its adherents of its unpopularity and marginality. Finally, there is such a strong catalyst “spirals of silence” as the criminalization of an anti -war position.

"Railway Test" for all of Russia

To detect the effect of the spiral of silence, Elizabeth Noel-Namiman used the “railway test”, which measures the readiness of adherents of one or another position on a socially significant issue to openly express it-in particular, discuss with a random companion adhering to opposite views on the train. We tried to adapt the “railway test” to the conditions of the telephone survey (CATI), which we conducted on June 27 - July 9, 2023 and the adult population of Russia on the floor, age and federal districts (N = 1977).

At first, the respondents asked a direct question about their attitude to military operations (“Tell me, please, do you yourself support or do not support the“ military operation ”of Russia in Ukraine?”), And then the question of their readiness to discuss them with unfamiliar people of opposite views. The supporters of military operations were asked the question: “Suppose you have to drive for several hours on the train, and one of the fellow travelers in your compartment begins to condemn the“ special operation ”. Will you talk with this person about the situation in Ukraine or do not pay attention to it? ” For opponents of the intervention, the question sounded mirrored: “Suppose you have to drive for several hours on the train, and one of the fellow travelers in your compartment begins to speak in support of the“ special operation ”. Will you talk with this person about the situation in Ukraine or do not pay attention to it? ” In our poll, the Railway Test is also supplemented by the question of the distribution of the positions of supporters and opponents of the intervention surrounded by the respondent (“What do you think among your close acquaintances, relatives, colleagues, the majority supports or does not support the“ military operation ”of Russia in Ukraine?”).

According to the results, the survey, the ratio of supporting and non -intervention was 71 to 20%, another 7% found it difficult to answer and 2% refused to answer. The issues of the “railway test” did not ask difficulty and refused, we excluded them from further analysis. As a result (after exclusion), the ratio of supporters and opponents of the intervention amounted to 78 to 22%. The military operations of a woman (76%), youth under 30 years old (62%), residents of Moscow (69%) and St. Petersburg (63%), people with higher education (75%) and people with relatively low, in their estimates (69%) supported relatively less commonly.

In general, the results of the “railway test” are confirmed by the conclusions of the qualitative studies of the laboratory of public sociology about the unpreparedness of Russians to talk about military operations: among their supporters and among their opponents, the majority does not want to discuss an acute military-political topic with strangers. At the same time, opponents of military confrontation prefer to be silent much more often: 77% versus 55% of supporters. Ready to talk among supporters of military operations more than 14 percentage points (35% versus 21%). This can be considered as a manifestation of "spirals of silence." The gap between the readiness of supporters and opponents of the intervention cannot be called insurmountable, but it is large enough to make it difficult to adherents to the anti -war position by its distribution.

Results of the "railway test": willingness to talk with political opponents, % of the number of respondents

The willingness to discuss military topics varies in different social groups. Regardless of the attitude to military operations, men and people of pre -retirement age are ready to speak more often than women and youth. Apparently, men are more politicized and more often ready to argue due to differences in assessments. This is partly confirmed by our studies showing that men are ready to participate in political surveys stably more often than women. Among the supporters and among the opponents of the “military operation”, the willingness to speak with age, reaching a peak in a group of 50–59-year-olds, and in a group of retirement age falls to the average of sample indicators. The level of education on readiness does not affect.

The results of the "railway test" in the socio-demographic groups of respondents, % of the number of respondents

Supporters of the "military operation" from different regions and settlements of various types are approximately equally ready to discuss it with unfamiliar opponents. At the same time, for opponents, the place of residence turns out to be a significant factor: in the border regions where support for hostilities is the highest, they are ready to discuss them less often, apparently, experiencing more social pressure. At the same time, opponents of military operations from rural areas are ready to discuss the situation with unfamiliar opponents more often, despite the fact that the level of intervention support in such settlements is usually higher. The level of income does not affect the readiness to speak out among supporters of hostilities, and their opponents have a willingness to talk with political opponents linearly with an increase in income. Dissatisfied with military confrontation, entrepreneurs are also more often ready to discuss it with their political opponents.

The most readiness of a person to speak about the “military operation” is affected by the distribution of opinions about it in his immediate environment. Those who are surrounded by supporters of views opposite the views of the respondent are less likely to discuss military operations with unfamiliar opponents. According to the All-Russian telephone survey conducted by us in December 2023, 43% of Russians (42% of supporters and 48% of the opponents of Svo) have experience in conflicts due to differences in estimates of current events. Those surrounded mainly by opponents and therefore, with a high degree of probability, conflicting with them on this basis feel in isolation and under social pressure and therefore seek to avoid explanations. Among such respondents, they are ready to discuss this topic with an accidental fellow traveler in the train only 9% of supporters and 10% of the opponents of the intervention - respectively, 35% and 21% in the sample in general. The last two groups, expressing their readiness to speak acute topics in spite of everything-are the same “strong nuts” in the terminology of Noel-Namoman, ready to defend their position, no matter how unpopular it seemed to them. The “spiral of silence” does not work on them.

If supporters of the “military operation” lose their desire to argue with its opponents as experience in communicating with them increases (readiness falls from 35 to 9%), then in opponents this tendency is not so pronounced: a decrease from 21% among those who are usually surrounded by like -minded people among those who are usually among opponents. At the same time, if the environment of opponents of hostilities is divided in views on the “operation” approximately in half, the probability of discussing “Svo” is not reduced. Opponents of the intervention were better adapted to the unpopularity of their position: their willingness to speak with opponents decreases only when they prevail in their social environment. While supporters of a militaristic position, having encountered even a parity of opinions in their surroundings, significantly lose their readiness to discuss the problem with unfamiliar opponents. Perhaps many of them, in their support for the intervention, joined the majority under the influence of the effect of the “van with the orchestra” - described in the classical work of sociologists George Gallp and the salt of Forbes Ray “Pulse of Democracy” to join the winners. Faced with the absence of such a majority in their own environment, many of them lose their willingness to discuss and defend their point of view.

Opinion of others as an indirect indicator of the intervention support level

The dynamics of the level of support for the “military operation” by the social environment of the respondents, which was measured by the third question of our test, is important for several reasons. Firstly, the position of the environment always significantly affects the position of the respondent, and the level of support for military operations by the environment indicates the level of social pressure that he experiences. Secondly, the distribution of assessments of hostilities surrounded by respondents shows how effective supporters and opponents of the intervention convey their opinion to others. Thus, the difference between the prevalence of a particular position among respondents and their perception of the prevalence of this position in their own environment can also be the result of the effect of the “spiral of silence”. The answers of the respondents to the question about the predominant attitude to “Svo” in their environment show how “heard” to the respondents this or that point of view in their social environment.

With a significant predominance of supporters of the “military operation” over its opponents (71% versus 20%), it can be assumed that the share of respondents, in whose environment supporters of military operations prevail, will prevail as much. However, according to our data, while 71% of respondents support the intervention, this position is dominated by only a little more than half of Russians (56%). Whereas 40%surrounded either have a parity of opinions (27%), or opponents of military operations dominate (13%). There are four possible explanations of this situation: 1) or supporters of the intervention prefer to be silent much more often than their opponents; 2) or 20% of its opponents were able to convince that there are much more of them, which twice as much as their share of Russians; 3) or opponents of the intervention more often do not want to participate in sociological surveys and the samples are shifted in favor of adherents of the militaristic position, 4) or, answering the question of personal support, respondents join the normative, “correct” position learned from mass media, but in assessing the position of their immediate environment, they are not subject to such normativity and respond more freely.

The first assumption is refuted by the data of the "railway test": supporters of hostilities are ready to discuss them more often than their opponents. The second option seems unlikely, since a militaristic position dominates the Russian information field. At the same time, as our research shows, there is a certain duality in relation to state propaganda: propaganda is recognized as necessary and useful to demonstrate the firmness of the intentions of the Russian side, but even supporters of military operations do not consider the information of the official media to be reliable and correct it to the extent that it seems reasonable to them.

Satisfactory tools for checking the most probable, in our opinion, third (displacement of the sample) and the fourth (shifting our own preferences in the direction of normative) hypotheses, unfortunately, do not. But their favor is indicated by the weak viability of the first two. If the social base of opponents of the intervention is only 20% of the population, then how can they prevail surrounded by 13% of Russians, and surrounded by another 27% of the vote? Regression is also possible to average: people are not inclined to give extreme estimates. Однако, когда доля сторонников одной позиции больше доли их оппонентов в 3,5 раза, непонятно, почему столь значительное преобладание замечает лишь чуть более половины россиян (56%), при том что государственная пропаганда настойчиво продвигает идею о непопулярности в России антивоенных взглядов.

По данным девяти общероссийских опросов, проведенных в 2022–2023 годах, разрыв между долей сторонников «военной операции» и долей тех, у кого в окружении преобладают ее сторонники, наблюдается на протяжении всего периода военного противостояния. Особенно заметным он стал сразу после начала мобилизации. Затем он немного сгладился, но все равно остался на более высоком по сравнению с периодом до мобилизации уровне. Как видим, после начала мобилизации доля сторонников «военной операции» составляет в среднем 73% (по четырем замерам), в то время как в начале «военной операции» составляла 79% (по трем замерам), то есть число людей с провоенной позицией снизилось на 6 п. п. В то же время доля респондентов, у которых в окружении большинство составляют сторонники «операции», снизилась с 68 до 57%, то есть здесь снижение было почти вдвое заметнее. Это дает основания предполагать, что, возможно, из поля зрения социологов-полстеров стала выпадать все бóльшая группа недовольных военным противостоянием.

Динамика поддержки «СВО» респондентами, % от числа опрошенных

Динамика поддержки «СВО» окружением респондентов, % от числа опрошенных

В некоторых наиболее антивоенных группах (молодежь, жители Санкт-Петербурга, люди с низкими доходами, занятые в частном секторе) люди чаще окружены противниками «военной операции». Однако в других социально-демографических группах, где подобные взгляды также более популярны, этот эффект не наблюдается. Это москвичи, жители региональных центров, предприниматели и те, кто узнает о военных действиях из интернета. Преобладание сторонников интервенции явно выражено (больше 60%) в окружении только самых милитаристски настроенных групп: у телезрителей (66%), жителей приграничных регионов (65%), обладателей высоких доходов (64%) и россиян старшего поколения (61%). Таким образом, дифференциация респондентов по позициям их ближайшего окружения не столь велика, как по их собственным декларируемым взглядам на российско-украинский конфликт.

Уровень поддержки «СВО» социальным окружением респондентов, % от числа опрошенных

Итак, полученные в ходе адаптированного «железнодорожного теста» данные подтвердили сделанное по результатам прошлогодних фокус-групп предположение о низкой готовности россиян обсуждать российско-украинский конфликт. Это косвенно свидетельствует в пользу аккламационного и аполитичного характера поддержки «СВО» у многих жителей России, описанного Владимиром Ищенко и Олегом Журавлевым по материалам серии глубинных интервью с россиянами, не являющимися противниками «военной операции». По данным «железнодорожного теста», обсуждать военные действия готовы лишь 35% их сторонников и 21% их противников. Разница между этими долями свидетельствует о том, что под действие описанной Элизабет Ноэль-Нойман «спирали молчания» значимо чаще попадают противники «СВО», а ее сторонники чаще готовы обсуждать свою позицию с незнакомыми оппонентами, что неудивительно ввиду большей популярности их точки зрения.

Однако эта готовность резко снижается, если в их ближайшем окружении не преобладают их единомышленники. По всей видимости, хотя механизм «спирали молчания» чаще влияет на готовность высказываться у противников «СВО», в то же время они лучше адаптировались к смешанной среде, где представлены оба мнения. Как в данном опросе, так и в предыдущих замерах доля респондентов, заявивших о поддержке «военной операции», значительно выше доли тех, кто говорит, что в его окружении ее сторонники преобладают. Разрыв между этими показателями заметно увеличился после «частичной мобилизации», хотя уровень поддержки интервенции респондентами изменился незначительно. Именно распределение мнений в окружении респондентов сильнее всего влияет на их готовность обсуждать российско-украинский конфликт с приверженцами противоположной точки зрения. Столкнувшиеся с преобладанием оппонентов в ближайшем окружении россияне намного реже готовы говорить на эту тему. Такие данные перекликаются с результатами качественных исследований , показывающих, что сохранение социальных связей для россиян важнее, чем потребность отстаивания и распространения собственных политических взглядов.

Сокращенная версия статьи «Восприятие россиянами конфликта с Украиной: проверка гипотезы „спирали молчания“» , опубликованной в журнале «Социологические исследования» (2023. № 11).