Pigeons or ostriches? A tough US course towards post-war Russia will lead to a strengthening of the alliance between Moscow and Beijing, RAND experts say

It is difficult to predict the outcome of a major war, but the resulting agreements have long-term consequences. RAND Corporation experts described four scenarios for the post-war situation, which differ both in the conditions that develop at the end of the conflict and in Washington’s choice of a “soft” or “hard” line in relation to post-war Russia. Choosing a “soft” line will create better conditions for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine and its integration into the EU, but will require a rejection of its integration into NATO. And choosing a “hard” line will push Russia and China towards deeper technical and military cooperation. Experts give a clear preference to “détente” scenarios, believing that they will allow the United States to focus more on strategic competition with China. RAND has taken this view and has been proposing de-escalation strategies in relations with Moscow since the start of the war. However, such a strategy could backfire if Washington’s “soft” line is perceived in Moscow and Beijing as a sign of weakness. In this case, it will not reduce, but rather increase the likelihood of both a new clash between Russia and Europe and an escalation around Taiwan. And the United States will again face the need to fight on two fronts.

The outcome of a major war usually has powerful long-term consequences. The agreements at the end of the First and Second World Wars reformatted nations and states in Europe so decisively that this is felt to this day. At the same time, as history shows, assumptions about the post-war future made by politicians during the war often turn out to be completely false, RAND Corporation experts write in their latest report , in which they try to imagine the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war and formulate possible US strategies in the post-war world.

Having rejected the most radical scenarios, analysts focus on two intermediate outcomes. The more negative involves a long war of attrition that ends in a fragile ceasefire. Ukraine is suffering significant territorial losses. Russia is also quite exhausted, but relies on the support of China, which helps it with arms supplies. Ukraine is economically exhausted, but continues to dream of territorial revenge. Geo-economic fragmentation in the world is intensifying due to secondary sanctions. The situation in Europe does not allow the US to focus on the Indo-Pacific region, and there is no agreement within NATO.

In the second scenario, the war ends relatively quickly with a lasting ceasefire agreement. Ukraine's territorial losses are moderate and it is concentrating on its economic recovery. Russia is quite exhausted by the war, and its military-industrial complex is unable to cope with the task of replenishing weapons. Meanwhile, it continues to focus primarily on security goals. Its relations with China remain not very close, and NATO unity, on the contrary, has been preserved.

For these two scenarios, experts are trying to model a “harder” and a “softer” US course. For a bad outcome, this results in two scenarios - “Extended Instability” and “Localized Instability”. The first is the result of a “hard” line, which involves actively containing Russia. The US is deploying additional forces, as well as medium-range missiles and missile defense (BMD) infrastructure in Europe, abandoning arms control talks with Moscow. This provokes Russia and then China into a new nuclear race. Expanding security cooperation with Ukraine, including through NATO, is taking political tensions in the region to a new level. The truce on the Russia-Ukraine border remains fragile, with both sides preparing for a new war and Moscow seeking a preemptive strike to prevent Ukraine's NATO membership.

The Localized Instability scenario occurs if Washington realizes that it has spent too many resources on the conflict in Ukraine without much return, and shifts its attention to the Indo-Pacific region. The United States is reducing its military presence in Eastern Europe, which allows Moscow to take a similar step. Washington's less hard line is causing concern in Eastern Europe but appealing to allies such as Germany. Tensions between the United States and Russia are decreasing, and Russia is abandoning plans to attack any NATO country. Ukraine abandons revanchist intentions and offensive operations and concentrates on defense. The risk of a new war between Moscow and Kyiv is lower than in the first scenario, but remains high.

The “Cold War 2.0” and “Cold Peace” scenarios arise in response to an unfavorable outcome of the confrontation for the Kremlin. Washington’s choice of a “hard” line aims to continue pressure on Moscow, causing even greater damage to it. In fact, we are talking about the same steps as in the “hard” scenario of the first type (“Extended Instability”), that is, the build-up and development of nuclear potential, the deployment of additional forces and missile defense systems in Europe, and the integration of Ukraine into NATO. In addition, the United States is actively countering Russian influence in the post-Soviet space and is preparing to admit Georgia to NATO. Lacking the resources for a symmetric response, Moscow relies on hybrid attacks, including election interference and operations in the information space. The ceasefire in Ukraine is being observed, which helps Kyiv, with the help of the EU, to begin reforms, ensure the return of refugees and the growth of private investment. The economic situation in Europe remains good, but for the United States, the confrontation with Russia and China is resulting in a slowdown in economic growth. In both “hard” scenarios, the United States is forced to divert resources and attention from the Pacific arena, and the pressure it puts on Russia provokes closer technological and military cooperation between Russia and China.

Finally, in the most favorable scenario, according to RAND—Cold Peace—the United States abandons “hard” containment of Moscow, which leads to an overall decrease in tensions. This is a classic scenario of what was called “détente” during the Cold War. Washington has demonstrated a willingness to negotiate to limit the arms race and conventional forces in Europe and provides assistance to Ukraine in strengthening its defense capabilities, but does not integrate it into NATO, agreeing to its neutral status. The United States also refuses to expand its influence in the post-Soviet space and Georgia’s integration into NATO. Moreover, Washington is demonstrating its readiness to negotiate with Moscow on easing sanctions. Both “soft” scenarios, experts emphasize, increase the possibilities of post-war economic recovery in Ukraine and its successful integration into the EU.

Since the beginning of the war, the RAND Corporation, a renowned think tank that develops strategies for the American government, has been on the side of the “doves,” that is, that part of the US political establishment that believes that America is not interested in a long war in Ukraine that would divert resources from strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. RAND experts view such a war as a kind of “trap” and argue that Putin’s Russia has demonstrated its weakness and is not an existential challenge to US interests (→ Re: Russia: Long war or quick defeat ). This position is fully manifested in this report: experts give preference to “soft” strategies and consider the last scenario to be the most preferable.

Strong arguments on this side are the theses that a decrease in tension is an important factor in the post-war recovery of Ukraine, and an increase in tension contributes to closer integration of Russia and China. The weak point of the “soft” scenarios is that they ignore the revisionist nature of Putin’s policies (→ Kirill Rogov: The global rise of revisionism ). In other words, de-escalation on the part of the United States will be perceived in the Kremlin as a manifestation of weakness, insufficient strength for a “war on two fronts,” and therefore will push it not to respond to de-escalation, but to provoke further tension. In this perspective, strategic coordination between Moscow and Beijing already exists, and a favorable outcome of the confrontation in Ukraine will strengthen both Putin’s positions within the country and in the international arena, as well as the positions of the “hawks” in the Chinese leadership - and will bring the likely escalation around Taiwan closer rather than further.