Pro-War Spring: Support for the war in Russia is growing amid economic prosperity and belief in imminent victory

The spring wave of public opinion polls shows an increase in support for the 'military operation' among Russian respondents in response to both direct and indirect questions.

In the April measurement by 'Chronicles'/ExtremeScan, the proportion expressing support for the war rose sharply from 52% to 61%. In the May-June polls by the Levada Centre and Russian Field, support for the idea of transitioning to peace negotiations decreased, while support for offensive actions in Ukraine increased.

Poll results in times of repression and war are likely to inaccurately reflect public preferences. Respondents who are disloyal to the regime and the war and who participate in polls consider such participation potentially dangerous 2–4 times more often than loyalists, which may lead to their underrepresentation in the sample. In this case, the actual proportion of those unsympathetic to the war could be about one and a half times higher than what is shown in the survey distributions.

Additionally, about a third of respondents avoid expressing support for the war if the survey scenario allows them to do so. This position can be characterised as a 'compromise identity,' balancing between respondents' pacifist preferences and normative patriotism.

The increase in support for the 'military operation' and the offensive actions of Russian troops is likely related to both the general improvement in social sentiments and heightened confidence in Russia's advantage on the battlefield.

The increased loyalty to the 'military operation' is also reflected in the growing proportion of respondents willing to support a second wave of mobilisation. This shift may lead the Kremlin to believe that the costs of such a move are not as great as previously thought.

Limited visibility

As the wave of surveys conducted in April and early June shows, the share of Russian citizens who support the war in Ukraine increased slightly in spring 2024. This is likely due to a general improvement in social sentiments – assessments of the family's material situation, confidence in the stability of the Russian economy – as well as strengthened perceptions of the success of Russian troops and Russia's advantage on the battlefield.

However, it is essential to note that the reliability of poll data under a repressive regime and wartime conditions raises significant doubts and remains a subject of extensive debate. The poll data itself provides key arguments for treating the distributions of responses to sensitive questions with caution. In surveys regularly conducted over the past two years by several sociological teams, we see a significant difference in the perception of the 'climate of opinions' between respondents who support Putin and the 'military operation' and those who do not.

For example, in the Levada Centre's surveys, the proportion of respondents who approve of Putin and feel free to express their political opinions remained unchanged from 2015 to 2022 (about 40%). However, among those who do not approve of Putin, this proportion dropped from 40% to 18%. Conversely, the proportion of those who fear expressing their opinions publicly increased among those who disapprove of Putin from 20% to 31% (only 8% among those who approve).

'Can you freely express your attitude towards the policies pursued by the country's leadership?' 2015–2022, % of respondents who approve/disapprove of Vladimir Putin.

According to the Chronicle project, among those who approve of the special military operation, 17% consider the risk of participating in surveys to be 'moderate' and 16% consider it 'high,' while among those who disapprove, the respective figures are 30% and 41% (October 2023). Interestingly, those who were uncertain about their stance on the war felt a sense of danger similar to those who support it, while those who refused to answer the question about support for the war had a sense of danger similar to those who did not support it.

Risk assessment of participation in polls, October 2023, % of those surveyed

Finally, according to the Russian Field poll, among those who support the special military operation, 16% are afraid to participate in surveys, compared to 43% among those who do not support it (February 2023). As we can see, the proportion of those who fear participation is 2–4 times higher among groups disloyal to the regime. Even loyalist groups believe that the majority of Russians consider participation in surveys to be unsafe. In October 2023, this opinion was held by 59% of those loyal to the authorities and 72–75% of the disloyal (Levada Centre survey).

Given such a difference in the perception of the climate of opinions between loyal and disloyal respondents, it is hard to imagine that it does not affect the decision to participate in a survey. This means that groups disloyal to the authorities may be underrepresented in the sample. This circumstance likely does not completely overturn the picture of attitudes toward the war but may significantly distort it.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the polls 'do not reflect reality' - rather, they reflect an authoritarian reality. Polling data is, however, quite meaningful in many respects, and even on sensitive issues, especially when questions are indirectly formulated (the answer to the direct question 'Do you support the actions of Russian troops in Ukraine?' can be criminalised), surveys provide important information about changes in trends and the balance of sentiments.

Survey scenarios and compromise identity

As we have previously noted, the data from various polls only appears at first glance very different. For example, in the Levada Centre survey, respondents are asked to express their attitude to the 'military operation' without first mentioning the options 'I find it difficult to answer' or 'I don't want to answer'. As a result, an average of 75% of participants in the Levada polls support the 'special military operation' (of which 49% definitely support it), while 19% do not support it (of which 9% definitely do not support it). In the polls of the Chronicles project and ExtremeScan, where respondents are immediately offered the options 'I hesitate' and 'I don't want to answer', an average of 57% declare support, 31% avoid expressing support (which is normatively obligatory in today's Russia), and 11% express open non-support. In this sense, the Levada Centre's survey scenario appears to be the most 'repressive,' while the Chronicles/ExtremeScan scenario allows people to avoid expressing support without directly opposing the regime. This option is used by between 30% and 40% of those surveyed.

It is important to remember that these distributions are likely skewed due to the underrepresentation of disloyal contingents among survey participants. If we hypothesise that, all else being equal, only 50–60% of disloyal respondents agree to participate in surveys, then in the Levada Centre's survey scenario, the share of those not supporting the war would be just over 30%, and the share of supporters would be just over 60%. In the 'Chronicles'/ExtremeScan survey scenario, the share of non-supporters would shift to around 15%, the share of those avoiding answering would move to 35%, and the share of supporters would be around 50% or slightly lower.

Dynamics of attitudes towards the 'military operation' among respondents participating in the Levada Centre and Chronicles/ExtremeScan polls, 2022-2024, % of those surveyed

It is important to note that those people who participate in surveys and cannot determine their stance on the war are not necessarily driven by fears about the consequences of their response (such people are more likely to simply not participate in surveys). They represent the 'grey zone,' meaning their attitude toward the war is contradictory: on one hand, it does not align with their belief system, but on the other hand, they are forced to seek a compromise with the political realities and society in which they live, which they perceive to support the war. They do not want to be seen as 'outcasts' or opponents of their 'own country,' and their position can perhaps be characterised as a 'compromise identity' (→ Re:Russia: Deadlocks of War).

In terms of dynamics, we see that the proportion of open opponents of the war has hardly changed in both survey series since disloyalty to the war was criminalised. The share of declarative supporters of the war in the 'Chronicles'/ExtremeScan surveys, after a decrease in the second half of 2022, fluctuates between 50-60%, while the share of those avoiding answering ranges between 30-40%.

Pro-war spring

In the April survey by 'Chronicles'/ExtremeScan, the share of those expressing support for the war rose by 9 points, from 52% (in October) to 61%, while the share of those avoiding an answer decreased from 38% to 27%. This is a significant change that aligns with other survey data.

For example, the Russian Field project has been asking respondents since April 2022 whether military actions should continue or shift to peace negotiations. Since the end of 2022, the Levada Centre has also periodically asked this question. As we see, from mid-2022 to the fall of 2023, the share of supporters of continuing military actions decreased from about 55% to 40% or even lower. However, at the beginning of 2024, a trend towards growth emerged – not very significant in Russian Field's data, but more pronounced in Levada's: from 37% in October 2023 to 43% in May 2024. Moreover, the latest Russian Field survey conducted in early June shows an increase in support for the strategy of 'offensive actions' by the Russian army: in October 2023 and February 2024, this strategy was supported by 60% of the project's respondents, while in the latest survey it was 69%.

Continued military action or peace talks?, 2022-2024, % of those surveyed

We observe a similar trend in the distribution of responses to another indirect question, which Russian Field began asking in the first months of the war and later replicated by Levada Centre. Respondents are asked whether they would repeal the decision to start the 'military operation' if they could go back in time. Supporters of repealing the decision either see no sense in it or consider its costs disproportionate to its goals. In response to this question, the proportion of those who do not wish to repeal the 'special operation' decreased from 56% in the first half of the war to 49% at the turn of 2023-2024. However, in the latest survey, it jumped again by 5 percentage points.

Cancel the decision to conduct the 'military operation' or not?, 2022-2024, % of those surveyed

Thus, from April to early June 2024, a trend of increasing pro-war sentiments is evident across all three survey series. This shift in loyalty also manifests in some other questions. For example, the percentage of those who consider it possible to make concessions to Ukraine for the sake of reaching a peaceful agreement decreased from 20% to 17%. Conversely, the share of those trusting official information about the 'military operation' increased by 6 percentage points, from 47% to 53%, in the Russian Field survey (the share of those not trusting decreased from 46% to 40%). Finally, in the 'Chronicles'/ExtremeScan surveys, the percentage of those who say that the majority in their environment supports the 'military operation' has increased slightly (from 50% to 53%). The distribution of responses to this question is interesting because it allows us to see how respondents perceive the 'temperature' regarding support for the military operation without the burden of self-identification. As we see, this 'temperature' seems closer to our assumptions of adjusted preference distribution: it is not absolute dominance of war supporters, but rather a strong predominance (50%), with another 30% in the 'mixed zone' and 15% firmly against.

'Do those in your community support the “military operation”?', 2023-2024, % of those surveyed

Traditionally, the level of support for the war and general loyalty among the youngest and oldest groups of respondents differs by about one and a half times in Levada Centre polls and almost two times in Russian Field and Chronicles/ExtremeScan polls. Moreover, after the war began, an interesting phenomenon is observed in Levada Center surveys: traditionally progressive Moscow demonstrates much higher loyalty to the ‘special operation’, while traditionally conservative rural areas show significantly lower. For instance, 58% of Muscovites support continuing military actions (33% support starting negotiations), whereas only 40% of rural residents share this opinion (54% support starting negotiations). If people could go back in time and support or repeal the start of military actions, 41% of rural respondents would repeal the decision – compared to 25% of Muscovites (respectively, 47% of rural respondents and 61% of Muscovites support this decision even in hindsight). There is no satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon. In the 'Chronicle'/ExtremeScan surveys, on the contrary, there is a significant difference in attitudes to the war between St Petersburg and Moscow. For example, 54% of respondents in St Petersburg are ready to support Putin's decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine even without achieving the goals of the military operation, compared to 39% among Moscow respondents. It should be noted that the phenomenon of opposition in St Petersburg has also manifested itself in closed surveys conducted at the request of the presidential administration and became known thanks to a recent leak.

Optimism: sources and threats

Previously, we assumed that the marked increase in support for the 'military operation' in April in the responses of those surveyed by Chronicles/ExtremeScan was due to the effect of the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, which triggered a wave of mobilisation (→ Re:Russia: War of Narratives). However, data from the Russian Field and Chronicles/ExtremeScan surveys conducted in late May and early June show the same trends, albeit somewhat weaker, and suggest that there are broader reasons behind the rise in pro-war sentiment.

Significantly, in the latest Russian Field survey, the proportion of respondents who believe that the ‘military operation’ is proceeding successfully for the Russian army jumped sharply from 56% to 69%. This is the highest recorded level during the observation period, with the previous record of 61% noted in July 2022, which was 8 percentage points lower. The impression of an expanding Russian advantage on the battlefield, offering the prospect of a relatively swift and victorious end to the war, likely appears to respondents as the optimal scenario for ending ‘all of this’, thereby increasing support for Russian military actions.

However, another notable event at the beginning of 2024 was the rise in assessments of the economic situation and the calculated Levada Center index of social sentiments. The latter continued to rise remarkably in early 2022, despite the crisis situation in the Russian economy at that time. It experienced a sharp decline only in September 2022 when the survey was conducted against the backdrop of Putin's announced mobilisation. However, by March 2023, it had recovered, and from November 2023, it surged again to reach an all-time high in May 2024.

Levada Centre Social Sentiment Index (modified), 2007-2024

It is unlikely that this means the Russian economy is experiencing its best times. Rather, sampling bias could also have played a role here. Among Russians, two groups stand out with low levels of loyalty to the Putin regime and the war: the younger, more educated demographic (advanced urban middle class) and low-income individuals. It is possible that, among the latter category, concerns about the safety of participating in surveys are more prevalent. Therefore, underrepresentation of this category might explain somewhat inflated indicators of war support and overestimated economic assessments. However, this does not negate the fact that economic optimism surged in early 2024 against the backdrop of high economic growth rates and incomes.

When looking at the fluctuations in Russians' attitudes towards the war, we can note that there was a decline in support for the special military operation in the autumn of 2022 against the backdrop of the Russian retreat and announced mobilisation and in the second half of 2023, when the war seemed to have reached a complete stalemate. These two declines and the current upswing demonstrate the significance of the cost factor in war support. When the perceived costs increase for respondents, some of the ‘supporters’ shift into the ‘grey zone’, and when costs decrease, the shift occurs in the opposite direction.

However, the current optimism may come at a high cost to the Russian middle class. Expectations of success and war's end have led to an increase in the proportion of those willing to support a second wave of mobilisation and some erosion of opposition to it. According to the latest Russian Field survey, 34% of respondents support or are more likely to support a second mobilisation (+4 percentage points from February figures), and if Putin's name is added to the question ('If Putin announces a second wave of mobilisation tomorrow???'), support increases to 40%. Among those who rely on television for information, nearly 50% are willing to support mobilisation. This is a sufficiently high figure that, against the backdrop of generally muted dissatisfaction with the war among Russians, could convince the Kremlin that the costs of such a measure would not be so high after all.