Multipolar Nuclear Threat: The normalisation of nuclear blackmail by the Kremlin leads to a new arms race, more dangerous than the previous one

Putin's invasion of Ukraine and the escalation in the Middle East following Hamas's attack on Israel have triggered a new nuclear arms race. This race is particularly characterised by the heightened activity of countries with relatively small nuclear arsenals.

The world is closer to the possibility of uncontrolled nuclear conflict than during the Cold War, especially considering the frequent threats of using nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts. These threats are prompting even those countries that previously did not plan to create their own nuclear arsenals to reconsider.

This primarily concerns South Korea and Saudi Arabia, as well as possibly the UAE and Turkey, for whom this might be the only response to the nuclear threat from existential rivals. Experts urge the leading countries of the world to recognise the danger of a new arms race escalation and to come to the negotiation table as soon as possible, aiming to reinstate non-proliferation and multilateral nuclear disarmament as global priorities.

Vladimir Putin's attack on Ukraine and the use of nuclear threats as a means of waging conventional war are critically undermining the fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime and creating the threat of a new type of nuclear arms race, which has, in fact, already begun. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) Yearbook 2024, although the overall number of nuclear warheads worldwide has decreased due to reduction programs in the US and Russia, the actual trend in nuclear armament dynamics has shifted towards growth.

SIPRI experts highlight that China has the highest rate of nuclear arsenal expansion: an increase of 90 warheads in a year (from 410 to 500), compared to 60 the previous year. The United Kingdom plans to increase its arsenal from 225 to 260 warheads in the near future and has begun developing a new warhead, Astraea, as part of its national nuclear deterrence strategy. France (with 290 warheads) continues to develop a third-generation ballistic missile submarine and a new air-launched cruise missile, as well as to repair and upgrade existing delivery systems. Russia has increased the number of deployed warheads by 35 (to 1710), seemingly aiming to catch up with the US (1770). For the first time, China has 24 deployed warheads. At present, almost all nuclear-armed countries are either planning or have already launched programs to modernise and strengthen their nuclear forces.

The primary danger lies in the fundamentally new nature of the current nuclear arms race compared to the Cold War era. By attacking Ukraine, Putin uses nuclear escalation to demonstrate that Russia cannot lose in a conventional war and to deter broader involvement in the conflict by third parties, especially the US. This strategy appears to be quite successful so far and is consequently altering the global perception of power balance. The possession of nuclear weapons is becoming a tool for waging conventional war and a reliable guarantee against defeat. This creates a powerful incentive for the development of nuclear weapons, especially for those states with long-standing and unresolved conflicts with neighbours or those involved in regional power struggles.

The new arms race, unlike the previous one, may thus unfold not so much as the building up of arsenals by superpowers, but rather as the building up 'small' arsenals by middle powers. According to some experts, including Patricia Lewis, Director of the International Security Program at Chatham House, the world is or will be closer to the possibility of uncontrolled nuclear conflict than during the Cold War.

Regions with long-standing conflicts are already being influenced by the prospect of a new balance of power. The situation in the Middle East is particularly dangerous in this regard. After Hamas's attack on Israel on 7 October, 2023, Israel's Minister of Heritage, Amichai Eliyahu, stated that he did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons against Gaza. In April 2024, amid escalating tensions with Iran, Israel struck the Isfahan province, where Iranian nuclear facilities are located. According to Lewis, this was a clear signal that Jerusalem is ready to attack them if necessary. Israel, which officially does not acknowledge having nuclear weapons, is estimated by SIPRI to be modernising its nuclear arsenal (currently about 90 warheads) and the plutonium production reactor complex in Dimona. The sharp escalation in the Middle East has undermined US diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's military nuclear program and to involve Israel in a conference on creating a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, SIPRI notes.

If Tehran acquires nuclear weapons, it will increase the likelihood of its hybrid and conventional attacks on its regional rivals, who would be defenceless against such attacks, as explained in an article by a group of experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Foreign Affairs. The US, as demonstrated by the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, will also be unable to provide sufficient assistance. Saudi Arabian leaders have previously stated that if Tehran develops nuclear weapons, Riyadh will be forced to take a similar step.

The US's ability to prevent such a development is limited. Following the discovery of uranium reserves on its territory, Saudi Arabia announced plans to establish a peaceful nuclear programme that would include a 'full nuclear fuel cycle'. Riyadh has offered the US cooperation in this area, but the deal has been delayed: the Biden administration wanted to secure a ban on uranium enrichment on Saudi soil. However, if the deal does not go through, Saudi Arabia may turn to China for nuclear assistance. In this case, Washington will be entirely unable to influence the development of Riyadh's nuclear program, the authors of Foreign Affairs note.

The prospect of Iran and Saudi Arabia becoming nuclear powers raises a similar question for Turkey and the UAE, which are technologically capable of achieving this goal. Otherwise, their regional status will sharply decline, something they are unlikely to accept, CSIS experts point out. Thus, a situation may arise where regional powers without nuclear weapons will lose their standing and face the prospect of losing this status, creating a new impetus for nuclear proliferation. The global confrontation between China and Russia with the West will only contribute to this.

An important factor in the likely nuclear arms race is not only the threats of nuclear escalation in conventional military conflicts from the Kremlin but also the lack of a response to this strategy from Washington. This makes several countries question the reliability of security guarantees from the US. For example, more than half of South Koreans are not sure they can trust US military support in the event of an attack by the DPRK (→ Re:Russia: Defending the South).In April 2023, the presidents of the US and South Korea signed an additional Washington Declaration, but Moscow responded by signing a military assistance treaty during Putin's visit to North Korea. According to SIPRI, Pyongyang currently has about 50 warheads (up from 30 a year ago) and enough fissile material to create another 90. North Korea has apparently conducted its first test of a short-range ballistic missile and has completed the development of at least two types of ground-launched cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The main danger is that, just like in the cases of Russia and Iran, the possession of nuclear weapons may prompt the North Korean regime to conduct conventional military operations or at least provocations against Seoul.

Public opinion polls in South Korea traditionally show that more than 70% of the country's residents support the development of nuclear weapons. However, according to a CSIS study, only 34% of surveyed members of the ruling elite share this view; they continue to believe in the inviolability of US guarantees. Nevertheless, the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House threatens to dismantle even this last bastion against nuclear consensus in South Korea. In an interview with Time magazine, Trump stated that Seoul should pay much more to Washington for protection against the North Korean threat. Representatives of the South Korean academic community asserted on Voice of America that almost every research institute in the country has developed scenarios for Trump's return, which include the creation of a nuclear arsenal.

The idea of a multipolar world, which is highly favoured in Moscow, is currently manifested as a reality of multipolar nuclear threats. In the long-term strategic perspective, this development is highly disadvantageous for Russia itself.