Three Relocated Groups in Five Countries: What is happening with the new Russian diaspora in Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

At least two-thirds of the new Russian diaspora resides in five countries bordering Russia to the south: Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Among the relocated, three groups emerge: political, economic (related to the relocation of businesses from the sanctioned zone), and 'mobilisation', which includes those fleeing from the 'partial' mobilisation.

The migration to Armenia, Georgia, and Turkey was more often driven by economic or political reasons, while Kazakhstan absorbed those fleeing the threat of mobilisation. Those relocated in Armenia and Georgia, who are generally younger and more educated than those in the other three countries, tend to hold more oppositional views and have experience in political activism in Russia. Meanwhile, a significant portion of Russian 'military' migrants in Turkey and Kazakhstan aligns more closely with Russians who stayed in the country and is more influenced by official Russian rhetoric.

Unlike Armenia, which is drifting towards the West, unfavourable political trends in Georgia are pushing the politicised sector of the Russian diaspora out of the country. Georgia's adoption of laws on ‘foreign agents’, aimed particularly at Western organisations working there, will further reduce their presence.

While representatives of the Russian opposition, opposition public figures, and independent media are primarily located in the EU, the majority of the diaspora that left Russia after the start of the war in Ukraine resides in five countries bordering Russia to the south: Armenia (about 100,000), Georgia (75,000), Turkey (180,000), Kazakhstan (100,000), and Kyrgyzstan (over 170,000), according to a report by the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), which conducted a survey among Russian relocants in these diasporas. However, the estimated numbers are highly tentative, as they rely on registration data from 2022–2023, and many relocants have since changed their country of residence or even returned to Russia. While estimates suggest that by the end of 2022 the wave of relocation might have reached about 820,000–920,000 people (→ Re:Russia: Escape from War), the researchers from ZOiS now believe it has likely decreased to around 650,000. Of these, at least two-thirds are thought to reside in the five aforementioned countries.

Based on 4300 interviews with those who have relocated (relokanty), experts concluded that there is a direct correlation between the socio-demographic profile of migrants and their political views, and the diasporas in these countries vary significantly from each other. The average age of those relocated in all five countries is lower than the average age of the Russian population: 32 versus 39. Additionally, the new diaspora is skewed towards people from major cities. About one-third of respondents said they have children, and nearly half are married.

In Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, there is a higher proportion of male ‘relokanty’ (from 56% in Armenia and Georgia to 62% in Kyrgyzstan), while in Kazakhstan and Turkey, women dominate the relocated population (58% and 63%, respectively). Unsurprisingly, the new Russian community in Georgia and Armenia is represented by a younger, better-educated urban segment (from Moscow and St Petersburg), with a larger share of IT sector employees. Among those who have settled in Kazakhstan, there are more migrants with lower educational levels, and a higher proportion work in construction and trade sectors. The migration to Armenia, Georgia, and Turkey was primarily driven by economic factors—relocation of businesses from the sanctions zone (particularly relevant for IT) – or political reasons, while Kazakhstan absorbed those fleeing the threat of mobilisation.

Those relocated in Turkey and Kyrgyzstan exhibit more diversity, and they cannot be clearly categorised as belonging to either the 'educated middle class', as in Georgia and Armenia, or the 'working class', as in Kazakhstan. Turkey, in particular, has a higher proportion of Russians pursuing education than the other countries studied. Moreover, the two major Russian clusters in Turkey – İstanbul and Antalya – attract different groups of relocated Russians. İstanbul is dominated by young Russians pursuing education, while Antalya is home to a more affluent group, 47% of whom work in the IT sector.

As before (→ Re:Russia: Relocating to the Caucasus), those surveyed from Armenia and Georgia, who on average are younger and better educated than relokanty in other surveyed countries, tend to hold more oppositional views and have experience with political activism in Russia. However, it would be incorrect to consider those who have settled in Georgia as the political core of the opposition diaspora. The socio-political context in Georgia, where relocated Russians are viewed with suspicion, to say the least, and where there is a trend towards autocratisation in domestic politics, has a demobilising effect on them, limiting their opportunities for political activity. According to a survey by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, young Georgians aged 14-29 placed Russian citizens among the top categories of people they would like to see banned from entering the country. Similar levels of undesirability were only recorded for ‘drug users’ and ‘homosexuals’.

This unfavourable backdrop contrasts sharply with the situation in Armenia, which relocated Russians generally describe as a more welcoming country towards them. In Armenia, which is steadily drifting towards the West, conditions are much more favourable for the political engagement of the diaspora, according to the study's authors. A third of the surveyed Russians who settled in Armenia noted that they had participated in protests in Russia (compared to only 20% in Georgia). These relokanty represent political, rather than 'mobilisation' or economic, migration. They rarely work in the IT sector, and when relocating, they typically had friends or acquaintances who had also moved to Armenia.

Most of those relocated in Armenia believe that Russians who have moved abroad should protest against the Russian regime and emphasise the symbolic importance of such protests as a signal to the international community. More than a third of respondents in this group express a sense of responsibility for Russia's political future – the highest level among all five countries. In 2023, it was already noted that Armenia hosts the most politically active portion of Russian relocants, those who believe that Russia and Russian citizens bear responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine. According to ZOiS data, 76% of respondents in Armenia held this view, compared to 67% of emigrants in Georgia.

At the same time, a significant portion of Russians relocated in Turkey and Kazakhstan are positioned much closer to Russians who remained in Russia on the political spectrum and are more susceptible to Russian official rhetoric. Many of them clearly distance themselves from opposition and anti-war views. In Turkey, 60% of respondents blame other countries (the US, Ukraine) and Western institutions (NATO, the EU) for starting the war in Ukraine. More than half do not feel responsible for Russia's political future, and the overwhelming majority believe that Russians abroad should not protest (in Kazakhstan, two-thirds share this view). In fact, most of them did not engage in protests even while in Russia. Moreover, few of those who believe Russians abroad should protest are convinced that such actions can influence Russian politics – a sentiment rarely expressed in other countries.

In turn, the new Russian community in Kyrgyzstan shows a wide variety of attitudes: about half of the respondents blame Russia for the war, around 20% blame the US, 15% blame Ukraine, and 15% refrain from answering the question altogether. More than a third of those surveyed do not feel responsible for Russia’s political future, while just under a third, on the contrary, do. At the same time, every fifth Russian emigrant in Kyrgyzstan shows signs of burnout: their interest in political events has significantly declined, and the sense of responsibility for the country's future they once felt has become a relic of the past.

Thus, the large-scale survey and research allow for the following conclusions. The five countries bordering Russia to the south host the largest portion of wartime Russian relocants. As before, three sectors are clearly identifiable: political, economic, and 'mobilisation' migration. These sectors are unevenly distributed across the countries. For instance, the weak presence of the political group in Kyrgyzstan leads to its dilution and burnout. In Georgia, the suppression of the political group is driven by unfavourable political trends and a paradoxical situation: while the ruling 'Georgian Dream' party leans towards fostering economic ties with Russia and is tolerant of economic migration from Russia, it is not welcoming to the political sector. Meanwhile, the opposition, ideologically closer to Russian relokanty, relies on anti-Russian nationalist mobilisation. This ultimately leads to the shrinking of the politicised sector of the Russian diaspora. Georgia's laws on 'foreign agents', aimed particularly at Western organisations working in the country, will further contribute to this contraction.