Original Material
Tug-of-war over Armenia: A geopolitical shift is underway in the South Caucasus after the third Karabakh war
Relations between Yerevan and Moscow have reached a new low. On September 18, Armenian security forces announced they had foiled an attempted coup, accusing Russia of involvement in its planning. At the same time, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan delivered sharp criticism of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), warning that Yerevan is nearing the point of no return in its ties with the military alliance. Tensions between Yerevan and Moscow are escalating as Armenia pivots away from Russia and toward the West — a shift that began after Azerbaijan seized full control over Karabakh by force last year. Armenia is increasingly distancing itself from Russia politically, while also gradually reducing the presence of Russian security forces on its territory. In contrast, Western influence in the country is on the rise. Yerevan’s position as a battleground in a geopolitical tug-of-war between major powers carries the risk of destabilizing both Armenia and the broader region — something the post-Soviet space has seen before.
Content
The Karabakh fracture
From alliance to breakup
A turn toward the West
Negotiation is key
The Karabakh fracture
One year ago, the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ceased to exist. On September 19, 2023, Baku settled its long-standing territorial dispute with Yerevan by force. On that day, Azerbaijan launched and concluded a military operation in Karabakh within 24 hours, gaining control over the last remaining Armenian-held areas, which had been populated by Armenians after the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020.
Baku achieved its objectives in this third, “lightning fast” Karabakh war: Artsakh — the Armenian name for the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, or NKR — is no more. Now Karabakh is a district of Azerbaijan — one from which almost all Armenians, approximately 100,000 of them, have fled.
The process of resettling the region is currently underway. This past spring, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev handed over the keys to apartments in the restored city of Khojaly. Earlier, settlers arrived in Lachin and Agali. This fall, the resettlement of Stepanakert (now called Khankendi), the former capital of the defunct NKR, was announced. Azerbaijani media extensively covered the arrival of students and professors from Karabakh University in Khankendi. But despite Azerbaijan’s efforts to resettle the area, entry into Karabakh remains regulated: to visit the region, one must obtain permission through the Yolumuz Qarabağa (“Road to Karabakh”) portal.
Understandably, Baku’s battlefield victory became something of a turning point in the already strained relationship between Armenia and its supposed security guarantor to the north: Russia. Russian forces failed to intervene against Baku’s attack despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh since 2020, and Yerevan predictably accused Moscow of inaction. “The Russian Federation's peacekeeping forces were deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh by decision of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. And in that decision, it is stated that the Russian peacekeeping forces are there to protect the civilian population. So where is the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh now?” Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan asked rhetorically in an interview last December, three months after Azerbaijan took Karabakh.
The Russian peacekeeping contingent was deployed to the region in accordance with a trilateral agreement signed in Moscow in November 2020 by Pashinyan, Aliev, and Vladimir Putin. This document effectively halted Azerbaijan’s offensive in Karabakh at the time, as without Russia’s opposition, Baku could have fully taken control of the entire republic back in 2020. However, the peacekeepers deployed in the region had no formal mandate, as the parties were unable to reach an agreement on their role there. As a result, Russian activities were mostly limited to documenting incidents, which were reported in information bulletins.
When Baku conducted its lightning-fast special operation in September of last year, the Russian contingent did not make any serious move to stop them. However, the peacekeepers still suffered casualties — several soldiers were killed, for which the Azerbaijani authorities apologized to Russia. In the summer of 2024, the peacekeepers left the region. This marked the only instance of a voluntary withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from a conflict zone in the post-Soviet space. The Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts ended with Russia recognizing the independence of those territories while keeping its forces in the areas, and Russian peacekeepers remain in Moldova’s Transnistria region with no clear plans to leave.
The withdrawal of peacekeepers from Karabakh marked the only instance of a voluntary withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from a conflict zone in the post-Soviet space
Baku's operation in Karabakh last year was preceded by other clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In May 2021, armed skirmishes broke out on the border between the two countries, with Azerbaijani forces capturing strategically important heights in Armenian territory. In September 2022, the situation sharply escalated again — five days of fighting ensued, with the resort town of Jermuk subjected to artillery shelling. Hundreds of people on both sides were killed in these clashes, which were among the largest in a series of incidents.
Although Armenia, as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), is officially a military ally of Russia, Moscow chose to act as a mediator rather than as a guarantor of Yerevan’s security. As a result, Armenian authorities began to openly and loudly criticize Russia and the CSTO, declaring that the organization had failed.
As part of the CSTO, Russia chose to act as a mediator rather than a guarantor of its ally's security
From alliance to breakup
After losing all of Karabakh, Yerevan began a strategic shift away from Russia and toward the West, reshaping its political, geopolitical, and security landscape. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan deliberately paused relations with Moscow late last year, declining to attend October’s CIS summit in Bishkek, where Vladimir Putin was present. Instead, on October 5, Pashinyan participated in the European Political Community summit in Granada, Spain.
Pashinyan also skipped the CSTO summit in Minsk in late November. Yet he found time to make an appearance at the Ukraine-focused Paris Peace Forum held on November 10-11. During that visit, aside from meeting French President Emmanuel Macron, Pashinyan also had a discussion with Karim Khan, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) — which had already issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin.
Yerevan’s growing ties with the ICC became a new point of tension in Armenian-Russian relations. On October 3, 2023, the Armenian parliament ratified the Rome Statute, committing itself to the court’s jurisdiction. Russia had warned Armenia against this move, cautioning that it would harm bilateral relations with Moscow. However, Yerevan ignored the warnings, and as of February 1, 2024, Armenia became a full member of the International Criminal Court.
Pashinyan did pay a visit to Russia just before the end of 2023, attending an informal CIS summit in St. Petersburg on December 27. However, this did not thaw the icy relations between the two countries, and in February 2024, Pashinyan announced that Armenia was suspending its membership in the CSTO.
“In our assessment, the Collective Security Treaty Organization did not fulfill its obligations to the Republic of Armenia in the security sphere, particularly in 2021 and 2022. This could not be without consequences for us. In practice, the consequence is that we have effectively frozen our participation in the CSTO,” the Armenian Prime Minister explained in an interview with France 24.
Pashinyan suggested that Armenia might ultimately leave the CSTO altogether. On September 18, he stated that Yerevan had suspended its membership “not only because the CSTO fails to fulfill its security commitments to Armenia but also because the CSTO poses threats to Armenia’s security, its continued existence, sovereignty, and statehood.” He emphasized that Armenia “with every minute and every second will be moving further and further away from the CSTO,” adding that, “There is a concept called the point of no return. And if we haven't reached it yet, there's a strong likelihood we soon will.”
Such harsh criticism of the Russian-led military-political bloc had never before been voiced by any of its member states.
Pashinyan emphasized that Armenia “with every minute and every second will be moving further and further away from the CSTO”
Armenia has taken not only symbolic, but also concrete steps away from Russia. At the insistence of Armenian authorities, Russian border guards, who for three decades had been working at Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport under the 1992 Russian-Armenian agreement, left the facility this summer.
Armenian authorities are now discussing the future of Russian border guards stationed along Armenia's boundaries with Turkey and Iran.
A turn toward the West
Amid his country’s noticeable cooling of relations with Russia, Nikol Pashinyan has been meeting more frequently with Western leaders. His counterparts include U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Macron, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and USAID Administrator Samantha Power.
Despite still formally being part of the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Armenian authorities have expressed a desire to move closer to the EU, even hinting at possible integration. On September 9, during a meeting in Yerevan with Margaritis Schinas, the European Commission Vice President and Commissioner for Promoting the European Way of Life, Pashinyan stated that “significant changes” were being marked in Armenia's relations with the EU. He noted the start of negotiations on visa liberalization and the decision to provide Armenia with assistance through the European Peace Facility, which he said was highly valued in Yerevan.
The Armenian leader also acknowledged that the topic of Armenia joining the EU is “not a simple issue, but it has become part of Armenia’s political agenda.” He emphasized that, “We need to approach this issue thoroughly and comprehensively. It will be important to hear observations and advice from our EU partners.”
Yerevan is not only deepening its political ties with the West but also expanding security cooperation. The Armenian authorities now view reliance on Russia alone as a flawed security strategy. “Depending on or being tied to just one source for security is a strategic mistake in itself,” Pashinyan said in an interview with Italy’s La Repubblica a year ago.
France has emerged as Armenia’s primary partner in this area. Last year, Paris delivered a batch of Bastion armored vehicles and radars to Yerevan and promised to supply Mistral surface-to-air missile systems. Previously, Russia acted as Armenia’s exclusive arms supplier.
French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné, who visited Yerevan in mid-September and met not only with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan but also with Pashinyan, stated that Paris will continue its support. “We will maintain our defense cooperation with Armenia. Armenia must be able to protect its integrity, territory, and population,” Séjourné emphasized. He also mentioned Russia: “Despite Russia's threats, blatant hostility, and desire for oppression, Armenia continues its path toward democracy and freedom, progressing step by step. Know that you can always count on us when it comes to democratic values.”
India has also become a defense partner for Armenia. According to a recent article in The Print, the Armenian side hopes for New Delhi's assistance in modernizing its air force, specifically its Su-30 aircraft. India had previously supplied Armenia with multiple rocket launcher systems and other weapons.
While Russian border guards have been withdrawn from Zvartnots Airport and Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO, the European Union has, strengthened its presence in the country. At the end of 2023, the EU deployed a civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA) to monitor the situation along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Later, both parties agreed to increase the mission’s personnel from 139 to 209. Notably, Moscow had proposed sending a CSTO observer mission, but Armenian authorities chose to collaborate with the EU instead.
There is also the financial aspect of cooperation. In 2024, the EU began providing Armenia with support through the European Peace Facility, established three years ago. This fund also aids Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia in addressing security issues. These three nations maintain special ties with the EU. Chisinau and Kyiv have already begun negotiations with Brussels on EU membership, and Tbilisi was granted candidate status this year (although the process was paused in July due to the country’s adoption of a “foreign agents” law).
In 2024, the EU began providing Armenia with support through the European Peace Facility
The fund's budget for 2021–2027 amounts to €5 billion. So far, Yerevan has received only €10 million, but even this sum carries rather symbolic weight. Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia may receive European assistance in much larger amounts, but none of them are involved in alliances with Russia.
Negotiation is key
Armenia began its pivot to the West ten years after choosing to integrate into economic structures involving Russia. In the second half of 2013, negotiations between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia regarding association agreements and the establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area were nearing completion.
Moscow sought to prevent this. Vladimir Putin personally discouraged Kyiv and Yerevan from pursuing closer ties with the EU, and at that time, he succeeded — at least in part. In September 2013, Armenia’s then-President Serzh Sargsyan announced that his country would join the Customs Union (a process that culminated in joining the Russia-led EAEU).
What happened next with Ukraine is well known: Viktor Yanukovych, then in power in Kyiv, followed Sargsyan's example. However, in Ukraine, the population resisted, leading to a protest movement that convinced the president to flee to Russia in February 2014. After that, relations between Russia and Ukraine only became worse.
Armenia's current steps are clearly irritating Russia, but not to the point that physical coercion appears likely. Instead, the Russian Foreign Ministry and state media are merely criticizing Pashinyan, emphasizing that the Armenian authorities are acting against the interests of the Armenian people.
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Moscow supports the opposition in Yerevan, yet Pashinyan's opponents consistently fail to pose any significant challenges to his government. Mass protests in 2020, following Armenia’s defeat in the Karabakh war, again in 2023 following the complete loss of Karabakh, and most recently this year over border demarcation with Azerbaijan due to territorial concessions, have had little practical impact. Despite these events, Pashinyan remains in power, while the opposition, primarily represented by former officials including ex-presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, continues to enjoy ever less public support.
Paradoxically, the political rift between Moscow and Yerevan has not noticeably affected trade relations between the countries. “Numbers and facts speak louder than words. In 2023, mutual trade between Russia and Armenia increased by 55.8% to $7.4 billion. This year, growth has accelerated. In the first half of this year alone, trade between our countries reached $8.4 billion. We could potentially hit $14–16 billion by year-end. In 2020, our trade stood at $2.3 billion,” said Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk during his September visit to Yerevan.
Moscow could attempt to apply economic pressure on Yerevan, but its history of deploying sanctions in the post-Soviet space has not produced any notable successes. Bans on the import of wine and other goods into Russia did not deter Moldova or Georgia from pursuing EU integration, and sanctions are unlikely to gain Moscow any goodwill in Armenia either. Surveys indicate a markedly negative shift in public attitudes vis-a-vis Russia following the recent events in Karabakh. According to a spring survey by IRI, only 34% of Armenians view Russia as their most important political partner, with France at 61% and the United States at 56%. Additionally, 40% see Russia as the greatest political threat, trailing only Azerbaijan and Turkey (at 86% and 82%, respectively). Furthermore, 51% perceive Russia as an economic threat (compared to 54% for Turkey and 50% for Azerbaijan).
Then there is the matter of Armenia’s formal alliance with Russia. Imposing sanctions on one of the EAEU member states would backfire on the organization itself at a time when it is looking to expand. Punishing a member over a political dispute would send a clear negative signal to both existing allies and those contemplating membership.
This situation offers the Armenian authorities a degree of maneuverability, which they are cautious not to misuse — especially at this still-uncertain stage in their relations with the West. Given existing economic realities, the EU is unlikely to replace the EAEU market for Armenia anytime soon.
This does not mean that Moscow has chosen a path of complete inaction. Yerevan has hinted — and even stated outright — that the Armenian opposition is receiving support from Russia. On September 18, the Investigative Committee of Armenia announced it had thwarted an attempted coup allegedly planned by people from Karabakh who had undergone special training in Russia, specifically in Rostov-on-Don.
Moscow has long expressed dissatisfaction with the defiant leadership in Armenia. Sergey Lavrov even referred to Nikol Pashinyan's government as a “temporary administration.” Russian state media have dedicated entire episodes of TV shows to Pashinyan, featuring guests who have not held back on making highly critical remarks about him. It is clear that Moscow would prefer to deal with a different government in Armenia.
Another source of risk is neighboring Azerbaijan. While Yerevan and Baku are engaged in negotiations for a lasting peace agreement, such a deal remains yet to be signed. As a result, the situation in the region remains precarious. The issue of unblocking transport routes is also unresolved, and for Baku, it is essential to connect the exclave of Nakhchivan to the rest of Azerbaijan. This connection could be made through Armenia, but four years of negotiations have yielded no results thus far.
In short, the potential for renewed conflict remains. Russian-Armenian relations are deteriorating at the same time ties between Moscow and Baku are flourishing. And given the frequency with which the sovereign territory of post-Soviet states pursuing a pro-Western path have become sites of military confrontation, it is clear that the Armenian authorities are embarking on a highly risky experiment as they maneuver ever further away from Moscow’s grasp.