Putin -Shredinger cat: The West cannot choose between two opposite views on the war in Ukraine

“Putin will not stop there” - is this phrase, which implies the likely attack of Russia on one of the NATO countries if successful in Ukraine, a propaganda cliche or a perspicacious warning?

Currently in the West there is two views of the war in Ukraine. The first considers it as an existential challenge to Europe, for which she was not ready. The limited support provided by Ukraine is a constant look at the Putin’s “red lines” and the lack of proactive position and determination of Western countries in unconditional assistance to Ukraine allow Putin to prevail and only provoke future escalation on his part, demonstrating the weakness of the West.

The second approach is inclined to see a regional conflict in this war rather and proceeds from the fact that Putin has no reasons to attack Europe if the Ukrainian campaign is completed by the achievement of certain agreements. Proponents of this approach believe that politicians calling to look at this conflict as existential for the West, thereby bring a clash with Russia, making other options and scenarios of events. In addition, at the end of the conflict in Ukraine, Putin simply will not have the opportunity to continue military aggression as a result of depletion of military resources.

In turn, a strong party in the American establishment considers confrontation with China as existential for the United States and offers to focus on it as much as possible. Supporters of this view consider Russia a strategically weak power. From this point of view, the United States must avoid escalation and retraction into confrontation with Russia, which will only be a spray of forces.

The Western strategy in relation to Russia and the war in Ukraine was essentially stuck between these two opposite logicians - an understanding of the conflict as existential, which requires the adoption of risks and costs of proactive policy, and as a regional one, the decision of which should be the conclusion of minimally acceptable agreements between the parties and avoiding actions that can lead to direct confrontation between Russia and NATO.

The Russian attack on Ukraine, which grew into a protracted war, put Western countries and especially Europe in front of the dilemma: is this war a local clash in the post -Soviet space or a prelude to a wider conflict that directly affects Europe and the West as a whole? At the initial stage, having decided to provide wide economic and military assistance to Ukraine, the West nevertheless considered the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as a regional one. However, the transformation of the Putin regime during the war, the radicalization of its rhetoric, the effectiveness of nuclear blackmail and partial militarization of the Russian economy against the backdrop of the open military vulnerability of Europe changed the focus of discussion. On the one hand, politicians and especially the military are increasingly talking about a direct threat to the West, primarily in Europe, from Russia and about the unworthyness of Europe to such a conflict. Another part of the Western community does not perceive the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as existential for the West and for Europe and advocates minimizing its consequences and finding a “compromise” around Ukraine, based on existing realities. Is the common phrase “Putin on this will not stop” by a propaganda cliche or a perspicacious warning?

Hawks: existential threat

A completely unambiguous answer to the question is given by countries bordering Russia. Finland and Sweden in the very first days of the war decided to abandon the neutrality and join NATO. This step not only has become the largest over the past twenty years by changing the balance of forces in Europe, but also created the basis for strengthening the Baltic NATO group, that is, it was aimed at increasing the safety of other Baltic states.

Much later, after an unsuccessful Ukrainian offensive in the summer of 2023, against the backdrop of disappointment in the effectiveness of assistance provided by Ukraine, the thesis that “Putin will not stop in Ukraine” began to sound in the West at a high political level. This was said by Joe Biden , the existence of the threat of attack by Russia on one of the NATO countries was warned by the Ministers of Defense of Germany and Denmark , in a similar vein, President of the Czech Republic Peter Paul, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and other Western politicians spoke out.

Behind these statements there is a holistic idea of ​​the Putin regime as the heir to the Soviet and another reincarnation of the global threat to Europe and its security, that is, as a real existential threat. This look consistently sets out by the former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson . If the West does not begin to help Ukraine more actively now, which he so far “forces to fight with his hands tied behind his back”, then after some time he will face the restored “Empire of Evil”. If Putin does not tolerate defeats, then the countries on the periphery of the former Soviet Union will live in a state of constant threat, and China will try to force Taiwan. In this prospect, the situation gains similarity with the one that has developed in Europe in 1938, when the indecision of the European powers stimulated the aggression of the Nazi regime (Donald Tusk also hinted at this, saying that “Europe is in a pre -war state”). The unconscious threat as existential today will lead to its implementation in the future.

Awareness of threats as existential marks the transition from the ideology of restraint to proactive actions that do not exclude the risks of escalation. Johnson calls on to give Ukraine unconditional permission to use the available weapons, including long -range ammunition. As well as provide Ukraine with sufficient financial support similar to the American Land Lease of the last century, and accept NATO without waiting for the end of the war. On the logic of proactive actions against Russia , the famous German retired diplomat Wolfgang Ishinger also insists . It was time to draw his “red lines” to the West, and not to worry about those that were designated by Putin, he says. The West should, for example, clearly say that if Russia bombs another civilian building, then the West will put the Taurus rockets or the USA to Kyiv for blows on military targets in Russia. In this case, Moscow will have to decide whether it is worth crossing the “red lines” and dealing with the indicated consequences. However, having identified them, in the relevant situation, the West will have to impleal its threats. In the logic of Ishinger and Johnson, the fear of Western politicians over the escalation provokes it because Putin despises weakness and concessions, and respects only strength.

Pigeons: peripheral conflict

The allegations that Russia will not stop in Ukraine and the NATO countries are under a direct, although not momentary threat, rely on four - in many respects unreasonable - assumptions, the experts of Rand Samuel Charp and Miranda Proba noted at the peak of the above politicians. Firstly, this is the assumption that the restoration of the military potential of Russia is rapidly and this will allow it to attack NATO in the near future. Secondly, the assumption that the NATO holding factor does not work in the case of Russia in connection with the tendency of its leaders to high risk. Thirdly, the idea that the organizing principle of the alliance strategy should be the opposition of the opportunistic aggression of Russia. Finally, the fourth assumption is that the “victory” of Russia in Ukraine will inspire the Kremlin and this will jeopardize NATO safety.

Charap and the fee believe that the Russian capabilities to restore real -time military potential should not be overestimated. Moreover, in their opinion, by his actions the Kremlin demonstrated that he was not interested in a full -fledged military economy and the militarization of the whole society. He did not force civilian industrial capacities to switch to defense production and did not conduct the second round of extremely unpopular mobilization, and the economic pressure of the sanctions has not yet reached its peak and limit the possibility of restoring the military machine in the future.

At the same time, NATO Bloc increased defense costs by 9.3% in 2023 and by 17.9% in 2024. The alliance becomes more combat -ready than before the Russian attack on Ukraine. Military expenses of NATO members exceeded $ 1.1 trillion in 2023 compared to $ 74 billion in Russia. As for the number of manpower, in 2022 the NATO countries had more than 3.1 million existing military personnel against 900 thousand in Russia. Before the war, the Russian capabilities were caused by Russian opportunities on the Baltic Front, but because of the current combat losses, Russia was flooded with a significant part of its military potential in the region. Satellite pictures in June 2024 showed that 80% of Russian forces and equipment previously located along the border with Finland are involved in Ukraine. And a significant part of these forces, most likely, has already been destroyed.

Russia, of course, will continue to pose a significant threat to the alliance. Her high -tech weapons - anti -cosmic, underwater, non -strategic nuclear weapons, etc. - In general, they were not used against Ukraine and remained untouched. However, the global and regional balances of forces will remain on the side of NATO with an overwhelming advantage, draw the conclusion of the Charap and the form.

As for the NATO holding factor, it, according to Rand experts, is still strong. Western supplies of weapons violated Russian plans for the lightning conquest of Ukraine, but the Kremlin still abstained from direct attacks on the alliance countries, limiting himself to operations in the "gray zone": cyber attacks, sabotage, etc. In addition, Russia's obsession does not apply to its neighbors - NATO members, such as Poland or the Baltic countries. And while there is no reason to think that the Kremlin doubts the determination of NATO to defend themselves from conventional aggression using Article 5 of the Charter of the Alliance.

All this does not mean that the new opportunistic Russian aggression is, in principle, it is impossible, but there is a difference between what such a scenario is hypothetical, and in order to turn it into a central element in the planning of NATO and the USA strategy in Europe.

Concentrating on the possible attack of Russia, Western politicians form the relevant representations in Moscow itself. Studies of political scientist Bruce Kronin show that statements of political leaders can become self -exploring prophecies. War time calls aimed at situational mobilization of support are laid by a vision for the long term. Around him begins to build planning from both sides. Presenting a direct conflict with Russia as the inevitable (to mobilize the support of Ukraine), politicians push Russia to prepare for such a conflict and Russia itself. And this scenario can really lead to a large -scale clash, although the assumption of the desire of Moscow to attack one of the countries of the Alliance is speculative and emotional.

West against the West

From the very beginning of the war, Rand experts adhere to the critical perception of the Russian threat. This view assumes that the United States should concentrate on the confrontation with China, which will probably take more acute forms in the future. The conflict with Russia in this perspective looks like a trap that distracts the forces and weakens the position of the United States in the main confrontation, while Russia itself, due to its strategic weakness, does not pose a threat to American leadership (→ RUSSIA: pigeons or ostriches? ).

Such an approach, which is reflected in the analysis of the charapis and will, will be more in demand in case of winning the American elections of Donald Trump. It implies an attempt to separate two conflicts-Ukrainian and American-Chinese-of which only the second is unambiguous for the United States. But is such a prospect of Europe suitable?

While in the USA the conflict is clearly felt as a more regional one, in Europe there is also no unambiguous view of its character. In the July survey of Eurobarometer, exactly 50% of the EU surveyed in all countries on average called the conflict in Ukraine the main challenge to the European Union at the moment. But although this is the first position in the call list (the second is illegal migration, 41%, the third is the environment and climate, 35%, the fourth is the cost of life, 32%), 50%of the references indicate that it is not consensus. About 60 or more percent of respondents noted this challenge in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Luxembourg, Croatia, Hungary, Portugal, Finland and Sweden. And vice versa - in Spain and Austria, 42–43%indicated it, in Greece and in Cyprus - about 30%. In the remaining 12 countries, the value ranges around 50%.

The list of priorities for the EU Political Policy looks even more blurry: 33% of respondents believe that these should be environmental and climate issues, another 33% indicate the problem of illegal migration, 29% consider defense and security issues, and 25% - the war in Ukraine.

The logic of the second approach described above is built on the postulate about the need to avoid escalation and a direct collision of NATO with Russia. This approach implies the view of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as a regional one. The logic of the first approach is that the desire to avoid escalation is just leading to escalation. While the only way to avoid it is to take its costs and risks in advance, realizing the conflict as existential. The Western strategy in relation to Russia and the war in Ukraine is essentially stuck between these two opposite logicians.