Time for Revenge: The pendulum that swung left has been pushed backwards by voters

Trump’s victory in 2016 was not the anomaly, but rather Biden’s win in 2020, amid the pandemic, was, argues Ivan Kurilla, an expert on American history and Russian-American relations. This unexpected success disoriented the Democrats and prevented them from recognising the trend in Trump’s victory – a trajectory to which the electoral landscape reverted during Biden’s presidency, leading to such strong results for Trump in the current elections.

Trump’s radicalisation of the conservative agenda brought out voters who had previously stayed home, while traditional Republicans retained their loyalty. At the same time, the radicalisation of the Democrats' progressive agenda did not win them additional support on the left, but alienated centrists.

Throughout his presidency, Trump will attempt to partially roll back the gains Democrats have made over recent decades. However, his reform plans are unusually ambitious for a Republican. Meanwhile, the polarisation of American society will exert a strong influence on the situation in the country. The paradox is that, historically, internal polarisation has often led US governments to pursue an active foreign policy. In this scenario, Trump’s isolationism could shift in the opposite direction, raising the likelihood of a major conflict on the global stage.

Accidents and patterns: a reassessment

The feeling that Trump had a good chance of winning began to take shape around the time he won the debate against Biden. For a while, amid the excitement over the Democrats finally changing their candidate, it seemed that Kamala Harris might be able to compete with Trump. Then there was a period where the odds looked even, lasting right up until 5 November. But in polling terms, equal odds often actually mean Trump has the advantage. As in 2016 and 2020, Trump’s polling was underestimated. This time, it was believed that pollsters had factored in the ‘Trump adjustment’, but, as we see, this was not the case.

In conversations with Democratic supporters, there was a general sense that they were mentally preparing for the possibility of a Trump win – unlike in 2016, when it came as a true surprise. Few doubted that Republicans would win the Senate, and there was a sense they had a strong chance of taking the House as well.

Trump’s 2016 victory seemed like it should have shaken up the Democratic Party, but that did not happen. Biden’s victory, on the other hand, seemed to convince them that all was well, and that 2016 was just an anomaly.

But if we dig into our memory, we will recall that by February 2020, the US economy was thriving, and it seemed like nothing could stop Trump’s path to a second term. Polls indicated his likely win. This was likely part of the reason Democrats nominated Biden. Younger Democrats may have assumed that running would be a losing proposition.

But 2020 went so tumultuously, with the pandemic and the Black Lives Matter movement, impacting both Trump’s standing and the economy. Yet, from the vantage point of February 2020, Trump’s loss in November was unexpected, and it was by a narrow margin. In this light, the Democratic victory was arguably a fluke brought about by these unforeseen contexts. And in this perspective, Trump’s return now is merely a continuation of the same trend that initially brought him to victory. In other words, it was not the 2016 result that was the anomaly – it was 2020.

Two radicalisations with different outcomes

In the current election, Trump improved his performance compared to both 2020 and 2016. Now, for the first time, he has not only a majority of electoral votes but also a majority of the popular vote – that is, the majority of Americans who turned out to vote. This is a new situation that says something about the Republicans but perhaps even more about the Democrats, indicating they have lost something.

There is a sense of crisis within the Democratic Party, and it’s not just about specific individuals. Had Biden bowed out of the race earlier and allowed a proper primary season within the Democratic Party, they might have arrived in November with a more prominent, energetic, and younger candidate. It could have even been Kamala Harris but with a different political background. Under the circumstances, Harris was seen as a sort of ‘successor’, someone not building her own political capital but rather inheriting it from the previous president. This, of course, worked against her.

Beyond this, there are systemic issues. Some Democrats acknowledge that the party’s platform and image have shifted too far to the left and become overly radical, alienating a portion of American voters. Meanwhile, Republicans have also radicalised, but this has not harmed them. Elections are the primary way to gauge voter perceptions, and they clearly indicate that Democrats need to rethink their strategy and party positioning.

The main and most convincing explanation for Trump’s success and his victory today lies in his ability to mobilise far-right voters. People who previously abstained from voting, feeling that political decisions were controlled by the so-called ‘deep state’ and the establishment, turned out in 2016 to vote for Trump. As a result, the Republican Party has shifted rightward in the sense that it does not want to lose these voters who back Trump. This segment is substantial. Meanwhile, moderate Republicans still vote for the party’s candidate, even if they personally dislike Trump.

On the other side, the Democrats' shift leftward has not attracted a comparable number of new voters but has instead led to a loss of the ‘centre’. Centrist-leaning voters who are not solid Democrats but sympathetic to the party are repelled by sensitive issues, particularly around gender and identity politics. As a result, they feel Republicans are defending individual rights to self-determination, while Democrats seem focused on protecting various minority groups. This alienates people who are not Trump supporters or far-right but who no longer feel aligned with the Democrats.

The major American parties are, by nature, broad coalitions. In today’s Democratic coalition, however, the role of progressive leftists is disproportionately high, though there are also more moderate factions. But polarisation on both sides of society, combined with the primary system, has empowered radical elements. Democrats need to address this because, as we see, they have limited electoral prospects on the far left.

The age group with the highest concentration of Trump voters is 50-64, but one of the surprises in this election was an increase in young people voting for Trump compared to 2020. While young Americans are generally seen as Democratic supporters, it turns out this is not entirely accurate, and this should signal something to Democrats. They will need to think about retaining the ‘centre’. Radicalisation does not benefit them, meaning they must pursue support in the centre.

The pendulum of reform and counter-reform

Trump now has significant opportunities because, unlike in 2016, Congress is also becoming Republican. Previously, Trump faced a Democratic Congress, and the main conflict unfolded between branches of government. Now, however, this is not the case, opening a window for more extensive reforms than were possible from 2016 to 2020. Trump will likely try – and may succeed – in enacting a series of reforms. Some Democratic achievements from previous years could be repealed. Major targets include Obamacare and healthcare reform, among others that might also be at risk.

Interestingly, large-scale reforms in America have traditionally been more frequently implemented by Democrats. The ‘Great Society’ programmes of the 1960s under Lyndon Johnson created new government departments and set new responsibilities for the federal government, ones it had never previously considered its own. Trump’s project is, in some sense, the opposite, but the scale of his ambitions could be comparable. It is clear that Democrats and those who support their positions face challenging times ahead. Polarisation reflects the amplitude of the political pendulum’s swing: previously, it swung far to the left, but in the next four years, it will likely swing sharply to the right.

When Trump was first elected in 2016, many noted that he was not a typical Republican. While he is conservative, like other Republicans, his leadership style is distinct from that of traditional Republicans. We still do not know if he will implement everything in his platform, but it will likely not be a standard Republican approach. The usual Republican stance is to avoid tampering with what works or to eliminate what does not. But if Trump engages in major restructuring, closing down some things and creating new ones, it will come as a surprise.

I am not concerned for the American political system as a whole. Throughout the campaign, there were alarmist voices warning that Trump might eliminate democracy altogether, but I am confident this will not happen. However, it is undeniable that Republicans now have the chance to undo many of the Democrats' achievements.

We are already seeing the long-term results of this Republican ‘revenge’ in Supreme Court decisions. During his first term, Trump managed to shift the balance of the Supreme Court to the right, and over the past two years, the Court has overturned two major rulings – federal protections for abortion and affirmative action policies that gave African Americans an advantage in college admissions. Both had been in place for several decades.

Internal polarisation, foreign policy escalation and the rise of nationalism

Polarisation within American society has been growing over the past fifteen years, reaching a level of division unseen in recent memory. This may be comparable to the polarisation of the 1960s, marked by the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, another period of extreme division.

However, it is worth noting that periods of polarisation in American society often end with, or lead to, a sharp increase in foreign policy activity. While many expect isolationism from Trump, history suggests a different trajectory may be possible. The civil rights crisis and the conflicts around it eventually culminated in the Vietnam War. Similarly, the Great Depression spurred a surge in support for the left, with communists gaining record numbers in elections, ultimately ending in the United States’ involvement in World War II. In other words, Americans tend to export their internal conflicts outward.

This has happened in the past, and I would not be surprised if we see something similar in the future. It might not involve Russia or the Middle East, but potentially China and Taiwan, an area of particular concern for Trump. It would not surprise me if, despite Trump’s isolationist rhetoric, the United States became entangled in some foreign conflict.

Currently, there is a lot of alarmism, and I would not say it is entirely unwarranted. There’s a possibility that Trump may take an isolationist approach, withdraw all support for Ukraine, and attempt to negotiate with Putin. Theoretically, that is one path he could choose. But he has not committed to this direction yet, and it’s uncertain that he will. Interestingly, Ukraine’s President Zelensky immediately congratulated Trump on his election, while Putin did not.

It’s possible that Trump might be an inconvenient partner for the Kremlin due to his unpredictability. Biden was very predictable, with clear 'red lines' he was reluctant to cross, and he responded effectively to nuclear threats. With Trump, it’s unclear if he has specific 'red lines' or where they lie. His reactions to nuclear threats are also unknown. During his previous term, two notable incidents occurred: first, the US struck a unit of Wagner forces in Syria, and second, Trump responded to North Korean threats by showing a willingness to escalate.

We do not yet know how Trump will approach Russia, so it is best not to jump to conclusions. We will need to wait for concrete steps and key appointments – who will be Secretary of State, Defense Secretary, National Security Advisor. Only then will scenarios start to take shape.

One logical theory is that Trump views China as more significant than Russia, and therefore will not push Russia exclusively into China’s sphere but will leave it with some options. Another line of reasoning, also tied to China, suggests that allowing Russia to secure its hold on occupied territories could be seen as giving China the green light on Taiwan. China is certainly watching Russia’s actions and their consequences, weighing whether it should embark on a similar venture. So, if the new administration prioritises countering China, it could lead to opposing conclusions about US policy toward Russia. Once the election dust settles, what argument will carry more weight for Trump?

What opponents portray as Trump’s isolationism is not entirely accurate. He was criticised for his isolationist stance on NATO and alleged intent to undermine the alliance. But his approach led European nations to increase their financial contributions to NATO, which, rather than being dismantled, actually emerged stronger. This reflects a different worldview and a style unfamiliar to Democrats, but with NATO as an example, Trump could argue, ‘See, this approach works’.

This logic could lead to escalation, and Trump’s return increases the likelihood of such escalation, even a major war. In contrast to Biden, who was cautious and prioritised ‘avoiding escalation’, Trump clearly has different priorities and a different attitude toward escalation – he seems unafraid of it. His mindset is that of a high-stakes player, but this approach indeed comes with higher risks.

Yet the main challenges in international relations stem not only from Trump’s style. From a broader perspective, it’s clear that today we’re witnessing a prolonged reaction to the globalisation of the 1990s when it seemed liberal democracy and economic globalism were triumphant. Since the late 2000s, and especially through the 2010s and early 2020s, we have seen a resurgence of nationalism. Strong states have returned, and political realism has once again become the fundamental theory of international relations. Right-wing parties have either come to power or gained strength. This trend is evident in Europe, the post-Soviet space, and the US However, in my view, this is not the end of the world but rather another turn of the spiral. From a long-term historical perspective, it’s clear that this phase will eventually end, leading to a shift in the other direction. But what will the outcome be? There are various dangers here. We know from history that surges in nationalism have led to major wars. And how to stop this is not entirely clear.