“United in hatred of Khamenei”: Lessons learned from half a century of Iranian opposition in exile

Repression, societal regression, and war have forced millions of educated, affluent, and socially active people to leave Iran. Over the past half-century, the Iranian diaspora has tried nearly everything — supporting opposition movements from abroad, voting in elections, and even armed resistance against the regime. Yet they have never succeeded in forming a unified vision for the country’s future.

• 1.Waves of Emigration from Iran
• 2.Those who left and those who stayed
• 3.Agents of Influence?
• 4.“In Iran, anyone can go out to demonstrate in support of the Gaza Strip, but no one is willing to”
• 5.United only by hatred of the regime
• 6.Couch war: how the Iranian opposition fights online
• 7.The Iran of the Future

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Waves of Emigration from Iran

In 2024, Iran marks 45 years since the Islamic Revolution and the beginning of a massive exodus from the country. In the first few years following the revolution, approximately 2 million people out of a population of 34 million left Iran, according to estimates by Cambridge professor Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi. Since then, there have been at least three more major waves of emigration: during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), amid economic hardships at the turn of the century, and following protests in the late 2000s and 2010s. Each protest wave involved new people with fresh ideas and perspectives. Yet in nearly half a century of exile, Iranian emigrants not only failed to find common ground, but also began quarreling among themselves more frequently.

At demonstrations by Iranian expatriates, the old Shah-era flag featuring a lion is often displayed. Activists are quick to explain to journalists that “this is the true flag of Iran, not the Islamic Republic.” However, not everyone agrees with this sentiment. Shortly after the 1979 revolution, many former opponents of Shah Pahlavi's regime, including communists and political prisoners who had once been jailed under this very flag, also joined the ranks of the exiled.

Protests outside the parliament building in Tbilisi against dictatorship in Iran and human rights violations.

Alexander Fedorov / Perito and Cherta

In 2009, protests in Iran erupted over election fraud under the slogan “Where Is My Vote?” Tens of thousands of Iranian emigrants worldwide decided to show their solidarity. They held rallies in over 100 cities, carrying contemporary Iranian flags — a hallmark of the so-called Green Movement. This mobilization of Iranians in the diaspora was unprecedented, writes Amy Malek, an American sociologist, diaspora researcher, and the daughter of Iranian emigrants.

However, these rallies quickly became breeding grounds for rivalry: “In Los Angeles, Toronto, and other major cities with Iranian communities, monarchists clashed with leftists and Green Movement supporters. Fights broke out over waving pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary flags.”

The women’s rights protests that began in late 2022 became a new and even more powerful point of consolidation — at least for a time. Solidarity demonstrations spread to more than 150 cities. Yet they were soon followed by even larger-scale clashes among opposition groups in Toronto, London, and Paris. These conflicts included direct and anonymous threats from one opposition group to another, along with widespread harassment involving accusations of collaborating with the regime and calls to cancel rival campaigns. Defamation lawsuits followed.

“Even in non-political contexts, teamwork and large-scale volunteering in the diaspora are still often limited by divisions based on generation, ethnicity, or religion,” Malek writes.

Those who left and those who stayed

Two years on, protests under the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom” continue both in Iran and abroad. The latest symbol of resistance is Ahoo Daryaei, a graduate student from Tehran, who stripped down to her underwear in protest after being attacked by the paramilitary Basij forces for what they deemed to be her improper wearing of the hijab.

Ahoo Daryaei, who undressed in defiance of hijab mandates, has since been sent to compulsory psychiatric treatment

Now, Daryaei’s image appears on posters and cartoons, making her a unifying symbol for both regime opponents inside Iran and the global Iranian diaspora, says political scientist Amir Chahaki, a representative of the first generation of Iranian emigrants:

“Islamic education in Iran has completely failed. The values of Islamic morality, despite being propagated in all educational institutions, have had no influence on Generation Z. Iranian youth live entirely modern lives, almost indistinguishable from their peers in the West. Pre-marital sexual relationships have become widespread — not just in Tehran, but in other cities as well.

Twenty years ago, things were very different. Now, neither mullahs at universities nor mandatory group prayers can halt this trend. Most of the country is indifferent to religion. Even Ali Khamenei, in his attempts to motivate people, speaks less about Islam and more about the Iranian nation.”

Despite mullahs at universities and mandatory group prayers most of the country is indifferent to religion

Chahaki has not lived in Iran for many years, but she maintains close ties with dozens of relatives and friends in the country, speaking with them regularly. The Islamic Republic is not like North Korea or even China — its people are not cut off from the global network. They read exile media covering Iran, use social networks and messaging apps, and stay updated on world news, explains Arash Azizi, an Iranian historian, writer, and journalist. She is also the author of the book What Iranians Want: Women, Life, Freedom. In a conversation with The Insider, Azizi explained:

“Interestingly, people often ask me how I keep in touch with Iranians still in the country. It’s very simple. Iranians don’t live in a bubble; they know what’s happening outside. At the same time, those who remain in Iran often tell us: ‘You left, and you have no idea what’s happening here.’ Many accuse us of abandoning the country instead of staying and fighting. It’s similar to the conflict among Russian opposition figures.”

In Iranian social media, there is a term for those who have left the country: Kharej-Neshin (خارج نشین, literally “those sitting abroad”). This term refers to radical emigrants who call on Iranians to take to the streets — while they themselves remain safely outside the country, says Amir Chahaki.

Chahaki first emigrated in 1984 during a wave of mass arrests of critics of the Islamic Republic. That wave was accompanied by a spate of executions in the country’s prisons. He fled across Iran’s eastern borders into Afghanistan before heading to the USSR to study medicine. A member of one of Iran’s leftist parties, the Fedayeen Khalq Iran, several of his friends, relatives, and party comrades were imprisoned. In 1995, Chahaki returned to Iran, but in 2014, facing the threat of criminal prosecution, he emigrated permanently to Germany, home to Europe's largest Iranian diaspora.

Over the decades, leaving Iran has become easier. The country has visa-free agreements with Malaysia and Turkey, making them common destinations for dissidents seeking residence permits, similar to how Russians move to Georgia or Kazakhstan. However, these visa-free countries are not considered completely safe, as deportation back to Iran remains a risk. As a result, those actively involved in politics tend to move further afield.

Dissidents from Iran move to Malaysia and Turkey, similar to how Russians relocate to Georgia and Kazakhstan, before eventually moving further afield

Azizi himself moved to Malaysia in 2005 and even collaborated with the local Socialist Party. Later, he relocated to Canada, where he obtained citizenship. Canada, he explains, offers favorable conditions for emigration, particularly for engineers and technical specialists. This was the path his own parents once took.

“But there were others who were less fortunate. They fled in haste through the mountains to Pakistan or Turkey,” he notes.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, economic migrants began leaving Iran for the United States and Canada. The Islamic Republic had developed a class of educated technical specialists to support its missile and drone programs. Many of these engineers and IT professionals moved to the U.S., where they managed to establish successful careers. Los Angeles, home to the world’s largest Iranian diaspora, is considered the global hub of the Iranian community. The city is also home to Reza Pahlavi, the son and heir of the deposed Shah.

Agents of Influence?

Iranian migrants of the 2000s and 2010s often do not sever ties with their homeland entirely. Many remain economically dependent on property or businesses in Iran. According to Amir Chahaki:

“This dependence makes emigrants vulnerable. If someone becomes too politically active, they can be stripped of their livelihood. Intelligence agencies can silence them or exploit them for their own purposes.

Some Iranians working in Western media, whether Persian-language outlets or English-language American publications, may, for various reasons — or perhaps under coercion — promote the agenda of Iranian intelligence services.”

Iranian migrants often remain economically dependent on property or businesses in Iran

Another method of influence is exerted through the relatives of emigrants. Intelligence agencies often summon citizens for “chats” at various institutions. According to Chahaki, those summoned are offered tea and fruit and told: “You love your country, you are against foreign interference in the affairs of your homeland.” But for those who have left Iran, this is a clear signal that their family members remaining inside Iran could pay the price for their relatives’ opposition activities — or even for their simple refusal to cooperate.

It is no surprise that some Iranians in the diaspora are seen as agents of influence for the Ayatollahs' regime. Currently, a scandal is unfolding around Arian Tabatabai, an Iranian emigrant, the daughter of an opposition professor, a scholar, and a Pentagon employee. A year ago, the opposition publication Iran International, based abroad, published an investigation based on leaked correspondence revealing that Tabatabai was part of a group of experts acting as agents of Iranian influence in the United States. In October of this year, she was accused of leaking classified information about Israel's preparations for a retaliatory strike on Iran. However, the real culprit behind the U.S. security breach, it seems, was someone else.

“In Iran, anyone can go out to demonstrate in support of the Gaza Strip, but no one is willing to”

Recent Israeli strikes on Iran were met with widespread approval on Iranian opposition internet channels. Iranian expatriates and the flags of the Shah's Iran are always prominent at European and American rallies in support of Israel. The diaspora's attitude toward the conflict with Israel is mixed, says Ksenia Svetlova, an Israeli expert on the Middle East. As she told The Insider:

“Iranians who support the Shah's line view Israel as a natural ally in the fight against the Ayatollahs. Others see what is happening in Gaza and Lebanon and believe that the arrival of the IDF will bring nothing good to their country. Finally, there are intellectuals among the emigrants, particularly those teaching at universities. They align with the progressive public stance and stand in solidarity with students and professors advocating for ‘Palestine from the river to the sea.’ Some professors of Iranian descent were dismissed for anti-Israel propaganda after October 7. And now we see such people even in the Pentagon.”

The heir apparent of the now-defunct Imperial State of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of the last Shah of Iran, made a historic visit to Israel in April 2023 and met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — this despite the fact that the Islamic Republic has been in an unofficial state of war with Israel for many years.

According to sources who spoke to The Insider, most opposition figures do not support this war, but it is not necessarily the case that they support the Jewish state either. In Iran itself, the slogan “Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, my life for Iran” is popular, says Amir Chahaki:

“During the war in Gaza, there have been rallies in support of the Palestinians at the Israeli embassy in Jordan. I think if Israel had an embassy in Tehran, nothing like this would have happened. In Iran, the government supports Hamas, and anyone can freely participate in demonstrations in support of Gaza, but most Iranians are against interference in the affairs of other countries and the funding of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

If you were to ask that girl, Ahoo Daryaei, about international affairs or Israel, she would say she doesn't care. She’s simply tired of Islamic rule and doesn’t want to be bothered.”

At the same time, some Iranian emigrants hope for military assistance from other countries in the fight against the regime. These people are called baar andaz (برانداز) — “overthrowers.” They say that “the head of the snake must be cut off,” and dream of Israel eliminating Ali Khamenei. However, according to Chahaki's estimates, only 20-25% of the diaspora shares this view. Arash Azizi, himself an opponent of even minimal military strikes on Iran, including against nuclear facilities, is confident that those in favor of foreign intervention are in the absolute minority.

Approximately a quarter of Iranian emigrants dream of Israel eliminating Ali Khamenei

Among those supporting the idea of action from outside, however, are some of the most organized, wealthy, and influential Iranian emigrants — the Islamic-communist movement Mojahedin-e Khalq (“People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran”). This group regularly organizes mass rallies against the regime of the ayatollahs in Europe, bringing participants in by bus.

Mojahedin-e Khalq not only calls for war with the Islamic Republic — they have already participated in it. When, six months after the revolution, the Iraqi army invaded Iran, the leader of the movement, Massoud Rajavi, sided with Saddam Hussein. He viewed the Iraqi dictator as the lesser evil. By doing so, Chakri says, that Rajavi made a major mistake:

“The Iraqi invasion forced the Iranians to unite. Iranians generally have a negative view of Arabs. This war touched on the deep history of Iranian-Arab relations, dating back to the Arab conquest, when the people of Iran were converted to Islam. Rajavi called on his supporters to rise up against Ayatollah Khomeini, who ruled from 1979 to 1989. They took to the streets. Ordinary people captured them and handed them over to the police. That’s how my very close friend died. He was 17 years old. Even now, young Iranians, who weren’t born at that time, say: anything but Rajavi.”

The armed units of Mojahedin-e Khalq remained in Iraq until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, when they were disarmed by coalition forces. Later, this same organization of mujahideen drew Western attention to Iran's nuclear program. In 2020, when the Iranian nuclear physicist and IRGC officer Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated in Tehran, both Mossad and Mojahedin-e Khalq were accused of being behind the killing.

United only by hatred of the regime

When two unfamiliar Iranians meet in places like Toronto or Los Angeles, the conversation usually starts with neutral topics. The interlocutors try to figure out which part of the country the other is from and attempt to understand each other's ethnic background, if they haven't already deduced it from their accents. They share nostalgic memories and talk about how much they love Iran. In the past, unfamiliar Iranians abroad typically avoided political discussions, fearing that the other person might be connected to the regime, emigrant Farhad Rezaei told The Insider:

“However, after the start of the Women, Life, Freedom movement, people have started to express their views more openly, although the risks associated with this have increased. The Iranian regime has sent terrorist squads abroad to fight political opponents. Iranians who plan to return home to visit their families also risk paying the price for their views.”

Rezaei is a Canadian expert on Iranian politics and a representative of the recent wave of emigration. He is the author of books on Iran's nuclear program and its proxy wars. Of Kurdish descent, Rezaei was persecuted both as a member of an ethnic minority and later as a researcher and critic of the regime.

And his concerns are justified. According to Azizi's calculations, around 300 activists have been killed by agents of the Islamic Republic abroad at different times. Some have also been kidnapped in Iran and executed there.

But when emigrant oppositionists do begin to talk about politics, it almost always ends in an argument. There is no semblance of unity within the opposition, Chahaki notes: “Neither ordinary oppositionists nor leaders can come to an agreement. At one point, Reza Pahlavi decided to form a united front and gathered seven people. Even Kurds were represented. But within six months, it fell apart.”

If Iranian oppositionists in exile begin to talk about politics, it almost always ends in an argument

Iranians argue over federalization. The country is home to Kurds, Baluchis, Turkmen, and Azerbaijanis. Some believe Iran should become a federation, while others see this as a path to the country’s disintegration.

There is debate over the 2015 nuclear deal. Some, like Azizi, view it as a strongly positive development that was ruined by Donald Trump. Others, like Rezaei, advocate for a tough stance on Iran's nuclear program.

There is also disagreement on whether the regime can be reformed. In this regard, the first generation of emigrants, who witnessed mass executions and revolutionary terror, are less inclined to cooperate than Azizi’s younger generation, which left the country more recently.

In the late 1990s, a reformist movement emerged in Iran. Part of the opposition welcomed it, while others, like Rezaei, saw it as an attempt by the regime to present itself in a better light.

Today, the reformists are the only systemic opposition fighting within the country. They oppose compulsory hijab and advocate for women's rights and freedom of speech in ways that still maintain the country’s Islamic character. When they endorsed voting for Masoud Pezeshkian in the latest presidential elections, it caused a rift both inside and outside the country.

Part of the opposition mobilized during the elections, while others called for a boycott. In Australia, due to protests from the Iranian diaspora, voting was canceled in Brisbane and Sydney. In the United States, the Biden administration was criticized for allowing polling stations to be set up. Ultimately, Pezeshkian won after two rounds of voting, with voter turnout increasing from 39.93% in the first round to 49.68% in the second. According to Chahaki, most people voted based on the principle of “the lesser evil.” As he explained: “The second candidate, Saeed Jalili, is an ultra-reactionary. He lives in another century, when Prophet Muhammad was still alive. Many Iranians admit they already hate this choice between two evils.”

However, there is one point on which all opposition members in exile agree. Everyone hates Khamenei and his regime, and everyone is waiting for his death. Chahaki notes: “An Iranian, if asked, will always criticize the current government, even if they constantly travel to Iran and have business there.”

Couch war: how the Iranian opposition fights online

Online discussions increasingly devolve into mutual insults. On Twitter and in YouTube comments, people curse at each other, says Chahaki: “Supporters of Prince Pehlevi can't stand criticism. They immediately accuse you of being an enemy and a regime mercenary. And in this, they resemble Khamenei's supporters.”

Azizi also notes the harassment online and the aggressive language from monarchists:

“They have become ultra-right fascists, supporting Trump and Israeli right-wingers. They make chauvinistic comments about other nations. But some of their opponents on the left show just as much aggression. The regime has invested heavily in agents-provocateurs. I think troll farms are also being used. In any case, the regime is very successful at this. Now, opposition members spend more time attacking each other than the regime.”

This became particularly noticeable in the fall of 2022, when protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in a police station erupted in Iran — the Women, Life, Freedom movement. In the first month, around 330 million tweets with the hashtag #MahsaAmini were sent in Persian. “I’ve not seen something of this scale before,” commented Marc Owen Jones, author of Digital Authoritarianism in the Middle East. “By way of comparison, #BlackLivesMatter over the course of eight years got about 83 million. And since February, the word #Ukraine has been mentioned 240 million times.”

Upon further analysis, Owen Jones noted that 20-30% of all tweets with the protest hashtag #OpIran were sent from 13,000 accounts created in the last ten days. This closely resembles bot usage.

Amy Malek, who dedicated a paper to conflicts within the Iranian opposition in 2022, believes that bots may have been used not only by the Ayatollah regime but also by the U.S.., Israel, Mujahedin-e Khalq, and other opposition groups.

Fake news of all kinds spread at an astonishing speed — from plans by the regime to disband the “morality police” to rumors of plans to execute 15,000 protesters.

Amy Malek spoke to the complexity. “Individuals and opposition groups took it upon themselves to allege relationships between diaspora Iranians and the Islamic Republic and guided their followers to conduct purity tests that sought to target, silence, and excommunicate anyone with whom they disagreed, labeling them as apologists or agents of the Islamic Republic for having called for reform in years past (now deemed too soft on the Islamic Republic), or for being unwilling to name the then-nascent protest movement a “revolution” or, in more extreme cases, for being unwilling to support regime change by any means necessary,” she explained. “As a result — and although it may seem counterintuitive — in many parts of the world, diaspora Iranians are experiencing community at its most united and most divided simultaneously.”

Opposition figures like literary scholar Nasrin Rahimi and Iran Podcast host Negar Mortazavi were subjected to widespread harassment. Rahimi in particular was accused of having ties to the former Iranian foreign minister.

The Iran of the Future

In the 1980s, many Iranian families in the United States faced the same conflict. Children remembered the homes with swimming pools they had left behind in their homeland, the previously privileged and wealthy life. “The children blamed their parents for losing all of that,” recalled Sattareh Farmanfarmaian, an Iranian aristocrat who founded a social work school in Tehran and found herself in exile after the revolution.

As they grew up, the children of immigrants displayed two opposite reactions, which are described by German anthropologist Judith Albrecht in her article “How to be an Iranian Woman in the 21st Century? Female Identities in the Diaspora.” Some changed their Iranian names to American ones and tried to assimilate as much as possible, while others learned Farsi, immersed themselves in the national culture, and demonstratively avoided engaging with U.S. politics.

The same process continued later. Many of the children of immigrants no longer identify with Iran and would not want to live there — such as Amir Chahaki’s daughter. But sometimes, the opposite is true, as Ksenia Svetlova recounts:

“I’ve met Iranian monarchist patriots who were born in other countries or left as small children. They spoke of restoring the monarchy without fully understanding why it was overthrown, seemed detached from reality, and reminded me more of the white emigration. Others are glad they left. They are sure that things will always be bad in Iran.”

Arash Azizi, Farhad Rezaei, and Amir Chahaki all dream of returning to Iran. For that to happen, the regime must fall and the state must change, they say. However, it seems unlikely that there is a vision of a future Iran that would satisfy all three.

It’s also difficult to bring that future closer from abroad. While they can write books and articles, vote in elections or call for boycotts, push for the IRGC to be recognized as a terrorist organization, or either support or oppose the nuclear deal, Iranians who have left the country can do very little, Chahaki admits.

“But there is one thing we can do. Through international pressure, we can push to abolish the death penalty for activists in Iran and save lives. This works, and it’s incredibly important,” he adds.