A deal with the devils: Israelis find no reason for optimism while Hamas celebrates victory

After more than a year of negotiations, Israel and the Palestinian movement Hamas have reached a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip. The deal, brokered under heavy pressure from U.S. President-elect Donald Trump — who threatened that “all hell will break loose” if no agreement was reached before his inauguration — offers a fragile promise of peace. Yet doubts linger about whether the deal’s terms will be fully implemented. In Israel, the agreement has sparked widespread dissatisfaction, while Hamas hails the development as a major victory.

• 1.The exchange will start right away, albeit in phases
• 2.Why did it take so long?
• 3.A Complex Puzzle
• 4.Dissatisfaction in Israel

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The exchange will start right away, albeit in phases

This week, Israelis and Palestinians anxiously tracked every news update. Negotiations had been ongoing in Doha since Sunday, Jan. 12, focusing on a ceasefire in Gaza and the freeing of hostages held there in exchange for Israel’s release of Palestinian prisoners. Unlike in previous rounds, the likelihood of success appeared reasonably high. After four days of tense deliberations, the breakthrough came on Wednesday evening, Jan. 15, with reports confirming that Israel and Hamas had reached an agreement.

The announcement occurred on the 467th day of the war, a conflict that has caused devastating human loss. Official figures report 1,800 deaths in Israel and over 46,000 in Gaza, although the latter number, provided by the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health in Gaza, includes both militants and civilians who died from various causes, including illnesses unrelated to the conflict. The true toll of the war will only become clear once the fighting stops and the rubble is cleared.

The war began on Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas militants launched a large-scale incursion into Israeli territory. Over 1,000 people — both Israeli citizens and foreign nationals — were killed in a single day, and another 251 were taken hostage and transported to Gaza. In response, Israeli authorities vowed to rescue the captives and dismantle Hamas’ military infrastructure, aiming to end its control over Gaza once and for all.

As of the agreement’s signing — referred to in Israel simply as “the deal with Hamas” — 98 hostages remain in Gaza: 82 men, 14 women, and two children under the age of five. Some of them are known to have died during their captivity. The agreement raises hopes that many — ideally all — of the remaining hostages will be returned home, even if only gradually. Meanwhile, the residents of Gaza, battered by months of war, hope for a chance to mourn their dead and to begin rebuilding their shattered lives. Gaza has been left in a state of near-total devastation, with approximately 92% of its housing stock destroyed. The vast majority of its population is now displaced.

As of the deal's signing, 98 hostages remain in Gaza: 82 men, 14 women, and two children under the age of five

The implementation of the deal is set to begin on Sunday, Jan. 19. The United States, Qatar, and Egypt are serving as mediators and guarantors of the agreement’s execution.

Reaching a compromise between the warring sides took more than a year. A previous ceasefire lasted only six days — from Nov. 24-30, 2023. During that time, 81 Israelis and 24 foreign nationals were released, while Israel freed 240 Palestinian prisoners. However, hostilities resumed shortly thereafter.

The current situation is different. The agreement includes requirements for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, though this is scheduled to occur in the second of the deal's three phases. At present, only the first phase has been outlined in detail, with the remaining two described in more general terms.

On the evening of Jan. 15, the text of the agreement was made public. One key point is that the exchange of hostages for Palestinian prisoners will begin on the first day of the deal’s implementation. Three hostages are to be released initially, and a total of 33 Israelis — including civilian women, female soldiers, children, and men over the age of 50 — are expected to return home during the first phase.

In exchange, Israel will release approximately 1,977 people, including those labeled as “terrorists with blood on their hands.” Among them, 290 Palestinians had been sentenced to life imprisonment by Israeli courts. This time around, the exchange formula is more complex than in the previous deal, as the number of released Palestinian prisoners will depend on how many Israeli hostages are confirmed to be alive.

Israel will release approximately 1,977 Palestinian prisoners, including those labeled as “terrorists with blood on their hands.”

During the first phase, the volume of humanitarian aid deliveries to the Gaza Strip is set to increase to 600 trucks per day. The previously agreed minimum was 350, but even that was often not met. Additionally, on the seventh day after the deal's implementation begins, Israel is required to start relocating its military units. After 42 days, Israel will retain control over a 700-meter-wide security buffer zone along the northern and eastern borders of Gaza, as well as two corridors: the Philadelphi Corridor (along the Egyptian border) and the Netzarim Corridor, which separates northern Gaza from the rest of the territory.

In the second phase, by the 50th day, Israeli forces are to fully withdraw from Gaza, including from the Philadelphi Corridor — a point of contention in recent months, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly vowing that the corridor would remain under Israeli control. This phase also includes the release of all remaining hostages still alive, although the exact formula for their exchange has not yet been determined. During the third phase, the conflicting sides plan to exchange the bodies of the deceased. Simultaneously, a reconstruction plan for Gaza is set to begin.

However, until the very last moment, doubts lingered as to whether the deal would come into effect. Despite official statements announcing the agreement, the negotiation teams continued working in Doha to finalize technical details. One major point of contention was Israel’s insistence on retaining veto power over the selection of Palestinian prisoners whose release was expected to be demanded by Hamas, as several of them are considered “symbols of terror” in Israel.

Ultimately, on Friday, Jan. 17, one day later than anticipated, Israel's security cabinet approved the deal. At the time of publication, the government was convening and was also expected to give its approval. It is telling that Benjamin Netanyahu refrained from making any immediate statements after the news from Doha broke, even as the agreement was welcomed by key mediators and many world leaders. The Israeli Prime Minister was reportedly waiting for the final details to be settled.

Nevertheless, Israeli President Isaac Herzog addressed the nation, urging members of the security cabinet and government to approve the deal:

“As the President of Israel, I speak with absolute certainty — this is the right step, one that is both significant and necessary. There is no greater duty — moral, human, Jewish, or Israeli — than bringing our children home. Some to recover and rest, others to their final resting place in their homeland.”

Why did it take so long?

The first official announcement of the deal came from U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, who credited himself entirely for the breakthrough.

“This EPIC ceasefire agreement could have only happened as a result of our Historic Victory in November,” he wrote on the social media platform Truth. His claim, while bold, was not far from reality.

Mediators had been trying to push both sides toward an agreement since December 2023, immediately after the first deal between Israel and Hamas expired. The negotiations fluctuated between moments of progress and prolonged deadlocks, with both sides unwilling to compromise. It became clear that no further temporary arrangements would be accepted.

Hamas demanded a complete cessation of hostilities and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. Israel, on the other hand, refused to commit to ending the war until Hamas' rule in Gaza was dismantled.

In January 2024, the idea of a three-phase deal was proposed for the first time. However, it only took its final shape several months later. The ceasefire plan was introduced by U.S. President Joe Biden on May 31 and was later formalized through a United Nations Security Council resolution. On Jan. 15, 2025, while welcoming the finalized deal, Biden reminded everyone that he had outlined the framework for such an agreement as early as May. However, mediators were unable to compel the parties to sign on at that time. The question of why this happened troubles many, especially given that, aside from minor details, the May plan and the eventual deal are nearly identical. Had the deal been accepted then, many lives could have been spared.

For months, Hamas and Arab politicians, including representatives from Qatar and Egypt, accused Israel’s Prime Minister of delaying the negotiations. Israel's opposition also places the blame squarely on Netanyahu.

Critics argued that the Prime Minister was unwilling to end the war out of fear of destabilizing his ruling coalition. Losing the coalition would inevitably lead to early parliamentary elections, which could result in Netanyahu losing his position. This is a crucial issue for Netanyahu, as he is under investigation in several criminal cases. As Prime Minister, he can remain in office during the trial, but in any other capacity, he would likely have to step back from politics, potentially permanently.

Critics argued that Netanyahu was unwilling to end the war out of fear of destabilizing the ruling coalition

Undoubtedly, these factors may have influenced the Prime Minister's decisions. The threat of a coalition collapse persists. Leaders of two far-right parties within the coalition — Religious Zionism, represented by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, and Jewish Power, represented by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir — have consistently opposed the deal. They repeatedly threatened to leave the coalition if an agreement with Hamas were signed.

This week, Ben-Gvir reiterated his threat, emphasizing that, until recently, he and Smotrich had managed to block the agreement. Now, however, he claimed, “the government’s survival no longer depends on us,” adding that, “leaving the government is the only step that could effectively prevent the catastrophic implementation of the deal.”

On Thursday evening, Ben-Gvir announced that he would resign if the government approved the deal with Hamas, though he has not yet exited the coalition. Smotrich remains in the government for now but, like Ben-Gvir, voted against the deal during the cabinet meeting. Thus, the coalition remains intact, at least during the first phase of the agreement.

It is important to note that Hamas was also reluctant to conclude the deal, aiming to negotiate terms that were more favorable to its interests. At times, it refused to engage in talks without a prior ceasefire and offered no guarantees regarding the number of hostages it would release. According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, every time the deal seemed imminent, new obstacles arose from Hamas.

“What we’ve seen time and again is Hamas not concluding a deal that it should have concluded. There have been times when actions that Israel has taken have, yes, made it more difficult. But there’s been a rationale for those actions, even if they’ve sometimes made getting to a conclusion more difficult,” Blinken said in an interview with The New York Times.

He dismissed allegations that Netanyahu had obstructed the deal in July, when it was believed the parties were on the brink of reaching an agreement. Blinken also expressed surprise that “despite the understandable criticism of the way Israel has conducted itself in Gaza,” the international community has not exerted significant pressure on Hamas to demand the release of hostages.

In July, amid stalled negotiations, the situation in the wider Middle East — and also in the immediate conflict zone — began to shift rapidly. Israeli intelligence conducted one of its most daring operations ever: on Jul. 31, Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran. He was replaced by Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza and one of the key architects and instigators of the October 7 attack.

Additionally, in April, Iran and Israel exchanged strikes on each other's territory for the first time in history, and there were serious fears of a direct Iran-Israel war. Mediators eventually proposed a way for Tehran to avoid further escalation while saving face, pushing for the resumption of negotiations over the deal, which could, if successful, be framed as a diplomatic win for Tehran. However, the so-called “last hope summit” held during the August round of talks also ended without any clear result.

There were serious fears of a direct Iran-Israel war

It became clear that reaching an agreement before the U.S. presidential election would be impossible. Both sides awaited the outcome. However, several pivotal events occurred before Nov. 4. Yahya Sinwar was killed, though by chance: during a rare foray out of the underground tunnels where he had been hiding since the war began, Sinwar unexpectedly encountered Israeli soldiers. For a time, Hamas was disoriented.

In the fall, the primary focus of Israeli attacks shifted from Gaza to Lebanon. The Lebanese group Hezbollah had supported Hamas and had begun shelling Israeli territory as early as Oct. 8, 2023. While Israel responded, it only began addressing Hezbollah in earnest a year later. This marked the start of Israel's first ground operation in Lebanon in 18 years. Over two months of intense military actions, Israel eliminated nearly the entire leadership of the group, including its long-time Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah.

Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election significantly impacted the region. It became apparent that one of the most pro-Israel administrations of all time would return to the White House. Within three weeks of the election, a two-month ceasefire agreement was reached between Israel and Hezbollah. Trump claimed credit for the deal and immediately turned his attention to Gaza.

“If the hostages are not released prior to January 20, 2025, the date that I proudly assume Office as President of the United States, there will be ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East, and for those in charge who perpetrated these atrocities against Humanity,” he wrote on Truth in early December. On Jan. 8, he reiterated his threat, after which negotiations suddenly gained momentum.

Trump never clarified the specifics of what form that “hell” might take, but U.S. vice-presidential candidate J.D. Vance explained the details on the president-elect’s behalf: Israel could be given a “green light” to continue its war in Gaza in order to dismantle the last Hamas battalions, while the U.S. might impose “financial penalties on those who are supporting terrorist organizations in the Middle East.”

Israel could be given a “green light” to continue its war in Gaza in order to dismantle the last Hamas battalions

It is believed that Trump's team decided to exert pressure primarily on Arab intermediaries — Qatar and Egypt — so they would ultimately force Hamas to make concessions. However, pressure was also applied to the Israeli side. Over the weekend, Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, arrived in Jerusalem. Following his visit, Netanyahu decided to send a negotiation delegation to Doha.

A Complex Puzzle

It is clear that without Trump’s election victory, such a swift agreement might not have been possible. The shift in the balance of power in the region — marked by the dismantling of the Iran-backed “axis of resistance,” which included groups like Hezbollah and Hamas — was also crucial.

A turning point was the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. For decades, Syria had been a stronghold for pro-Iranian forces. The country hosted dozens of military advisers from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Using Syrian territory, Iran supplied weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon and also delivered arms to Jordan for transshipment to Palestinian groups in the West Bank. These channels are now severed. Pro-Iranian forces have left Syria, and Shiite groups in Iraq have also gone quiet.

In Tehran, anticipation of Trump’s return to the White House has sparked serious concerns that Israel, either alone or in cooperation with the U.S., might strike Iranian territory in order to end Tehran’s nuclear program. Reports indicated that Ron Dermer, Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs, left a November meeting with Donald Trump convinced that the incoming U.S. president would either support an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities or order the U.S. military to attack Iran directly. However, Trump’s unpredictability leaves open the possibility that he might instead seek a compromise with Iran.

In any case, Tehran cannot be dismissed. It is adept at playing the long game. However, the Middle East has no shortage of such players.

Among them is Turkey, which has significantly strengthened its position following the fall of the Assad regime. Ankara had been waiting for this event for over 13 years and invested considerable effort in supporting the Syrian armed opposition. Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sees himself as a victor — and almost the master of Syria. At the very least, he is already attempting to set the rules there. Whether he succeeds remains to be seen, as the new authorities in Damascus, headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of the group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, may decide their interests do not align with Erdoğan's. For now, however, the Turkish president is not only threatening Kurdish formations in Syria — a familiar tactic — but also Israel, whose forces, taking advantage of the chaos in the neighboring country, have occupied part of the border territory.

Many experts in the region are seriously considering the possibility of a confrontation between Turkey and Israel. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Ankara supports Hamas, which is ideologically aligned with Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party. Many Hamas leaders are based in Turkey, which also serves as a haven for the movement’s financial assets. Thus, instead of an Iranian threat, Israel now faces a Turkish one.

Instead of an Iranian threat, Israel now faces a Turkish one

Furthermore, it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, Israel will remain heavily dependent on the United States, and the nature of Trump's relations with Tehran and Ankara will have major implications for Jerusalem.

Dissatisfaction in Israel

The terms of the deal with Hamas have provoked widespread dissatisfaction among Israelis, despite their strong desire to see the hostages returned home as quickly as possible.

The main objections to the deal are the preservation of Hamas’ control in Gaza and the release of hundreds of terrorists. Israelis vividly recall how, in 2011, more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners — nearly half of whom were serving life sentences—were released in exchange for the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Among those set free was Yahya Sinwar, who later became one of the key figures behind the October 7 attack. There is concern that history could repeat itself. Israelis find little solace in the fact that many of the released terrorists will be sent beyond Palestinian territories, as attacks can still be planned and coordinated from afar.

At the same time, Hamas is portraying itself as the victor. “Today, with the help of Allah and His support, we prove that the occupiers have neither defeated nor will defeat our people and its resistance. They have achieved only destruction and massacres against our people, and they retrieved their captives only through an agreement with the forces of resistance to end the war and aggression and through a fair exchange,” wrote Khalil al-Hayya, head of the Hamas negotiation team and the movement's formal leader in the Gaza Strip.

It is notable that the current agreements do not address the issue of Hamas' governance in Gaza. This issue will be part of the discussions during the second and third stages of the deal, which will determine Gaza’s future. Influential Arab players, including Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia — along with Western parties including the European Union — are keen to transfer governance of Gaza to the official Palestinian Authority, based in the West Bank city of Ramallah. However, they have stipulated that this would require significant reforms to the Palestinian Authority itself.

So far, the current agreements have not addressed the issue of Hamas' governance in Gaza

At the same time, some Arab mediators, including Doha and Cairo, are open to the idea of Hamas retaining influence over the situation in Gaza, even if the group does not directly govern the territory. Turkey shares this position. For the Israeli authorities, however, such an option is unacceptable, as is the strengthening of the Palestinian Authority.

Israel would prefer to transfer Gaza’s governance and responsibility to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, but these countries are reluctant to take on the burden — although they are willing to invest in the region in the event that the Palestinian Authority assumes control. As a result, negotiations over the second and third stages of the Hamas-Israel deal are expected to be contentious, and there is no certainty that a final agreement can be reached. This raises the possibility that some Israeli hostages may remain in Gaza.

For this reason, some Israeli civil society organization are demanding that Netanyahu see the deal through to its conclusion — without breaks between stages. Supporters of the deal argue that saving the hostages' lives ought to take precedence over everything else, and for that, any price — even releasing killers — can be paid. They contend that it is the responsibility of the security forces to ensure that the Hamas prisoners slated to be released do not succeed in taking any more Israeli lives. However, not everyone shares this view.

Representatives of the Hostages' Families Unions (the Tikva Forum) and Families of Fallen Soldiers (Gvura), who initially opposed any deal at any cost, also fear that some of the abducted individuals may remain in Gaza. Early in the week, when it became clear that negotiations were nearing a conclusion, they held a demonstration in Jerusalem with slogans such as, “You have no mandate to surrender to Hamas,” and “Their deaths are an order for us to win.” They called on the government not to sign an agreement that would allow Hamas to retain power in Gaza.

Protests continued on the day the deal was announced. Additionally, representatives of the Tikva and Gvura forums, along with several members of the Knesset’s ruling coalition — including lawmakers from Netanyahu's Likud party — sent a letter to the Prime Minister outlining three “red lines”: to avoid any withdrawal of IDF soldiers from the Rafah and Netzer checkpoints, to secure the return of all hostages simultaneously, and to prevent the return of Palestinians to the northern part of Gaza.

Public opinion polls demonstrate the shifting emotions Israelis feel about the cost of the deal. In early June 2024, only 40% of Israelis surveyed by the state broadcaster Kan 11 supported a deal to free the hostages. However, a poll conducted by the Israeli newspaper Maariv on Jan. 8-9, 2025, when reports emerged of potential progress in the negotiations, showed dramatically different results: 88% support.

However, there is a key caveat — 52% supported a full deal, meaning the return of all hostages in the first stage, but only 36% were willing to accept a partial deal. Six percent of respondents opposed the deal, while another 6% had no opinion.

The majority of Israelis supported the return of all hostages during the first phase of implementing an agreement with Hamas

A more detailed picture is provided by a survey conducted by the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI). On Jan. 12, Israeli media published partial data from the study, which was carried out among the country’s Jewish and Arab communities. The figures align with the Maariv polls — most respondents support the deal, but opinions shift when its specific terms are considered.

A significant majority (73%) of Jewish respondents oppose allowing Hamas to continue governing the Gaza Strip. Over half (59%) of surveyed Jewish community members are also against a “deal involving the release of only some of the hostages.” At the same time, 64% are willing to accept the release of terrorists “with blood on their hands” and an “agreement to end the war” if it ensures the release of all hostages.

Fifty-five percent of Israelis believe that “it is acceptable to meet Hamas’s demands and secure the return of the hostages, as there will always be a way to resume fighting later.” Meanwhile, 37% of Jewish respondents and 14% of Arab respondents feel that agreeing to terms requiring Israel to cease the war and allow Hamas to survive is unacceptable, as there is no guarantee of being able to resume military actions later.

Opinions also vary among military experts. Reserve Brigadier General Amir Avivi, the head of the Bitkhonistim movement (a group of retired IDF officers), stated in an interview with Channel 14 just hours before the deal was announced: “If Israel gives guarantees not to resume fighting in the Gaza Strip, then we have lost the war. There is no option but to return to battle!”

Formally, Israel indeed provides no guarantees, but the question remains as to whether it will have the opportunity to return to Gaza if necessary — and at what cost. This issue becomes particularly challenging if Palestinians return to northern Gaza, as relocating them again would be extremely difficult. In the event of a new conflict, Israel would have to start over, and it is unclear whether the international community would support such actions.

“There’s no need to sugarcoat reality: the emerging agreement on a ceasefire and the release of hostages is bad for Israel, but we have no choice but to accept it,” wrote military commentator Yossi Yehoshua on the eve of the deal in his column for Yedioth Ahronoth. According to him, Israeli soldiers are exhausted, and many commanders responsible for the army’s unpreparedness prior to the October 7 terrorist attack need to be replaced:

“After 15 months of war, the army has failed to dismantle Hamas’s military structure. On the other hand, the political leadership has not managed to establish a governmental alternative in the Gaza Strip. Now we have an agreement for which we are paying a high price.”

Slightly more optimistic is Amos Yadlin, Israel’s former head of Military Intelligence (AMAN) and the president of the consulting group Mind Israel. However, even Yadlin notes that much depends on what happens “after the deal,” which he considers “morally justified,” as “the state has a duty to bring back the hostages.”

“Only after we bring back the hostages will we be able to strike Hamas as decisively as we struck Hezbollah in Lebanon. Moreover, all terrorists and everyone involved in the October 7 massacre will be dealt with under the 'Munich 72' protocol,” Yadlin explained in an interview with Globes, with allusion to Israel's operation to eliminate the perpetrators of the 1972 massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes.

Yadlin also touched on the regional dimension. “If, after the hostages are returned and the war ends, Israel advances a deal with Saudi Arabia [on normalizing relations] and secures assistance from the Trump administration to address the Iranian nuclear issue, we will return to the correct trajectory for national security development,” he emphasized.

A deal with Riyadh would extend the scope of the Abraham Accords, which were signed in 2020 during Trump’s first stint in the White House. Via that agreement, Israel established diplomatic ties with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco while also forging connections with Sudan. However, normalization with Saudi Arabia cannot proceed if the war continues. This means that all issues surrounding the deal with Hamas must be resolved as swiftly as possible, ideally within the coming weeks, as the first stage of the ceasefire agreement is implemented.

It is also critical that Saudi Arabia seeks assurance from Israel that it is prepared to address the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the potential approval of a Palestinian state. In its initial response to the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed the importance of “eliminating the root causes of the conflict by granting the Palestinian people their rights, foremost among them the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.” Most Israeli politicians, including many from the current opposition, are not prepared to take such a step.

Saudi Arabia seeks assurance from Israel that it is prepared to approve the creation of a Palestinian state

According to a survey conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 54% of Israelis (64% of the Jewish community and 12% of the Arab community) oppose the creation of a Palestinian state, while 30% (23% of Jews and 59% of Arabs) would support it under certain conditions.

Among those who favor the idea, 25% believe that the most important condition for the creation of a Palestinian state is the establishment of a defensive alliance involving Israel and moderate Arab states. 10% see Israel's ability to act freely in order to prevent terrorism as the key condition. 5% believe that the Palestinian administration must be reformed. And 3% want assurances that Hamas will not be part of the Palestinian government structures. Meanwhile, 46% of respondents consider all these conditions equally important.

The outgoing U.S. administration pushed for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the coexistence of Israel and a Palestinian state, in line with United Nations Security Council resolutions. European capitals share the same view, as announced Wednesday in London and Paris. During his first term, Trump proposed unconventional solutions, which were firmly rejected by the Palestinians. Only time can tell what he will propose after four years spent wandering in the American political wilderness.

Of course, Washington’s voice cannot dictate the terms of any prospective Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement. In Israel, discussions around the feasibility of approving a Palestinian state may coincide with an early election campaign should Netnyahu’s governing coalition collapse. In that event, Israeli politicians may focus more on their own political survival than on making strategic decisions. However, such concerns must be left until later. For now, the central question simply regards whether the current ceasefire deal will hold. In the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a breakdown of agreements is unfortunately all too common.