
After the victory in the elections surrounded by Trump, two glances formed at the negotiation strategy with Putin. However, Keith Kelloglog, who advocated a longer process and the search for pressure tools for Russia, was completely pushed away from contacts with the Kremlin in the last week. The top was taken by supporters of the rapid negotiation blitz without the participation of Europe and Ukraine. While the latter, insisting on effective measures of deterrence of Moscow, became the main targets of the political attacks of the Trump team.
The strategy of tough negotiations, the adherent of which is considered Trump, involves a significant threat and a tempting proposal made against its background. However, in fact, in Riyadh, Trump's negotiators moved to the second stage, not succeeding in the first. As a result, they had to put a set of concessions on the table on almost all points of the ultimatum Putin, not receiving a single public promise in return.
For the considered strong negotiator Trump, a long train of failures actually stretches, the brightest of which is a deal with the Taliban, which ended in the collapse of the United States in Afghanistan, and the negotiations with Kim Jong Yon under the nuclear program that ended in complete failure. The new blitz Trump is similar to both the Korean and Afghan scenario at the same time.
Having not received anything from Moscow, the Trump administration has already managed to quarrel with Europe and attack the President of Zelensky. Moreover, the US strategy that has been unchanged for 80 years was actually revised, based on the principles of a bicaparty consensus in foreign policy and the indivisibility of Euro -Atlantic security. Representatives of the new team, on the contrary, put party and ideological thoughts to the fore, attacking instead of geopolitical rivals, domestic political opponents in America and Europe.
Even if Trump's goal is to transfer the focus of political deterrence to China, the lost confidence in the United States in Europe will affect the possibilities of establishing an allied relations in Asia. And the hopes of the Trump team to drive a wedge between Russia and China look like amateurish and unrealizable in the context of the real trade dependence of Russia from China. In order for these hopes to become at least any real, you need to redirect about 30% of Russian trade towards Europe.
As a result, Trump and his team operate with fictitious threats, projects and numbers that brought and bring them popularity on social networks, but do not make any impression on Moscow and Beijing. Even if ensuring the independence of Ukraine and the protection of Europe are not the goals of the Trump team, nothing yet indicates that this team will be able to achieve its goals, but the fact that this is according to the results of its actions, Putin has managed to, will become just a fixed and learned world fact.
After Donald Trump finally took office, his team discovered that the election promise to stop the conflict in Ukraine cannot be fulfilled in one day. On the contrary, to conclude a “strong” transaction with Putin, it was necessary to demonstrate the ability of the new administration to increase pressure on the Kremlin and use its weaknesses, which became even more noticeable after the introduction of the last portion of sanctions leaving the Biden administration.
The representative of this point of view in the new administration was Kit Kelloglog, appointed by a special support for Ukraine and Russia and stated that to complete the conflict it will need more time - about six months - and additional pressure on Moscow. Several attempts by Trump’s team to threaten the Kremlin by sending American soldiers and a huge number of missiles to Ukraine, concluding a deal on minerals or restrictions on the export of Russian oil did not have any action, because they were practically difficult or impossible at all. Any realistic threat to Moscow required resources and time ( Re: Russia: Transactionism time ).
It is characteristic that in recent weeks, Kellog was completely pushed away from the contacts of the Trump team with the Kremlin. He did not participate in the blitz-visits of the emissar Trump in Moscow and in negotiations in Riyadh and even found himself in the background in Washington's contacts with European leaders. The general strategy of the Trump administration has also changed: in the last week, her attacks were not aimed at at all at the Kremlin, but to the President of the Zelensky and European allies of Ukraine. That is, on those who insisted on security guarantees and effective measures to contain Russia as an obligatory part of the transaction. Vice-President of Vance in an insulting form made it clear at the forum in Munich that the United States does not intend to take into account the position and interests of Europe in negotiations with the Kremlin and do not consider it as a strategic partner. And Trump answered President Zelensky, who declared that Ukraine would not agree to a deal without her participation, Trump replied that he himself was to blame for Putin’s attack on Ukraine .
According to the results of negotiations in Riyadh, Trump representatives could not say much about their logic and results, but persistently repeated that President Trump intends to act quickly. This, in particular, said to Reuters Mike Waltz . Secretary of State Marco Rubio in an interview with the same agency tried to adjust him somewhat, noting that the meeting was the first step on a long and difficult path, the ultimate goal of which is a fair and strong end of the war. However, there is reason to believe that, as in the case of Kelllog, the ideologists of the blitz will be closer to Trump than supporters of long and more balanced strategies.
Hard negotiation strategies, whose fan is considered President Trump, suggest two phases - “a significant threat” and “profitable proposal” made against its background. In this case, the first part turned out to be bluff and that was exactly what was perceived in Moscow. However, President Trump did not depart from the strategy of Blitz. In fact, the Trump administration moved to the second phase of the “hard negotiation strategy” (profitable proposal), not having achieved any success in the first phase (significant threat).
The fan of the assassination of the captivity laid out by the Trump team in front of Putin is impressive and lengthens every day. Even before the negotiations, President Trump actually justified the Putin invasion of Ukraine, announced the need for Ukraine to abandon claims to return the territories captured by Russia and categorically rejected the possibility of Ukraine’s entry into NATO. He agreed with the concept of Putin, according to which the fate of Ukraine should decide the “great powers” without the participation of both Ukraine itself and “non-self-state” Europe. (And, apparently, with the formal demand of Moscow, so that neither Europeans, nor Ukrainians, nor special supporter Kelloglog participate in the negotiations.) And finally, apparently, he accepted Putin's demand to hold the elections in Ukraine before signing the agreement, whose purpose will be the replacement of Zelensky by post of president.
In fact, in Riyadh there were a complete diplomatic rehabilitation of the Kremlin and recognition of non-essential claims of Europe and the former American administration. And Moscow was promised not only the lifting of sanctions, but even American investments in the oil industry and the development of Arctic fields.
The Trump’s team by the point is performed by Putin's Ultimatum, and a list of possible concessions and “gingerbread” is practically exhausted. However, from the part of Moscow there was not a single public statement about any counter steps. In addition, already during negotiations in the capital of Saudi Arabia, the Kremlin made it clear that he would categorically not tolerate any foreign troops in Ukraine . At the same time, the final agreement on the meeting of Trump and Putin was not reached, and Vladimir Putin made it clear that this meeting would need additional preparation and talk about its deadlines, perhaps six months. At the same time, the Western intelligence Union made a warning that, according to their data, the Kremlin did not change the initial strategic goals, which involve the complete subordination of Ukraine, and considers the negotiation process as a profitable pause, which allows to further strengthen its position.
The glory of a strong negotiator was fixed behind Trump. And, it seems, Trump himself is most confident in this. His asset really has one successful transaction - an agreement between Israel and a number of Arab states (the so -called Abraham agreements), which, however, still remains unrealized and unrealized. At the same time, the list of Trump's negotiations is much longer, writes Mikhail Korostikov in the Carnegie Politika material . The most striking of them were, firstly, negotiations with the Taliban behind the back of the American military and pro-American government of Afghanistan, which led to the flight of US forces from the country at the beginning of Biden's presidency. And, secondly, negotiations with Kim Jong-un over the North Korean nuclear program.
Trump's strategy in relations with North Korea and its failure most like the trajectory of today's blitz with Moscow, Korostikov notes. Then Trump first brought down verbal threats on Pyongyang, and then believed in the vague promises of the North Korean leadership to make concessions, trying to seduce Kim Jong -uni with signs of attention and bilateral summits. Having received political dividends from meetings with Trump and a cascade of courtesy, the Korean dictator continued nuclear tests and expansion of his nuclear program. Trump is ready to boldly take up conflicts that seem unsolvable, but his enthusiasm has the reverse side - unwillingness to immerse deeply into details and a quick loss of interest in the problem, if it is not possible to solve it from the scab, writes Korostikov. And his Kremlin blitz dangerously resembles both the Korean and the Afghan scenario at the same time.
Brett Bruyen, a former foreign policy adviser in the Obama administration, in a conversation with Reuters described negotiations in Riyadh as an “time of amateurism” for the US national security apparatus. At the meeting, Moscow was represented by the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Lavrov and Putin’s assistant in foreign policy Yuri Ushakov - two veterans who are 34 years old in their current positions, while Secretary of State Rubio, Mike, Advisor Michee, were sitting on the other side of the table. Waltz and Special Representative Steve Whitkoff, who have been in their posts for less than a month. The American team has practically no experience in conducting international negotiations at a high level, there is no regional examination in Ukraine and Russia, there are simply no appropriate knowledge, echoes Bruyen Timothy Snyder , professor of Yale University and an expert in Russia and Ukraine, on his page in X.
Russia won a complete victory in the first round, the Kremlin achieved the normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations excluding Ukraine and NATO, and did not sacrifice anything for this, said to Reuters democrats Jake Okincloss, who is the co -chair of the Ukrainian faction of representatives.
Moscow publicly expressed satisfaction with the results of negotiations in Saudi Arabia. First, their participants - Lavrov and Ushakov - did this - and then Putin personally . However, analysts close to the Kremlin express restraint following the results of the first round, which obviously reflects the hopes of Moscow to continue the cascade of concessions (Trump, which has already posted all the cards and quarreled with the allies, the result of negotiations is needed much more than the Kremlin). At the same time, the ideologist of Eurasian anti -Western fundamentalism Alexander Dugin in an interview with the propaganda “Radio Satellite” said: “The radical novelty of the ideological position of the modern United States opens up great opportunities for our dialogue ... This ideology is surprisingly coincided with ours, therefore, completely new ones were created for the meeting and Trump. worldview conditions. "
He made this impression from the speech of Vice President Wans in Munich, which actually became the Declaration of the Trump team on the revision of the fundamental foundations of American foreign policy. During the previous 80 years, this policy was based on the Euro -Atlantic allies and a bicopartican consensus in the field of fundamental foreign policy goals, in particular, on the issue of indivisible Euro -Atlantic security.
Wence's speech and the actions of the American administration turn this doctrine. The Trump team made it clear that, firstly, he takes off his responsibility for the safety of his allies and, secondly, that she did not want to deal with the current EU leadership, but would welcome the coming to the power of the ideologically close to it of the ultra-right forces. This was unequivocally indicated by the Wansa Demarch , who refused to meet in the fields of the Munich forum with the German Chancellor Sholts and met with the leader of the right -wing AFD, intentionally strengthening his positions in the upcoming elections. In other words, the US Vice-President did not act as a representative of the United States, but as a representative of a certain party group, preferring party interests to national, that is, the interests of all Americans-both voting for Trump and who did not vote.
The comments of Trump, which imposes responsibility for the war and respectfully protecting the “right of the aggressor” in the person of President Putin, is also revising the fundamental principles, says the New York Times . “This is a shameful turn of the 80-year-old American foreign policy. Now we are legitimizing aggression to create the spheres of influence, ”says Kory Shake, a former assistant to the radical Republican, President George Bush Jr.. He recalls that the American government for forty -five years did not recognize the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries.
In the next election, American voters will again make their choice, and a politician of certain beliefs may become the president. However, the unique political role of the United States in the world was determined, in particular, by the fact that the map of the foreign policy priorities of America did not change every four years, and allied relations have strengthened its base on the basis of long -term trust.
The refusal of the new American administration of allied relations with Europe is part of the strategy to transfer the main focus of the American foreign policy to contain China. Such a popular point of view on Trump’s strategy is developing in today's comment, The Economist magazine . The United States does not have enough strength to demonstrate sufficient military power in both directions at the moment, so the burden of conflict in Europe should be assigned to Europeans themselves. In this position and in the demand for Europe, there is, of course, there are rational grounds to sharply build up their military expenses and opportunities. At the same time, military experts and American generals, gathered on the same days at the defense forum in Honolulu, were divided into opinions, notes The Economist. Some argue that the actual military balance requires concentration at the Pacific Theater, others say that “deterrence can only be inseparable” and if America loses confidence in itself as an ally in Europe, then this will respond equally to it in Asia . The Biden administration actively worked on the strengthening of the Asian Bloc of the Allies, but did not give a reason to believe that the next president could cross out all the previous obligations with one stroke. The method of action of Trump and his team is strikingly different from the policy of Russia and China, which only strengthen their union against the backdrop of the infringement in the Euro -Atlantic block.
However, a respectful attitude towards Putin, large -scale concessions and broad promises that are benevolent towards the foreign policy innovations Trump is emphasized by commentators explain precisely his intention to break the union of Moscow and Beijing. In this sense, they interpret the reasoning of the Secretary of State Rubio on the “identification of extraordinary capabilities” in the relations of Russia and the USA “on geopolitical issues of common interest” and “on unique, potentially historical, economic partnerships”.
However, these statements are saturated with the same amateurism as other elements of Trump strategy, given the degree of actual dependence on China in which today's Russia is located. In 2024, 31% of the total Russian exports (129.3 out of 417.2 billion dollars, according to the Russian Central Bank and Chinese Customs ) and 39% of Russian imports (115.5 out of $ 294.5 billion), that is, 35 % of the total foreign trade turnover. A change in this state of affairs will require great effort and time. At the same time, the United States practically do not have levers of influence in this process. Американо-российские экономические связи никогда не были существенными — в 2021 году на долю США пришлось немногим более 4% российского товарооборота. В то время как основным торговым партнером России до начала войны являлась Европа: на ЕС в 2021 году приходилось 36% российского товарооборота ( по данным Евростата — 247,8 млрд евро). Именно эти объемы в основном и были переориентированы в направлении Китая (и Индии в части экспорта), в то время как товарооборот с Европой сократился до 67,5 млрд евро.
Каким образом можно убедить сегодня европейцев вновь перевести на себя эти торговые потоки, если в предыдущие три года в тесном сотрудничестве с прежней американской администрацией они предприняли огромные усилия, чтобы отказаться от них? И какова будет позиция нового президента США или даже самого Трампа в этом вопросе через три года?
В то же время, как и рассуждения о глобальной сделке по украинским недрам двумя неделями ранее, нынешние посулы уникальных экономических партнерств, под которыми подразумеваются, вероятно, разработки в Арктике, скорее подходят для твитов в сети Х или Truth Social, но вряд ли могут рассматриваться в качестве сколько-нибудь серьезного предложения. Собственно говоря, то же можно сказать о большинстве исходящих от новой администрации предложений и угроз — они рассчитаны на информационный эффект, который должны произвести на сторонников Трампа и его «брутальной» политической манеры в Америке и по всему миру, но практически не реализуемы на практике, что прекрасно понимают в Москве и в Пекине. В конце концов, мифы и фейковые цифры по масштабам поддержки Украины со стороны США или уровню поддержки Зеленского, которыми оперируют Трамп и его сотрудники, выдумывались в созданных Россией и Китаем подразделениях по информационным диверсиям, и им нетрудно будет иметь дело с администрацией, которая опирается на них в продвижении своих идей.
Даже если обеспечение независимости Украины и защита Европы от созданной Путиным угрозы не являются целями команды Трампа, ничто пока не указывает на то, что этой команде удастся достичь своих целей, но то, что это по итогам действий команды удалось Путину, станет как раз зафиксированным и усвоенным миром фактом.